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Abstract 
Using accounting records and financial data, a business history of the Lancashire textile 
industry from 1870 to 1914 is presented. Issues of technology and industry structure, which 
have attracted a great deal of comment are first re-addressed. The discussion is then widened 
to include other aspects of the industry which have previously been neglected, namely the 
social processes of capital accumulation with reference to those evolving relationships between 
managers and shareholders which, in the context of broader economic change, helped forge 
the special characteristics of Lancashire capitalism. 
The industry is found to be generally healthy and competitive, although its fortunes 
were dangerously dependent on the overseas value of the pound. Whilst the original 
technologies of the industrial revolution were maturing, the alternative twentieth century 
means of automated throughput had still not been developed. External economies and 
flexibility associated with vertical specialisation thus continued to outweigh those of integrated 
throughput production. 
Meanwhile a transformation of the industry occurred in terms of its ownership, as 
the previously influential small shareholder was forced to surrender influence to a rising class 
of promotional and financial capitalists, a trend accentuated by, inter alia, a very serious stock 
exchange crash in the 1890s which forced many to sell their holdings. A shift of industry 
value added from labour to capital and record profits after 1900 are identified. These attracted 
capital into cotton and reinforced the position of the newer owners of the industry. Important 
features of their behaviour are examined, primarily their ability to construct impressive 
business empires through personal shareholdings and interference in day to day management, 
and their corresponding reluctance to establish professional management hierarchies, which, 
although increasingly common in other industries, were compromised by preference for 
individual, and not corporate, accumulation. 
Characterised as they were by their easy access to financial resources, these new 
capitalists might well have made sweeping changes to industry structure and technology had 
they chosen to do so. However, although ring spinning was found to be in general more 
profitable, the basis of that superiority was an extension of the process of increased 
specialisation. All specialised companies, whether ring spinners, mule spinners, or weavers, 
tended to do much better than their vertically integrated counterparts in the period after 1900. Evidence from this period has implications for our understanding of subsequent developments. If the industry could have been restructured before 1914, then so it could have been after the First World War when it arguably became more necessary. Pre 1914 technical 
constraints are identified and it is also noted that it was in the inter-war period that the means 
to remove them were fully developed. However, considering technical issues in conjunction 
with characteristics of capital ownership, it is concluded that, as the industry failed to attract 
investment when profit signals turned negative, for example in the 1890s, and attracted a lot 
of capital in the booms of the early 1900s, any constraint did exist to prevent restructuring it 
was financial rather than organisational. The process and character of capital accumulation is 
therefore advanced as a crucial ingredient of our understanding of business history. 
In short, the established financial, technical, and organisational structure, when 
combined with buoyant overseas monetary and trading conditions, is found to have created 
the synthesis of a profitable industry; when external conditions changed, financial, technical, 
and organisational constraints became important but in that strict and steeply descending order. 
Lancashire was highly vulnerable to the world market; that vulnerability was accentuated by 
the way in which capital was created. It was the social process of capital accumulation which 
was the principal determinant of the development, and perhaps therefore ultimately the 
decline, of a once great industry. 
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at length and challenged in the pages that follow, although no doubt it will remain a moot 
point among historians of the industry for many years. What is perhaps unfortunately less 
debateable is that economic history as a discipline is suffering increasingly from an excess of 
specialisation. In such an environment, it becomes ever more difficult for historians using 
archives to communicate with those applying the newest econometric techniques or those 
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Sheila, for her encouragement and conveniently located overnight accommodation. 
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Part 1 
Introduction 
Chapter 1: Aims and methods 
The cotton industry, and its dark satanic mills, has long been a metaphor for the rise 
and fall of Britain as a manufacturing economy. Useful questions can thus be 
addressed by an examination' of the transition of the industry from growth to 
maturity. In 1860, no one would have disputed its world supremacy and domination 
of the British export economy. By 1922 there were as many pessimists as optimists 
regarding future prospects. It is therefore appropriate to seek answers to the 
important questions which governed long' term development in the period between 
these dates. 
Many previous authors'have addressed the broad agenda of the evolution and 
growth of the cotton industry. In following that agenda, the evidence presented 
below is aimed primarily at a contribution towards business history. It seeks some 
originality of approach by following what might be called an accounting method; 
that is the use of published company financial statements to assess the performance 
of individual and groups of businesses. The publication of these results are treated 
as historical events and form a body of empirical evidence for judging the behaviour 
and response of entrepreneurial and investor groups. Accounting techniques may 
have been relatively primitive, but our purpose is to examine what was actually 
reported under historical conditions, rather than to say what would have been 
reported under modem conditions. 
No other business history of Lancashire textiles has thus far sought to make 
such a direct and integral use of accounting data. Yet such evidence is of relevance 
to the major areas of discussion and controversy, such as technology, 
entrepreneurship and the world market, dealt with by previous histories. The scope 
2 
of the ensuing analysis is therefore wide, and we seek to comment on each of these 
issues in turn. Obiter dicta, the use of the accounting method also allows room for 
comment on issues of accounting history. Similarly the data used lends itself to the 
opportunity to review aspects of economic, labour, financial, and econometric history 
(or `cliometrics'), as well as historical geography. 
Nonetheless, the primary focus and differentiating feature of the current study 
is its concern with the financing and the financial performance of the industry. 
Financing of productive activities serves both as an issue in its own right, much 
neglected hitherto in the pre 1914 period, and as a vehicle for the introduction of new 
evidence. Historians of the Lancashire cotton industry have for many years shared 
much the same bank bf statistical data and narrative accounts. In addition to these 
established sources, the two most important types of new evidence are financial 
statements of cotton companies and capital market data in respect of their shares. 
Such evidence facilitates not only comment on the performance of the industry and 
its component firms, but also allows discussion of the context of managerial 
decisions, for example by reference to technology, industry structure, and significant 
groups of stakeholders. These themes are directly addressed in the chapter structure 
that follows. 
However, before developing the themes, some justification of the method 
adopted for their analysis is appropriate. Therefore, the discussion below first 
considers previous interpretations of the history of the industry, thereby highlighting 
the issues which inform the structure of the ensuing analysis. Potential research 
problems associated with the use of accounting and financial data are then recognised 
and concerns that might be raised in their use are addressed. In relation to the major 
debates that have characterised our understanding of the industry hitherto, it is argued 
that, whilst being aware of limitations, the use of this data can potentially offer new 
3 
insights when considered in conjunction with other evidence. Finally, on the basis 
of the foregoing discussion, definitions of key terms, delimitations, and structural 
outlines for the research are provided and justified. 
The `Condescension of posterity': ' A historiography of the Lancashire cotton 
industry 
The following discussion will outline briefly the influences which have coloured the 
views of commentators on the cotton industry from about 1880 to the present day. 
In sketching a historiography, it is always difficult to determine the boundary between 
the territory of the contemporary commentator and that of the historian. No attempt 
to define the distinction is made here and there is to an extent no need. Cotton was 
a classical victim of the trade cycle and a perennial continuity of views can be 
established by reference to the peaks and troughs of its fortunes. For example, 
contemporaries' doom laden interpretations of the problems of the industry in the 
1890s are in some ways strikingly paralleled by the gloomy interpretations of 
historians writing from the standpoint of depression in their own times, either in the 
1930s or following the almost total collapse of cotton after the 1960s. 
For optimistic accounts, one must therefore turn first to the views of those 
writing during the period of Lancashire's dominance of British export industry and 
world cotton markets. After the industry had recovered from the traumas of the 
1890s, notions of failure and decline were generally absent from the accounts of those 
writing prior to the First World War 
.2 Adherence to Free Trade, a dominant 
principle of the so-called `Manchester School', was almost inevitable in a period of 
Farnie, English cotton, p vii. 
2 Ellison, The cotton trade; Schulze-Gaevernitz, The cotton trade in England; 
Chapman, The Lancashire cotton industry; see also, Farnie `Three historians 
of the cotton industry', pp. 75-89. 
4 
overwhelming export dominance, and its advocacy was well exemplified by the 
political activities of cotton industrialists such as Edward Tootal Broadhurst3 and 
writers such as Ellison. " Remarkably, as the supremacy of Lancashire internationally 
was increasingly challenged in the twentieth century, there were few. parallel 
challenges to this dominant idea. ' Thus recent historians, with one important 
exception, have broadly supported the precepts of the Manchester School 6 During 
trade depressions, the adverse impact of Protection in export markets was highlighted 
by these authors, but the superiority of British products in `open markets' strongly 
emphasised. ' 
After 1922, and the onset of decline, attitudes began to change. Some writers 
reacted to the depressed conditions of the 1920s by viewing the pre war period as a 
`golden age'. 8 Decline in cotton was paralleled in other sectors, notably heavy 
industry, ' and by the 1930s, when economic historians had begun to examine the pre 
1914 period to find explanations of post war problems, commentators on the cotton 
3 Clarke, Lancashire and the new Liberalism. 
Ellison, The cotton trade, p. 113. 
Although a consistent advocate of Free Trade in the period of Lancashire's 
dominance of the world market, Sydney Chapman became a convert to 
Protection during the years of decline; MacKenzie (ed) Diary of Beatrice 
Webb, 30 April, 
-1928, vol. 4, p. 141 (I am grateful to D. A. Farnie for 
pointing out this reference). 
6 For example, Boyson, The Ashworth cotton enterprise, p. vi; the exception 
is William Lazonick, see below. 
Examples include Ellison, The cotton trade, p. 116; Marsden, `Optimistic 
views of the cotton trade', p. 275; Chapman, `Report of the Tariff 
Commission', p. 420. 
8 Bowker, Lancashire under the hammer, p. 23. 
9 See for example, Aldcroft, The inter 
- 
war economy, Ch. 5. 
5 
industry made similar, and more pessimistic, reappraisals. " Historians of the cotton 
industry have thus been influential in the formation of views about the British 
economy as a whole, and the commonly addressed question of British economic 
decline. 
Relative economic decline has continued until the present day and has been 
a dominant theme in the historiography of Lancashire cotton textiles since the 1930s. 
Hypotheses purporting to explain decline have been influential in economics, and 
indeed politics, and most of them have been applied, or are applicable to, the cotton 
industry. Obsession with manufacturing decline in the 1970s and 1980s has coloured 
interpretations of pre 1914 Lancashire, and left its recent historiography dominated 
by the views of economists. 
The chief concerns of these more recent economic investigations can be 
grouped under four interrelated headings. First, the issue of whether or not the 
industry generally was unsuccessful and inefficient. Industry representatives writing 
in the 1930s strenuously denied such allegations arguing that whenever poor export 
performances were recorded, including during pre 1914 recessions, the fault lay with 
governments and monetary policy. " An early influential comparative survey from 
a more neutral observer suggested that Lancashire cotton performed poorly vis a vis 
the American competition, " and such a view was mirrored in later arguments about 
the slowing of productivity growth rates for the economy as a whole. " The second 
10 Jones, Increasing return. 
11 Munro, Review of Schulze Gaevernitz's Cotton trade in England, p. 691; 
Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' Associations, Measures for the revival. 
12 Jones, Increasing return. 
Phelps Brown and Handfield- Jones, ` The climacteric of the 1890s', pp. 266- 
307, identified general economic failure based on a review of output per 
operative data for selected key industries. Coppock, `The Climacteric of the 
1890s: a critical note' argued the slow down was attributable to cotton, and 
6 
issue is technological choice, alleged conservatism, and the rationality of the choices 
made. 14 Connected are the third and fourth issues which have formed part of two 
wider debates regarding the British economy; entrepreneurial failure, which has been 
developed and criticised from a broader sociological perspective; " and industry 
structure, particularly the impact of vertical specialisation. " 
The issue of technology has perhaps been the loudest metaphor of all for the 
mistakes of Lancashire. `Iron clad arguments against re-equipment' 17 and 
perseverance with the so-called `stubborn' mule" and associated technology, when 
other nations were introducing and developing other production methods, has 
provided many critics with an apparently obvious explanation for the failures of the 
industry. " Our period begins with the unquestioned dominance of mule spinning 
dated from the 1860s, pp. 1-31. Floud, and McCloskey,. The economic 
history of Britain since 1700, noted a period of stability in productivity 1873- 
1890 with a decline from then on. In contrast, other estimates suggest any 
retardation prior to 1899 was explicable solely by the agricultural and mining 
sectors, Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee, British economic growth, 
1856-1973, p 606. 
14 Aldcroft, `The entrepreneur and the British economy' pp. 113-34; Landes, 
The unbound Prometheus; McCloskey and Sandberg, `From damnation to 
redemption' pp. 89-108; Sandberg, Lancashire in decline. 
's Aldcroft, `The entrepreneur and the British economy' pp. 113-34; Wiener, 
English culture; these views have been criticised in Rubinstein, Capitalism, 
culture and decline. 
16 For the main interpretations; Sandberg, Lancashire in decline; Lazonick, 
`Competition, specialization and industrial decline', pp. 31-8; Lazonick, 
`Factor costs', pp. 89-109; Lazonick, `Industrial organization and technical 
change' pp. 195-236; Saxonhouse and Wright, `Stubborn mules and vertical 
integration', pp. 87-94, Mass and Lazonick, `The British cotton industry', pp 
9-65. 
Coleman and McCleod, `Attitudes to new techniques', p. 589. 
'$ Saxonhouse and Wright, `Stubborn mules', p. 87. 
19 For an early exposition of this view see Young, The American cotton 
industry, p. 137; for later views of technological conservatism see Lazonick, 
`The cotton industry' and `Stubborn Mules: Some Comments', pp. 80-6. 
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and plain loom weaving, and ends with the increasing advocacy of their replacement 
with ring spindles and automatic looms. An important objective of the current 
analysis is therefore to monitor, and if possible date, the supersession of the one 
technology with the other. Only then is it possible, if not necessarily appropriate, to 
attribute blame. 
With the advent of `new economic' history, or the use of applied economics 
techniques to investigate historical issues, entrepreneurial failure and associated 
technological conservatism were initially called into question? ° Subsequently a series 
of interpretations readdressed the evidence with reference to the additional issue of 
industry `constraints', namely the rise of vertical specialisation and the structure of 
labour relations. " These issues have dominated recent debates. 
It was noted above how few critics of the Manchester School emerged among 
historians of the cotton industry. The work of one school of thought, however, forms 
an important and recent exception. 22 As an industry dominated by the small, 
vertically specialised firm, and governed by intense competition, Lancashire cotton 
has been used as an exemplification of the inability of such industries to compete on 
an international stage increasingly dominated by large, concentrated companies. The 
`myth of the market economy', the organising principle of those attempting to draw 
wider conclusions on issues of economic policy and industry structure, finally 
provides an antithesis to the Manchester School, or if its analysis of the history of 
Lancashire cotton is correct, a suitable epitaph for the industry. For the moment, this, 
and other pronouncements referred to above, shall enjoy the status of hypotheses to 
20 McCloskey and Sandberg, `From damnation to redemption' pp. 102-3; 
Sandberg, Lancashire in decline. 
21 For a summary, see Mass and Lazonick, `The British cotton industry'. 
u For example, Elbaum and Lazonick, The decline of the British Economy; 
Lazonick, Business organization. 
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be re-examined in the analysis that follows. 
The current dominance of these interpretations, and 
-the `state of the 
debates" surrounding them, are of particular importance when considering new 
evidence. Indeed, the value of gathering evidence at all is perhaps best judged by the 
likelihood of its contribution to the major research questions. The linkage between 
hypotheses and evidence is even more important when the hypotheses are dominated 
by economic model building and the new evidence presented is quantitative. In 
collating the evidence for the survey below, the major debates already noted were 
used as a constant reference point. The path steered by the historian is inevitably 
governed by the directional impetus of previous studies. Indeed the strength of this 
impetus is a function of the validity of hypotheses advanced to date. If the 
momentum is weak, only a small amount of new evidence contradicting established 
thought is required to change direction, perhaps significantly. On the other hand, a 
powerful explanatory theory creates a forward impetus where only the most decisive 
and explicit new evidence can form a fulcrum strong enough to alter the course of 
accepted wisdom. Historiographically, as noted above, recent views and debates have 
supported contradictory conclusions; as more hypotheses have been advanced, 
consensus based knowledge of the working of the industry has not proceeded 
proportionately. New evidence, which this study seeks to present, ought therefore 
to be valued highly. 
Whilst tracing the historiography of the industry in outline, it is important to 
note that participant writers have hitherto relied on similar bodies of evidence, such 
as measures of output, quality growth and the marginal profitability of investment 
decisions, 24 on world market share, u and estimates of efficiency based on measures 
Mass and Lazonick `The British cotton industry', pp. 9-65. 
Z4 Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, ch. 3. 
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of factor input in relation to output 26 All of these perspectives have advanced our 
understanding of the development of the industry, and it is hoped that by adding to 
the body of evidence, and concurrently reinterpreting major hypotheses, the process 
of advancement will be continued. To achieve this task, certain methodological 
points must be addressed. These are; first, the relationship between economics and 
history; second, the nature of the evidence; third, the process of evidence selection; 
and fourth, definitional and temporal limitations placed on the study. 
Quantification, History, and Economics 
The first issue is important because the roots of the investigation are simultaneously 
based in economics and history. Generally, the two disciplines have enjoyed a 
harmonious relationship in recent years, with a tendency for the latter to accept new 
techniques and methods from the former. n The natural response to such 
developments is to recognise the economics bias noted in the above historiographical 
review and to structure research around deductive social science hypotheses. Indeed, 
this would imply adoption of the economic model building approach which has 
characterised historical analysis of the cotton industry since the late 1960s. 
However, in doing so, it might easily be forgotten why economists have 
undertaken historical analysis. History provides what the economist lacks; a theory 
of change. Being concerned not with `origins, but transitions', 2Lhistory explores the 
paths which, to the classical economist, are simply movements from one state of 
Lazonick and Mass, `Performance of British cotton', pp. 5-13 
Jones, Increasing return, pp. 100-19; Phelps Brown and Handfield-Jones, 
`The climacteric of the 1890s', pp. 266-307. 
For example, see Hawke, Economic for Historians, ch. 1. 
28 Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, p. 61. 
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equilibrium to another. Thus Mass and Lazonick criticised Sandberg for applying 
`static' models of neo 
- 
classical equilibrium to the cotton industry, suggesting instead 
that history and economics should seek a dynamic theory of institutional change. 29 
Also, simple acceptance of the dominance of economics places potential limitations 
on conclusions, since where the historian `counts heads' it is incumbent upon him to 
be concerned with people as well as categories. 30 Keynes, as an economist, was 
careful to recognise the need for a wider context for his own discipline, when he 
postulated that economics is a method rather than a doctrine. 31 Indeed, thorough 
analysis of the documentary sources without any reliance on formal economic models 
and a conscious neutrality vis a vis contradictory ideological interpretation remains 
a viable alternative standpoint. 32 However, both history and economics share the 
common problem of incompleteness, 33 the former in terms of evidence, the latter in 
terms of the restrictive assumptions necessary for the analysis of isolated economic 
relationships. The obvious and uncontroversial solution is to combine the best aspects 
of both; using economic models and data to add to the evidence where appropriate, 
and using historical context to qualify the conclusions drawn from economic analysis. 
In the latter case, it is important to point out how historical perspective can 
strengthen bare economic analysis. There is an significant difference between the use 
of an economic, econometric, or financial model and the methodological standpoint 
of the historian. For example, to argue that contemporary entrepreneurs would have 
made decisions according to the realisable rate of return on investment calculated 
29 Mass and Lazonick `The British cotton industry', pp. '58-9. 
3o Elton, The practice of history, p. 28. 
31 Keynes, quoted in Henderson, Supply and demand, p. vii. 
32 A good example being Farnie, English cotton, p. vi. 
33 Hawke, Economics for historians, p. 3 
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according to the assumptions of marginal economics is a possible model for analysing 
the decision making process. Indeed, such techniques are a common means today by 
which investment decisions are rationalised. 34 For the historian, noting that decision 
makers in a market economy behave according to certain precepts, perhaps governed 
by the simplifying static assumptions of equilibrium, can be a useful means of 
understanding the past. It is not the same thing as endorsing those precepts, rather it 
is the acceptance of their use as a tool of historical investigation. A neo classical 
economist using neo classical economic models to investigate historical problems is 
one thing; a historian examining the same problem with the same model, because the 
model was used by historical actors, and aware of the limitations of that model, is 
quite another. 
New economic history as applied to British cotton textiles has been labelled 
neo classical, in so far as it has assumed rationality and maximising behaviour. " 
However, much judgement about rationality has been coloured by subsequent events. 
The heyday of the cotton industry and the modem era are separated by- a period of 
restructuring in the rest of the economy which witnessed the emergence of vertical 
integration and the dominance of mass production techniques. 36 That Lancashire 
entrepreneurs were apparently oblivious to such changes until it was too late is an 
easy judgement to make with the benefit of hindsight. A specific attribute of 
hindsight particularly relevant to cotton is `technological determinism', or the notion 
Modern techniques such as discounted cash flow (DCF), as applied by 
Sandberg in Lancashire in decline, only began to supersede the traditional 
emphasis on payback, accounting rate of return and the perceived inverse 
relationship between the two. Even DCF fails to provide any illusion of 
optimality vis a vis `qualitative factors', (Pike, `An empirical study', pp. 341- 
351) 
3s Mass and Lazonick `The British cotton industry', p. 25. 
36 Chandler, Strategy and structure. 
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that the technology which eventually became dominant was always inevitably destined 
to become so. For some, hindsight is easily assimilated; for example Carr argued that 
the only way for the historian is to write `as if what happened was bound to 
happen'. 37 Yet if history is intended to improve modern decision making through 
learning from the past, this approach is of little use, and the equivalent of expecting 
decision makers to rely on a crystal ball. It is in circumstances such as these that 
historical analysis, the explanation of specific events and decisions in terms of cause 
and effect, can lay claim to equal and complementary status alongside economic 
analysis. Empiricism, as defined by Mill, as the establishment of `laws' by direct 
examination of instances of their operation, is avoided by using economics to test 
those laws by reference to human nature 38 For current purposes, human nature is 
represented by the managerial decision making context. Our preoccupation here is 
thus not with facts, but with decisions, the output of the management process, and the 
distinctly human aspect of economic development. To measure the effectiveness of 
decisions is only partly a quantitative exercise, but as qualitative performance 
indicators can be difficult to define, there is an inevitable pressure to place undue 
emphasis on the numbers. Coupled with the hindsight problem, where the outcome 
of counterfactual decisions based on what the historian thinks ought to have been 
done are quantified, there is serious risk of misinterpretation. Major debates, such 
as entrepreneurial failure, might even have to be ignored since standards against 
which decision makers are' judged could not be defined. 39 Alternatively, relating 
decisions made in one period to outcomes in another might be to mistake a sequence 
of historical events for cause and effect; another version of the hindsight problem. 
31 Carr, What is history?, p. 97. 
38 Mill, A system of logic, Book 6, Chapter 9, Section 1. 
39 Casson, The entrepreneur, pp. 10-11. 
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A compromise solution is required. Research, as exemplified by the study 
below, might be constructed to explain as objectively as possible the reasons why 
decisions were made. As a first stage, economic models and historical fact are 
allowed to inform one another as much as possible, the former being allowed to play 
its correct role as method rather than doctrine. Having determined the possible 
multiple causes of an event or decision by this process, an evaluative stage then 
follows. At the second stage, historical method is given priority. Our concern is the 
evaluation of cause and effect; the identification of dominant and subordinate 
causality; of sufficient and necessary conditions. The role of economics is now more 
limited, given its tendency to make deductive assumptions about human behaviour. 
Where economics is used, it is in its applied form, at the stage of partial analysis and 
in terms of its incremental contribution to the historical record. Placing a broadly 
inductive umbrella above a variety of methods of enquiry provides the fundamental 
methodological framework to justify the internal validity of a case study of a 
particular industry against a backdrop of issues affecting the economy as a whole, and 
which, above all, allows a workable and constructive coexistence of history and 
economics. 
The Use of Financial and Accounting Evidence in Historical Analysis 
The second issue, that of evidence, can now be addressed with the above framework 
in mind. As noted already, one purpose of the research is to widen the scope of the 
evidence available for the analysis of the industry. For this reason, a summary 
collation of some important aspects of the new evidence is presented in Appendix 1 
in a format other historians of the industry will find easy to assimilate into their own 
work. Mostly the data is gathered from accounting reports of textile companies, 
collated with evidence from other sources. Capital market data is also included. 
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If any reliance is to be placed upon them, these types of data require some 
recognition of their uses and limitations. Accounting and finance are generally 
recognised as sub branches of economics. 40 If this proposition is accepted, then the 
arguments advanced by the new economic historians to justify the use of applied 
economics in history, " which have gained acceptance, can be extended to accounting 
and financial techniques. Of course, the methodological caveats noted above on the 
use of economic models in the historical context therefore also apply. 
Further caveats, specifically associated with published accounting data and the 
creativity that can be involved in their preparation, should be added. "' It is 
important that this concern should be stressed, as some dismiss accounting evidence 
as completely unreliable. For example, one author has gone as far as to argue that 
`few, if any, series of profit figures before 1900 can be taken at their face value'. 43 
Studies of specific industries confirm that view. Historical analysis of accounting 
records in the case of the coal industry, has suggested that the figures reported were 
completely unreliable. ' However, it might be argued that these conclusions were 
simply a function of the industries surveyed. For example, financial reports in the 
coal industry, upon which Wale based her conclusion, made no attempt to separate 
capital and revenue expenditure. It is hardly surprising under such circumstances that 
profit was measured inaccurately. None of the authorities referred to above 
considered the cotton industry, and this is an important omission, given the 
40 See for example, Tinker, Paper prophets, pp. 108-11 
41 McCloskey, Essays on a mature economy, p. 3 
'Z Brief, `Nineteenth century accounting error' pp. 12-27; Marriner, `Company 
financial statements as source material for business historians', pp. 203-5. 
a3 Lee, `The concept of profit in British accounting, ' pp. 6-36. 
44 Wale, `How reliable were reported profits', pp. 253-268. 
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considerable variation in accounting practice between industries. 41 
There are two further reasons why the historian should not succumb to the 
unreliability hypothesis and abandon accounting data as a tool of analysis. The first 
is that even if accounts were unreliable, that in itself constitutes an interesting 
historical fact. Where the dramatis personae are entrepreneurs; investors, and trade 
union negotiators, as is often the case in business history, accounting reports are an 
important mediating document between the stakeholder groups. They are also one 
of the few annually published company documents likely to survive, thereby offering 
potentially valuable time series and cross sectional data. Such reports have been 
argued to be a response to a political agenda' and their origins in the context of the 
modern joint stock company explainable in terms of the relative freedom of managers 
to produce them in the absence of shareholder scrutiny 47 Conflict between 
managerial and shareholder groups has been used by some economic historians to 
explain the development of the British economy. "' These can be reflected in the 
content, or lack of content, of accounting reports. Hence the relative accuracy or 
otherwise of accounting reports can be used by the historian to judge the emergent 
relationship of managerial and investor classes and how that relationship evolved with 
economic growth. In addition, there is a second argument. If the historical actor can 
use accounting data to distort the truth in order to gain particular advantage, then so 
the historian can use accounting data to undo the bias and produce reports which 
approximate to the true picture. Lee acknowledged that his conclusion of 
as Toms, `Supply and Demand' p. 7. 
Solomon, `The political implications of accounting' pp. 114-5. 
Yamey, `Some topics in the history of financial accounting', p. 39. 
a$ Hannah, Rise of the corporate economy; Kennedy, Industrial structure, p. 
126. 
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unreliability might be modified when the figures supporting the published report could 
be investigated by the historian. "' In some cases, surviving accounting data might 
allow the figures to be reconstituted. S° The method adopted below is thus constructed 
at two levels; first an identification and historical explanation of bias; and second, a 
reconstruction of the truth. 
In collecting the evidence, it was assumed generally that the accounts of 
cotton companies might be more reliable than those of other industries. 
Paradoxically, such reliance is a function of the pressures which would have tempted 
accountants to distort the economic reality facing their companies. For example, the 
overstatement of profits would create an opportunity to pay higher dividends than 
otherwise. Conversely, as the cotton trade famously linked its collective bargaining 
procedures to the trade cycle, 5' the disclosure of high profits would tend to 
encourage demands for advances from the operatives. ' Such contradictory social 
pressures meant that, on average, across large samples of companies and through 
time, the profits of companies were probably accurately reported. Moreover, issues 
such as depreciation accounting and stock valuation, which attracted controversy in 
other industries, 32 were dealt with in remarkably uniform fashion in the cotton trade. 
For example, cotton companies had little difficulty in distinguishing capital and 
revenue, and seven and a half per cent reducing balance depreciation on plant and 
I Lee, 'The concept of profit', p. 34. 
so Church, Baldwin, and Berry, `Accounting for profitability at the Consett Iron 
Company', pp. 706-8. 
51 Burgess, Origins of British industrial relations. 
sZ For example; Coal, Wale, `How reliable were reported profits? ', pp. 253-68; 
Coal and Iron, Church, Baldwin, and Berry, `Accounting for profitability at 
the Consett Iron Company', pp. 703-24. Brief, `Nineteenth century 
accounting error', argued that error arose from failure to systematically 
distinguish between capital and revenue expenditure, p. 14. In the cotton 
industry few such difficulties arose. 
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machinery became an industry norm. 53 This is not to say that the use of cotton 
company accounts is entirely unproblematic. Balance sheets cannot have accurately 
reflected the true value of capital invested. Until 1896, prices and hence replacement 
costs fell, and thereafter tended to rise, 54 and accountants provided no adjustment for 
this. The effect of depreciation charges was to show old but productive plant and 
machinery at relatively low book values. " If the performance of a company is 
examined over a number of years distortions can easily arise and must be borne in 
mind when interpreting the data. However, these distortions can be quantified, and 
may not have been of great significance. 56 The problem is less serious when data is 
used comparatively between companies, since each would be affected in 'a similar 
way. 
Putting these problems to one side, some facets of the profitability of 
Lancashire textiles can be derived from earlier work. -' However, these either deal 
only in absolute measures or fail to relate the profits of the industry fully to the scale 
of capital investment responsible for their creation. Without such data, it is difficult 
to draw conclusions on the behaviour of management within the industry and their 
investment decisions, together with investment decisions made by external individuals 
and institutions. Our understanding of these issues is thus likely to benefit from the 
construction of a return to capital series. Return on capital is defined as profit before 
interest as a percentage of long term capital invested. The latter is defined as 
s' Moss, Cotton spinning company accounts, p. 34. 
sa Robson, The cotton industry, p. 336. 
ss Ryan, `Machinery replacement in the cotton trade', p. 569. 
16 See for example, the calculation in Toms, `The financial performance of 
Lancashire cotton', p. 33. 
Campion, `Pre-war fluctuations', p. 627; Robson, The Cotton Industry, p. 
338; Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, pp. 104-5. 
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shareholders' equity plus fixed interest loan finance. " 
A major potential problem with using such a measure is its subjectivity 
regarding asset values, in particular their understatement through the charging of 
excessive depreciation. As illustrated in Part Three, companies tended to depreciate 
their assets but instead of using depreciation funds for replacement, surplus cash was 
used to repay loan accounts or was paid out as dividends. The money would then 
circulate back into fixed capital via the flotation of new mills. "' Furthermore, many 
assets would remain productively employed long after they were fully written off for 
accounting purposes. For a typical established company, therefore, the book value of 
capital employed tended to diminish and accounting returns would tend to rise, and 
this is an important bias which deserves full recognition in the discussion below. 
A further defence against bias is to plan the careful use of accounting data in 
conjunction with other evidence. Documentary evidence, whether in the form of 
accounting numbers or narrative, poses problems of survival and selection. Both 
types are biased by the coincidence of survival. This has implications for the 
formulation of hypotheses ex ante as lack of required data may lead to their 
subsequent modification. Much depends on the historical fact and its interpretation. 
According to Carr: 
The historian starts with a provisional selection of facts, and a 
provisional interpretation in the light of which that selection has been 
made 
- 
by others as well as himself. As he works, both the 
interpretation and the selection and ordering of facts undergo subtle 
and perhaps partly unconscious changes, through the reciprocal action 
s$ More formal economic definitions are the subject of academic debate and will 
not be examined here. The definition used deals exclusively with loan and 
share capital as disclosed in the Economist and Oldham Chronicle surveys. 
Loan capital does not include bank loans since such loans were rare, typically 
short term and used to finance working capital. The usage of return on capital 
in this paper is consistent with that referred to periodically by the Economist 
and Oldham Chronicle. 
S9 See also, Toms, 'Financial constraints on economic growth', pp. 374-5. 
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of one or the other. 60 
Such an iterative process arguably underlies all analysis of the past, and featured in 
the evolution of this study. The approach to evidence selection was governed by two 
considerations. First, a prior examination of the available statistical, financial and 
documentary evidence in conjunction with a review of the major issues, discussed 
already, as identified by previous historians of the industry. Second, the design of 
a research structure facilitating the integration of industry and individual case study 
perspective. 
By analysing evidence from the industry as a whole in conjunction with 
evidence from individual firms, and combining different data sources, the aim was 
to minimise the impact of missing or biased data via triangulation. Where individual 
companies were selected as case studies, the ability to triangulate the evidence was 
the most important consideration. Thus it was important that where accounting data 
had survived, it could be used in conjunction with surviving manuscripts, 
contemporary published sources, or capital market data. 61 
To return to the earlier historiography, part of the judgement applied in 
selecting the evidence was also governed by its potential relevance to issues affecting 
the industry. Another source of bias was therefore introduced via the a priori 
conclusions of previous historical studies. However, although some degree of 
originality of approach is claimed for this work, it is accepted that the majority of 
new knowledge is created incrementally and that reference to previous studies is a 
necessary starting point, regardless of the methodological standpoint of the new work. 
Even so, when comparing existing literature with previously unused historical 
60 Carr, What is history?, pp. 29-30. 
61 The best source giving simultaneous coverage of the first two areas is, 
RCHM, Records of British business and industry. 
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evidence, ideas for new areas of exploration are inevitably suggested. Indeed this is 
a particularly important justification for undertaking historical research. 
On this basis, with reference to the historiographical review above, but 
without forming specific hypotheses, or identifying others for falsification as is 
standard in the social sciences, although nonetheless identifying important issues, the 
analysis has been constructed around the following broad areas: 
(i) The issue of technological choice. In which the choices between the mule 
and ring spindle in spinning and the plain and automatic loom in weaving are 
considered. 
(ii) The issue of industry structure. In which the impact of vertical 
specialisation is examined. 
(iii) The issue of capital accumulation and divestment. In which the use of 
profits in terms of their distribution and reinvestment is analysed. 
(iv) The financial and economic performance of the industry. In which case 
study evidence and industry data are examined and conclusions from previous 
studies reconsidered. 
All but the third area have occupied an important place in the historiography of the 
industry. Item (iii) has attracted much less comment, but is an obvious subject for 
further investigation, given the nature of the evidence used. All four areas are clearly 
interrelated and whilst each section will have its dominant theme, interrelationships 
with the other areas will be developed at the appropriate stage of analysis. Figure 1 
presents an analytical model upon which the structure of the ensuing examination is 
based. The model is structured so as to present the theoretical and evidence 
categories used in previous studies on the left, and the incremental perspectives 
presented in this study on the right. 
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Figure 1.1: Evidence and Hypotheses 
EVIDENCE 
ECONOMIC ARCHIVE CAPITAL ACCOUNTING 
STATISTICS RECORDS MARKET RECORDS 
DATA 
MEASURED VARIABLES 
* DEMAND + SUPPLY * PROFITS + DIVIDENDS 
* RETURNS TO SCALE * RETURNS ON INVESTMENT 
* STOCK MARKET INDICES 
EXPLAINED VARIABLE: INDUSTRY GROWTH 
ECONOMIC ENTRE- FINANCE/ INVEST- 
PERFORM- POURS AGENCY MENT 
ANCE THEORY AND PROFIT 
THEORY 
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Sample selection and documents 
The documents chosen for study were governed by the priorities of debates identified 
in the historiography, and considerations about the nature of evidence discussed 
previously. In terms of objectives, this translated into finding data which would 
measure the variables identified in figure 1.1. Companies chosen for detailed study 
are listed, together with their attributes in table 1.1. In most cases the objective was 
to construct a profit series from original accounting records, supported where 
appropriate by documentary and secondary sources. Those companies selected for 
detailed study were chosen from a recent record of available archive material. 62 
Table 1.2 shows the principal archive or other source used for each sample company. 
Of the surviving archives, it was considered important to concentrate on those 
spinning and manufacturing firms which were based in Lancashire and where the 
following were available: 
* Financial records, ie accounts and ledgers for the longest possible unbroken 
period prior to 1914. 
* Shareholding records and minute books. 
Out of a total listing of 172,63 30 companies broadly met the above criteria, albeit in 
many cases with fairly " limited time series of data. To narrow the field further, 
priorities were established according to the apparent quality and continuity of the 
surviving evidence. Thus firms with the longest run of pre 1914 figures were given 
precedence. On this basis, ten companies were initially selected. " 
Further companies were then added to the list where comparison was useful, 
bZ RCHM, Records of British business. 
63 RCHM, Records of British business, pp. 29-47. 
These were: Dowry, Era, Fielden, Healey Wood, Horrockses, Osborne, T 
&R Eccles, Tootal, Werneth, and Whiteley. 
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but the analysis of primary data unjustifiable, either because the work had already 
been done in previous studies, as with Moorfield, 65 Rylands and Sons, 66 and Sun 
Mill, ' or because original data had not survived. In these three cases, the issues of 
profitability and other aspects of financial performance have only been partially dealt 
with in previous studies, and it was thus necessary to study each in conjunction with 
other data sources. Moorfield and Sun Mill data were therefore gathered also from 
local newspaper reports, in which a fairly full disclosure of financial statistics was 
normally made on a quarterly basis. 68 
The availability of published press sources for financial results greatly 
widened the sample from which further companies could be selected. However, to 
widen the sample too far on this basis would have biased the study through the 
inclusion of too many specialised Oldham based spinning companies. Nonetheless the 
availability of such data meant that companies which might have been of particular 
importance vis a vis the historiography of the industry could still be chosen regardless 
of the absence of archival material. Hence the inclusion of the three Rochdale district 
ring spinning concerns, the New Ladyhouse, New Hey and Haugh Spinning 
Companies. 69 
Extending the same principle to other important companies, it was also 
possible to include Ashton Brothers of Hyde in the sample. As a pioneer in automatic 
65 Smith, `An Oldham limited liability company', pp. 34-53. 
66 Farnie, `John Rylands of Manchester', pp. 3-103. 
67 Tyson, `Sun Mill'. 
68 Oldham Chronicle, 'Commercial reports', Saturday issues published the 
quarterly reports of companies detailing profits, dividends, share and loan 
capital, 2nd April 1884 
- 
27th December 1913. 
69 The precise location of these mills was the township of Milnrow south east 
of Rochdale and north west of Oldham. They are referred to collectively 
below as the `Milnrow ring spinners'. 
. 
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weaving, this company has attracted considerable comment. " Again, its, inclusion 
could not be justified on the basis of listed archives. However, because the company 
was quoted at Manchester from 1899 onwards, it filed accounts with the stock 
exchange, and these were available in the archives of the Guildhall Library and in 
stock exchange collations of financial data. " Reports of a few other companies were 
obtainable from this source, and two others were chosen. These were Rylands and 
Sons, and Barlow and Jones. The former was included to complement the data 
available from the secondary source noted above72 and the latter as an additional 
comparator. Others, such as those specialising in thread manufacture and finishing 
processes' were excluded as being beyond the scope of the current investigation. " 
Taken together the 18 companies discussed above and selected for detailed 
analysis will be referred to as the ` main sample'. The general approach throughout 
is to use simple averages for each of these companies to produce an average for the 
industry as a whole. Two further samples were also used, as detailed below; the 
`spinning sample' and the Economist sample. The objective in creating the main 
sample was, given the constraints of data availability, to ensure coverage and contrast 
70 Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, pp. 80-1; Lazonick, `Industrial 
organization', pp. 211-2; Fowler, `Trade unions and technical change', pp. 
43-55. 
71 LGL, Commercial reports, half yearly balance sheets, 1899-1913; SEOI, 
1899-1914. 
11 Farnie, `John Rylands of Manchester', pp. 3-103. 
Notable examples of the former included J. and P. Coats, and the English 
Sewing Cotton company, and of the latter, the Bleachers Association and the 
Calico Printers Association. 
There is an important exception to this delimitation in chapter 6 below. Some 
vertical companies, such as Horrockses, integrated forward into finishing. 
Thus when the performance of vertically integrated companies is compared 
to horizontally specialised spinners and manufacturers, it is appropriate also 
to review the performances of specialised finishing companies. 
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in terms of size (capital employed), structure (ie the degree of integration), 
technology, ownership and, to a lesser extent, geographical location. These contrasts 
are detailed fully in table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: Main Sample Companies 
(1) Sample companies 
Capital in 
Company Description 1890 (£)* 
Ashton Brothers of Hyde VI; M, R, AL; Q; Ma 325,948 
Barlow and Jones VI; M; Q; Bo 500,002 
Dowry Spinning Company VSS; M; Q; 01 44,726 
Era Ring Mill Company VSS; R; Q; Ro 100,000 
Fielden Brothers VI; R, PL, AL; P; To 130,169 
Haugh Spinning Company VSS; R; Q; Ro 44,238 
Healey Wood Mill VI; M, PL; P; Bu 15,000 
Horrockses Crewdson VI; M, R, PL; P; Pr & Bo 1,067,620 
Moorfield Spinning Company VSS; M; Q; 01 75,699 
New Hey Spinning Company VSS; R; Q; Ro 58,521 
New Ladyhouse Spinning Company VSS; R; Q; Ro 30,361 
Osborne Spinning Company VSS; M; P; OI 23,960 
Rylands and Sons VI; M, PL; Q; Ma 4,196,994 
Sun Mill Company VSS; M; Q; OI 99,270 
T and R Eccles VSW; PL; P; Bl 28,885 
Tootal, Broadhurst and Lee VI; M, R, PL, AL; P; Bo, Ma 830,130 
Werneth Spinning Company VSS; M; Q; 01 135,885 
Whiteley and Company VI; M, R, PL; P; Bl 38,976 
Total 7,746,384 
* where 1890 figures were not available, eg for companies formed after then, the nearest 
alternative date was used. 
Key 
Structure: VSS, vertically specialised, spinning company; VSW, vertically specialised, 
weaving company; VI, vertically integrated company. 
Technology: M, mule spindles; R, ring spindles; PL, plain looms; AL, automatic looms. 
Ownership: Q, quoted; P, private. 
Location: 01, Oldham district; Ro, Rochdale district; BI, Blackburn district; Pr, 
Preston; Bo, Bolton; Ma, Manchester; To, Todmorden; Bu, Burnley. 
(2) Lancashire textile industry as a whole 
Number of firms (1890) 1801 
Capital employed (1886): Total £108 million 
Spinning £58 million 
Weaving £14 million 
Finishing £22 million 
Note: a useful rule for the conversion of money values to modern equivalents is to multiply 
the above figures, and those used throughout the text, by a factor of 60. It should also be 
borne in mind that relatively, these values compare to 1890 GNP. 
Sources: (1) see table 1.2; (2) Number of firms, Jones, Increasing return, p. 277, capital 
employed, Ellison, The cotton trade, p. 70 and analysis by industry branch based on Blaug, 
`Productivity of capital', p. 111 (where the capital of each branch is the cited figure, plus a 
proportion of the £25m floating capital of the whole industry allocated pro rata). 
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Table 1.2: Data and sources 
Company Source 
Ashton Bros LGL, Commercial reports, half yearly balance sheets, 1899-1913. 
Barlow & Jones LGL, Commercial reports, half yearly balance sheets, 1900-1913. 
Dowry CAC, LCC/DowI, nominal ledger; June 1885 - December 1912; Oldham Chronicle, 
'Commercial reports', Saturday issues, quarterly reports detailing profits, dividends, 
share and loan capital, April 1884 
- 
December 1913. 
Era RLSL, C/IND/COT/ERA, miscellaneous, details of net profits and spindles, 1898 - 
1914. 
Fielden WYRO, C353/475, Detailed accounts, balance sheets and summary profit and loss 
accounts, December 1891 
- 
December 1914; RMA, detailed profit and loss accounts 
and costings, December 1895 
- 
December 1914; 1884-1889, Law, Fieldens of 
Todmorden, table XVII, p. 129. 
Haugh Oldham Chronicle, 'Commercial reports', Saturday issues, quarterly reports 
detailing profits, dividends, share and loan capital, April 1884- December 1913; 
Rochdale Observer, ditto, 28th June 1890 and quarterly reports April 1892- June 
1914 inclusive. 
Healey Wood RM, BB614, Balance sheets, quarterly trading and profit and loss accounts and 
balance sheets, April 1907 
- 
December 1914; dividends ledger, April 1882 
- 
December 1914. 
Horrockses CVR, Detailed accounts, half yearly balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, 
November 1887 
- 
October 1905; LCRO, DDHs/53, Balance sheets, half yearly 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, October 1905 
- 
April 1914. 
New Hey Oldham Chronicle, 'Commercial reports', Saturday issues, quarterly, reports 
detailing profits, dividends, share and loan capital, September 1886 
- 
June 1913; 
Rochdale Observer, ditto, 28th June 1890 and April 1892 
- 
June 1914. 
New Ladyhouse Oldham Chronicle, 'Commercial reports', Saturday issues, quarterly reports 
detailing profits, dividends, share and loan capital, April 1884 
- 
December 1913; 
Rochdale Observer, ditto, 28th June and April 1892 
- 
June 1914. 
Moorfield Oldham Chronicle, 'Commercial reports', Saturday issues, quarterly reports 
detailing profits, dividends, share and loan capital, April 1884 
- 
December 1913; 
Smith, 'An Oldham limited liability company', pp. 34-53. 
Osborne LCRO, DDX/869/3/1, Trade, capital, and profit and loss accounts, June 1889 - June 
1914. 
Rylands LGL, Commercial reports half yearly balance sheets, 1899-1913; SEOI, 1884-1898; 
Farnie, 'John Rylands of Manchester', pp. 71-2. 
T&R Eccles LCRO, 868/7/1, Profit and loss accounts and balance sheets, annual reports, 
September 1897 
- 
September 1914. 
Sun Mill Oldham Chronicle, 'Commercial reports', Saturday issues, quarterly reports 
detailing profits, dividends, share and loan capital, April 1884 
- 
December 1913; 
Tyson, 'Sun Mill', appendices 1 and 2. 
Tootal MCRL, M. 461, Board minutes, yearly balance sheets andprofit and loss accounts, 
July 1888 
- 
July 1914. 
Werneth OLSL, Misc. 42/17 and 18, quarterly reports to members, April 1889 - October 
1912; Oldham Chronicle, 'Commercial reports', Saturday issues, quarterly reports 
"detailing profits, dividends, share and loan capital, April 1884 - December 1888. 
Whiteley LCRO, DDX/868/21/5, Balance sheets, annual balance sheet and profit and loss 
account summary, September 1898 
- 
September 1914. 
Note: The above show the primary sources from which profit and capital series were constructed; for 
details of full sources, see bibliography, section 1. Aggregate data from these 18 companies have been 
used to construct financial indices which are used throughout the text. 
. 
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Because of the intention to segment the sample on the basis of vertical 
structure and technological adoption, when combined with the availability of archival 
evidence, the sample showed a bias towards south east Lancashire. Inclusion of The 
Fine Cotton Spinners' and Doublers' Association, which comprised over 40 firms and 
employed over 2.8 million spindles after 190075 might have corrected this bias, but 
would have added little comparative value. The relative profitability of the fine and 
coarse sections of the trade have not attracted attention in the historiography of the 
industry before 1914, partly because the'ring was not a competitor in the province 
of the fine spinning section, and such a comparison is beyond the scope of the present 
study. Whereas the Oldham district (which included Rochdale) may not have been 
typical of Lancashire as a whole, it was nonetheless useful for providing the 
necessary comparative data for companies using different spinning technology. 
In contrast to the data sources for spinning companies, for weaving, the 
dominance of the private company meant very few archival records and published 
results were available. Specialised weaving companies therefore do not figure 
prominently in the research. Nonetheless the vertically integrated companies provided 
examples of important issues in weaving and cotton economics as a whole, and were 
chosen with this consideration in mind. For example, only four companies using 
automatic looms in the pre 1914 period could be identified. These were, Gregs of 
Quarry Bank, Ashton Brothers of Hyde, Tootal, Broadhurst and Lee, and Fielden 
Brothers of Todmorden. For the first two companies, the impact of the use of 
automatic looms has been evaluated elsewhere. 76 The study of automatic looms is 
therefore based around the additional data gathered for the three latter companies and 
75 Macrosty, The trust movement, p. 138. 
76 Respectively, Fowler, `Trade Unions and Technical Change', pp. 43-55; 
Rose, The Gregs of Quarry Bank Mill. 
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using the previous analyses for comparison. 
Selection of these vertically integrated companies was also useful for purposes 
of comparison with specialised concerns. Vertically integrated companies also tended 
to be large in relation to the rest of the industry, and it is the larger concerns that 
have received considerable attention elsewhere. " Notable exceptions were 
Horrockses, Crewdson and Co. Ltd. and Tootal, Broadhurst, and Lee, and Co. Ltd., 
which were therefore chosen for inclusion in the study. The rationale for the inclusion 
of other vertically integrated companies, Ashton Brothers and Fielden Brothers, was 
referred to above. Many vertically integrated firms were also relatively small. Thus 
the sample was further extended 'through the inclusion of three other, smaller 
concerns, G. Whiteley and Co. Ltd. and T. and R. Eccles and Co. Ltd., both of 
which joined the Birtwistle Group before 1914, and Healey Wood Mill Ltd., a small 
Burnley company, were also selected. 
A further rationale behind sample selection was to provide contrasts between 
different patterns of ownership structure. Contrasts were therefore sought between 
diverse and narrow ownership patterns within case study companies. The- second 
sample of companies (the `Spinning sample'; see below, table 1.3, p. 33) used to test 
the issue of technology was also of use in providing a database for the performance 
of companies which had wide share ownership. By contrast, Horrockses and Tootals, 
at least in its earlier years, provided useful examples of narrowly controlled but large 
companies, with Fielden, Whiteley, Eccles and Healey Wood, representing the 
For example, Macrosty, The Trust Movement in British Industry, ch. V. 
Although this survey included Horrockses, the comparison was with ý the 
larger amalgamations viz, the Fine Cotton Spinners' and Doublers' 
Association, J&P Coats and the English Sewing Cotton Company, Calico 
Printers Association and the Bleachers Association. These large 
amalgamations featured prominently in later surveys, for example Hannah,. 
`Mergers in British manufacturing industry', pp. 1-20, and The rise of the 
corporate economy, pp. 9-13 and p. 23. 
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smaller, family controlled sector. Finally, all the above were considered with 
reference to their strategies of capital accumulation and divestment. For each 
company chosen in the main sample, data was sought on dividend distributions and 
accumulated profits. In conjunction with the above data, ownership could then be 
fully investigated vis a vis its impact on financial performance. 
To evaluate further the effects of the variables in figure 1.1 it was important 
to ensure that companies were included which used types of technology considered 
unusual for Lancashire before 1914, specifically ring spindles and the automatic 
loom. Lancashire adopted the former earlier and in greater numbers than the latter. 
An emphasis was placed on the spinning, rather than weaving, sector since 
documentary sources were available for several companies. To specifically address 
issues associated with spinning, using stock market data, a further sample of 
companies was identified differentiated by technology, thereby allowing the relative 
profitability of ring and mule spinning to be assessed (table 1.3). This will be referred 
to as the `spinning sample'. The twenty one companies were selected from the group 
of companies whose financial details were 
" 
disclosed on a regular basis- in the 
Lancashire press. Some publicly quoted, vertically specialised, companies included 
in the main sample were also included in the spinning sample. 78 The remaining two 
ring mills were chosen as the only ones where published data was available for a 
sufficiently long period before 1914.79 For the mule mills, the remaining ten were 
selected randomly from the April 1884 share list, which comprised a total of 83 
companies. ' Between 1884 and 1914 the average population of Oldham companies 
78 The eight companies in both samples were: Dowry, Era, Haugh, New Hey, 
New Ladyhouse, Moorfield, Sun Mill, and Werneth. 
79 Palm Mill, April 1884 to June 1914 and Cromer Mill, December 1907 to 
June 1914. 
80 Oldham Chronicle, 2nd April, 1884. 
31 
quoted on this basis varied between about 83 and 160, tending to increase more 
dramatically in the later years, especially after 1900.81 
81 Oldham Chronicle, Saturday issues, commencing 2nd April 1884 
- 
27th June 
1914 inclusive. The Economist `Commercial history and Review of 1895, 
VII, Textiles: the cotton trade', 22 February 1896 and the corresponding 
report for each year thereafter through to 1914. 
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Table 1.3: The spinning sample 
a) Ring Mills 
Name Spindles Product Range 
1890 
New Ladyhouse 16,696 18s/32s twist 
Haugh 27,768 20s/32s twist 
New Hey 35,200 16s/32s twist 
Palm 70,000 12s/40s twist 
Era 70,000 12s/40s twist 
Cromer 60,000 18s/64s twist 
b) Mule Mills 
Name Spindles Product Range 
1890 
Albert 24,000 4s/24s twist 
Borough 57,250 16s/40s back beams 
Duke 70,380 40s/70s twist and weft 
Dowry 66,760 30s/50s twist and weft 
Garfield 61,364 30s/50s twist and weft 
Guide Bridge 156,864 26s/46s twist and weft 
Greenacres* 114,034 24s/50s twist and weft 
Hathershaw 77,424 24s/52s twist and weft 
Moorfield* 72,000 20s/50s twist and weft 
Oldham Twist 125,562 20s/70s twist and weft 
Park and Sandy 35,992 lOs/26s twist and weft 
Sun Mill 143,930 32s/60s twist and pin cops 
Shiloh 37,132 20s/36s twist and weft 
Stanley 48,480 20s/52s twist and weft 
Werneth 99,992 30s/62s twist and weft 
* Predominantly a mule mills, but also using a small number of ring spindles 
by 1914. 
Sources: Compiled from, Worrall, Cotton Directory, 1889,1891 and 1913; Gurr and 
Hunt, Cotton Mills of Oldham, Jones, F., `The Cotton Spinning Industry'. 
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Of the companies with share listings, the local press was only able to detail 
and collate profit and other financial figures for those companies which published 
balance sheets. Thus in the survey for 1899, the Oldham Chronicle correspondent 
wrote: 
The results declared by the limited cotton spinning companies of Oldham and 
district for the year 1900 show that, though the profits are not so large as 
those of 1898, they compare very favourably with the results of any other 
year since 1890. We have returns relating to 128 companies, of which, 
however, only eighty six issue balance sheets.. 
. 
The average profit of these 
eighty six companies is £3405 each (or a total of £292,861), or about £8 7s 
2d per cent on the paid up capitals 
Using the same data, the Economist's ` Commercial history and review' typically 
contained aggregate data for the same 80 to 110 spinning companies whose results 
were reported in individual detail in the Oldham Chronicle. ' Although impressive in 
its detail, and in many ways an unrivalled source of published financial data for the 
period, it should be borne in mind that only a minority of the cotton industry was 
represented, predominantly in the coarse to medium section of the industry' The 
companies referred to above were taken from the Oldham, Ashton, and Rochdale 
districts out of a total of around 320 operating in Oldham alone in 1914. 
The local and national press was thus identified as a potentially important 
source of data for further analysis of industry profitability. Indeed, the aggregate table 
as published in the Economist has been used extensively by historians of the cotton 
82 Oldham Chronicle, `Cotton spinning in 1900', 29th December, 1900, p. 8(i). 
83 Economist, `Commercial history and review of 1900, VII-textiles: the cotton 
trade', 16th February, 1901, p. 29. After reproducing the above quotation 
from the Oldham Chronicle, the Economist then reproduced the same table 
of aggregate profits back to 1884. It is clear from this that the Oldham 
Chronicle acted as the source document for the Economist. 
The ranges of counts tended to be predominantly coarse to medium, the data 
in table 1.3 being fairly typical; see also Jones, `The cotton spinning 
industry', table 5, pp. 221-3. 
" 
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industry. ' Because the Economist based its own survey on information published in 
the Oldham Chronicle it is possible to identify the same individual firms as 
components of the listings in the latter, and which were consistently included on a 
year to year basis. Hence certain companies in the main sample were selected by 
reference to these lists and the criteria for sample selection noted above. 86 
The aggregate index, of which these companies formed part, in the Economist 
constituted a useful comparator against which to judge the performance of individual 
companies. However, the published format of this data, measured profit only in 
absolute terms and not by reference to the amount of capital employed. One of the 
first tasks of the research was thus to convert the data from this source into return on 
capital employed measures. By combining data from this with several other sources 
it was possible to construct an index along these lines. In addition to data on profits 
for all years, capital employed details were also available for some years in the 
Economist. ' Earlier years data were obtained from a list of aggregate share and loan 
capital for the period 1877 to 1896 for similar numbers of companies to those whose 
profits were quoted in the Economist. 88 From these sources it is possible to estimate 
a return to capital index for most years, with only occasional missing observations. " 
Otherwise, the only major assumption required was for the rate of interest on loan 
Smith, `A history of the Lancashire cotton industry', p. 179; Robson, The 
British cotton industry, p. 338; Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, p. 105. 
86 For details of main sample companies where press sources were used either 
partially or as the only data source, see table 1.2. 
Economist, 'Commercial history and review', included the amounts of share 
and loan capital for the years 1895 to 1911; 
$$ Farnie, English cotton, table 14, p. 260; 
89 Interpolation was therefore used where there was no data for share and loan 
capital as in 1887, or missing data for loan capital, as in 1888,1889,1913 
and 1914. 
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capital. A figure of 5% was used to 1888 and 4% from then on, being an 
approximation to the average rate used throughout the period. ' The aggregate index 
resulting from these calculations is widely used for comparative purposes in ensuing 
chapters and is referred to as the Economist sample. 
Definitions, delimitations, and scope 
The above discussion has sought to define the scope of the work by its relationship 
to current academic debates and to research problems in terms of the evidence 
available. More detail is required in both areas and will be introduced in the 
appropriate section below. At this stage, however, some further formal definitional 
points are called for in order to establish the broad parameters and delimitations of 
the research. The cotton textile industry is defined as those firms engaged 
predominantly in activities concerning the production and sale of cotton goods from 
the importation of raw cotton via the port of Liverpool to its conversion and sale as 
grey or dyed piece goods into the British or world market. The scope of the study 
is 1870 to 1914, although as suggested by the data description above, 1884 formed 
the beginning of the period from when certain important sources of financial data 
became available. It will not be possible to address the above issues without 
occasionally referring to the periods either side of these parameters, since the data are 
to be measured in relative terms. Earlier and later periods will thus be referred to 
where useful for comparative analysis. Excluded from the scope of the study in the 
first instance are those branches of the textile industry located outside Lancashire, as 
defined geographically rather than administratively (see map, p. xv). For the purposes 
90 Thomas, The provincial stock exchanges, p. 153, and Farnie, English cotton, 
p. 257. 
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of the study and the selection of sample data, Lancashire is taken as a geographical 
rather than administrative expression comprising the axes of the Pennine watershed 
and the Irish Sea, the Calder and Ribble valleys to the estuary of the latter at Preston, 
and a southern axis from the Mersey estuary via Stockport to the Pennines around 
Glossop. 
The ensuing analysis is structured around issues (figure 1.1) more than case 
studies, although the latter will be used to exemplify the former where appropriate. 
Apart from this introduction (part 1) and the concluding chapter (part 5), there are 
three other major sections, dealing in turn with industry structure and technology 
(part 2), and then with financial policy and ownership (part 3), in which these two 
areas are linked to the performances of the sample companies described above. 
Finally in part 4, the industry is reappraised from a macro economic perspective, 
concentrating on relative performance, efficiency and world markets. The first area 
has generated many controversies and Chapter 2 documents these as far as they are 
relevant to the new evidence to be presented. The next four chapters introduce and 
analyse this evidence. First, as an introduction to its significance, chapter 3 examines 
the diffusion of alternative technology in Lancashire. Chapter 4 analyses the 
profitability of those alternatives and chapter 5 adds a further dimension to the 
comparison by focusing on spinning labour costs and technical efficiency. Both are 
primarily concerned with the specialised spinning companies in the sub sample 
described above. Chapter 6, by contrast, re-examines the issues from the point of 
view of vertical integration, concentrating on the experience of several case study 
companies. 
The second major area, financial policy and ownership, has attracted less 
controversy than the first, but is worthy of attention precisely because of its neglect 
to date. Chapter 7 considers dividend policy, the role of entrepreneurs and their 
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impact on investment decisions, an area often neglected in business history generally, 
as well as cotton in particular. Chapter 8 develops these themes further by assessing 
the changing pattern of ownership and control of the industry through an assessment 
of the accountability of managers and entrepreneurs to the providers of industry 
finance. Chapter 9, after reassessing the characteristics of entrepreneurship, revisits 
some old arguments on the performance of the industry but from new the perspective 
of financial indicators, used in previous chapters to consider specific issues, but here 
collated to present a systematic comparison of corporate performance. Chapter 10 
uses the collated return on capital data gathered from archival and other sources to 
re perform economic analysis, which, where conducted previously, has not drawn on 
such information. Finally chapter 11 reappraises the evidence in the previous chapters 
and attempts to quantify the impact of wider economic and market forces on the 
performance of the industry, thereby setting the scene for the concluding chapter. 
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Part 2 
Structure, Technology, and Performance 
39 
Chapter 2: Controversies and Debates 
In 1914 the British economy remained dominated by the industries of the first 
industrial revolution. ' As a result, the `window of opportunity' briefly opened in the 
1890s for investment in those industries of the second industrial revolution, which, 
through productive, distributional, and organisational economies of scale, created high 
profit potential, was now beginning to close 
.2 Chandler argued there were three 
possible reasons for this decisive lag; small geographical size and domestic market, 
lack of raw materials, and that older industries were still profitable. The final point 
emphasises the importance of analysing the profitability of the cotton industry in the 
period 1880 to 1914, not just in relation to its own attempts to modernise, but in 
relation to the impact on deployment of capital in the wider economy. 
However, such a view is in part predicated upon the assumption that the 
industry remained unmodernised. As the previous chapter noted, such a view has 
gained historiographical dominance. Before considering the implications for the wider 
economy, it is therefore necessary to examine the ways in which the industry 
attempted to modernise, and to do so by reference to data, drawn from business 
accounting records, share prices and archival records, in conjunction with wider 
economic statistics and narrative accounts. 
Lancashire entrepreneurs have been judged by reference to their willingness 
or otherwise to adopt the ring spindle and automatic loom. A mythology of the 
industry has thus grown around the ostensible old fashioned attitudes of Lancashire 
Chandler, Scale and scope, p. 250. 
2 Chandler, Scale and scope, p. 286. 
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entrepreneurs and commonly held views concerning incorrect investment decisions, 
poor leadership and inappropriate industry structure. Although ring spinning 
eventually supplanted mule spinning, and the automatic loom the traditional power 
loom, during this period the two technologies coexisted in direct competition. ' Few 
could necessarily foresee at that time the ultimate demise of the mule and the 
Lancashire loom. It is therefore more appropriate to use the term `alternative 
technology' when referring to the ring spindles and automatic looms adopted by the 
minority of Lancashire companies. 
None of the evidence considered to date has included any case studies of the 
experience of actual companies, nor reference to the profitability of those companies 
that shifted to the less familiar technology. To what extent, therefore, were 
Lancashire entrepreneurs genuinely reticent in experimenting with ring spinning and 
the automatic loom, was any such reticence justified, and if so, did it ultimately cost 
the industry its world leadership? To address these questions, the actual experiences 
of Lancashire companies are examined. The analysis is divided into five chapters, 
which facilitate the linkage of previous explanations with a framework for the 
presentation of the empirical evidence introduced by this research. It is first necessary 
to develop the historiography introduced in chapter 1 in more detail; thereby 
establishing the nature of the hypotheses to be tested against empirical evidence. The 
latter is then presented, first by examining the diffusion of alternative technologies 
and examples of companies which sought to specialise in ring spinning or experiment 
with automatic looms, in some cases from a relatively early date, are identified. Ring 
spinning is then analysed by reference to the financial performance of and experiences 
The essential difference was that ring spinning was a continuous process, 
whereas mule spinning was intermittent, with twist inserted only on the 
outward movement of a wheeled carriage. For a more detailed explanation 
see Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, pp. 18-20. 
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of companies pursuing different investment policies. There follows a re-examination 
of ring spinning by reference to technical progress cost structures and labour 
relations. Finally, vertical integration is considered with exemplifications from major 
companies. Automatic looms investments can be examined within this final area, 
since vertically integrated managements were responsible for all the decisions taken. 
Did Lancashire fail? 
As the discussion in the rest of this chapter will attempt to show, much of the history 
of Lancashire cotton has been characterised by a dominance of economic theory, 
sometimes based on hindsight, and based more on generalisation than actual examples 
of corporate and entrepreneurial behaviour. Nonetheless, much debate has arisen from 
these analyses. ' The objective here is to add to these debates through an examination 
of the realised profitability in ring and mule sections of the spinning industry. It is 
thus important to consider hypotheses advanced hitherto on why ring spinning was 
not adopted and the extent to which non adoption was linked to the performance of 
the industry. 
As noted in chapter 1, four major issues have dominated the historiography 
of the industry and are therefore worthy of further review. The first argument 
advanced was by those using comparisons with the U. S. cotton industry who alleged 
that the industry had `failed' as a result of its non adoption of the ring spindle and 
automatic loom. ' The extent of alleged non- adoption is addressed by reference to 
empirical evidence in chapter 3. Of particular influence was Jones's `real cost' index 
which showed no gain in productivity in the period 1880-1914, and compared badly 
° For a comprehensive summary of these debates, see Mass and Lazonick, 
`The British cotton industry', pp. 9-65. 
Young, The American cotton industry, Copeland, `Technical Development' 
p. 149, Jones, Increasing return, p. 53. 
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with the industry of Massachusetts. ' Measures used were aggregates for the industry 
as a whole. The method has been criticised methodologically, particularly for its 
exclusion of return on capital. ' Failure to consider the level of profit earned created 
an unjustifiably dim picture, and recent studies incorporating this element have 
suggested a more encouraging view of the industry! The survey in chapter 4 seeks 
to build the foundation blocks for a more detailed understanding of the determinants 
of industry profitability by comparing the performances of actual companies pursuing 
different entrepreneurial strategies. Further analysis of returns to capital is well 
justified since evidence accumulated to date is indecisive in its support of the 
accusation of failure. 
Were Lancashire entrepreneurs irrational? 
The second argument, advanced principally by Sandberg and McCloskey, was that 
decision makers responded rationally to the profit signals sent from the alternative 
investment opportunities. ' Therefore the loyalty of the Lancashire entrepreneur to the 
mule was justified by its apparently superior profitability on counts above 40s. '° The 
argument has formed an important part of attempts to refute the so-called 
`entrepreneurial failure' hypothesis. " Evidence for entrepreneurial rationality was 
based on calculations of internal rates of return, albeit based on generalised 
6 Jones, Increasing return, p. 55. 
Lazonick and Mass, `Performance of British cotton industry', pp. 33-4. 
8 Toms, `Financial constraints', pp. 365-8. 
Sandberg and McCloskey, ` From damnation to redemption', p. 100. 
10 Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, p. 28. The fineness of yarn was measured 
by the count(s), the ratio of hanks to the pound. 
11 McCloskey and Sandberg, `From damnation to redemption', p. 101. 
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assumptions about the replacement cost of rings and the resulting factor cost 
savings. 12 
However, such a calculation can be criticised since it is unlikely that rates of 
return would be uniform throughout the industry and through time. For example mill 
architecture would have caused variations in marginal cost of replacement from firm 
to firm. " Furthermore, when new investments did take place, they tended to be as 
much in the form of new mills as for the replacement of machines within existing 
structures. Finally, it has been demonstrated by Lazonick that the assumptions used 
in terms of operative per machine, shipping costs, and the level of investment in 
rings, have been applied inaccurately. " Therefore, instead of such theoretical 
calculations, the actual realised performances of companies form a more suitable basis 
for comparison, being less dependent on assumptions. 
To criticism of the empirical evidence and assumptions used by Sandberg, 
Lazonick has added methodological concerns. In particular, that entrepreneurship was 
too narrowly defined, allowing cotton managers to be adjudged successful by 
reference to their ability to produce a rational or optimal solution, given certain 
constraints. Had the industry been led by successful entrepreneurs as defined in the 
Schumpeterian sense, they would have concentrated their efforts on removing those 
constraints, for example by vertically integrating as a precursor to introducing ring 
spinning. " Furthermore, in analysing the problem, Sandberg adopted a `static 
methodology' and failed to define the problem of entrepreneurship in its correct 
12 Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, p. 51. 
13 Frankel, `Obsolescence and technological change', p. 313. The example is 
based on weaving but is equally valid for spinning. 
14 Lazonick, `Factor costs', pp. 89-109; Mass and Lazonick `The British cotton 
industry', p. 25. 
15 Lazonick, `Industrial organization', pp. 232-6. 
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institutional setting. 16 
Both these points need to be addressed here as the analytical method used 
below could be subject to similar criticism. Sandberg's analysis was indeed static as 
the internal rate of return calculation was based on similar assumptions for the whole 
of the period, with modifications only for changes in the level of capacity 
utilisation. " This provides further justification for the use of actual rates of return 
and their variation from year to year. Such a method can also assist with establishing 
at what point in historical time commercial supremacy was actually achieved by ring 
spinning. The emphasis is thereby correctly placed on the dynamics of the industry's 
development. As to the definitional problem of entrepreneur, if Sandberg's use of the 
term is too narrow, Lazonick's is too wide. Whereas it is correct to say that 
entrepreneurs should concentrate on removing constraints, the extent to which they 
can do so must be limited, otherwise they would effectively plan the economy. 
However, the study of Lancashire cotton is essentially the study of a market 
economy; it is felt more important to examine how that market influenced 
entrepreneurial behaviour than the other way around. 
Was Lancashire inappropriately structured? 
A third, and very important, argument advanced to explain the development of the 
Lancashire textile industry was the `institutional constraints' hypothesis. " In 
particular, that the increasing vertical specialisation of the industry became a 
constraint on the development of high throughput, integrated manufacture. According 
16 Mass and Lazonick, `The British cotton industry', p. 21 
17 Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, pp. 56-8. 
18 Lazonick, `Competition, specialization and industrial decline', pp. 31-38; 
Lazonick, `Industrial organization and technological change', pp. 195-236; 
Lazonick, `The cotton industry', pp. 18-50. 
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to this argument, in the rest of the industry both branches began to resist the 
introduction of new technology because of their structure. Spinning companies were 
incapable of replacing mule spindles with ring spindles because weaving companies 
required mule yam for their technology. Simultaneously, weaving companies could 
not replace power looms with automatic looms because the spinning companies could 
only supply yarn suitable for the former. 19 Ring weft bobbins were not a suitable 
production ready package for power loom weavers. Packaging was a very important 
reason for preferring the ring since weft bobbins were much cheaper than mule weft 
rewound onto pirns. 20 Conversely ring weft with its strength and break resistant 
qualities was ideal for automatic weaving. Also, the automatic loom was more 
effective when using ring yarn since mule cops needed to be skewered resulting in 
more work for battery fillers, increased waste, and more breakages? ' 
The reason for the slow adoption of rings and automatics was industry 
structure. ' According to this view, specialised weavers demanded mule yarn for 
their power looms; the fragmented structure of the industry prevented the 
simultaneous introduction of the ring spindle and automatic loom. 3 Thus in Britain, 
only in the production of warp yarns were specialist ring spinners able to compete. 
Furthermore, in a locally specialised industry, not only were there costs involved in 
transporting yarn to the weaving mill, but also ring yarns for weft could not be 
" Lazonick, `Competition, specialization and industrial decline', p. 34. Frankel, 
`Obsolescence and technical change in a maturing economy'. 
20 Bennett, An introduction to automatic weaving, p. 29. 
21 Bennett, An introduction to automatic weaving, p. 29. 
Lazonick, `The cotton industry', pp. 22-3. 
Lazonick, `Factor Costs', p. 100 
24 Lazonick, `Stubborn mules', p. 82. 
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wound onto packages that were light and ready for use in weaving. 
Thus ring spinning tended to be used for spinning warp yarns. Here the 
choice of technology was less relevant since whether rings or mules were used for 
warp, the yam still had to be rewound from bobbins onto beams prior to weaving. " 
Before or after travel, all warp yarns would need to be rewound in preparation for 
the weaving. Moreover, because weaving firms were committed to plain looms, mule 
spun yarn, with its higher elasticity and loom-ready packaging, was favoured. The 
latter combination was arguably easier to achieve where organisations were vertically 
integrated, due to easier co-ordination between spinning and weaving and lower 
transport costs. Where ring spinning was adopted, it ought therefore to have been in 
integrated concerns which could also take advantage of developments in automatic 
weaving; a proposition examined fur ther in chapter 6. 
However, it has been argued by means of international comparatives that 
vertical integration was not a sufficient condition for the adoption of ring spinning. 
Other considerations were important, such as product specialisation' and possibly, 
as explored in chapters 4 and 5, rates of profit and cost structures. If the institutional 
constraints hypothesis is accepted, it would be expected that vertically specialised ring 
spinning companies would be less profitable than similar mule mills. A further 
justification for the approach adopted in chapter 4 is that the identification of a group 
of dedicated, vertically specialised ring spinners, producing warp yarns, provides a 
useful comparative sample. The institutional constraints argument only applies to the 
incompatibility of ring spun weft yam with the plain loom. Producers of warp yarn, 
" Lazonick, `Stubborn mules: some comments', p. 82. 
Z6 Saxonhouse and Wright, `Rings and mules around the world', p. 293; 
Saxonhouse and Wright, 'Stubborn mules', p. 92. 
r Saxonhouse and Wright, `Stubborn mules', p. 93. 
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whether on ring or mule frames, would both have needed to wind their output onto 
beams prior to the yarn being used in weaving? Similarly, both would have had 
the option of selling directly into export or hosiery markets. Direct comparability of 
product range and strategic options is crucial to the analysis. 
-If ring mills producing 
warp yarn could significantly outperform mule mills, then entrepreneurs, on the 
evidence that the ring was genuinely superior in the commercial sense, would have 
had an incentive to switch technology for warp production. On the other hand, if 
there appeared to be no significant advantage to ring spinning in circumstances where 
the use of the ring frame was relatively unconstrained, then it would hardly be 
surprising if entrepreneurs stuck to the mule for warp spinning and even more so for 
weft. This vital question is addressed directly by the ensuing analysis. 
In addition to vertical integration, the evidence presented also allows comment 
to be made on other facets of the Lazonick and Mass argument. For example, that 
the structure of labour relations and the substitution of cheaper inputs was the basis 
of the survival and indeed success of the mule prior to 1914. It has been contended 
that Lancashire's success was based its responses in these areas to the cost cutting 
strategies of overseas companies, which were armed with the ostensibly advantageous 
combination of the ring spindle and cheap labour. 29 Again, if the hypothesis is 
correct, vertically specialised mule mills would be expected to outperform vertically 
specialised ring mills in Lancashire. Wage cost savings in ring mills would be 
outweighed by the option of substituting cheaper raw materials in mule mills and 
there would be additional reasons, associated with packaging and transport costs, to 
expect the superior performance of the latter. These issues are analysed in more detail 
28 Lazonick, `Stubborn Mules', p. 82. 
29 Lazonick, `Production relations', pp. 512-3, Lazonick and Mass 
`Performance of British cotton', p. 5. 
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in chapter 5. 
Other explanations 
The final relevant contribution in the context of the ensuing analysis are the 
explanations put forward by those placing greater emphasis on empirical surveys 
rather than the testing of economic hypotheses. The work of Farnie is particularly 
important in this respect, providing a comprehensive analysis of all the forces 
underlying the development of the industry, but only as far as 1896.3° Saxonhouse 
and Wright have been more directly concerned with the specific issue of why 
Lancashire failed to adopt the ring at the same time as the international competition. 
Use of archival evidence, in this case the sales records of textile machinery 
companies, has helped to widen the scope of the debate. 31 Also, by means of 
international comparisons, they have sought to highlight patterns of technological 
diffusion. 32 The approach followed below is similar, in that empirical evidence is 
used to ascertain the historical facts and events delaying the introduction of the ring. 
Saxonhouse and Wright used their evidence to challenge the conclusions of Lazonick, 
principally by arguing that vertical specialisation and mule spinning was consistent 
with a profitable and expanding industry. 33 However, Lazonick agreed with this 
view, maintaining that the conditions which led the industry to its success before 
1914, were equally responsible for its demise after 1920.34 Although some of the 
conclusions of these authors appear to overlap, the contribution of Saxonhouse and 
30 Farnie, English Cotton. 
31 Saxonhouse and Wright, `New Evidence', p. 507. 
32 Saxonhouse and Wright, `Rings and mules around the world', pp. 271-300. 
33 Saxonhouse and Wright, `Stubborn mules', pp. 89-90. 
34 Lazonick, `Stubborn mules', pp. 83-4 
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Wright is important, since their archival work has helped to add to our knowledge 
of the industry; an objective shared by the present enquiry. 
Towards a Consensus 
Much uncertainty, and a large measure of disagreement, remains regarding the pre 
1914 period. Empirical evidence, particularly in business and company archives has 
not featured prominently in these discussions, and it is in this direction we must turn 
if consensus is to be reached. Additional and relevant evidence is therefore important 
and likely to clarify understanding of the actual conditions facing the industry. 
The parameters of most typical discussions of Lancashire textiles are 
dominated by by certain assumptions. First, and perhaps oversimplistically, that 
Lancashire did not adopt ring spindles and automatic looms to the extent it ought to 
have done. Second, that ring spindles and automatic looms were more efficient than 
mules and power looms. Third, that industry structure was an important influence 
on investment decisions. Each of these points will be examined in more detail in the 
next four chapters. An additional point of reference, hitherto neglected entirely, will 
be the strategies and profitability of specific companies differentiated by their 
investment policies. 
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Chapter 3: The diffusion of alternative technology in 
Lancashire, 1870-1914 
The technological breakthroughs of the industrial revolution had given Lancashire 
cotton a position of prominence in Britain and the world. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, the basic technologies were improved and refined, but it was the new 
alternatives to established production methods which arguably presented the industry 
with its greatest challenge. Detailed descriptions of machinery are available in many 
texts' and are not repeated here in detail, other than to make explicit important 
specific attributes which have a bearing on the evidence presented and the way it may 
influence currently held views on the evolution of the industry. 
Such-views as those referred to in the preceding chapter were heavily 
influenced by the existence of such alternatives. Before proceeding to an analysis of 
the commercial profitability of ring spinning and automatic looms, it is necessary to 
establish the scale of their introduction and how importantly their development was 
perceived in contemporary Lancashire. Their introduction was uneven, despite their 
apparent complementarity. 2 In fact, the introduction of ring spinning preceded the 
automatic loom by three decades, and was thus adopted by far more firms. The 
former was available on a commercial basis from the 1870s, the latter not until the 
early 1900s. Greater emphasis is therefore placed on ring spinning in ensuing 
chapters, simply because there are a greater number of case studies. Below we 
For example, Murphy in The textile industries, writing in 1910, provides a 
contemporary portrait of the technical issues. 
2 Mass and Lazonick `The British cotton industry'; especially in addressing the. 
debate originated by Sandberg, there is an uncontested assumption that firms 
could have introduced rings and automatics simultaneously. 
51 
consider the 'establishment of specialised ring spinning companies in South East 
Lancashire, and then go on to'discuss the diffusion of ring spinning and automatic 
looms in case study companies located elsewhere in Lancashire. 
Throstles, rings, and mules 
The great innovations of Arkwright and Crompton provided the impetus for the 
industrial revolution in the late eighteenth century. For over a century after that, their 
inventions provided cotton spinners with two generic alternative types of equipment. 
These were the continuous methods of the throstle, later the ring, and the intermittent 
method of mule spinning. Continuous spinning was developed from Arkwright's 
water frame, which, as steam power replaced water, ' became known as the "throstle' 
I 
due to the singing noise it made when run at high speed. 3 The method was favoured 
from the outset by firms producing strong, even yarns; 4 a tradition continued by 
those adopting the ring frame. Also like the ring, the throstle was limited by its 
driving speed and the delay and expense associated with doffing the full bobbins. ' 
Based on a similar spinning method, the ring was able to supplant the throstle by 
virtue of its greater speed, as facilitated by the use of a `traveller' to guide the yarn 
onto the bobbin. ' As the evidence presented below illustrates, such improvements 
meant that many companies replaced their throstles with the new ring spindle. ' There 
were far fewer cases of rings replacing the mule. 
Murphy, The textile industries, Vol. 3, p. 68. 
° Nasmith, Students' cotton spinning, p. 501. 
Murphy, The textile industries, Vol. 3, p. 71. 
6 Copeland, `Technical development', p. 122. 
Textile Recorder, 13th May, 1897, attributed the spread of ring spinning in 
Rochdale to the previous tradition of throstle spinning; see also Cotton 
Factory Times, 26th March, 1897. 
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Explaining the diffusion of ring spinning 
A number of interpretations of the diffusion of textile technology have pointed to the 
division of the market as an important determinant. Ring spinning was particularly 
useful for the production of coarser yarns and was widely adopted by companies 
worldwide spinning counts of below 40s. 8 Yet Oldham, the centre of the British 
coarse trade and with its dependence on Platts for machinery, was notable for its 
retention of the mule. ' Whereas there is some evidence that the industry as a whole 
had begun to shift to finer counts, " many Oldham companies moved to coarser 
counts (figure 3.1; table 3.1). In parallel, many also narrowed their product ranges, 
although the tendency in this respect was not pronounced in its own right (table 3.1). 
Nonetheless, in the context of the wider economy, where horizontal diversification 
was becoming more important, the trend was perhaps more significant. 
8 Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, p. 59. 
Jones, `The cotton spinning industry', p. 18; Farnie, `The emergence of 
Victorian Oldham', p. 49. 
Helm, `The alleged decline', p. 739; Marrison, `Great Britain and her rivals', 
p. 309; `Finer counts in Oldham and what they are indicative of, Textile Mercury, 16th August 1890. 
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Figure 3.1: Average counts, Oldham Mills, 1891-1913 
Average Counts, 1891-1913 
Albert 
Borough 
Boundary 
Butler Green 
Dowry 
Duke 
Equitable 
Glodwick 
Greenacres 
Moorfield 
Oldham Twist 
° Osborne 
Palm 
Royton 
Shiloh 
Stanley 
Sun 
United 
Werneth 
West End 
Woodstock 
Source: Worrall, Cotton spinners' and manufacturers directory, 1891 and 1913. 
Calculated by taking the average mid point of each count range. 
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Table 3.1: Product ranges and specialisation, Oldham 
Mills, 1891-1913 
Company Average Count Count range 
1891 1913 Change 1891 1913 Change 
Albert 14.0 17.0 3.0 20 30 
-10 
Boundary 38.0 31.0 
-7.0 28 "26 2 
Borough 32.5 30.0 
-2.5 24 26 -2 
Butler Green 45.0 46.5 1.5 30 32 -2 
Dowry 40.0 37.5 
-2.5 20 24 -4 
Duke 55.0 45.0 
-10.0 30 30 0 
Greenacres 37.0 32.5 
-4.5 26 30 -4 
Glodwick 35.0 33.5 
-1.5 2 16 -14 
Equitable 33.0 31.0 
-2.0 32 22 10 
Moorfield 35.0 33.6 
-1.4 30 16 14 
Oldham Twist 40.0 34.5 
-5.5 50 24 26 
Osborne 48.0 59.0 11.0 38 26 12 
Palm 26.0 24.0 
-2.0 28 32 -4 
Royton 26.5 21.0 
-5.5 18 22 -4 
Shiloh 34.0 16.0 
-18.0 36 16 20 
Stanley 31.5 38.0 6.5 32 26 6 
Sun Mill 42.0 34.5 
-7.5 18 20 -2 
United 50.5 36.5 
-14.0 38 10 28 
Werneth 44.0 60.0 16.0 32 60 
-28 
West End 34.0 34.5 0.5 30 30 0 
Woodstock 42.0 27.0 
-15.0 36 44 -8 
Average 37.2 34.4 28 27 
Notes 
1. Count range is the difference between the lowest and highest count spun. 
2. Average count is the simple average of the lowest and highest count spun. 
Source: Calculated from Worrall, as for figure 3.1 
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There was thus no generalised shift to either fine of coarse counts, but simply an 
increase in the degree of product specialisation. As specialisation grew, fostered by 
the development of the cotton and yarn markets in Liverpool and Manchester, 
naturally there were niches available for ring spinners. Machine sales data would tend 
to support such an interpretation, " but without showing any association between 
technology and product quality. According to this data (table 3.2), no rings were 
ordered from the six main machinery manufacturers by British firms prior to 1880, 
and gross investment in rings did not supersede mules until 1915. The period between 
these dates is thus most important for further investigation of technological diffusion. 
11 Saxonhouse and Wright, `Rings and mules around the world', p. 284. 
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Table 3.2 
. 
Cotton spinning machinery orders by 
British firms, 1878-1920 
Period Mules % Rings % Total 
1878-1879 258,246 100 0 0 258,246 
1880-1883 3,210,034 95 151,931 5 3,361,965 
1884-1890 8,219,590 93 640,279 7 8,859,869 
1891-1898 5,813,819 87 860,215 13 6,674,034 
1899-1906 13,659,835 84 2,670,776 16 16,330,611 
1907-1914 10,055,583 75 3,264,996 25 13,320,579 
1915-1920 1,336,445 46 1,594,406 54 2,930,851 
Source: Adapted from, Saxonhouse and Wright, Tables 7 and 8, `Rings and mules 
around the world', pp 282-3. 
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Although offering further scope for specialisation, as noted in chapter 2, the ring 
spindle remained confined to the production of warp yarns. The packaging and 
transport problem for weft inevitably influenced the diffusion of ring spinning. a 
recent survey concluded that whilst this may have been a constraint in Oldham, it was 
not elsewhere in Lancashire, since the majority of spinning companies in other 
districts had sufficient local weaving capacity to avoid long distance transport if they 
chose to do so. 12 According to the 1906 Enquiry" quoted in this survey, Rochdale 
accounted for around 27 % of all sub 40s in Lancashire. Transport may not have been 
a constraint, but clearly there must have been other factors at work reinforcing the 
concentration of ring yam output into one particular district. 
Specialist ring spinners I 
The move from throstle to ring spinning began in Rochdale in the 1870s and 
geographical specialisation was an important reason. Traditionally the town had relied 
on wool and worsted, but with the emergence of the cotton industry transferred some 
of its dependence to flannels and flanelettes, the latter being introduced in 1883.14 
All of these fabrics were conducive to the use of the continuous spinning method. 
Dependence on cotton increased at the expense of the woollen trade following the 
depression of 1878 and the arrival, in imitation of nearby Oldham, of the first limited 
liability companies-Is 
The ring spinning system had been originally developed and later widely 
adopted in the United States. The U. S. patent of John Thorp was adopted and 
12 Leunig, 'Lancashire at its zenith', p. 44. 
13 BPP, Report of an enquiry, p. 241; Leunig, 'Lancashire at its zenith', p. 42. 
14 Fannie, 'Cotton towns', p. 44. 
`s Fannie, 'Cotton towns', pp. 43-4. 
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patented in England within six months by George William Lee in 1829.16 
Notwithstanding the relatively early date of patent registration, in the USA, it was 
only the development of the Sawyer and Rabbeth spindles from the 1870s and its 
associated increase in productivity, that created a significant shift to rings from 
mules. " In parallel to these improvements, no references to the operation of the ring 
in Lancashire were noted until the 1870s when competing claims began to circulate. 
Representatives of capital equipment manufacturers, particularly Howard and 
Bullough of Accrington, were the first to make moves to acquire the patents of the 
Booth-Sawyer and later the more efficient Rabbeth, or gravity spindle. '8 Rival 
machine makers, Samuel Brooks of Manchester, 19 as well as Howard and Bullough, 
became enthusiastic about ' the ring following various visits to America by 
representatives who were impressed by its operation. Perhaps the most important visit 
was by the latter company in 1872 since it resulted in the acquisition of patents for 
the Booth-Sawyer, and the commencement of commercial, production using ring 
frames in 1874.20 
The earliest experiment in ring spinning involving a dedicated factory unit 
commenced at New Hey, Rochdale in 1878. Quickly thereafter a large number of 
Rochdale companies replaced their throstle spindles with rings, so that by 1890 there 
were 400,000 ring spindles in operation in the Rochdale area, making Rochdale the 
16 Jeremy, Transatlantic industrial revolution, pp. 214 and 243. 
17 Saxonhouse and Wright, `Rings and mules around the world', p. 289. 
'$ Rochdale Observer, 4th January 1890. ` - 
19 Murphy, The Textile industries, p. 75, refers to this visit, but not the others, 
which occurred approximately contemporaneously. 
20 Farnie, Cotton towns, p. 44; Farnie, English Cotton, pp. 229-231. Rochdale 
Observer, 28 June 1890, p. 4,4 January, 1890, p. 6. Samuel Tweedale was 
a director of New Ladyhouse mill until his death in 1881. 
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centre of a `great industry'. Of these, 300,000 were supplied by Howard and 
Bullough. Z''Ring spindles supplied by the six leading machine makers up to 1890 
totalled 792,000 (table 3.2), illustrating the preponderance of one district and one 
capital equipment supplier in the early stages of the diffusion of the new spinning 
method. The first company to use the new method was the New Ladyhouse Cotton 
Spinning Co. Ltd, registered on 26th April, 1877,1 Lancashire's first major 
vertically specialised, dedicated ring spinning mill. ' It replaced an older mill which 
had previously burned down and was constructed on a shed pattern, a style emulated 
by later larger ring mills, notably Cromer at Middleton (1906)24 Although the 
company used Howard and Bullough spindles, their sale in 1877-8 was not apparent 
in the survey by Saxonhouse and Wright (table 3.1). 
In the early 1880s, a group of three companies was formed around the New 
Ladyhouse which became known as the `Milnrow Ring Spinners'. u These were 
relatively small companies operating in a geographically concentrated cluster, sharing 
cross' directorships and shareholdings, characteristic of emergent industrial 
organisation in the industry? 6 Samuel Tweedale (1846-1928) was a founding director 
of the New Ladyhouse company and, as a trusted lieutenant of John Bullough (1837- 
21 Rochdale Observer, 4 January, 1890. 
1 New Ladyhouse Cotton Spinning Co. Ltd, RLSL, Memorandum and Articles 
of Association. 
2' Details of this development are documented in a detailed newspaper article; 
Rochdale Observer, 28 June 1890, p. 4. The New Ladyhouse actually 
followed an earlier and smaller experiment at Bright Bros. 
24 Farnie, `Cotton towns', p. 44; Farnie, English cotton, p. 230. 
u Rochdale Observer and Oldham Chronicle, passim. 
I Rochdale Observer, 28th June 1890, p. 4. Similar loose structures were 
beginning to emerge elsewhere in Lancashire, for example the so-called 
`Bunting group', Farnie `John Bunting', DBB, pp. 506-9; these are discussed 
extensively below in part 3. 
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1891), also played a leading role in the management of Howard and Bullough and 
Co. Ltd. ' Tweedale sent a relative on the visit to America in 1872, and from then 
on was closely involved in the ring spinning experiments at Milnrow. The role of 
capital equipment manufacturers and their relationship with the spinning companies 
was thus crucial in the diffusion of the ring. James Heap (1828-1892), like all the 
other directors and shareholders, a local man, was the Chairman of all three 
companies until his death in 1892. Like John Bullough in Accrington, he was a 
prominent Conservative and the main employer, and a dominant figure in the 
locality, " although largely unrecognised in histories of the industry. In a way, this 
was surprising. Because ring mills were unusual, they attracted considerable interest 
from contemporary observers. 29 The Rochdale experiments were described as a `leap 
in the dark, involving great risk' 30 
Few emulators of the Milnrow experiment were willing to launch new 
dedicated ring concerns, notable exceptions being the Palm (1884), specialising in 
strong rope yarns, 31 and the Nile (1898) in Oldham, Burns Ring Spinning Co. Ltd 
at Heywood (1891), ' promoted with the backing of the rival ring frame pioneer, 
Samuel Brooks, 32 and the Era (1898) in Rochdale. The latter was again backed by 
Howard and Bullough, equipped with 51,200 of their ring spindles and finding 
2' Rochdale Observer 4th Jan., 1890; Kirk, `John Bullough', in Jeremy (ed. ) 
Dictionary of Business Biography (hereafter, DBB), p. 502. 
1 Rochdale Observer, 16th April, 1892. 
29 For example, a correspondent in the Oldham Chronicle noted: `The 
companies at New Hey are attracting attention all over the country', (4 July 
1887, p. 8). 
3o Rochdale Observer, 28 June 1890. 
31 Worrall, Cotton spinners and manufacturers directory; see the company's 
advertisement in the annual editions of the directory. 
32 1 am grateful to D. A. Farnie for information on this mill. 
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employment for 450 operatives, was described as one of the finest mills of its kind 
by the local newspaper. 33 It was three times the size of the prototype Milnrow 
company, and as with the previous investments, backed and encouraged by capital 
equipment suppliers. 
However, such projects were isolated. In the 1890s a fog of gloom enveloped 
the cotton industry, and its prospects were viewed by many as bleak. "' As a result, 
very few new mills of any kind were built in the 1890s, and the diffusion of the ring 
was undoubtedly slowed by the dampening of expectations. Indeed little investment 
of any sort took place, particularly in the depressed Oldham area for the whole of the 
1890s, and this may be one reason. for Oldham's notable commitment to the mule. 
Nonetheless, mule spindleage in the area actually declined from 11.4 million spindles 
in 1891 to 10.9 million in 1897 35 Unsurprisingly, other than those noted above, 
there were no other significant ring mill constructions before the early 1900S. 36 
The period 1905-9 saw a new mill building boom in south-east Lancashire. 
After a lag of more than ten years, the centre of the coarse spinning trade in Oldham 
began to emulate Rochdale to an extent. Although the majority were new mule mills, 
there were some significant investments in specialised ring spinning establishments. 
Out of 74 new mills commenced in the Oldham district between 1900 and 1907, " 
eight were specialist ring spinners. In spindleage terms they were small in relation to 
mule mills, Belgrave 2 had only 43,200 spindles, although Iris (62,568), Moston 
33 Era Ring Mill Company Ltd, History of the Era Ring Mill, p. 1. 
34 `Is the cotton trade leaving the country? ', Textile Mercury, 21 January, 1893, 
p. 43. 
35 Farnie, `The emergence of Victorian Oldham', p. 42. 
36 Jones, `The cotton spinning industry', p. 223. 
37 Jones, `The cotton spinning industry', pp. 221-3. 
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Ring (59,796) and Royton Ring (64,176) were more typical. By contrast, the median 
mule specialist in the Oldham district was by this time of the order of 100-130 
thousand spindles. The largest, Times No. 2, at 174,000 spindles, revealed the limits 
of economies of scale in the mule section. " Nonetheless ring spinners also became 
larger, and, unlike the highly specialised large new mule mills, developed higher 
count product ranges. Whilst the counts spun by the Milnrow group began at 18/36s 
and became 6/36s by 1914,39 the newer companies had average counts of 31s, 
including some, such as Cromer spinning up to 64s Egyptian and Nile, 80s Egyptian, 
entering the finer product range. 40 Product specialisation and market niches 
undoubtedly played a part in these developments, although the ostensible constraint 
of sub 40s coarse specialisation for ring spindles was far less applicable in the 1900s 
than it had been in the 1880s. 
The `constraint' of specialisation 
The above examples show how the adoption of ring spinning was part of a process 
of product and geographical specialisation in Lancashire. Yet, as noted above, it has 
been argued by some that such specialisation represented a constraint on the adoption 
of alternative technologies. " It is therefore useful to note examples of diffusion 
among vertically integrated companies in other parts of Lancashire, where the vertical 
specialisation constraint did not apply. Of the vertically integrated companies in the 
main sample, the best archival records providing evidence on equipment decisions 
were those of Fielden Brothers and Horrockses Crewdson, and these are considered 
38 Jones, `The cotton spinning industry', p. 88. 
39 Worrall, Cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 1891 and 1913. 
40 Jones, `The cotton spinning industry', pp. 221-3. 
41 Lazonick, `Cotton industry', p. 20. 
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a 
in turn. 
Fielden Brothers, based at Todmorden and geographically close to Rochdale 
and Milnrow, scrapped its throstles in favour of rings in 1889-90.42 However there 
were important differences. There were disadvantages associated with being a 
combined mill peripheral to the emerging centres of spinning and weaving 
specialisation, such as the physical constraint of old buildings, dependence on coarse 
and plain product range and lack of access to joint stock finance. 43 The age of the 
Fielden concern committed it to older buildings, in contrast to the purpose built ring 
spinning sheds of Rochdale and Oldham. Nonetheless, in such situations, the ring 
spindle was more adaptable than the ever widening mule frame. It was no surprise 
therefore that Robinwood Mill, in the Calder valley at Lydgate near Todmorden, 
abandoned mule spinning, replaced its throstles, and specialised in ring spinning from 
the 1890s onwards ' 
Another integrated company, Horrockses Crewdson and Company Ltd., with 
its activities centred on Preston also introduced a significant number of ring spindles. 
Again obsolete throstles were replaced by rings. But by contrast with the examples 
so far, there was also a tendency to replace ageing mules with rings as part of the 
plant replacement cycle (table 3.2). True, the company did construct a specialist mule 
mill in 1895 of nearly 80,000 spindles, but otherwise the ring spindle became 
increasingly important. One reason was that Horrockses resisted the trend towards 
specialisation. By 1900 the company was producing a wide range of goods, many of 
which were for the domestic market. ' However, this company was an exception, and 
42 WYRO, C/35311, Directors minutes. 
43 Kenney, `Sub regional specialization', pp. 41-63. 
C353/1, Directors' minutes, passim. 
as Platt, Latin America and British trade, p. 166. 
. 
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in general the throstle was the main victim of the development of the ring. 
' 65 
Table 3.3: Horrockses Crewdson, Installed 
Spindleage, 1887-1905 
Number of Spindles 
1887 1905 Net 
Investment 
Mule spindles 118002 173752 54662 
Ring spindles 14220 58464 44244 
Notes 
1. If the 78572 mule spindles installed at Centenary Mill are excluded, there is a very 
strong trend to replace mules with rings on a routine basis at existing sites. 
2. There was no investment of any kind between 1906 and 1914. 
Source: CVR Machine Book 
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The automatic loom 
Although there were earlier experiments, the automatic, or Northrop, loom was only 
commercially available in Lancashire from 1903 onwards, largely on the terms of the 
American parent company, following the establishment of the British Northrop Loom 
Company. ' The manufacturer claimed that the weaver using Northrop automatic 
looms could be up to eight times more productive than the plain loom weaver. 47 
Automatic looms were adopted by a small minority of firms prior to 1914, 
and typically not in the main centres of geographical specialisation. Of the total looms 
installed a large proportion were at Ashton Brothers of Hyde. 48 Other examples of 
pre 1914 introductions included Tootal Broadhurst and Lee, Fielden Bros of 
Todmorden, and Gregs of Quarry Bank. 49 At Ashtons and Tootals, automation led 
to strikes by the weavers; in the Ashton case in 1904 and again in 1908, in the Tootal 
instance at Rumworth Mill in 1906 S° Nonetheless labour relations did not 
necessarily constitute a significant reason for slow diffusion; the strike at Hyde was 
partly at the instigation of the employers, faced as they were with high stocks and 
falling demand. As with the ring spindle, automatic loom adoption was related to 
product specialisation. Ashton Brothers produced plain cloths, whilst North east 
Lancashire concentrated on fine goods s' 
46 Saul, ` The engineering industry', p. 195. 
47 British Northrop Loom Company, Northrop labour saving looms, p. 10. 
48 Fowler, `Trade unions and technical change', p. 43; in 1911, of the total 
5409 automatic looms in Lancashire, 1820 were installed at Ashton Bros. 
49 Tootal, MCRL, M461, Board Minutes; Fielden, C353/1, Board minutes; 
Greg, Rose, The Gregs of Quarry Bank Mill, p. 96-8. 
so Fowler, `Trade unions and technical change', pp. 45-6; Tootal, MCRL, 
M461, Board Minutes, 4th September, 1906. 
s` Fowler, `Trade unions and technical change', p. 52. 
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Again, like the ring spindle, the role of the capital equipment supplier was 
important. In the case of the automatic loom, however, the machinery company, 
through its patent and pricing policy tended to act as a constraint. In contrast to the 
flotations of mills in the Rochdale and Oldham areas, there was little support for new 
weaving companies from the British Northrop Loom Company. Established in 1903, 
there were some connections via cross directorships between equipment supplier and 
manufacturer; for example Henry Philips Greg (1865-1936), a director of Ashtons, 
and Edward Tootal Broadhurst (1858-1922) both held directorships with the British 
Northrop Loom Company 52 However, the American parent, the Draper Corporation, 
retained a strong influence owning two thirds of the shares, 53 and demanding, in 
return for production under patent, a high level of monopoly profits. Unlike the ring 
spindle, whose relatively simple `traveller' device had improved the throstle, the 
Northrop loom was a complex piece of equipment. Costs of invention have been 
estimated at $lm and patent control for the machine, together with improvements and 
attachments, became an important part of management strategy for the parent 
company, which had 1,330 enforceable patents in 1907 S4 As a consequence, the 
prices of the looms were set high and may have deterred adoption by. British 
manufacturers. ' Thus there were compelling reasons other than industry structure 
for slow diffusion of automatic looms. 
Nonetheless in three out of four known cases, companies which adopted 
automatics were also vertically integrated. The exception was Quarry Bank, which 
Howe, `Sir Frank Hollins', DBB, p. 316; Dupree, `Edward Tootal 
Broadhurst', DBB, p. 452. 
13 Saul, ` The engineering industry', p. 195. 
Mass, `Mechanical and organizational innovation', pp. 901; 906-12. 
ss Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, p. 77. 
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abandoned spinning in 1894.11 Integration removed the ostensible constraint of co- 
ordination of weft yarn production on rings with the acquisition of automatic looms. 
At Fielden many of the ring frames purchased in the 1890s for Lumbutts Mill and in 
the 1900s for Robinwood Mill were for weft spinning onto pirns. In one case, the 
purchase was made simultaneously with automatic looms. -' The decision appears to 
be the only known example of Lancashire entrepreneurs putting into practice what 
their critics have accused them of failing to do; it is analysed in detail in chapter 6. 
Without casting doubt on the ultimate reasons for the adoption of the 
automatic loom, the evidence of corporate behaviour induces scepticism as to whether 
it represented a decisive breakthrough before 1914. In the Fielden case, the 14 
automatics purchased in the period 1907-1914 represented only a minute proportion 
of total weaving capacity whereas by 1914 94% of its spinning capacity was 
accounted for by ring frames. Vertical integration per se did not prevent this 
experiment taking place, but equally cannot account for the lack of more widespread 
introduction. At the other vertically integrated companies, there was no apparent 
evidence of simultaneous use of the looms with ring weft spindles. 
General trends of diffusion 
The above discussion has highlighted several interesting trends. The diffusion of ring 
spinning was associated with product and geographical specialisation, manifesting 
itself prominently at first in one district, Rochdale: A decisive impetus came from one 
capital equipment supplier, Howard and Bullough, which having acquired the patents, 
sold the majority of the earlier frames. 
Ring spinning was carried out in a significant and increasing minority of 
56 Rose, The Gregs of Quarry Bank Mill, p. 92. 
57 WYRO, C353/1, Directors' Minutes, 2nd March 1909, p. 334. 
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establishments in the 1889-1914 period in other districts as well as Rochdale, but in 
virtually all cases in vertically specialised mills producing warp yarn. Vertical 
integrated firms, albeit unconstrained regarding the deployment of machinery in 
spinning and weaving branches, did not adopt the ring spindle and automatic loom 
simultaneously. Part of the reason was that ring spinning was associated with growing 
geographical diversity, product specialisation and the establishment of market niches. 
This was also true of automatic weaving. In spinning there had been a hundred years 
of competition between continuous and intermittent methods and the adoption of the 
ring reflected the tradition and replacement of throstle spinning in certain districts, 
whereas in weaving the transition from the power loom was a straight forward 
question of automation. In ring spinning, capital equipment manufacturers played an 
important supporting role in the establishment of the technique and several British 
firms were supplying the domestic and export market for ring spindles by 1914. By 
contrast, capital equipment manufacture of automatic looms was monopolised and 
hence less supportive of manufacturers. Furthermore, automatic loom diffusion lagged 
ring spinning for reasons of technical development. The British Northrop Loom 
Company was established 31 years after Howard and Bullough first acquired ring 
spinning patents from the United States. Ring spinning and automatic weaving also 
had potentially asymmetric consequences for the structure of industry labour relations. 
Some of the consequences of the last two points are explored further in chapter 5. 
However, the next stage is to focus on the spinning aspects in more detail by 
comparing the performances of some of the companies identified in the above survey. 
. 
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Chapter 4: The profitability of alternative investment 
decisions 
Like the evolution of the industry as a whole, the diffusion of ring spinning was 
uneven, and tended to an extent to reflect growing product and geographical 
specialisation of the industry before 1914. An important influence on diffusion, 
hitherto not fully considered, was likely to have been the relative profitability of 
alternative technologies. Of the two stages of production, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, only in weaving, with the development of the automatic loom, was 
there a technological discontinuity before 1914. Ring and mule spinning co-existed 
in competition with one another, and the progress of that contest in terms of relative 
profitability of spinning investments is the subject of this chapter. Experiments in 
automatic weaving were more isolated, and are dealt with in chapter 6 in the case 
studies of vertically integrated companies. Below the relative profitability of 
investments in ring and mule spinning companies in the period 1880-1914 are 
examined by reference to return on capital, share prices, and investor returns. 
Data and method 
The principal data were the trading results, share prices, and dividends published in 
the local press of south east Lancashire, supplemented where possible by the company 
business records. Trading activity in shares was centred around Oldham, although 
companies in other towns, such as Rochdale, Middleton, Shaw, and Stalybridge also 
had their shares quoted at Oldham. For this reason, reference is made throughout to 
the Lancashire, rather than specifically the Oldham, stock market. This market was 
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uniquely concerned with Lancashire's main industrial activity, and its specialism in 
cotton shares uniquely distinguished it from the finance capital dominated London, 
Manchester and Liverpool exchanges. ' Returns to the equity investor in each mill 
were calculated using the weekly share list published in the local press, by reference 
to the share price quotation and percentage dividend. Return (r) to an investor using 
such a sequence of data was calculated as follows: 
P1- P11 +d 
r= 
Pty 
(4.1) 
Where P is the share price in pence at times 
, 
and 1 and d' is dividend in pence 
relating to the period between those dates. Two initial problems were the use of non 
metric currency and the method of quotation. Thus all financial, data were first 
decimalised. Information for use in the return formula and for share price indices was 
derived by reference to published share price quotations. Usual practice was to quote 
the share price at bid/offer spread of x shillings discount or premium to a quoted 
nominal value, the latter corresponding to the amount of share capital called up. 
Dividends were quoted at a percentage of the called up share capital rather than of 
the market price. To represent the data in a usable form, the decimal equivalent mid 
price was calculated. Dividend per share was then calculated and added to the capital 
gain. 
Ex ante, there are several potential problems associated with using share 
market data. In modern financial theory, it is usually assumed that financial markets 
equalise rates of return for securities with similar risk and produce returns adjusted 
for the appropriate degree of expected risk, based on knowledge of previous 
Thomas, The provincial stock exchanges, p. 145; Lavington, The English 
capital market, p. 208. 
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volatility. 2 Thus, in the context of historical research, an important potential 
difficulty associated with such financial data is the so-called `market' problem' 
Differential returns between investments in ring and mule shares might therefore 
simply reflect the perceived differences in risk associated with the two types of 
technology, or possibly differences in their respective product markets. Therefore to 
investigate the problem historically, measures of risk as -well as return must also be 
considered. These will then be interpreted with reference to the historical 
circumstances in which investment decisions were made. It is accepted at this stage, 
however, that using financial market data alone, it may be difficult to draw inferences 
on the commercial superiority of either form of technology. 
Much modern theory rests on the assumption of market efficiency! 
However, rather than presuppose efficiency, for example by simply applying 
twentieth century theory to nineteenth century conditions, it is the historian's task to 
investigate the origin and evolution of the market. Social, and other detailed 
institutional aspects of the emergence of the financial market are examined in Chapter 
8.5 The issue of whether or not the market efficiently allocated capital to different 
sectors of economic activity is also dealt with in later chapters., At this stage, in 
seeking to justify the use of investor returns as evidence, it is necessary to investigate 
one particular aspect of how efficiently the market reflected new information through 
2 Sharpe, `Mutual fund performance', pp. 119-38 and `Risk aversion and the 
stock market', pp. 416-422. 
3 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire, p. 63, 
4 Brearley and Myers, Principles of corporate finance, pp. 309-10. 
In particular, this chapter discusses the co-operative origins of share 
ownership, extensive financial disclosure, and the evolution of powerful 
equity based interests. 
- 
6 See especially chapter 11 which charts the fortunes of Lancashire investors 
against those investing in the wider economy. 
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the adjustment of share prices. Efficiency in this respect is demonstrated if past 
market price changes, and their direction, cannot be used to predict future price 
changes. 7 
However, in nascent or small markets, for example where there are relatively 
few buyers and sellers, shares might be thinly traded and such a condition may not 
necessarily follow. Under such circumstances returns are serially correlated and 
return variances biased! If this were the case, rates of return to the investor would 
be of little value to the historian applying modern financial empirical tests due to the 
presence of `sticky prices', for example if share prices remained unchanged for long 
periods of time without responding to changes in the circumstances of the company. 
Conversely, if a problem of bias did exist, the evidence from a nineteenth century 
stock market would extend the scope for empirical studies of financial markets from 
the perspective of the modern financial economist. Either way, further investigation 
is well justified.. 
, 
Further aspects of market efficiency in the informational sense, given data 
problems, were difficult to test and therefore not subjected to systematic analysis. 
Two particular aspects of this are the speeds with which market prices adjust to new 
published information or to all information whether in the public domain or not 9 For 
example, opportunities to profit from published financial information are rare in a 
modern efficient market due to the speed of price adjustment. 1° In the case of 
Kendall, `The analysis of economic time series, pp. 11-25; Fama, `The 
behavior of stock market prices', pp. 34-105. 
8 Dimson, `Risk measures when shares are subject to infrequent trading', pp. 
197-8. 
9 Respectively these are referred to in finance theory as the semi strong and 
strong forms of the efficient market hypothesis; for a fuller description, see 
Levy and Sarnat, Capital investment and financial decisions, pp. 666-7. 
1° Ball and Brown, `An empirical evaluation', p. 174. 
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Lancashire, share lists were published only weekly, and disaggregation of share price 
movements between anticipation of, and responses to, the announcement of earnings 
figures, would be very difficult using century-old data. Given these difficulties it is 
necessary to exercise caution when interpreting the market data. 
In addition to market data, accounting results were also used. As with any 
financial market, a close relationship between profit and share price might be 
expected, and the same result might also therefore be expected from comparisons of 
market returns and accounting returns on capital employed. Moreover, use of two sets 
of financial data creates the advantage of greater objectivity. Thus two definitions of 
profit were used and compared. First, the return on investment, that is the rate of 
return accruing to an investor as a result of holding a share for one year (equation 
4.1). Second, the rate of return to total long term capital employed. This was defined 
as profit before interest, tax, and dividends, divided by the total long term capital 
employed. In turn, capital employed was defined as equity share capital plus 
distributable reserves plus outstanding long term loans. To achieve consistency, 
historical cost asset valuations were used for all companies and for all years. 
Whilst market data represented objectively determined measures of value, 
accounting reports would not necessarily have possessed the same neutrality. Quoted 
companies were under competitive pressure to pay large dividends, and in the absence 
of regulation, tended to manipulate reported profits through depreciation and stock 
valuation policies. " However, accounting policies of Lancashire spinning companies 
were relatively uniform with respect to fixed assets, depreciation, and stock 
valuation. " Even so, by using two sets of data, the potential weaknesses of each can 
" For an excellent example, inter alia, `Albany Spinning Company: The policy 
of no depreciation: shareholders had enough of it, Oldham Chronicle, 28th 
December, 1895, p. 8. 
12 Moss, Cotton spinning companies' accounts, pp. 27-34. 
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be overcome by reference to the other. 
A method relying upon rates of return of whatever description might be open 
to the accusation that conclusions can only be drawn on the behaviour of decision 
makers who were optimising subject to constraints, and that the full scope of 
entrepreneurial behaviour is not being addressed. " The first point in response to this 
is that the ring mill investments examined represent instances of entrepreneurs 
altering at least some of the constraints, namely those associated with the use of 
skilled mule spinning labour. 11 According to this argument, under such circumstances 
any incremental level of profit for ring spinning would represent a return to 
`innovative' activities, and not optimisation within constraints. 
A second point raises important methodological issues on performance 
measurement. It was not the purpose of the comparative analysis to establish what the 
optimum solution was, and therefore what entrepreneurs should have done. The two 
problems with optimisation are first, that it is impossible to measure consistently 
through time; in economics it is represented as an equilibrium position, and second, 
that it is inadequate as a proxy for actual human behaviour, which tends to seek 
satisfactory rather than ideal solutions. " It is equally likely that in the conditions of 
technological change which existed a hundred years ago, decision makers would have 
sought a satisfactory rather than an optimal solution. If mule spinning provided 
satisfactory solutions, ring spinning was unlikely to be favoured unless there was 
evidence of decisive superiority. 
13 This point formed the basis of the debate between Lazonick and Sandberg; 
see Mass and Lazonick, `The British cotton industry', pp. 25-6. 
14 Lazonick, `The cotton industry', identified two constraints, industrial 
relations and industrial organisation, p. 20 
For an elaboration of these perspectives, see Simon, The New Science of 
Management Decision; Pfeffer and Salancik, External Control of 
Organizations. 
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In attempting to replicate the decision making methods of historical actors, 
the historian must first examine the evidence of the indicators used, and then make 
assumptions, if necessary, about how investments were determined. Given the 
incidence of regular press comment, it would appear that, although the dividend was 
the aspect of financial performance that attracted the greatest comment, return on 
investment was also used frequently by external investor groups. 16 It is, however, 
unlikely that these measures alone would determine investment decisions, given the 
role of complexity, bias, and qualitative factors. In examining rates of return in their 
historical context, it is probable that entrepreneurs would not have shifted from one 
technology to another without unambiguous evidence of superiority. 
Putting these methodological problems aside, an investigation into the 
profitability of ring spinning technology in Britain was likely to be constrained by 
three further factors. First, as noted in chapter 3, relatively few companies adopted 
exclusively ring spinning technology before 1914, but even fewer did so in the 1880s. 
Nonetheless, the willingness of promoters to launch new concerns of this type must 
have been influenced by the profitability of those already in production. The fewer 
the number of ring spinning companies, the greater the individual attention each 
would have attracted. ' Second, the survival record of documentary evidence for 
16 Oldham Chronicle, weekly reports never omitted dividend data (as a 
percentage of paid up capital) throughout the period; passim various issues 
also published rankings of companies in the district by reference to profit per 
spindle or profit as a percentage of equity and loan capital. The rankings 
ceased to appear after 1892, but the measures themselves continued to be 
used. 
For example, the Oldham Chronicle reported: `The result at the Palm was 
awaited with some interest, this concern having adopted what is known as the 
ring principle of spinning' (1 January 1887, p. 8 (vii)); other examples of 
interest in ring mill shares from this source, see 3 January 1891, p. 8 (iii); 
4 April 1891, p. 8. 
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individual concerns for this period was relatively poor. " Finally, the availability of 
comparative evidence was restricted to the south east Lancashire area, which although 
representing a significant proportion of British and world output, " prevented the 
survey from being described as comprehensive. 
'$ RCHM, Records of British business, section on cotton, pp. 29-47, and as 
acknowledged by other historians, for example, Lazonick and Mass, 
`Performance of British Cotton', p. 33. 
19 The Oldham `district' of Oldham, Rochdale, and Ashton under Lyne 
accounted for 26 % of spindles in Britain and 12 % of the world total in 1890, 
Farnie, `The emergence of Victorian Oldham', p. 42. 
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Table 4.1: Sample data 
Observation Sample companies and dates 
(1) Returns on investment: 
Share market data 
Share prices; mule spinners 
Share prices; ring spinners 
Per table 1.3: all mule companies, Apr 1884 
- 
June 1914, except Hathershaw, Apr 1884 
- 
April 1907. 
Per table 1.3: 
New Ladyhouse, Apr 1884 
- 
June 1914. 
Haugh, Apr 1884 
- 
June 1914 
New Hey, October 1886 
- 
June 1914. 
Palm, June 1884 
- 
June 1914. 
Era, June 1898 
- 
June 1914. 
Cromer, October 1907 
- 
June 1914. 
Return on investment, all companies Equally weighted average calculated from 
individual company data. 
(2) Returns on capital: 
Accounting data. 
Return on capital; mule spinners 
Return on capital; ring spinners 
Return on capital; averages 
Return on capital; industry average 
Dowry, 1884 
- 
1913 
Werneth, 1884 
- 
1913 
Moorfield, 1884 
- 
1913 
Sun Mill, 1884 
- 
1913 
Osborne, 1890 
- 
1913. 
New Ladyhouse, 1884 
- 
1913 
Haugh, 1884 
- 
1913 
New Hey, 1886 
- 
1913 
Equally weighted average calculated 
individual company data for mule and 
mills listed above. 
Average returns for approximately 
companies, 1884 
- 
1913. 
from 
ring 
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Sources: All share prices and dividends for each quarter in the above ranges taken 
from the Oldham Chronicle; profit before interest and tax and capital employed 
calculated by company for each of the above years from each source listed in table 
1.2; industry average return on capital, based on the Economist sample, see chapter 
1, pp. 34-6. 
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Details of the samples used are given in table 4.1. Financial data, as 
published in share lists, were available for a large number of mule companies and a 
restricted number of ring spinning companies. The sample used was the `spinning 
sample' (see chapter 1), which was selected from the Oldham share list, the 
population having been segmented on the basis of the technology employed. All ring 
spinners floated prior to 1906 with market quotations were included, but even so the 
sample consisted of only four companies in the earlier decades, the three companies 
in the Milnrow group and Palm Mill of Oldham. For later flotations, the time series 
of data would be too short to support valid conclusions. Fifteen mule spinners were 
selected randomly from the eighty three companies in the Oldham share list of 2nd 
April 1884,20 subject to the inclusion of the Werneth, the Moorfield, the Sun Mill, 
and the Dowry Spinning Companies, whose performance could be corroborated from 
other published and archival sources? ' The mule sample was large enough to be 
insensitive to unusual factors affecting specific companies. For example, one of the 
companies selected, the Hathershaw, was put out of business when its mill was 
destroyed by fire in 1907, causing an estimated £60,000 worth of damage. ' 
Another, the Shiloh, enjoyed an extraordinary fivefold increase in size during the 
period (table 4.5). 
Accounting data were more restricted for both types of company, and sample 
sizes smaller than for the `spinning sample'. For mule spinning, the four companies 
listed above, plus the Osborne Spinning Company were used, and contrasted with the 
20 As published in the Oldham Chronicle. The list included Rochdale companies 
and those from other districts near Oldham. 
21 Werneth, OLSL, Misc/42/17 and 18, quarterly reports to members, 1890- 
1912; Dowry, Courtaulds Plc Archives Dept, LCC1/Dow. 1, nominal ledger, 
pp. 269-272; Moorfield, Smith, `An Oldham limited', pp. 34-53; Tyson, 
`Sun Mill'. 
' Gurr and Hunt, The cotton mills of Oldham, p. 35. 
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three Milnrow ring spinning companies. 2' However, to supplement individual 
companies, the Economist sample, being aggregate data for between 70 and 100 
companies, was also drawn into the analysis as an industry average measure. 24 All 
the companies in the `spinning sample' were also included in the Economist sample, 
along with other similar companies from the same area. Thus although comparable, 
the term `industry' average, should be used cautiously since the companies included 
were exclusively from south east Lancashire. 
Similarity of product range amongst the mule spinning companies prevented 
a matching of each of the ring mills to a comparable mule spinner on the basis of 
yarn count or raw cotton input, since all used American cotton and spun typically 
Oldham counts of 32s. Mule mills tended to produce wefts as well as warps (table 
1.2). Ring mills produced warps only, but this condition allowed us to test whether 
or not any incentive existed for mule mills to shift to rings on the warp section of 
their product range, since the constraints of vertical specialisation did not exist for 
warp production. ' Given the small number of ring concerns, the simple choice 
facing the investor would have been between ring mill shares and the shares of mule 
mills, not between shares of ring and mule mills specialising in particular product 
ranges. 
Data analysis (1): Stock market trends 
On the basis of the above justifications of the method adopted, the samples used, and 
2' For Osborne, LCRO, DDX/869/3/1, trade, capital and profit and loss 
accounts, 1889-1914; for the Milnrow companies there were no surviving 
archival records, and their profits and capital as published in the Rochdale 
Observer, and Oldham Chronicle were used instead. 
24 See chapter 1, p. 22. 
Lazonick, `Stubborn mules', p. 82. 
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the significance of the data, we now examine two areas in turn. First, stock market 
data is analysed in terms of investor's returns and share prices. Stock market data is 
then reanalysed incorporating measures of risk. The second stage of data analysis, 
conducted in the next section, is to examine returns to capital, contrasting accounting 
rates of return between ring mills and other mule mills and ring mills against the 
industry average. 
Interpreting the capital market data, it has to be borne in mind that throughout 
the period, the Lancashire stock exchange failed to establish a formal set of trading 
procedures and permanent location. ' The Lancashire market was relatively 
narrow, ' and it would be correct to conclude that investments were not based on 
diversified portfolios in the modern sense 21 Transactions occurred in specified hotel 
rooms, and generally without contract notes or other formal trappings. ' Press 
advertising of shares for sale was a common practice, not only for brokers, but for 
will executors and members of the public. " Open soliciting of custom and 
21 Thomas, The provincial stock exchanges, chapter 7. 
27 Thomas, The provincial stock exchanges, p. 155. 
28 Modem portfolio theory (Evans and Archer, `Diversification and the 
reduction of dispersion', pp. 761-7), has suggested that 95 % of specific, non- 
market risk, can be avoided by holding a portfolio of 15-25 shares. The 
average shareholding in the early 1870s was 5 shares per investor (as 
calculated from the number of shares listed, per Oldham Chronicle, and 
number of investors, per Fannie, English Cotton, p. 252). In any case, given 
the similarity of activity and product range, investors would have had little 
to gain by diversification. 
29 Farnie, English cotton, pp. 253-4. 
30 Typical advertisements listed shares bid and offered by company and by 
number required. Private individuals tended to offer small lots in contrast to 
the established brokers. On 7th January 1905, one regular advertisement 
employing, along with seven other broking firms, a regular weekly format, 
John Hood and Sons, Stock and Sharebrokers of Clegg Street, listed 2530 
shares in 43 named companies on a `want to buy' list, and 2345 shares in 34 
companies on a `have for sale' list. 
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commission in this manner exemplified the unregulated nature of the market. 
Whilst on the one hand creating a certain transparency, broking practices 
might well have generated profit making opportunities for unscrupulous brokers and 
promoters. Weekly reporting of financial news, with daily trading opportunities, 
might have supported such behaviour. News events such as profit results may have 
been known to directors and their associates during the week, but in practice they 
would not be widely known until published on the Saturday. 31 Anecdotally, there is 
evidence that prices were often slow to respond to new information, and that certain 
dealers had strong advantages over potentially naive investors 32 Brokers such as 
John Kidger and John Bunting provided the weekly share price and dividend 
collations, together with, in the case of the latter, market commentaries. Some 33 
investors were occasionally caught by surprise when trading results were published, 
but this may have provided good profit making opportunities for more expert dealers. 
For example the stocktakings of September 1891 `made serious havoc in the prices 
of some notable companies'. ' Naive investor groups might well have lost out to 
increasingly dominant cliques of promoters. In addition to promotional groups, there 
were many examples of established clientele groupings of shareholders, 35 which 
31 John Kidger, a sharebroker, supplied the Oldham Chronicle with collations 
of company results (the ` latest stocktakings' column appeared weekly). 
32 Inter alia, Oldham Chronicle, 24 September, 1892, p. 8(iii); BPP, Royal 
Commission on the depression of trade and industry, pp. 427-9, evidence of 
A. Simpson blamed limited liability legislation for the rise of a new class of 
speculators. 
33 Oldham Chronicle; Bunting contributed a regular column on progress and 
expectations for the share market from 4th January 1890 onwards. 
34. John Bunting, writing in the Oldham Chronicle, 3rd October, 1891. 
31 Typical shareholders of this sort exercised influence over managerial 
behaviour by `voice' (active participation at meetings), as opposed to `exit' 
(selling their shares). See the examples of the Mitchell Hey, Sun Mill,. 
Werneth and Albany Spinning Companies in chapter eight. For a more 
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might have counterbalanced activities of insiders and promoters. The average investor 
held shares in perhaps one or two companies, participated actively in their affairs, 
and understood the trade. 36 Investors were overwhelmingly local, although this 
became less true as the century progressed. 37 Generally, it was unlikely that 
Lancashire investors diversified into nationally based portfolios, a point given further 
empirical support in chapter 11. For now, it is enough to note that a significant 
proportion of investors' capital became committed to specific companies. If the 
strategies of large numbers of investors were based around the principle of `buy and 
hold', there may have slow turnover in certain securities and hence sticky prices. 
The first stage of the empirical analysis is to deal with those aspects of market 
efficiency as pointed out above, which, if not present, might bias the data. To 
establish efficiency, it is necessary to show that successive price changes are not 
correlated. " Similarly, where the differences between two prices in a time series can 
be equated to an error term which displays random attributes, the conventional unit 
root test can be applied. " Efficiency was thus tested for via the following equation: 
Pý = apt_, + at (4.2) 
general discussion of the 'exit/voice' dichotomy and capital market operation 
see: Hirchman, Exit, voice and loyalty; Fama and Jensen `Separation of 
ownership and control', pp. 301 
- 
26; Fama and Jensen, `Agency problems 
and residual claims', pp. 327 
- 
52. 
36 Lavington, The English capital market, p. 208; Ellison, The cotton trade, p. 
138. 
37 Smith, `An Oldham limited liability company', p. 41; Tyson, `Sun Mill', p. 
296. 
38 Fama, `The behavior of stock market prices', pp. 34-105. 
31 Gujerati, Basic econometrics, p. 718. 
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where P1 is the price observed at time , The error term, a, has zero mean, constant 
variance and is non- autocorrelated. Modern stock market data is normally expected 
to follow a random walk, ' and under these circumstances, the predicted value of the 
co-efficient a is 1, which is sufficient to prove the non stationarity, or random 
properties, of the error term. 
Arising from the techniques pioneered by the authors of this method, " in 
empirical work it is conventional to re-arrange equation 4.2, to incorporate first 
differences, as follows: 
Apt + a, 
= öPt, + at (4.3) 
In this reformulation, the expected value of the co-efficient ö is zero if randomness 
is to be demonstrated. A regression for the Lancashire stock market, using quarterly 
observations for the period 1884-1913 gave the following results: 
Apt 
_ 
-0.033901 + 0.003470 P,, 1 
(0.020) (0.222) 
r2 = 0.00041; DW = 1.564742 
t (= tau) statistics are in parentheses, and by reference to a priori computed critical 
values, 43 the hypothesis of non stationarity, or randomness is strongly supported at 
40 Kendall, `The analysis of economic time series', pp. 11-25. 
a' Dickey and Fuller, `Distribution of estimators', pp. 427-431. 
42 DW 
= Durbin Watson ratio. A result close to 2, as in this case, confirms the 
absence of serially correlated error terms, Gujerati, Basic econometrics, p. 
424. 
43 MacKinnon, `Critical values of cointegration tests', p. 275. 
the 99 % confidence interval. Hence the market is concluded to have been weak form 
efficient. In other words, it was likely that shares were not so thinly traded as prevent 
a market response to a change in profit or risk expectations. Thus despite aspects of 
primitiveness in organisation and its informality, the stock market of nineteenth 
century Lancashire, provides perhaps a surprisingly close parallel with a modern 
financial market. 
On the basis of such a conclusion, the next stage is to analyse return and risk 
differentials between different types of companies. Taking returns first, in terms of 
investor's total return (equation 4.1) and an index of share prices, both types of 
technology enjoyed short periods of supremacy (figures 4.1 and 4.2). For the period 
as a whole, investor returns were higher, but not significantly higher, for ring 
spinners (table 4.2). In the years immediately following their flotation in the late 
1870s and early 1880s, the ring mills tended to outperform the mule mills, as 
measured by share price. However, at certain periods, mule spinning was able to 
compete on an apparently equal footing, especially in the upswing years of the trade 
cycle. For example in 1887-9, during a trade cycle upswing, mule spinners overtook 
the ring spinners. Once the cycle had reached its peak, market confidence shifted 
back to the ring spinners. A similar pattern occurred in the final boom period before 
the First World War. Under such conditions, it would be difficult for investors, and 
hence perhaps, entrepreneurs, to arrive at any sort of `optimum' solution regarding 
plant and equipment. 
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Figure 4.1: Stock market returns on investment, 
1884-1913 
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Sources: Share prices and dividends for each quarter taken from Oldham Chronicle 
as per table 4.1; returns on investment calculated for each company using equation 
4.1 and aggregated into equally weighted averages for ring and mule sub groups. 
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Figure 4.2: Share price index, 1884-1913 
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Sources: Share prices for each quarter taken from Oldham Chronicle as per table 4.1; 
and an index constructed for each company (2nd quarter 1890 = 100) and aggregated 
into equally weighted averages for ring and mule sub groups as per table 4.1 
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Table 4.2: Annual, percentage returns on ring and 
mule mill shares, 1884-1913 
(1) Financial Market Returns 
Ring Mule 
mills mills 
% 
Average return, 1884-1913 
Standard Deviation 
By period: 
1886-1892 
1893-1903 
1904-1910 
10.90 13.82 
11.10 33.08 
7.23 1.48 
9.60 22.49 
12.85 21.79 
(2) Accounting Returns 
Average return, 1884-1913 
Standard Deviation 
By period: 
1886-1892 
1893-1903 
1904-1910 
Ring Mule 
mills mills 
% 
10.46 5.26 
6.11 5.43 
9.72 4.19 
8.08 3.58 
14.52 
,_ 
8.75 
Sources: Financial market returns; share prices and dividends taken from Oldham 
Chronicle and returns on investment calculated as per figure 4.1, but using annual 
rather than quarterly observations. Accounting returns; sample as per table 4.1, 
annual accounting rate of return calculated from data sources of profit and capital and 
listed in table 1.2 
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In the 1890s technology provided neither solution nor shelter; cotton investors 
of all persuasions were buffeted by severe economic storms. The significance of the 
depression in share values in the period 1890-6 is clear from figure 4.2, and was well 
understood by commentators of the time. In 1893, a Textile Mercury correspondent 
had written of an `unparalleled depression and of severity and duration'. 44 Yet the 
real significance of the depression of the 1890s has been overlooked by historians. 
First, the depression amounted to a financial crisis. The consequences of the great 
crash of 1929, often depicted as a sudden panic, were better characterised by the 49 
months of continual decline in the London share index. In Lancashire the period of 
continuous decline, if one insignificant upturn is ignored, was of equal length. 
Despite absence of newsreel showing suicidal investors on high buildings, 
Lancashire's agony matched that of the world's stock markets four decades later. The 
economic consequences were not quite as significant, but nonetheless it is important 
to note that there were powerful forces at work in the world market which moulded 
the destiny of Lancashire. 
Some of these wider issues are left to a later chapter. Our concern here is 
with choice of technology, and this prompts a second reason for the importance of 
the 1890s depression. Speaking from the artificial standpoint of an economic vacuum, 
the 1890s was an important, and short lived, opportunity for Lancashire to install ring 
spindles. The patents had been acquired, the main capital equipment supplier, Howard 
and Bullough, was keen to extend its new market, and the pioneer companies'were 
successful. But if developments in ring spinning had been facilitated by the spread of 
joint stock finance to Rochdale in the 1880s, in the 1890s that system of finance 
became a barrier to its further spread. As noted in chapter 3, very few mills of any 
kind were floated in the half decade before 1898, and an important reason was lack 
" Textile Mercury, 21 January 1893, p. 43. 
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of confidence. If new mills were to be floated, the sine qua non was a rising stock 
market. Earlier booms had created `cliques' of promoters for whom a rising financial 
market provided liquidity to exit from their investment at a profit once the mill was 
launched. These practices were often criticised, especially by those who blamed 
promotional groups for overcapacity in the industry during trade depressions 45 
Whoever or whatever was to blame, the effect was a dearth of investment activity. 
Investors may have noticed from press reports that ring mills performed 
better than mule mills during the slump. However, in a market where the scarcest 
commodity is confidence, they would have been unlikely to seek investments 
associated with risk. As a recent technological development, the uncertainties 
associated with ring spinning would have no doubt counterbalanced any increased 
confidence that may have been associated with above average profits or below 
average losses (figures 4.1 and 4.2, table 4.2). Underlying profits of ring mills 
continued to be strong despite the fluctuations of the stock market. 46 Unfortunately 
confidence was too low to sustain new investment in any part of the joint, stock 
section of the industry. 
Ring spinning was thus not an alternative, even though during the early 1890s 
it was the mule mill shares that performed particularly badly. All mills in the sample, 
including those in Rochdale, were equally affected by the strikes which culminated 
in the Brooklands lockout of 1893. Ring mill shares thus declined along with those 
of the mule mills, albeit less steeply. By 1895, the continuation of the depression had 
as For examples of similar comments made at the depth of two trade cycles, see 
BPP, Royal Commission on the depression of trade and industry, 1886, J. 
Mawdsley, p. 407; Textile Mercury, 16th November, 1895. 
Oldham Chronicle, passim; Rochdale Observer, 27 December, 1902, noted 
the comparative success of the Milnrow mills over the previous nine years. 
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caused protracted declines in share prices, in some cases to catastrophic levels. ' 
Ring mill shares demonstrated some immunity to this 'downward pressure (figure 
4.2), and certainly escaped the worst of the switch back ride experienced by 
shareholders in the mule mills. 
An outstanding feature of the trends figure 4.1 was the high returns to mule 
mill investors in 1896-7. Much of this was attributable to a strong speculative element 
in the rapid rise of mule mill shares, matching earlier steep declines. Investors would 
have been able to pick up certain shares cheaply and watch them quickly treble or 
quadruple in value. High returns now became a function of previous poor 
performance, as investors looked first to the `discount class' of shares, leaving ` the 
dividend class of shares somewhat neglected'. ' As will become clear in the analysis 
of risk below, the mule spinners tended to be in the former class and the ring 
spinners in the latter. 
Earlier, the `market problem' was suggested as a possible obstacle to data 
interpretation. The implication was that return must be analysed in conjunction with 
risk, and, in particular at this stage, through an examination of how contemporaries 
would have interpreted these aspects of investment. We have already seen that ring 
mills enjoyed a slight advantage in terms of return; when risk is introduced into the 
picture, the advantage appears all the more decisive. Figure 4.3 shows the risk/ 
return trade off for all companies in the spinning sample. Standard deviation provides 
a measure of volatility, and hence the risk, of each share (see table 4.2 and figure 
4.3). Generally it might be expected that there should be a direct trade off between 
risk and return, since rational investors are risk averse and would demand 
47 For example the Albert mill had shares of called up nominal value £2 15s 
quoted at just ls. 6d. A survey in the Textile Mercury, 2 November, 1895, 
showed market capitalisations to have fallen to one third of 1883 levels. 
'ý Oldham Chronicle, 27th March, 1897, p. 8. 
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compensation for holding risky assets. 
There are two surprising features in figure 4.3. First, although the expected 
risk return trade off might be expected to display an approximately linear 
relationship, ' the correlation is less obvious. The rank correlation coefficient is only 
+0.017, which means there is virtually no linear relationship between risk and 
return. 10 Only very high risk mule companies, Albert, Hathershaw and Werneth 
provide any evidence of a trade off. As we have seen, this was attributable to the 
very serious decline, and subsequent recovery, in their share prices during the 1890s. 
49 Brearley, An introduction to risk and return, p. 51. 
50 In contrast, a survey of a more recent data for mutual funds showed a 
statistic of +0.44; see Sharpe, `Mutual fund performance', p. 119-138. 
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Figure 4.3: The risk and return trade off 
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The second important feature, which in part accounts for the 
surprising aspects of the first, is the clustering of ring mills on an axis of higher 
relative returns, but lower relative risk. Such a pattern is highly counter intuitive for 
the additional reason that if ring spinning was a new technology, expected risk would 
be higher than for mule mills where technology was more established. " However, as 
we have already seen in chapter 3, ring mill introductions were associated with 
continuous throstle spinning traditions and reflected the continuing geographical and 
functional specialisation of the industry. 
Investors may therefore have adopted alternative methods of appraising risk. 
The Oldham district, reflecting the traditions of co-operation and the large pay outs 
associated with the flotation manias of the 1870s and 1880s, had been noted for its 
obsession with dividends and earned the nickname of `Diviborough'. 52 Apparent 
generosity of dividend payments is a phenomenon investigated further in chapters 7 
and 8. The dividend is an obvious component of investor return, but may also have 
formed part of the risk perception of investors. In particular, the regularity of 
dividend, arising either from steady profits or careful accumulation and use of 
reserves, may explain the low rating of Sun Mill and the high rating of the Milnrow 
and other ring spinners in figure 4.3. 
Si In this sense the data are imperfect as actual returns are proxies for expected 
returns 
-a common problem in stock market based research; see Merton, `On 
estimating the expected return on the market', pp 323 
- 
361. 
I Farnie, `Emergence of Victorian Oldham', p. 41. 
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Table 4.3: Dividend payment reliability 
Number of Quarters in which no dividend paid, January 1890 
- 
June 1914 
Company Number of 
quarters 
High risk mule spinners 
Sun Mill 58 
Shiloh 32 
Low risk mule spinners 
Dowry 18 
Duke 9 
Ring spinners 
Haugh 1 
New Hey nil 
New Ladyhouse 10 
Source: Oldham Chronicle share listings by quarter, April 1890 
- 
June 1914. 
-High 
and low risk mule spinners were sampled according to standard deviations per figure 
4.3. 
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Regularity of dividend payment may have helped underpin market confidence 
and risk assessment. For the ring spinners, what hid been technically a `leap in the 
dark'33 in the 1870s, had, by 1890 become a stable and accepted method of 
producing regular profits and dividends. The Milnrow ring spinners established a 
reputation for paying a regular 10% per quarter; for one of these companies to fail 
to pay a dividend was a very rare exception. 54 The ability of these companies to 
guarantee a reasonably regular earnings stream, and its implications for risk 
assessment by investors, is analysed further by reference to profit data below. It is 
worth noting at this stage that despite their financial reliability, none of the ring mills 
attracted a significant amount of incremental capital investment. 
By contrast mule mills, such as Sun Mill, Shiloh, and Werneth, went for very 
long periods without paying dividends. They suffered serious misfortunes in the 
1890s, losing out to failed futures speculations and poor buying policies. " Large 
adverse balances on reserve rendered these companies incapable of paying dividends, 
relegating them to a long struggle for promotion from the `discount' class, and were 
unattractive to investors other than in speculative periods. Past profit, whether 
accumulated to reserves or paid as dividends, was thus an important determinant of 
investor perception of risk. " Unlike the ring mill companies, these three companies 
all made significant investments in new fixed assets after 1900. 
53 Rochdale Observer, 28th June 1890. 
sa Rochdale Observer, 28th June, 1890; Rochdale Observer, 27th December, 
1902. 
ss Tyson, `Sun Mill', p. 275; Jeremy, ` T. E. Gartside', DBB, p. 495; Werneth, 
OLSL, Misc. 42/17, quarterly reports to members, 27th October 1893; 
56 The crucial determinant was the balance on reserves, and hence accumulated 
past profits. Those with credit balances were referred to as the `dividend 
class'; in contra distinction from those with negative balances, which thus had 
no prospect of paying a dividend, Oldham Chronicle, passim. 
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Table 4.4: individual company rates of return 
Company Investor Beta 
return 
Male mills 
Albert 21.43 2.14 
Borough 10.66 0.92 
Duke 9.68 0.46 
Dowry 8.62 0.52 
Garfield 7.81 0.62 
Greenacres 9.59 0.82 
Guidebridge 10.23 1.71 
Hathershaw 23.57 3.94 
Moorfield 8.23 0.67 
Oldham Twist 7.81 0.72 
Osborne not quoted 
Park and Sandy 10.81 0.37 
Shiloh 9.63 1.19 
Stanley 10.36 1.80 
Sun Mill 15.85 2.08 
Werneth 12.03 1.25 
Average 13.82 
Ring spinners 
Cromer 16.87 2.32 
Era 10.92 0.50 
Haugh 10.25 0.31 
New Hey 11.08 0.18 
New Ladyhouse 11.66 0.35 
Palm 8.34 0.14 
Average 10.90 
Return 
on capital 
4.70 
5.33 
7.19 
4.60 
4.60 
5.28 
8.06 
9.38 
13.72 
10.43 
Note: Averages are weighted by length of period of inclusion for each company. 
Sources: as per table 4.2. 
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A further aspect of risk was that which arose from investing in a strongly 
cyclical industry. Such influences tended to dominate both profits and investor 
returns, and hence it is likely that investor risk perception might have been governed 
by the extent to which movements in the price of a particular share were 
amplifications of movements in the market as a whole. To avoid the so-called 
`systematic' risk associated with these movements, the response of the rational 
investor should be to diversify into other sectors. In Oldham, for the social and 
infrastructural reasons explored in chapter 8, this did not happen, and investors 
remained exposed to the specific risks associated with cotton shares. Our discussion 
of risk so far, using the standard deviation measure, has examined the total volatility 
of a share. To measure the risk associated with the cyclical aspects of the cotton 
trade, the beta factor (table 4.4) was used to formally measure covariance between 
an individual security and the market. 57 Because we are concerned with investment 
in a specific sector, the beta factor is calculated by reference to the returns on an 
individual cotton security and the market index for the Lancashire stock exchange. 
The above trends further explain the apparent anomaly of higher apparent risk 
associated with mule shares. Shareholders whose companies fell into the `discount 
class' by the 1890s, such as the Albert, the Hathershaw, and the Sun Mill companies 
found themselves holding highly volatile stock. Furthermore, their investments 
amplified in value vis a vis movements in the market. In the crash of the early 1890s 
they performed very badly indeed, but recovered very strongly thereafter. Ring mills, 
especially the Milnrow companies, demonstrated similar responses to cyclical effects, 
Beta factors were obtained by regressing quarterly company return against the 
market return, where beta was determined by the slope co-efficient. In all 
cases the co-efficient was statistically significant. Hence beta determines the 
extent of covariance with the market. For example, a share with a beta factor 
of two would on average rise or fall at double the movement of the market 
index. 
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but with far less dramatic variation. 
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Figure 4.4: Cyclical impacts on risk, 1884-1913. 
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Sources: as per table 4.1; investor returns calculated from quarterly data per figure 
4.1; beta factors calculated from a quarterly return index for each company and a 
market average quarterly return figure derived from all the companies in the sample. 
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Figure 4.4 plots return against risk, as measured by beta, for each company. 
Generally high risk, high beta, shares were a feature of mule mills and not ring 
mills. " More importantly, in an active and competitive market, investors might have 
been expected to switch from the mule mills which tend to cluster below the line of 
best fit to those ring mills which tend to cluster above. This is because the ring mills 
would have offered a higher return for an equivalent, or even lower, degree of risk. 
These shares would have been in high demand and as the market price rose, the 
return would fall, thereby eroding these differentials. The extent to which this market 
process actually took place is not clear from figure 4.4; it is simply suggested that 
over a thirty year period ring mills were highly rated shares, a fact regularly 
confirmed by share market reports in the press. 59 To a fairly large degree, it seems 
that investors took little notice of market signals. The reasons why are examined in 
more detail below, and in later chapters. 
One explanation was that during the renaissance of 1896-1914, ring mill 
shares were caught up by the mule mills (figure 4.2), although both were able to 
sustain high levels of profitability relative to the economy as a whole. 60 Strong 
performances of by mule mill shares were further accentuated by changes in the 
financial structure of the companies. In the booms of the early 1900s, many became 
cash rich, despite generous dividend payments and extensive re-equipment. " In some 
s$ It is noteworthy that investors in mills with high betas, especially Albert and 
Hathershaw, also received high actual returns, which would have 
compensated for the perceived risk of these shares, as predicted by modern 
asset pricing theory (Sharpe, ` Capital asset prices', pp. 425-442; Lintner, 
`Valuation of risk assets', pp. 13-37). 
39 Oldham Chronicle, passim. 
60 Jones, ` Cotton Spinning Industry', pp. 10-11; chapter 10 below. 
61 Sun Mill was a typical example; Tyson, `Sun mill', pp. 286-90. 
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cases surplus cash was used for investments in the shares of other mills, " and in 
many others for'the repayment of loan accounts. 63 Where rate of return on capital 
was above the cost of borrowing, as it normally was after 1896, the effect would 
have been to reduce shareholder returns in accounting terms. For share prices, 
however, there was a beneficial outcome, first from the bubble effect of purchases 
of shares by other mill companies, and then from elimination of financial risk 
previously associated with indebted companies. Shareholders now had sole rights to 
the large amounts of cash generated. Even more importantly, once loan accounts were 
repaid, surplus cash was used to reduce share capital. ' This was an important 
financial side effect of the boom of 1907. Earnings were thus concentrated over fewer 
shares, thereby boosting share prices. Furthermore, there was important distinction 
between policies of ring and mule mills. The Milnrow companies all used surplus 
cash to pay straight bonus dividends to their shareholders. Other mills, by contrast, 
cancelled share capital with the return of cash to shareholders. The apparent 
superiority of mule mill shares in the period 1906-12 (figure 4.2), which was in any 
case marginal, might thus be explained purely in terms of this effect. It also allows 
some explanation of the evident contradiction between the share prices and investor 
returns examined above, and the accounting returns analysed in the next section. 
62 Oldham Chronicle, 15th July, 1911, p. 12; Tyson, `Sun mill', p. 301. 
63 New Hey closed its loan account in 1905; Moorfield, Dowry closed theirs in 
1906; Oldham Chronicle, 30th December 1905 and 29th December 1906. 
Detailed cases are considered in chapter 8. 
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Data analysis (2): Return to capital trends 
Aside from these specific causes of divergence, when accounting rates of return were 
used the same overall trends were apparent. Impacts of creative accounting can be 
discounted to an extent since although manipulations might have occurred in different 
companies at different times, such pressures were likely to be felt relatively evenly 
by many companies, given their collective vulnerability to the trade cycle "65 In any 
case, it would have been difficult to distort figures persistently through accounting 
devices over a number of years without errors cancelling each other out. There was 
a strong similarity between the performances of individual mule companies and the 
industry average, reflecting high dependence upon forces beyond the control of the 
individual entrepreneur. 
Note the close correspondence in returns between the individual mule 
companies in figure 4.5 and the average for the section of the industry 
represented by the Economist sample in figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.5: Returns to capital; ring and mule mills, 
1884-1913. 
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Figure 4.6: Returns to capital; ring mills and industry 
average, 1885-1913. 
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As with the stock market trends, the mule mills had their best relative 
performances during trade recoveries. The local press, which periodically published 
league tables of companies showing profit as a percentage of capital and profit per 
spindle, noticed these trends. For example, in 1889, as the trade recovered strongly, 
the three Milnrow companies only achieved 10th, 12th and 22nd positions out of 68 
companies. " Once the cycle had reached its peak, a more usual state of affairs 
persisted. Commenting on the profit per spindle results for 1890, in a table showing 
the Milnrow group at 1st, 2nd and 4th positions, an Oldham Chronicle correspondent 
wrote: `The ring spindle concerns lead the way As usual... '. 67 The same turning 
points of 1896 and 1907 were also. apparent in the return to capital trends. When 
aggregate ring and mule samples were compared, however, the picture changed, in 
that the ring companies achieved consistently superior performance, earning greater 
profits whatever the condition of the trade cycle (figures 4.5 and 4.6). The New 
Ladyhouse performed better than its two apparently identical neighbours, but the 
Haugh and New Hey companies in turn were able to earn higher profits than any 
mule company. Some of the reasons for differential performances have already been 
pointed out. Nonetheless, on the basis of this evidence, the failure of Lancashire to 
emulate the pioneer ring spinners might still appear surprising. But to assert failure 
and seek to attribute blame, and to conclude merely on the basis of generic technical 
differentiation alone, might lead to oversimplification. What is more important is to 
seek causes of differential performance. For example, the high profitability of ring 
mills may have been to product range, geographical location, or factory architecture 
and organisation. To address these issues, further comparative analysis of the sample 
companies was carried out by reference to the aspects of individual company 
Oldham Chronicle, 4th January, 1890. 
67 Oldham Chronicle, 3rd January, 1891. 
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performances (tables 4.5,4.6 and figure 4.7). 
One obvious reason for the apparent discrepancy lies in the nature of the data. 
Accounting data were available for the Milnrow ring spinners, but not for the rest of 
the ring spinners in the sample. Despite their stock market quotations, none of the 
other companies in the ring mill section of the spinning sample published balance 
sheets. It was therefore likely that the Milnrow group simply out performed the later 
ring mills or those located elsewhere. Comparison with stock market returns to a 
shareholder of the Palm Mill of Oldham (figure 4.7) tended to support such an 
interpretation. 
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Figure 4.7: Comparative ring mill performance 
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Product range helped explain the unusual performance of Palm mill shares 
which tended to move in the opposite direction to the rest of the market. In the 
depression of 1894-5, Palm mill investors did remarkably well and uniquely amongst 
cotton investors saw their shares rise. Conversely, in the boom years of the 1900s a 
dismal performance contrasted markedly with record share prices elsewhere. Price 
behaviour of Palm shares distorted the ring share indices and exclusion from the 
accounting data confirmed the superior performance of ring spinners as represented 
by the Milnrow group alone. One reason for the differential performance of Palm 
Mill, the sole Oldham ring mill at this time, was niche marketing; the company 
developed its own trade mark in the 1880s, 68 and some of its wide range of output 
was for the domestic hosiery trade. 69 The crisis of 1894-5 caused for the industry as 
whole by the loss of the Indian market was therefore not a serious problem for Palm, 
unlike most other companies in the industry. 
Those mule mills which lowered their average count, or that specialised in 
warps, did not perform significantly better or worse than the rest of the mule sample 
(table 4.4). The Albert and Borough Spinning companies specialised in warps. As we 
have seen, very high average returns to investors in the former specifically resulted 
from the recovery from near zero values in 1896. Speculators were attracted to such 
shares in the `discount section... which... afford(ed) opportunities for a quick rise'. 70 
In a couple of years, 1896 and 1897, investor returns were two and three hundred 
percent. For example, the Albert saw a rise in its shares from is and 6d to 15s 6d 
in just over a year. " Borough shares achieved more average returns during this 
68 Worrall, Cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 1889. 
69 UTR, credit ratings, 4th April 1923. 
70 John Bunting, Oldham Chronicle, 26th December, 1896. 
Oldham Chronicle, 28th September, 1895; 26th December, 1896. 
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period. Unlike the ring mills, which also specialised in warps, the shares of neither 
company attracted much press comment. It was likely therefore, that the ring mills, 
or at least those at Milnrow, were genuinely more profitable when spinning warp 
yarns. Another company which specialised increasingly in lower counts was the 
Shiloh Spinning. Although the company achieved something of a turnaround during 
the 1890s, 'Z its average investor return for the period including the 1880s was not 
spectacular (9.63% compared to 13.82% for other mule mills; table 4.4). 
Geographical location might have been a further reason for differences in 
performance. To address the point in more detail, despite some obvious data 
restrictions, further comparisons were performed. The Era Ring Mill at Rochdale, 
floated in 1898, was contrasted with the Milnrow companies on a profit per spindle 
basis. On average it appeared to have been about as successful, recording a profit per 
spindle of £0.15 compared to £0.13 for the Haugh and New Ladyhouse companies 
(table 4.5). When we add the trends from figure 4.7, which showed that Palm Mill 
of Oldham, unlike all other companies, missed out on the boom of 1907 and suffered 
a dramatic decline until 1911, there was a hint that Rochdale might have been a 
preferred location. If acknowledged it could be concluded that ring spinners in 
Rochdale performed better than ring spinners in Oldham, and that furthermore, what 
was a well established and flagship ring mill, performed much worse than Oldham 
mule spinners in the period 1906 
- 
1911. That promoters generally rushed to float the 
new mule mills in the 1905-8 building boom was perhaps therefore not surprising. 
New mills were of an unprecedented size; factory organisation, and implicitly 
capital accumulation, provided further important contrasts between the two spinning 
methods. The single storey, shed based, construction of the early ring mills has 
already been noted in chapter 3. Mule mills, by contrast, continued to be built on a 
I Jeremy, ` T. E. Gartside', DBB, p. 495. 
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multi storey model, principally to accommodate rising mule lengths. What seems very 
surprising is that, given their profitability, not only were they not widely emulated, 
but in spindleage and capital terms, the Milnrow mills were the same size in 1914 as 
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Table 4.5: Comparative performance of ring spinners; 
profit per spindle, 1884-1913. 
(figures in decimal pence, p) 
YEAR COMPANY 
Haugh New Lady- New Hey 
house 
1884 0.13 0.33 
1885 0.16 0.31 
1886 0.12 0.35 
1887 0.10 0.15 0.43 
1888, 0.14 0.16 0.25 
1889 0.10 0.11 0.09 
1890 0.15 0.16 0.22 
1891 0.12 0.13 0.17 
1892 0.08 0.10 0.13 
1893 0.07 0.05 0.09 
1894 0.02 0.05 0.13 
1895 0.10 0.08 0.12 
1896 0.09 0.11 0.18 
1897 0.11 0.13 0.18 
1898 0.13 0.14 0.22 
1899 0.13 0.15 0.21 
1900 0.10 0.12 0.18 
1901 0.06 0.10 0.13 
1902 0.08 0.10 0.15 
1903 0.03 0.03 0.08 
1904 0.04 0.03 0.12 
1905 0.20 0.19 0.33 
1906 0.22 0.16 0.31 
1907 0.50 0.48 0.58 
1908 0.19 0.17 0.31 
1909 0.08 0.06 0.20 
1910 0.01 0.00 0.16 
1911 0.10 0.08 0.20 
1912 0.21 0.20 0.32 
1913 0.19 0.15 0.25 
Averages 
" 
Overall 0.13 0.13 0.22 
1899-1914 0.14 0.13 0.23 
Era 
0.11 
0.10 
0.09 
0.06 
0.01 
0.10 
0.30 
0.23 
0.52 
0.09 
0.04 
0.04 
0.14 
0.23 
0.22 
0.15 
0.15 
Sources: Compiled from Worrall, Cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 
1889,1913; Rochdale Observer; RLSL, C/IND/COT/ERA, balance book, trade 
accounts. 
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they were in the 1880s (table 4.6). " Issues of capital accumulation and divestment 
are addressed in chapter 7. Meanwhile, the size of ring mills would lend support to 
the hypothesis, borne out by the spindleages of new Oldham district mills in the early 
1900s, as noted in chapter 3 (pp. 62-3), that the efficient scale of ring mills was 
smaller than for mule mills. In the cash rich 1900s, investors, and especially the 
promotional groups, were interested in large, and even record breaking projects, such 
as Times No. 2 and the rumoured `Mammoth' mill. 74 Little ring mills might have 
appeared dull by comparison. 
It should be apparent from this discussion that investment decisions in plant 
and equipment did not automatically reflect the signals sent via the capital market in 
terms of relative profitability. This is all the more manifest when growth rates in 
terms of manufacturing capacity for each company are examined (table 4.6). 
Generally, once established, cotton companies tended to operate on a relatively fixed 
capital base. A notable exception was the Shiloh Spinning Company. It achieved very 
significant growth through investment in a new, much larger, mill together with 
significant machinery purchases. 's Thus the average growth in spindleage during the 
period was 6.03 % (table 4.6). On a smaller scale, the Werneth became a two mill 
company in 189976 and Sun Mill embarked on a significant capital replacement 
programme in the early 1900s? ' However, these companies were the exceptions. 
The New Ladyhouse, unlike the rest of the industry, increased its loan 
account in the period 1907-1911. It was likely that this money was used to 
finance re-equipment. 
74 Oldham Chronicle, 29th December, 1907. 
's Jeremy, ` T. E. Gartside', DBB, p. 496. 
76 OLSL, Misc 42/2 Werneth, Directors and general meetings minutes, 10th 
July 1895. 
71 Tyson, `Sun Mill', p. 290. 
" 
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Most surprising of all, is the almost static situation of the highly profitable ring mills. 
Not only were there few emulators of the Milnrow companies before 1900, but even 
the original companies, despite their success, failed to attract any incremental 
investment. This startling finding forms part of a broader picture of a unique system 
of economic, infrastructural, and social control which is explored in much more detail 
in later chapters. 
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Table 4.6: individual company growth rates 
Company Spindles Growth 
1889 1913 rate 
Mule mills 
Albert 24000 37982 1.93 
Borough 57250 68952 0.78 
Duke 70380 70380 nil 
Dowry 66760 66760 nil 
Garfield 61364 94292 1.81 
Greenacres 114034 122322 0.29 
Guide Bridge 150240 150240 nil 
Hathershaw 77424 n/a n/a 
Moorfield 72000 90640 0.96 
Oldham Twist 125562 166538 1.18 
Osborne 45320 45320 nil 
Park and Sandy 35822 35992 nil 
Shiloh 37132 151296 6.03 
Stanley 48480 50178 0.14 
Sun Mill 143930 157000 0.36 
United 91548 95600 0.18 
Werneth 99992 136000 1.29 
Average 1.00 
Ring spinners 
Cromer n/a 60000 n/a 
Era n/a '70000 n/a 
Haugh 27768 23400 
-0.71 New Hey 35200 36000 0.09 
New Ladyhouse 16696 19000 0.54 
Palm 105000 130000 0.89 
Average 0.20 
Note: Growth rates are annual compound equivalents. Doubling spindles excluded. 
All spindles in actual numbers, not MES. 
Source: Worrall, The cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 1889 and 1913. 
" 
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The profitability of ring spinning 
Trends in the relative profitability were explained by the interplay of demand in 
product markets, the allocative signals of the capital market, and the investment 
decisions taken by entrepreneurs. The causes of demand variations are considered in 
more detail in chapter 11. Putting these to one side for now, the relationship between 
the profit signals sent to investors by capital markets, as confirmed by accounting 
profits, played an important role in determining the future of Lancashire cotton. The 
industry was driven strongly by the trade cycle and when demand was weak, the 
profits of companies were depressed and the industry attracted no new investment. 
Such circumstances tended to coincide with otherwise good opportunities for ring 
spinning and superior profit and risk signals. Confidence was the important missing 
factor. During an upswing, pressure was placed on capacity and all sections of the 
industry were able to record strong profit performances. This was particularly true 
after 1896, when demand for Lancashire products grew rapidly in response to rising 
incomes in export markets (see chapter 11). The period tended to coincide with 
superior share price signals for mule spinning and profit parity. In all circumstances 
of the trade cycle, but for different reasons at different points in time, the possibilities 
for investment in rings were seriously limited. These causes of the cyclical impacts, 
especially demand in overseas product markets, would have created problems for 
entrepreneurs whichever technology they adopted. 
Since the primary purpose has been to explain British investment behaviour 
prior to 1914, it would be incorrect to attempt to extend conclusions into the changed 
conditions of the 1920s. However, if the trade cycle was important before the First 
World War, it must have been equally crucial in the 1920s and the 1930s. 
Furthermore, it will be demonstrated in the next chapter that the ring did not emerge 
as definitely superior in all technical aspects until the 1920s. By then the industry had 
. 
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lost markets, and remained in a state of overcapacity. Investment was stymied by the 
same lack of confidence that characterised the 1890s. The crucial difference between 
the two decades was that in the 1890s ring spinning was an option; by the 1920s it 
was becoming a necessity. 
In practice, the pioneer British ring spinners were able to overcome apparent 
obstacles and set up profitable companies. Although the profits were good, abnormal 
returns to ring investors were confined to a small group of companies, were 
intermittent, and did not suggest that ring spinning had developed a decisive and 
permanent superiority. Hence there were relatively few early emulators. Historical 
causation, systems of finance, and geographical location have provided some 
alternative explanations of investment behaviour, in addition to interpretation of profit 
signals. In this sense, the partial adoption of ring spinning in certain locations can be 
seen as a continuation of the process of specialisation. 
It is therefore difficult to see industry organisational structure as a constraint. 
However, ring spinning was slightly more profitable, despite the apparent advantages 
of mule spinners in terms of transport costs. More companies might thus have been 
expected to introduce ring spindles for the warp side of their product ranges, where 
no constraints existed. Yet despite their profitability, the early ring companies made 
no attempt to expand and widen their customer base. Furthermore, the entry of newer 
ring mills into the market after 1900 did not erode the superior profits of the 
established firms. Thus, whatever yarns were demanded by weavers, and it is 
generally accepted that they were indifferent on sub 40s counts, there was probably 
scope for greater specialised ring mill construction before 1914. 
The general lack of growth of established companies was a notable feature, 
and it is clear that the capital market did not fulfil its expected function of channelling 
financial resources into the more profitable sections of the industry. Those companies 
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that did invest in fixed assets tended to be mule mills not ring mills. Thus investment 
behaviour of entrepreneurs was asymmetrical to the signals sent by the capital 
markets in terms of profits, share prices, and risk. 
There are several possible explanations as to why this divergence occurred. 
The first is that entrepreneurs simply did not follow the signals sent by the market. 
Part 3 will examine the role of the entrepreneur in much more detail, and further 
comment on this issue will be reserved for later. Alternatively, suspicion of ring 
spinning technology may have played its part, or labour relations and cost structure 
may have imposed further difficulties. These issues are explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Spinning labour cost and technical 
efficiency 
The previous chapter has shown that the alleged superiority of ring spinning was not 
definitely established in commercial terms prior to 1914. Before accepting such a 
conclusion, however, the technical development of spinning, and linkages with 
improvements elsewhere along the chain of production, will be addressed from three 
further perspectives. First, a comparison of cost structures, with particular reference 
to labour cost. To examine this issue, new evidence will be used based on the 
analysis of financial reports of ring and mule spinning companies, and the relative 
costs of each spinning method will be contrasted. Second, an examination of technical 
improvements affecting both ring and mule spinning is conducted, primarily by 
reference to technical manuals published at the time, but also with allusion to the 
labour and other cost patterns established from the first area of discussion. Finally, 
. 
the overall efficiency of the two methods is reconsidered. On the basis of these 
comparisons, an attempt is made to date the final establishment of the supremacy of 
the ring spindle. 
As we have seen, entrepreneurs were aware of the risks involved with the 
`leap in the dark' of ring spinning; for the investor the risk was less apparent, once 
the early ring companies began production. Chapter four suggested that, for the 
pioneer ring spinners at least, and in contrast to mule spinners, risk was discounted 
by superior profits, the accumulation of reserves and a policy of steady dividends. 
However, possible reasons already advanced for their creditable financial performance 
prior to 1914, such as geographical location and product range, have not provided a 
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complete interpretation, and it is thus important to extend the enquiry further. 
Labour cost 
A further possible explanation might have been labour cost savings. The use of 
unskilled, female labour has been unanimously acknowledged by recent contributors 
to the debates on Lancashire cotton as one of the reasons for its eventual replacement 
of the mule. ' According to the Lazonick-Mass hypothesis, saving on raw material 
input was an important reason for adherence to the mule. Trade union inflexibility 
and the minder-piecer system prevented the reorganisation of work to achieve labour 
cost savings; at the same time the system was threatened by the availability of ring 
spinning. ' Masters and men therefore co-operated to achieve the best productivity 
possible through raw material savings, for example in the agreement for bad spinning 
compensation in the Brooklands agreement of 1893. 
Whilst providing a plausible theory, this argument is not backed by the 
evidence from Rochdale. It is noteworthy first of all that the managers making the 
experimental moves in ring spinning did not cite labour cost as a source of saving. 
Rather, the Rochdale entrepreneurs justified their investment in rings in terms of 
savings in raw material input without any loss of quality, low breakdown and 
maintenance cost, and the relative cheapness of the machinery. " In Rochdale, and 
For example Sandberg based his calculations on a weekly labour cost of $0.5 
per 100 spindles (approximately 2s. ) for rings compared to $1.65 for mules, 
Lancashire in Decline p. 30. Lazonick, `Factor Costs' p. 93 correctly pointed 
out that comparatives used for mule spinners were overestimated, but still 
higher than for ring spinning. 
2 Lazonick, `Industrial relations', pp. 253-7. 
Lazonick, `Production relations, p. 505. 
Rochdale Observer, 4 January, 1890, p. 6; Textile Mercury, 5 December, 
1896 
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elsewhere, raw material saving was given as a key reason for the introduction of the 
ring. Had Lancashire entrepreneurs wished compete against the threat of low wage 
competition from overseas on the basis of savings in raw material input, the ring 
spindle would have given them the means of doing so for the lower range of counts. 
On the other hand, using the ring spindle did not provide the early Milnrow 
pioneer companies with an easy way round the increased institutionalisation of 
industrial relations. Their entrepreneurs relied on paternalism rather than exploitation, 
but at the same time sought solidarity with employers elsewhere in the industry. Such 
contradictions were keenly felt throughout Lancashire, especially where joint stock 
companies were prevalent. ' As elsewhere, Milnrow had many of the characteristics 
of a `company town', and like the Ashtons of Hyde and the Fieldens of Todmorden, 
the Heaps exercised a good deal of local deferential and political influence. All the 
mills of the town, with one exception, were closed on the morning of James Heap's 
funeral in 1892, and flags flew at half mast above the mills, the school, the 
educational institute, and the Conservative club, each symbolising a locus of power 
and influence for the departed industrialist and his successors. Most of the local 
population appeared to turn out to pay their respects. ' Yet only a few days earlier 
the hands employed at the New Ladyhouse, the New Hey and the Haugh spinning 
companies had been placed on a week's notice. Local management acted at the behest 
of the Masters' Federation, which had decided to stop the mills until the settlement 
of the Stalybridge dispute. In addition to the Milnrow ring spinners, mule spinners 
such as the Garfield were also involved? Whatever reason Heap and Tweedale had 
for promoting the ring spindle at Milnrow, it was not because they sought to drive 
S Joyce, Work, society and politics, pp. 339-40. 
6 Rochdale Observer, 13th April, 1892. 
Rochdale Observer, 9th April 1892, 
122 
down wages, nor was it to escape from the increasingly institutionalised structure of 
labour relations. 
In order to gain further insight, and to reassess the apparent contradictions 
arising from the above discussion in further detail, actual cost structures of ring and 
mule companies, as reported in published balance sheets, are compared below. Table 
5.1 shows a compilation of ring and mule labour cost statistics for the late 1880s and 
early 1890s. In this respect, data observations were relatively limited, as 
. 
not all 
companies disclosed their financial results in the same way or in the same level of 
detail. From the main sample, wages data were available for only certain companies 
for certain years. ' However, these could be supplemented by accounting data analysis 
published intermittently in the local press. The years 1890 to 1892 were particularly 
useful for the extent of press analysis' and were also selected as being relatively 
neutral in terms of the trade cycle. For a limited number of years, there were thus 
data available for more than fifty mule companies and the ones shown in table 5.1 are 
intended to be representative. For the four ring companies then in existence, " 
because of their small number, it was more difficult to obtain consistent and detailed 
accounting information. Hence the periods selected for analysis were contingent on 
the availability of data on ring mills. In general, although the data give only a 
snapshot in time, they are nonetheless revealing. 
$ Fielden Brothers, Robinwood Mill (RMA, 1895-1914), Healey Wood Mill 
Co. Ltd., (RM NRA 29093, Trading and Profit and Loss Accounts 1907- 
1914), Osborne (LCRO DDX/869/, Capital, trading, and profit and loss 
accounts, 1890-1914), T and R Eccles (LCRO, 868/7/1, Profit and Loss 
Accounts and Balance Sheets, 1897-1914), Werneth (OLSL, Misc. 42/17 and 
18, Quarterly Reports to Members. 1890-1912), Whiteley, ' (LCRO, 
DDX/868/21/5, Balance Sheets, 1898-1914). 
In a typical week at the end of a quarter, the Oldham Chronicle, (2nd January 
1892, p. 8, `Limited companies' balance sheets) carried detailed sales and 
expenses analysis of eight companies. 
10 The three Milnrow companies and Palm mill of Oldham. 
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Table 5.1. Comparative wages in mule and ring mills, 
1890-92. 
(1) Wages analysis, 1889-90 
£ £ £ 
Spind. Hands Wages Wages/ Wages/ 
hand spind. 
Ring mills 
Haugh 27,200 260 8,692 33.43 
, 
0.3196 
New Hey 38,000 370 11,802 31.90 0.3106 
New Lady- 
house 15,728 200 5,477 27.38 0.3482 
Average 30.90 0.3261 
Mule mills 
Hathershaw 77,424 376 9,644 25.65 0.1245 
Stanley 48,480 236 7,172 30.39 0.1479 
Lees Union 63,000 306 7,048 23.02 0.1119 
Dowry 66,670 324 8,244 25.44 0.1237 
Average 26.13 0.1270 
(2) Comparative cost analysis, early 1890s 
Ring Mule 
% 
Material 70.8 74.7 
Labour 13.9 12.9 
Depreciation 3.8 3.2 
Other 11.5 9.2 
100.0 100.0 
Sources: (1) Compiled from, Oldham Chronicle, Ist October, 1889, Rochdale 
Observer, 28th June 1890 (for mule spinners, in the absence of data on actual hands 
employed the number was estimated using the industry average of 206 spindles per 
hand, per Wood, `Factory Legislation', p. 316). Wages data per the quarterly reports 
of each company, as published in the above newspapers; annual equivalents obtained 
by multiplying by four. (2) Collation of figures for the same companies as in (1). 
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Table 5.2. Comparative labour intensity in mule and 
ring mills, 1890. 
spindles/ 
hand 
Ring mills 
Haugh 105 
New Hey 103 
New Ladyhouse 79 
Average 
Mule mills 
Industry average 206 
Sources: as for table 5.1 
125 
Use of time limited cross sectional data of this sort is open to accusations of 
inconsistency. However, the wages analysis in part (1) of table 5.1 showed similar 
patterns when 1892 data was used. The collation in part (2) of the table is therefore 
considered representative of the typical cost structure at the beginning of the 1890s. 
The most striking feature of table 5.1 was the pattern of labour cost and, in 
5.2 the relative labour intensity. One reason for general reluctance to invest in ring 
spindles in nineteenth century Lancashire may have been that the labour content of 
their output was actually higher in the 1880s and 1890s than for mule spindles. 
Unlike the paternalist managements of the Milnrow mills, potential emulators may not 
have had a generous attitude towards expensive, and perhaps locally scarce, ring 
spinning labour. Table 5.1 suggests the early ring spinners had a greater labour 
intensity than mule spindle concerns. The higher productivity of ring spindles meant 
that labour formed an approximately equal proportion of total cost. Expensive labour 
in the context of ring spinning directly contradicts the usual understanding of the 
development of this technology. 
If labour cost savings did exist, they were confined to the spinning process 
itself. Ring spinning required more labour in roving and other preparation stages and 
in after spinning processes, such as doffing and winding. " Where ring spinning 
developed from throstle spinning, as in Rochdale and other areas, there was a 
tradition of labour intensity, particularly with regard to doffing. 12 Doffing was an 
unskilled task, normally assigned to teams (four per machine) of young and 
" Winterbottom, Cotton spinning calculations, p. 261. Jewkes and Gray, Wages 
and labour, p. 129. 
12 Production at the throstle section of the Fielden spinning plant at Waterside 
was facilitated by an `army of doffers', Todmorden Advertiser, 9 November, 
1889, p. 4. 
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inexperienced workers, 13 and their employment no doubt added to the apparent 
labour intensity of ring spinning. The evidence in table 5.1 and 5.2 was corroborated 
by international comparisons. A ring spinning mill in France in 1882 producing 30s 
twist had a spindle per operative ratio of 75,14 and was thus directly comparable in 
labour intensity with the New Ladyhouse spinning company (table 5.2). 
That labour cost saving was not a strategy associated with the introduction of 
ring spinning was confirmed by contrasts of costs between the ring mills themselves. 
In the previous chapter, the New Ladyhouse was shown to be the most profitable of 
the three Milnrow concerns (table 4.4). Yet it was also the most labour intensive 
(tables 5.1 and 5.2). Profit may have been helped by the relatively low average wage, 
which in turn may have reflected the application of piece rates to at least some of the 
hands. Even so, workers were paid more here on average than in the strongholds Qf 
labour aristocracy in the mule mills of Oldham. James Heap would have been 
regarded as a generous employer and the public grief apparently expressed by the 
whole town on his death may have run deeper, and for reasons beyond those of pure 
paternalism, than guessed at by the newspaper correspondent. " Expensive labour 
cost may have been compounded by the absence of a comprehensive, institutionalised 
wage list coupled with the relative scarcity of ring spinners. Highly individual lists 
for ring spinners existed by the early 1900s. Following industrial action, the final 
moves towards a universal official list for ring spinners' wages were not made until 
13 According to the recollections of former ring spinners; Kenney, Cotton 
Everywhere, pp. 130-1. 
14 Merrtens, `The hours and cost of labour', p. 160; the mill at Roubaix had 
13.3 operatives per 1000 spindles. The comparable figure for mule spinning 
was 4.86, or 206 spindles per operative, as used in table 5.1. 
's See above and the commentary in the Rochdale Observer, 13 April, 1892. 
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1912.16 Moreover, the same factor may have led to variation in wages over time and 
by geographical area. Thus, although wage structures were important, as far as the 
early experiments in ring spinning were concerned, they were not decisive. The new 
ring mills might well have employed female labour and probably young girls to doff 
the machines; they were hardly sweatshops though, and labour cost savings were 
patently not the reason for the introduction of ring spinning. 
Relative expense of ring mill labour may also have been a product of cheap 
labour in the mule spinning section of the industry. As an oft quoted example of a 
labour aristocrat, " relatively high wages in the mule room were confined to the 
senior minder. Out of his own wage, he would effectively sub-contract his two 
assistants, the big piecer and little piecer, both of whom depended on promotion up 
this hierarchy. " Both earned relatively low wages, " and would have depressed the 
wages per hand in table 5.1. Thus expensive and cheap labour existed side by side. 
Whereas the subcontracted payment system might create the risk of double counting 
when using industry data, and although there was no evidence of this, 2° firm specific 
published accounting reports could be relied upon to contain only the net labour cost 
to the firm. 
16 Oldham Chronicle, 29th June 1912; Porter, `Industrial peace' p. 55; Jewkes 
and Gray, Wages and labour, Ch. 9. 
17 Fowler and Wyke, The barefoot aristocrats. 
18 Burgess, The origins of British industrial relations, p. 239. 
19 Wood, `Statistics of wages', pp. 134-7. 
20 For example in the debate between Sandberg and Lazonick; for example the 
data in Lazonick, `Factor costs', appendices 1 and 2, was derived from 
Winterbottom, Cotton spinning calculations, although that source contained 
no supporting breakdown of its departmental labour cost statistics, pp. 272-3. 
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Table 5.3: Gross margins, ring and mule, mills, 1892 
COMPANY 
Sales 
Cotton cost and charges 
Margin 
Sales 
Cotton cost and charges 
Margin 
RING MULE 
Haugh Hathershaw Oldham 
Twist 
£££ 
17,572 23,798 38,092 
12,221 17,491 28,573 
69.49 73.50 75.0 
RING MULE 
Fielden Werneth Osborne 
£ '£ £ 
13,209 28,378 7,981 
9,094 20,981 5,350 
68.85 73.93 67.03 
Note: 
(1) For Fielden, in the absence of 1892 data, 1895 was used. 
(2) Werneth prepared its trading account on a receipts and payments basis and its 
purchases fluctuated dramatically, therefore a quarterly average was used based on 
the previous eight quarterly results. 
(3) In all cases raw material costs were adjusted for changes in stock levels. 
Sources: Haugh, Hathershaw, and Oldham Twist, calculated from Oldham Chronicle, 
`Commercial Notes' 2nd January, 1892; Fielden, RMA, 1895; Werneth, OLSL, 
Misc/42/17, Quarterly reports to members; Osborne, LCRO, DDX/869/3/1, trade, 
capital and profit and loss accounts. 
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As noted above, saving of raw material input using ring spindles was thought 
to be important by entrepreneurs. Rings were acknowledged to be more productive 
on the lower count range. 21 That argument was well supported in the evidence 
presented in table 5.1, with raw material accounting for a significantly lower 
proportion of production cost in ring mills. Table 5.3 provides a collation of data 
showing sales, cotton costs, and profit margins for ring and mule mills. When 
compared with mule mills spinning low counts, such as Hathershaw and Oldham 
Twist, ring mills tended to show a 4-7% superiority in margin. 22 The comparison 
was flawed however, as even lower count mule mills were producing higher counts 
than the ring mills, and also weft yarns. Taking into consideration count differentials, 
the advantage for ring mill margins would have been greater. Only when compared 
with Osborne, a fine spinner by Oldham standards and therefore operating on above 
average margins, did the advantage disappear. ' High labour cost, averaging just 
under 15 % of total cost (table 5.1), cancelled out the benefit for this company on raw 
material value added. At the coarse end of the market, margins were much narrower, 
and hence the ring spinners benefited from higher productivity per unit of cotton 
input, without having to increase their prices. Bearing the above interpretative 
difficulties in mind, the superiority of the ring on raw material usage clearly made 
a net contribution to company profits. 
Another factor influencing cost structure was lack of industry concentration, 
and the very small market share of each firm. Under such circumstances high levels 
of fixed cost create disproportionately large losses as output falls in a recession. 
21 Winterbottom, Cotton spinning calculations, pp. 212-3. 
22 Table 5.3. The tendency was for ring mills to be in the high 60%s and mule 
mills to be in the low 70%s. 
The Osborne produced 32s/50s warp and 40s/70s weft; Worrall, Cotton 
spinners and manufacturers' directory, 1890. 
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Increasing the' scale of operations would accentuate such risks. There was thus a 
strong incentive to avoid ring spinning where, despite some tentative evidence for the 
use of piece rates at Milnrow, time based wage rates predominated. By contrast mule 
spinning was attractive, since labour was paid according to piece rates and the 
Brooklands agreement specifically allowed wage rates to vary with the trade cycle. "' 
Fixed cost was also avoided through vertical specialisation, allowing management and 
administrative' costs to remain minimal, the market acting as the co-ordinating 
mechanism. ' Lazonick has argued that investment in rings was more likely to occur 
in integrated firms developing high throughput production 26 However, under the 
highly variable demand conditions imposed by the trade cycle, the last thing 
entrepreneurs needed was the high fixed cost structure that such investment implied. 
Previous discussions of the relative merits of ring spinning which have used 
labour cost in their analysis have thus concentrated too narrowly on the spinning 
process itself. Under British conditions, if wage cost was a barrier to competitiveness, 
labour intensity in preparatory and after spinning processes must have been an 
important reason for the coexistence of the ring and mule for a further generation. 
In its early years at least, ring spinning was not a route for substitution of labour by 
capital. 
The above examination of the cost structures of actual firms by reference to 
their business records and published balance sheets has suggested the opposite 
conclusion to that normally associated with views of ring spindle diffusion. However, 
the evidence used was static, being confined to the early decades of the 1890s when 
24 BPP, Board of trade report, c. 7567. 
The- flexibility of vertical specialisation and its advantages were noted in 
Jewkes, `Is British Industry Inefficient? ' pp. 9-10. 
26 Lazonick, `The Cotton Industry', pp. 21-2. 
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only a very few British ring spinning companies were in existence. The cheap female 
labour hypothesis may have become more relevant with the passage of time and 
indeed with the changing relative efficiencies of ring and mule technology, and these 
are considered in the next section. 
The technical race 
Patterns of commercial returns and cost structures suggested more than one route 
existed to the achievement of acceptable profit levels. But did satisfactory profit 
signals encourage a complacent entrepreneurial attitude towards technical 
innovation? Technical distinctions contributed towards differences in commercial 
performance, although the effects noted above and in chapter four were perhaps, in 
some cases, marginal. One interpretation might be that the two spinning methods 
were in a neck and neck race, with new technical developments for each in turn 
heralding the promise of superiority over the other. In this section the important 
turning points in that race are identified and evaluated. 
In 1890, both methods were imperfect, but the mule was established and the 
ring was not. It is therefore necessary to find evidence that the latter was gaining 
ground technically up to 1914. If it was, then entrepreneurs perhaps can be criticised 
for not being more alert to developments. Furthermore, if the relative profitability of 
the mule was attributable to the technical superiority of the ring being cancelled by 
industry structure constraints, they could also be criticised for failing to remove those 
constraints. 
Mule technology displayed few characteristics of obsolescence in the period 
up to 1914. Dependence upon the intrinsic nature of its intermittent action was a 
limiting factor, but also gave the machine certain important advantages. The action 
of the carriage facilitated a final stage of drawing following intermediate processing, 
- 
132 
giving mule yarn the advantages of `gain' and `ratch'. r Mule yarn was thus less 
susceptible to snarl and possessed greater uniformity, attributes of great value in 
weaving. Further improvements in the efficiency of the mule helped prolong the 
period of competitive coexistence. Speed and size increases were achieved with the 
full co-operation of piece workers, who had their own rewards built into the system. 
Mule efficiency was further improved through speed ups. R. P. M. was increased 
(13%) and faster draws in carriage speed (19%) between 1870 and 1910 ? The 
latter placed limits on the development of the mule, since production depended on the 
number of draws per minute. Larger machines, in preparation and spinning itself, 
increased spindleages by 25-30% between 1870-1910. 
One particular constraint resulting from bigger machines was architectural, 
According to Wood, writing in 1910: 
Some firms have actually had to put in ring frames and spin ring yarn 
because their mills would not, when the old mules were taken out, contain 
the mules of the size with which it has been desired to replace them 29 
Mule size increases, combined with existing factory layout were thus very important 
in the choice of technology. A wider issue is also raised. The slow growth rates for 
existing mule mills, noted in chapter four, may be explained by this problem. Such 
size constraints would add to the incentive to float new mills, rather than to re-equip 
or expand existing ones. 
In ring spinning, improvements were mainly concentrated on the reliability 
'Gain' refers to the differential between the carriage speed and the rate at 
which yarn was given out by the rollers; 'ratch' was the additional twist 
insertable by a special jacking motion at the end of the outward run of the 
carriage (Taggart, Cotton spinning, pp. 232-4; Thornley, Cotton spinning, 
pp. 149-174; Winterbottom, Cotton spinning calculations, pp. 166-8). 
21 Wood, `Statistics of wages', pp. 612-3; Tyson, ` The cotton industry', p. 123. 
29 Wood, `Statistics of wages', p. 155. 
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of the spindles used. The replacement of Booth-Sawyer spindle by the Rabbeth and 
the improvements to the latter such as the Howard and Bullough `quick running' 
spindle reduced alignment problems, oiling time, ultimately facilitated automated 
doffing, and allowed spindle speed to increase. ' But due to the limit on roller 
speed, these were not decisive improvements. 
A further difficulty was the requirement to use even, short staple, American 
cotton. Snarling remained a problem when Egyptian cotton was used, unless 
additional drafting was carried out in intermediate processing 31 Reliance on 
American cotton was an important constraint facing ring spinners, although such 
dependency did have its periods of advantage when coarse American was cheap. 
Dependence on raw material supply dictated mill margins, and it may have been for 
this reason that although producing superior performance, the return to capital trend 
for the Milnrow ring spinners mirrored the rest of the coarse section of the industry 
in Oldham almost exactly (figures 4.5 and 4.6). 
Dependence on short staple American cotton continued prior to 1914. The 
speed of the front rollers, which could not be accelerated too much with short staple, 
was the limiting factor on further productivity gain, contrasted with the mule, where 
the speed of the carriage imposed limitations. The next phase of technical 
development would necessarily concern itself with the removal of the speed constraint 
for both spinning methods. 
Relative efficiencies of rings and mules 
Both systems were gradually improved between 1880 and 1914. But the race was 
indecisive, technology was in a state of flux, and the choices facing decision makers 
30 Thornley, Cotton spinning, pp. 265-7; Murphy, Textile industries, pp. 80-1. 
31 Thornley, Cotton spinning, pp. 269-77. 
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were far from clear. Overall, the indecisiveness of the technical race was a significant 
determinant of investment behaviour and hence overall similar pattern of financial 
performance. Table 5.4 shows improvements in productivity, as measured by hanks 
per spindle. 
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Table 5.4: Productivity, ring and mule spindles 1866- 
1920. 
Output: Hanks per spindle 
(1) Mule Spinning 
Period Average % 
annual increase 
1866-1885 1.69 
1885-1893 1.33 
1893-1915 0.08 
1915-1920 0.14 
(2) Ring spinning 
Period Average % 
annual increase 
1893-1915 0.08 
1915-1920 1.01 
Source: Calculated from Thornley, Modern Cotton Economics, p. 302. Hanks per 
spindle was a common measure of production in the industry, see also for example, 
Winterbottom, Cotton spinning calculations, pp. 255-60. 
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By the 1900s, as illustrated by table 5.4, improvements in mule spinning 
productivity were becoming progressively slower. However, for the period 1893- 
1915, improvements in both methods were identical, but not spectacular. In ring 
spinning productivity only began to accelerate after 1915. The evidence appears to 
be consistent with the similar commercial profitability associated with the two 
technologies, and hence there would have been no felt need for re-equipment. Those 
ring spinning companies which were able to sustain superior performance prior to 
1914, such as the Milnrow companies, and especially the New Ladyhouse, were able 
to do so without increasing their spindleage, and as table 5.3 has confirmed, without 
increasing their technical efficiency. 
The discussion thus far has tended to suggest that technical issues associated 
with the transfer of output between plants within a vertically specialised industry 
structure were not important. If there was little incentive to shift from mules to rings 
on warp production, industry fragmentation would have eliminated it altogether from 
weft production, unless any decisive technical breakthrough occurred in transfer 
technology as well. 
Of particular importance in this respect were the methods associated with 
winding and transport between plants. There has been considerable disagreement on 
the pattern of adoption of paper tubes and their actual importance. 32 According to 
contemporaries, a major objection to the ring was the requirement to rewind yarn 
output to avoid the high cost of transport on wooden bobbins 33 Attempts were made 
to overcome the problem, albeit with dubious success. According to some authorities, 
the solution was via modifications to winding mechanisms on ring spindles. It would 
32 Lazonick, `Stubborn mules', pp. 80-6; Saxonhouse and Wright, 'Stubborn 
mules', pp. 87-94. 
33 Copeland, `Technical development', p. 149; Murphy, The Textile Industries, 
Vol III, p. 115. 
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thus be easier for weft as well as warp, to be spun. 34 However, these experiments 
met with limited success. Attempts were made to develop new ring spindles which 
manufacturers claimed could achieve efficient weft output onto lightweight paper 
tubes. 33 However, even this would not have been decisive as a cost saving measure. 
Competitive ring spun, loom ready yarn, would need to be produced on the bare 
spindle or at least on a low diameter cop, as with mule yarn. 36 Attempts were made 
to do this, but the result generally was bad spinning? ' The empirical evidence 
suggested a marginal superiority in the profitability of ring spinning in vertically 
specialised mills producing warp yarns. Given these additional obstacles in the weft 
section, the adoption of the ring was unlikely to appeal as a business strategy. 
The automation of ring spinning 
If the technical evidence suggests an indecisive struggle for supremacy in the period 
before the First World War, when exactly and how did the ring spindle finally 
emerge as the preferred alternative? As noted already, speed was a production 
constraint for rings and mules. The former, being independent of the wheeled 
carriage, was less restricted in terms of technical possibilities. It has also been noted 
that the lack of automation in drafting, doffing, and winding, before 1914 meant the 
introduction of the ring did not displace labour. 
The development of high speed drafting was decisive in both these respects. 
By overcoming speed constraints, its invention in 1914 created the possibility of much 
34 Murphy, The Textile Industries, p. 115 
 Textile Mercury, 5th December, 1896 
36 Lazonick, `Stubborn Mules', p. 82. 
37 Thornley, Cotton spinning, p. 247; Nasmith, Students' cotton spinning, p. 
532. 
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higher efficiency in ring mill preparatory processes. Early drafting mechanisms, 
responsible for the attenuation of yarn in processes prior to spinning, placed 
limitations on speed, in terms of impaired quality and irregularity, for both ring and 
mule systems 38 To ensure correct quality, several stages of intermediate drafting 
were required. Like all important inventions the high draft was based on a simple 
idea; the use of a grip device to ensure even pressure and attenuation. Cotton of 
uneven staple could thereby be regularised by a single process and at high speed. 31 
Although attempts were made to apply the new system to mules, high drafting 
destroyed the rationale of the intermittent carriage based spinning system. Carriage 
speed rather than roller speed was now the constraint, and whereas there were few 
technical obstacles to further speed increases for the latter, there were obvious 
problems in trying to accelerate the speed of a large wheeled carriage. Moving the 
frame instead of the material would increasingly look like fitting a light bulb by 
turning the ceiling round. 
Cost structures prior to 1914, especially in terms of the relative labour 
intensity of ring spinning, provided further evidence of the ultimate importance of 
high speed drafting, and the automation of other intermediate processes. Its effect was 
to displace labour in significant numbers in preparatory and intermediate processes 
rather than in spinning per se. However, it was not fully developed commercially 
until the 1920s. 4° Although at this time some contemporary writers still regarded the 
mule as superior, " its supremacy was now being seriously undermined. A survey 
38 Noguera, Theory and practice of high drafting, p. 20. 
39 Noguera, Theory and practice of high drafting, pp. 22-3. 
A0 Catling, The Spinning Mule, p. 189 
41 See for example, Thornley, Modern cotton economics, p. 137; Taggart, Cotton spinning, pp. 331-2. 
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in 1932 noted three cases of ring mill replacing low draft with high draft spinning, 
resulting in improvements in labour productivity of 42%, 56% and 50%. 42 Most of 
the gain came from the elimination of intermediate roving stages. 43 A further 
important development was the automation of the intermediate processes of doffing 
and winding. In view of the labour intensity of ring spinning in the 1890s (tables 5.1 
and 5.2) and compared with the improvement in ring spinning efficiency prior to 
1920 (table 5.3), such gains were of great significance. For the first time spinning 
became capital, and not labour, intensive. " Furthermore, the automation of doffing 
and winding might have given a new impetus to integrated manufacture, since 
efficient throughput and compatibility between spinning and weaving machines could 
bemore easily guaranteed. 
A technical stalemate 
There is little evidence that the ring spindle possessed any decisive technical 
superiority in the period before 1914. As ring spinning was actually more labour 
intensive than mule spinning, it could not have had any great appeal to employers 
seeking to displace labour, or circumvent the increasing institionalisation of wage 
negotiations. Commercially, the superior profits enjoyed by the Milnrow companies 
resulted from savings on raw material inputs; an advantage that would have been 
shared by other ring spinning companies, although as we have seen in chapter 4, not 
all succeeded in translating this into superior profitability. 
Rings and mules had coexisted for a long time in their various forms, and the 
reason for the ultimate triumph of the former was greater adaptability to new 
42 BPP, Board of Trade, Industrial Survey, p. 135. 
43 Tippett, Portrait of Lancashire cotton, p. 60. 
44 BPP, Board of Trade, Industrial Survey, p. 135. 
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efficiencies in before and after spinning processes, not from any inherent superiority 
per se. These advantages became apparent in the 1920s and obvious to all in the 
1930s. By the time they were available, the conditions facing Lancashire 
entrepreneurs had changed dramatically. 
The pre 1914 ring spindle has been overrated as a technical competitor to the 
mule under British conditions. °S Technical imperfections and the cost structures of 
ring spinners restricted opportunities in this period. Saxonhouse and Wright stressed 
the importance of high speed drafting as the major technical breakthrough for the ring I 
and the trends highlighted in the analysis support that conclusion. There is little 
evidence of the definite superiority of the ring until the 1920s and 1930s. By that 
time, the interventions of the government and the Bank of England were of particular 
importance. 47 It is therefore to this period that future investigations should look 
towards for the attribution of blame, if appropriate, both for failure to innovate and 
failure to restructure the industry. 
Commercially and technically therefore, although an argument existed for 
ring spinning, it was not a compelling one, and when set against the backdrop of a 
conservative business culture whose policies were rewarded with a record cash and 
profit bonanza in the 1900-14 period, the partiality of its adoption should not be 
greeted with any surprise. However, Lancashire cotton was neither static nor 
as It is noteworthy that Lazonick, in observing the compatibility of ring spinning 
with the automatic loom and automation through high draft preparation, cited 
authorities writing from the early 1930s onwards, eg BPP, Economic 
Advisory Council, Report of the committee, p. 17 (1929-30), Clay, Report 
on the position, pp. 13-14 (1931), BPP, Board of trade, Industrial survey, p. 
16 (1932), but argued that the adoption of these methods could have extended 
productivity at the end of the nineteenth century; Lazonick, `Industrial 
relations and technical change', p. 258. 
I Saxonhouse and Wright, `New Evidence', p. 519. 
I Bamberg, ` The Rationalization of British Cotton', p. 97. 
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complacent, and some restructuring had occurred, which resulted in some of the 
largest corporate structures in the British economy. To further examine the nature of 
technological change, it is perhaps appropriate to turn away from the competitive, 
vertically specialised, section of the industry, to those companies which might be 
expected to realise the largest economies of scale and speed; the vertically integrated 
combines. 
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Chapter 6: The costs and benefits of vertical 
integration 
Earlier chapters have revealed possible explanations for the investment decisions 
taken by Lancashire entrepreneurs. However, the companies examined to date have 
all been vertically specialised; the impact of structure, in terms of both industry and 
organisation has been held constant. Nonetheless it has been impossible to avoid, at 
least in passing, mention of the importance of this alleged constraint to the evolution 
of the cotton industry. - Three interrelated' issues are therefore introduced in this 
chapter. First, by reference to returns to capital, vertically integrated companies will 
be compared with their vertically specialised competitors. Specialisation can be 
approached in several dimensions; geographically, horizontally in terms of product, 
and vertically in terms of production and marketing process. Vertical specialisation 
in particular has been blamed for ultimately retarding the progress of the industry; 
efficient throughput from raw cotton to finished piece goods became the concern of 
too many independent and competing management groups, and was therefore never 
achieved. As Keynes put it in 1928: 
There was probably no hall in Manchester large enough to hold all the 
directors of cotton companies... One of the first things should be to dismiss 
the vast majority of these people, but the persons to whom this proposal 
would have to be made would be precisely those directors. ' 
Although widely accepted, that conclusion, when applied to before 1914, has rested 
to a certain extent on generalisation and thus merits further enquiry. The second area, 
exploiting the advantages of the survival of relatively detailed business records of 
several vertically integrated companies, introduces comparative case studies. 
' Quoted in Daniels and Jewkes, `The post war depression', p. 200. 
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Restricted availability of archival data led to the selection of three companies, none 
of which have been dealt with extensively elsewhere in relation to the issues explored 
in this chapter; Horrockses, Crewdson and Co. Ltd (Horrockses), Tootal, Broadhurst 
and Lee and Co. Ltd (Tootals), and Fielden Brothers Ltd (Fielden). Finally, given 
the relatively rare instances of automatic loom introductions in pre 1914 Lancashire 
and their coincidence with vertically integrated companies, the comparative case study 
analysis is extended to consider how each of the firms responded to the opportunities 
provided by this technology. Although archival evidence was limited, because of its 
importance to the automatic loom issue, Ashton Brothers of Hyde is also included as 
a case example for the final part of the study. 
Vertical integration and financial performance 
It has been universally acknowledged that growing specialisation in Lancashire 
became a source of competitive advantage after the early years of the industrial 
revolution. ' Whilst recognising this point, others have argued that in later times it 
was also the cause of the ultimate downfall of the industry? The first problem, 
therefore, is to establish precisely when specialisation assisted competitive 
performance. If specialisation was a positive influence, returns to capital in the 
specialised sector might be expected to be higher than in the vertically integrated 
sector. On the other hand if vertically integrated companies performed better, it 
would be difficult to conclude that any organisational constraint existed. 
A second dimension of organisation structure was use of technology. Again 
it has been asserted that vertically integrated companies were unconstrained from 
2 The commencement of the period of advantage for the vertically specialised 
company is various dated at between 1820 and 1850; Taylor, `Concentration 
and specialisation', p. 122, and Lyons, `Vertical integration', p. 425 
3 Mass and Lazonick, ` The British cotton industry', p. 57. 
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adopting what were claimed to be superior technologies. ' Given that the sample of 
vertically integrated companies adopted these technologies to varying degrees, the 
evidence presented below provides the opportunity to test that alleged superiority. If 
vertically integrated companies adopting ring spindles and automatic looms did enjoy 
a decisive advantage, it might be expected that they would achieve superior profits 
vis a vis their apparently more reticent specialised counterparts. 
4 Lazonick, `Rings and mules', p. 396. 
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Table 6.1: Rates of return, integrated and specialised 
companies, by period, 1884-1913 
(1) Spinning and manufacturing 
Return to capital (%) 
Period Vertically Specialised Specialised 
integrated mule spinners ring spinners 
1884-1913 6.26 5.26 10.46 
1890-1899 6.37 
. 
3.10 8.59 
1900-1912 7.02 7.00 11.93 
(2) Finishing 
Bleachers' 
Association 
1903-1912 5.10 
Note: The Bleachers' Association is not fully representative, but along with the 
Calico Printers' Association, it controlled a large proportion of the finishing section. 
Sources: (1) as per tables 1.1 and 1.2, samples split by category of company and a 
simple average rate of return calculated for each; see also appendix 1. (2) Calculated 
as a simple average from the data in Jeremy, `Survival strategies', p. 188. 
" 
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Figure 6.1: Rates of return, integrated and specialised 
companies 
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Using the sample of companies listed in table 1.1, and differentiating them 
on the basis of organisational structure, rates of return to capital were contrasted. 
Overall, results suggested that both types of organisation recorded similar rates of 
return over the period 1884-1914 (table 6.1). It might therefore be concluded that 
organisation structure was irrelevant to profit, or at least that more important forces 
were at work and shaped the destiny of the industry, a hypothesis explored further 
in chapter 11. 
When variations in profitability through time were analysed, however, 
significant differences emerged. Before 1900, vertically integrated companies tended 
to perform at least as well as specialised firms. In the 1890s they tended to perform 
rather better. However, they were relatively less successful after 1896 (figure 6.1). 
As noted in chapter four, the depression of the 1890s was especially severe in the 
specialised coarse spinning- sector based around Oldham, amounting to a major 
financial crisis for its investors. Integration was therefore a useful hedge, perhaps less 
in its own 'right, since the depression in weaving was in some respects more 
protracted than in spinning, 5 but certainly in 'the sense that larger integrated 
companies had wider product ranges and access to more than one market; a theme 
illustrated by the Horrockses and Tootal case studies below. 
However, if integration benefited the cotton investor in the 1890s, it had the 
opposite effect in the 1900s. Large returns attainable by the specialised spinners were 
beyond the reach of the broader based vertical companies, 6 again it might be inferred, 
Sigsworth and Blackman, `The home boom', p. 89. 
6 In the finishing section, the final stage of the value chain, returns were 
generally low in all years after 1900. Thus when the average Oldham mule 
spinner was earning returns of 20-30% in 1907, the Bleachers' Association 
earned only 5.19% on its capital (Jeremy, `Survival Strategies', p. 188). 
Avoidance of investment in such activities may have helped the specialised 
spinning and weaving sections at the expense of integrated companies. 
" 
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as a result of portfolio effects from their broader product and market ranges. Even 
more significantly, vertically integrated companies were outperformed in all periods, 
and especially after 1900, by vertically specialised ring spinning companies (table 
6.1). As the vertically integrated companies also adopted ring spindles, albeit to 
varying degrees, technology must apparently have been an insignificant determinant 
of competitive advantage, whereas vertical integration may have damaged it. 
Although, as we have seen from chapters four and five, technology itself was not a 
sufficient condition for achieving superior returns, and the ring spinning sample was 
very selective, it would now appear to be a more important determinant than 
organisation structure. Far from being a constraint, vertical specialisation offered 
superior profit opportunities where ring spinning technology was used, and 
significantly, in the boom periods after 1900, for specialist mule spinners as well. 
Certainly therefore few would have held integration to be a panacea and the 
boom years of the early 1900s must have given enormous confidence to Lancashire 
entrepreneurs reliant on specialisation and established technology. On the other hand, 
the superiority of specialised ring spinners suggests either that entrepreneurs were 
irrational in switching or that specialisation constituted a constraint on ring spinning 
diffusion that they were forced to abide by, regardless of profit signals. Rather than 
rely on generalisation too much at this stage, it perhaps appropriate now to consider 
individual cases in more depth, before drawing more definitive conclusions. 
Corporate case studies 
This section will examine how profit signals and technical improvements influenced 
the policies of specific organisations. Although alive with controversy, the 
. 
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historiography of Lancashire cotton, with occasional exceptions, ' has not dwelt 
heavily on case studies of individual organisations to inform its debates. Investment 
decisions analysed in studies elsewhere' have relied on data and assumptions, which 
although true for the industry as a whole, may not have applied to actual 
organisations. Through an analysis of the business records of several cotton 
companies, it was possible to compare and contrast the decision making processes 
against the backdrop of the wider trends already highlighted. 
Although the growth of specialisation was a dominant feature of Lancashire 
cotton in the three decades before 1914, a significant proportion of the industry 
remained, and grew, within the control of vertically integrated organisations. 
Prominent examples are included in the comparisons below. Other accounts of such 
organisations range widely in detail, ' but do not consistently address the purpose of 
the enquiry below, which is to examine the profitability and investment decisions of 
these and other vertically integrated companies in contrast to more specialised cotton 
spinners elsewhere in Lancashire. Whereas in the wider setting, the role of significant 
Lancashire entrepreneurs can also be reviewed, their function is analysed in more 
detail in later chapters. As far as their actions are assessed at this stage, it is in the 
context only of their alleged failure to remove constraints imposed upon them by the 
structure of the industry. '0 
Vertically integrated limited liability companies tended to emerge in waves 
For example, Smith, `An Oldham Limited Liability Company', pp. 34-53; 
Farnie, `John Rylands', pp. 3-103. 
8 Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, p. 51-6; Lazonick, 'Factor costs', pp. 107- 
8. 
For example, Farnie, `John Rylands' pp. 3-103; Pedrick, The Story of 
Horrockses; Dupree, ` Edward Tootal Broadhurst', DBB, pp. 452-7; Howe, 
Henry Lee and Joseph Cocksey Lee, DBB, pp. 703-714. 
10 Mass and Lazonick, `The British Cotton industry', pp. 56-7. 
. 
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of recapitalisation and reconstruction. Three such waves occurred; in 1887-1889, 
1898-1900 and 1919-21. " All were associated with trade cycle upswings. and many 
other new and interesting organisations began to emerge. However, it is beyond the 
scope of the present work to investigate the performances of the larger combines 
which emerged during the late 1890s. J and P Coats, Fine Cotton Spinners and 
Doublers, Rylands, and others, have been dealt with elsewhere. 12 Nonetheless a 
broader comparative analysis of profitability including some of these other companies 
is provided in chapter nine. Given the concern of the present chapter with the link 
between organisation structure and technological choice, the study was confined to 
the three specific companies referred to above. Of the three waves, our main concern 
was with the first. Those companies had business records which could be traced 
longitudinally for sufficient periods prior to 1914. Although one further company 
studied, Ashtons, was reconstructed in 1899, it was accepted that evidence would 
necessarily be more limited and constrained, due to the shorter run of data. 
The three chosen companies provide useful illustrations of the early wave of 
reconstruction. Horrockses was established in 1887 as the first of a series of 
amalgamations and incorporations of previously successful partnerships influencing 
a significant section of the cotton industry prior to the First World War. In the 
following year Tootals followed suit. As such they represented, after Rylands and 
Sons, two of the largest of the integrated concerns beginning to emerge in cotton and 
11 Macrosty, The trust movement, ch. V; Hannah, `Mergers in British 
manufacturing industry, 1880-1918', pp. 1-20; Hannah, The rise of the 
corporate economy, p. 23; Amalgamated Cotton Mills Trust Ltd., 
Concerning Cotton. 
For a summary of the main amalgamations see Macrosty, The Trust 
movement, ch. V. 
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other industries during this period. 13 On a smaller scale, what had previously been 
one of the largest cotton partnerships of the mid nineteenth century, Fielden Brothers 
and Co., was incorporated in 1889, albeit on a much reduced scale. Nonetheless 
given its established reputation and continued dominance in the locality, the firm 
remained significant. These companies emerged as part of a trend of reorganisation, 
but continued their commitment to a vertical structure. It is thus likely that the 
subsequent performances of the merged companies would have been viewed with 
interest by contemporary observers. 
Whatever their size, vertically integrated companies in theory enjoyed certain 
advantages and disadvantages. An important benefit was the ability to avoid extra 
transport costs, especially when using ring spindles. This was because ring spun yarn 
had to be transported on returnable wooden bobbins, as opposed to cheaper, 
disposable paper tubes. 14 It was calculated that transport costs could be trebled as 
a result of this factor. 's As noted in chapter three, whether transport costs were a 
genuine constraint on diffusion is a moot point. It is thus important to consider their 
impact on profitability. Where integration occurred, perhaps, production efficiency 
at least would be likely to improve. On the other hand, there was a potential conflict 
between production efficiency, as 'manifested in long continuous production runs, and 
marketing flexibility, for example the need to tailor output to the needs of specific 
customers. A study of Horrockses and other companies in the post 1945 period 
identified precisely such problem; 16 it was likely to be equally applicable also before 
13 Farnie, The English Cotton Industry, p. 194; Dupree, `Sir Edward Tootal 
Broadhurst', DBB, p. 452 
14 Sandberg, Lancashire in Decline, pp. 32-3. 
is Copeland; The cotton manufacturing industry of the United States, p. 69. 
16 Higgins, `Re-equipment as a strategy' pp. 225-6, and `Structural constraints', 
p. 20. 
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1914. Below we examine first problems in marketing and then go on to discuss 
production efficiency and technology: ` 
Horrockses and Tootals provided some particularly interesting contrasts in 
their marketing strategies. Detailed time series comparisons for these companies 
showed that Horrockses was the best performer throughout (figure 6.2). The company 
enjoyed a particularly decisive competitive advantage in the 1890s, a period when the 
rest of the industry remained in deep depression. To achieve a return of 20% at the 
depth of the depression in 1895 was a particularly remarkable result. Further financial 
analysis (table 6.2) suggested the likely source of superiority lay in the development 
of markets, and specifically through the achievement of high margins. Asset turnover 
showed a slowly declining trend but with little dramatic variation from year to year. 
Profit margin on the other hand, varied more dramatically and was a much stronger 
explanatory factor in determining the overall rate of return to capital. In other words, 
profitability was achieved because of good margins on finished products, and in spite 
of the declining efficiency of the assets required to produce them. The figures 
reflected the growing importance of product quality an element in Horrockses 
marketing strategy. " Higher profit margins were thus achieved by moving away 
from a purely commodity style product range; the price was declining efficiency 
through the holding of a wider range of stocks and shorter, differentiated production 
runs. Effective merchanting, in this case at least, contributed to reduced 
manufacturing efficiency. 
" Amalgamated Cotton Mills Trust Ltd., Concerning Cotton. A section on 
Horrockses stressed its commitment to quality. The Centenary Mill 
investment, being exclusively committed to mule spinning, would have been 
at the leading edge of this strategy. 
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Figure 6.2: Rates of return, vertically integrated 
companies, 1887-1913 
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Table 6.2: Horrockses, rates of return, 1887-1913 
Year ROCE Margin Asset Sales/ Sales/ 
turnover sp loom 
1888 14.34 12.13 1.18 6.65 168.28 
1889 10.75 9.40 1.14 6.44 166.31 
1890 12.41 9.93 1.25 6.84 180.31 
1891 13.80 12.03 1.15 6.40 169.06 
1892 16.61 15.65 1.06 6.07 157.91 
1893 17.67 17.00 1.04 5.88 143.42 
1894 11.11 11.16 1.00 5.99 147.53 
1895 20.11 21.41 0.94 6.29 153.66 
1896 12.88 14.58 0.88 4.03 145.52 
1897 8.40 9.62 0.87 3.77 149.82 
1898 16.19 18.07 0.90 4.09 162.25 
1899 18.20 19.76 0.92 4.29 167.79 
1900 11.67 13.15 0.89 4.23 164.93 
1901 6.52 7.56 0.86 3.62 158.66 
1902 11.25 14.61 0.81 3.96 164.44 
1903 9.93 11.81 0.84 4.08 168.56 
1904 5.36 6.91 0.78 3.68 153.09 
Average 13.06 13.30 0.97 5.08 160.09 
Std Dev 3.95 3.98 0.14 1.20 9.77 
Note: Margin is defined as profit before interest divided by sales; asset turnover is 
defined as sales divided by capital employed. The former provides a yardstick of 
value added through pricing and cost control, the latter a measure of efficiency and 
throughput. 
Sources: Calculated from CVR, Balance sheets and detailed accounts, 1887-1904, 
machine book. 
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Despite its apparent overall marketing efficiency, like its competitors, 
Horrockses had serious problems in selling to overseas markets. A report on the 
company by Barings stated: 
Large concerns like Horrocks lost so much in Latin America in years gone 
by that they now employ a London intermediary who pays them at once for 
their goods and runs this risk with their buyers. This must be a very 
expensive way of working and there must be many concerns who cannot 
afford, or who would wish to dispense with the intermediary. " 
A solution was found by direct selling where possible, and this was done by 
establishing control over price and quality, previously functions of the intermediary. 
Horrockses policy of branding and dealing directly with retailers in the home market 
from the 1880s onwards was innovatory at that time, but appeared to have been 
successful. " Brand names were applied to products from other producers such as 
the Hollins and Co. `Viyella' brand, and the goods marketed on their behalf. " 
Unlike other integrated manufacturer/ merchants which tended to lack the capital and 
the experience to sustain their activities, ' at a time when companies selling into the 
export markets performed badly, the Horrockses strategy was an outstanding success. 
Tootal followed a similar strategy, but with a greater dependence on exports, 
and less apparent achievement. Although like Horrockses, its branded products were 
also marketed domestically, the company remained exposed to problematic overseas 
markets. Difficulties were in part attributable to worthless debts taken over from the 
partnership, in particular arising from the failed chartered corporation, the North 
17 Quoted in Chapman, Merchant enterprise, p. 200. 
18 Howe, `Sir Frank Hollins', DBB, p. 315. 
19 Wells, Hollins and Viyella, p. 98; following the establishment of the ` Viyella' 
trademark in 1894, the product was sold via Horrockses agents because of 
their connections with retailers. 
20 Chapman, Merchant enterprise, p. 304. 
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West Africa Company. 21 However, bad debts also accumulated in many other export 
markets. The West Indies, for example caused serious difficulties; in June 1891 
overdue accounts reached £34,900, or more than half the total outstanding in that 
market. ' The problem worsened and the auditor, A. A. Gillies, qualified his report 
in the years 1894,1895, pointing out that the debts represented fictitious assets, 
without which there was insufficient capital to pay a dividend. ' Put more bluntly, 
the company was technically insolvent. A solution of sorts was found, through the 
implementation of a `scheme' suggested by the Auditor. This involved the revaluation 
of property assets, thereby creating a reserve against which bad debts of over £69,000 
could be written off without reducing reported and distributable profits to catastrophic 
levels. ` However, the problems of selling into overseas markets were endemic. 
Even with the implementation of his own scheme, the auditor remained unsatisfied, 
qualifying the 1897 accounts, again arguing the previous bad debt write off was 
insufficient. New York was the problem this time, and the auditor hinted at both poor 
trading position and management control by pointing out that `serious losses had 
occurred which required further investigation'' Such difficulties explained the poor 
performance of the company in the 1890s. 
Despite difficult trading circumstances, management exercised considerable 
determination in forging an effective organisation. In terms of structure, marketing 
21 Howe, `Henry Lee and Joseph Cocksey Lee', DBB, p. 708. 
22 MCRL, M. 461, Finance committee minutes, Minute book No. 1., 22nd June 
1891. 
MCRL, M. 461, Minutes of general meetings, Minute book No. 2, auditors 
reports, 9th October 1894 and 22nd October 1895. 
24 MCRL, M. 461, Board minutes; minutes of annual general meetings, Minute 
book no. 2., Sept 29th 1896. 
' MCRL, M. 461, Board minutes, Minute book No. 2, September 21st 1897. 
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departments were organised by horizontal specialism. Each important market had a 
separate department allocated to it, thereby allowing staff to gain specialist knowledge 
but also enabling the Finance and other committees to exercise strategic control. That 
function, although unsuccessful in some cases at first due to the inadequate 
communication of credit terms, 26 was performed by monitoring overdue accounts 
and setting credit limits. ' Departments were given considerable flexibility, in 
particular they were allowed to place orders direct with the mills. Their actions were 
controlled via the assignment of stock limits, authorised by directors at committee 
level, to each department? Again the obvious problem would have been the 
imposition of short production runs and inefficiency on the manufacturing half of the 
company. The problem was solved through an effective application of `personal' 
capitalism. Henry Lee (1817-1904) was an enthusiastic and effective mill manager 
and was able to work in close harmony with his brother, Joseph Cocksey Lee (1832- 
1894), whose function was to help Tootals develop its overseas markets 29 Despite 
poor profitability in the 1890s, these policies became the foundations of later success. 
By the early 1900s, profits reached much higher levels than previously. The 
recovery was described as a turnaround; aggressive marketing, coupled with 
withdrawal from the Coats' dominated sewing thread market, represented an 
important component of the strategy. 30 Tootals helped retain their important North 
MCRL, M461, Finance Committee minutes, Minute book No. 1,22nd 
December, 1890. 
MCRL, M461, Finance Committee minutes, Minute book No. 1,24th 
November, 1890 and passim. 
Z$ MCRL, M46 1, General Management Committee Minutes, Minute book no. 1, 
19th November 1888. 
29 Howe, `Henry Lee and Joseph Cocksey Lee', DBB, p. 706. 
30 Howe, `Henry Lee and Joseph Cocksey Lee', DBB, pp. 708-9. 
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American markets by establishing channels for branded products direct to the retailer; 
a policy similar to that of Horrockses. 31 Nonetheless despite the determination of its 
management, Horrockses remained the more successful. 
One reason might have been that Horrockses, as noted in chapter three, made 
large investments in ring spinning from the late 1880s and replaced many of its mule 
spindles in favour of ring spindles. Evidence reviewed to date has suggested that such 
a policy was not necessarily a guarantee of superior profit. Nonetheless, Horrockses 
evidence represents a useful opportunity to examine plant replacement decisions. 
Parallels can be drawn this time with Fielden, a smaller company with a much 
narrower product range, but where similar archival evidence helps facilitate 
comparison. 
The analysis below seeks reasons for plant replacement and investment 
policies. Horrockses commitment, to both mules and rings was probably a function 
of its widening product range. Under British investment conditions, the mule was 
acknowledged to be superior at yarn counts of 40 and above. 32 Such finer yarns 
would have been produced on mules with coarser and twist yarns on ring spindles. 
The opportunities available to a company such as Horrockses, with spinning 
and weaving sheds adjacent on its main Preston site, to plan its production efficiently 
were clear. Management were presumably faced with varying levels of replacement 
cost at the margin; some replacement would have been little more than direct 
technological substitution, whilst other changes to capacity would have involved 
changes to factory lay out, modifications to supplementary machinery, and extensions 
to buildings. These decisions were analysed (table 6.3) into the two categories of 
spinning technology, using an arbitrary cut-off point of 5000 spindles, into `minor 
31 MCRL, M. 461, Board Minutes, Minute book no. 1,8th March, 1888. 
32 Sandberg, Lancashire in Decline, pp. 24-8. 
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replacement' (MR), and 'larger refit' (LR) classifications. " 
In the absence of specific data on machinery additions, estimates were made 
from the available records. The method adopted in the compilation of table 6.3 was 
to compare data on number and type of spindle in the Machine book with fixed asset 
values in the accounts for each major location on a year to year basis. Like many 
other companies in the industry, Horrockses provided depreciation at 7.5 %, 34 and 
disposals of machines would explain further falls in book values carried forward in 
the accounts. After making adjustments for these effects, where there is a rise in the 
book value of the machinery in the accounts this most probably explained by the 
inclusion of the cost of any new machinery purchased during that year. Such cost can 
then be compared with the numbers of new spindles actually purchased by examining 
differences in the machine book between spindles at the beginning of the year and the 
end, and a unit cost then calculated. 35 Other sources tended to confirm the overall 
accuracy of these figures (table 6.4). The data presented excludes the Centenary mill 
investment of 78,572 mule spindles at 32s per spindle. 36 
33 CVR, Machine book; Balance sheets and detailed accounts. Changes in 
spindleage were noted from the Machine Book. Balance sheet values of plant 
obtained from the accounts. Clear from the latter is the consistent use of a 
7.5 % reducing balance depreciation charge. 
34 CVR, Balance sheets and detailed accounts, 1887-1905 
31 The method used consisted of the following steps: 
Fixed asset value per balance sheet at beginning of year =A 
Less: depreciation (A x 7.5 %= B) 
Less: identifiable scrappings (undepreciated value eliminated on a pro rata 
basis) 
(A 
- 
B) x proportion scrapped =C 
Notional fixed asset value at end of year: A-B-C=D 
Fixed asset value per balance sheet at end of year =E 
Imputed cost of new capacity: E-D 
(expressed in shillings per unit in table 6.3; pounds and fractions thereof in 
table 6.5) 
36 CVR, detailed accounts, Centenary mill accounts. 
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Table 6.3: Horrockses, spindle replacement marginal 
costs 
Replacement costs (in shillings) 
Date No of Unit cost 
spindles Mules Rings 
MR LR MR LR 
1888 3040 16 
1889 5040 12 
1890 2352 11 
1891 380 20 
1894 832 17.5 
-17.5 
1894 2976 17.5 17.5 
1894 2920 30 
1896 612 7 
1897 9326 21 21 
1898 2000 13 
1899 6800 9.5 
1901 17600 23 
1902 1300 40 
1904 2400 28 
1905 336 11 
Weighted average cost of all replacements: 
Mules 22.9s 
Rings 18.7s 
Sources: Calculated from CVR, Machine book; detailed accounts. 
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Table 6.4: Cost of new capacity, spinning industry 
Date 
1878 
1883 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1889 
1895 
1898 
1907 
1907 
Value in 
shillings 
Mule Ring 
39.7 
21 
20 
24 
20 
23.6 
31.9 
28 40 
20 
23.3 
Source 
Cost of New Ladyhouse Mill, calculated 
from figures in Rochdale Observer, 28 June 
1890. 
An Oldham mill, Schulze-Gavaernitz, The 
cotton trade, p. 151. 
Average cost of mills built to date, Smith, 
`An Oldham Limited Liability Company', p. 
38. 
Ellison, The cotton trade, p. 70. 
Murray, The Accountant, p. 611. 
Beal Mill, Oldham; Gurr and Hunt, `Cotton 
Mills of Oldham', p. 24. 
Centenary Mill, calculated from' CVR, 
Accounts of Centenary Mill. 
Typical current prices; Oldham Chronicle, 
March 26th, 1898, p. 8. 
Times No. 2; Oldham Chronicle, 29th 
December, 1907. 
C Mill; Jones, `Cotton spinning Industry', p. 
88. 
Mule mill, Thornley, 'Modern 
, 
Cotton 
Economics, p. 203 ; Ring mill, Textile 
Mercury Annuals, Cotton Year Book, 1914, 
p. 179. 
1914 24.5 33.3 
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Perhaps . the most striking trend in tables 6.3 and 6.4 was that whereas in new 
mill flotations ring mills always had a higher cost per spindle, the Horrockses 
evidence suggested that where new machinery was purchased for existing buildings, 
the ring was cheaper than the mule at the margin. New ring mills required greater 
investment per spindle in preparatory machinery and engine power. 7 Such costs 
were not however, necessarily incurred for more marginal decisions. There was a 
wider variation in marginal cost for decisions on ring spinning installations, perhaps 
a reflection of ring frame versatility for installation in corners and extensions where 
mules were too large. At Horrockses rings were relatively cheaper, although the 
difference is far from dramatic at the margin. Given guidelines and norms on optimal 
mill size, whilst taking the opportunity to fill space vacated by older, narrower mules, 
entrepreneurs may have been reluctant to engage in more wholesale replacements at 
high marginal cost. The larger the replacement, the more necessary additional 
construction or alteration was likely to be since on the whole there was a positive 
relationship between the size of the replacement and the marginal cost. 
Cotton machinery may have become relatively cheaper vis a vis other industry 
sectors, especially in the last decade before 1914. Elsewhere, there was a disincentive 
of rising plant replacement costs. 38 No such rising trend of replacement cost 
occurred in the cotton industry (table 6.4), rather there was a fall up until 1907, 
followed by a rise thereafter. For Horrockses, there was no apparent rising trend of 
replacement costs (table 6.3), although no new purchases of capital equipment were 
made in the period 1906-14. As mills became larger, economies of scale drove down 
37 For example, see the comparative costings in The Cotton Year Book, 1914, 
pp. 179-180. 
38 Phelps Brown, and Handfield- Jones, `The Climateric of the 1980s', p. 305; 
the cost of manufacturing equipment for the British economy as a whole rose 
by 17% between 1885 and 1912. 
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unit spindle cost; particularly in mule mills where efficient scale was higher than for 
ring mills. " Inflation counteracted this effect after 1907 pushing prices higher. In 
general marginal costs of new investments fluctuated dramatically; it was not simply 
a question of the `rational' investor preferring rings to mules on the ground of rapid 
payback of investments in the former type of technology. 
The additional dimension to investment in production equipment, was as we 
have seen with Horrockses and Tootals, the potential conflict with marketing. In 
general, vertically integrated structures are difficult to manage, and such difficulties 
were well exemplified by the case of Fielden. The first problem was a result of the 
partiality of integration. There were external markets for the outputs of the spinning 
mills at Robinwood and Lumbutts and the weaving shed at Waterside also bought 
some of its yarn from local spinning companies. 40 Under such circumstances, the 
management of the vertically integrated organisation becomes problematic, since 
management co-ordination replaces the market as the mechanism for transfer between 
different processes of production. For Fielden Bros. Ltd. management, the co- 
ordination problem would have also manifested itself at the interface of spinning and 
' weaving technologies, both of which were in flux and both of which demanded 
different types of specialist knowledge. The difficulties faced in this respect were 
generally not shared by cotton entrepreneurs in the emergent specialist spinning and 
weaving centres. 
Vertical integration tends to pose a series of dilemmas for central 
39 See above, pp. 96-7. 
40 WYRO/353/421,480 and 481 Lumbutts and Robinwood mill accounts; 
RMA, 1895-1914. 
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management. For example, the choice open to Edward Brocklehurst (EB) Fielden, 41 
would have been whether to treat the units of the business as cost centres or profit 
centres. Fielden chose the former option, with cotton costed into Robinwood at 
invoice price, in conjunction with a system of the spinning mill charging the weaving 
shed on the basis of average daily prices quoted in the Liverpool Cotton Circular. 42 
As local management thereby had no control over mill revenues, their performance 
could only be evaluated by reference to controllable labour and other costs. Again, 
the choice of this method gave the minimum possible delegation to plant level 
management. Apparent lack of trust may have been motivated in part by worry over 
poor accounting controls and by concern that the true state of the business was 
thereby concealed. 43 Because of these difficulties, management was changed 
frequently as Fielden's dissatisfaction with financial performance continued. 
Something of a turnaround was achieved after 1908, and this coincided with the 
closer involvement of George Coates, a Rawtenstall based manufacturer hitherto 
employed on a part time basis. ' At the same time, if local management could keep 
costs under control, thereby fulfilling their part of the bargain, any responsibility for 
poor overall performance remained with E. B. Fielden himself. 45 
Given the adopted structure and practices, is it possible to blame local 
management for the poor general profitability of the company? The key indicators 
Edward (1857-1942) became the first chairman of Fielden Brothers Ltd on 
its formation in 1889, thereby suceeding the last partners of the third 
generation, John (1822-1893) and Samuel (1816-1889). 
42 Note from a conversation with Mr. J. Hirst, the former company secretary 
of Fielden Brothers Ltd. 
EBF diaries; Coates to Fielden, March 13th 1909. 
44 Various correspondence, Coates to Fielden, 1908-1912. 
as RMA, 1895-1914. These show clearly the use of unit cost as the mechanism 
for management control. 
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used by central management to judge local performance were cost per lb. of yarn and 
the percentage of waste to production "' For example, did the adoption of a cost 
centre based approach lead to a general reduction of costs at Robinwood? Figure 6.3 
shows unit cost trends for Robinwood, including labour and other cost controllable 
(ie non raw material) by local management. 
i 
RMA, 1895-1914. Prior to forwarding the accounts to EB Fielden, losses 
were calculated every year as a percentage of output, and each major 
category of expense calculated on a cost per pound basis. 
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Figure 6.3: Robinwoöd mill, unit costs 
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Fielden Brothers Ltd 
Unit costs (cost per lb) 
There was no general reduction in cost during the period. `Other expenses' climbed 
steeply on two occasions, in 1900 and in 1912-3, reflecting the vulnerability of the 
company to coal prices. 47 The second rise in coal charges may have been an 
important reason for the conversion of Robinwood mill to electric power in January 
1914.4' However, the measures in figure 6.3 are based on money amounts. As far 
as unit labour costs were concerned, real wages in the cotton industry rose during this 
period. Moreover, labour was the most significant expense item after raw materials. 
Further analysis of the labour cost figure is therefore required. Figure 6.4 shows 
Robinwood unit labour cost relative to unit labour costs under the Oldham list. As 
part of total costs, labour costs appear to have been well managed. The comparison 
is a fair one since Oldham was the centre of the coarse to medium trade and the 
Robinwood count tended to average low 20s. 11 Moreover, Fielden Bros. Ltd paid 
wages according to the industry wide lists and therefore would have had the same 
wage cost per employee. On the other hand, the Oldham figures would have reflected 
the commitment of that section of the industry to mule spinning. The improving 
labour cost per unit of output suggests Robinwood was an efficient mill, especially 
after 1908, when the previous manager, John Migley, was sacked for persistent 
drunkenness. S° The longer run trend towards improved efficiency may have reflected 
the earlier conversion from throstle to ring spinning in the late 1880s and the efforts 
of Wrigley, outlined below, in helping to modernise the mills' 
47 RMA, 1900 and 1912-3. 
48 WYRO, C351/1 Board Minutes, p. 380. 
49 RMA, 1895-1914. 
so Coates to Fielden, December 12th 1908. 
WYRO C/353/475, detailed accounts. Some modernisation occurred after 
Wrigley's departure, for example the conversion to electric power in 1914. 
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Figure 6.4: Unit labour costs 
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During the period costs for the industry as a whole rose considerably whereas the 
equivalent for Robinwood showed a small decline (figure 6.4). Because labour costs 
were a significant proportion of total costs controllable by local management, and in 
general these were controlled well, the evidence suggests competence at local 
management level, especially after 1900.52 In itself, however, good cost control was 
insufficient to secure competitive advantage for the company as a whole. If local 
management were competent, but entrepreneurial drive from the centre were lacking, 
it is a further fault of the latter if a centralised management style is adopted. Under 
such conditions, technical innovation was hardly likely to thrive, even where 
opportunities existed. 
Fielden Bros. Ltd. pursued the unusual strategy of using ring spinning for the 
production of weft yarns, and after 1909 did so in conjunction with a handful of 
experimental automatic looms. 33 Although much smaller than Horrockses, and like 
Gregs of Styal, a shadow of its former self, the Fielden concern became highly 
innovative. Its automatic loom experiment is dealt with in the next section. At this 
stage we concentrate on this vertically integrated company's attitude to ring spinning. 
Unconstrained by the obstacles of specialised industry structure, the company 
used predominantly ring spindles at its two spinning mills, Robinwood and Lumbutts, 
and experimented with automatic looms at the third site, Waterside weaving shed 
(figure 6.5). Lumbutts was converted substantially to ring spinning from 1895 
onwards, although some mules were retained. All capital equipment purchases after 
1895 were for ring frames, and mules in use in 1890 were gradually supplanted from 
thereon. Ring frames for weft spinning were installed at Lumbutts in 1895, the old 
sZ Despite fluctuating with output, unit labour costs were always below those in 
Oldham after that date. In some years, such as 1909, the difference was 
significant (figure 6.4). 
S3 WYRO C353/1 Directors' Minutes, 2nd March 1909, p. '334. - 
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mules being moved to Robinwood. S4 According to one source, by 1913 94% of the 
total spindles were rings. 55 Generally, its simultaneous use of rings and automatics 
confirmed exactly the predictions of the broad elements of the institutional constraints 
hypothesis. 
sa WYRO C353/1, Directors' minutes. Details of new machinery purchased between 1895 and 1900, pp. 182-256. 
ss Worrall, The cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 1891 and 1913, 
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Figure 6.5: The Fielden Mills 
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However, vertical integration was not a necessary condition for this 
innovative stance. Geographically Todmorden was located in an area, like Milnrow, 
which had a tradition of throstle spinning. " As noted in chapter three, the ring was 
seen as a logical development of throstle spinning. Another reason was that the 
company remained geographically specialised. Developments in spinning and weaving 
occurred at separate sites; responsiveness to innovation prior to 1900 was thus not 
driven by opportunities to develop integrated throughput manufacture, but by 
perceived advantages for each specialist application. As we have seen in chapter five, 
the real benefits of throughput manufacture were not in any case available until after 
the First World War. 
Another important reason for innovation was the role of the talented 
individual. Several specific inventions were inspired by Thomas Wrigley, the 
manager of Waterside. One was described as a `most ingenious device' for the 
loading of coal into hoppers. r Another device was given particularly favourable 
mention by one correspondent: 
Anti-Ballooning arrangement for Ring Frames 
... 
a recent invention of Mr. 
Thomas Wrigley, of Fielden Bros., Todmorden, whose name we have had 
the pleasure of mentioning in these pages in connection with many 
improvements in cotton machinery 
... 
The appliance has been found highly 
satisfactory in working. SB 
In the 1890s the ring frame was in a relatively early stage of its development. A 
general problem was `ballooning', referring to the tendency of the yarn between the 
traveller and the spindle to fly out thereby causing breakages. 59 The development 
56 Edward Fielden, as Chairman of Fielden Brothers and as MP for the 
Middleton division, briefly served both towns, 1900-2; Law, Fieldens of 
Todmorden, p. 266. 
5' Todmorden Advertiser, 22nd November 1889. 
s$ Textile Mercury, July 8,1893, p. 28. 
S9 Nasmith, Students' cotton spinning, p. 535. 
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of `anti-ballooning' devices was therefore important in improving the efficiency of 
machinery for a company such as Fielden Bros. Ltd.. Other improvements occurring 
in the 1890s, in which Wrigley had an important influence, were attempts to increase 
the reliability of the spindles used in ring spinning. The replacement of Booth-Sawyer 
spindle by the Rabbeth, and other improvements referred to earlier such as the 
Howard and Bullough `quick running' spindle (p. 134), allowed spindle speeds to 
increase. ' A refinement of the Howard and Bullough spindle became known as the 
`Wrigley spindle'. 61 
In addition to specific inventions, Wrigley applied his expertise to the 
organisation of the factories. The local correspondent quoted above also gave 
examples of his apparent achievement in these respects: 
The originator of the improvements at Waterside, as well as those carried out 
at Robinwood, and those in contemplation at Lumbutts, Jumb and Waterside, 
has been Mr. Wrigley... (and) will place their establishments on a footing 
equal to that of the best modern mills. 62 
Such was the public perception based on the views of newspaper correspondents. As 
will be demonstrated below, the validity of this view is open to question when 
compared to actual evidence from inside the company. In the modernisations of 1889- 
91, throstle and mule spindles were moved out of Waterside to allow the shed to 
concentrate exclusively on weaving. The improved efficiency from increased 
specialisation must have been a compelling argument, as the company were prepared 
to incur transport costs from the two spinning mills, both of which were located more 
than a mile away (figure 6.5). The transport costs must have been significant and thus 
the benefits of specialisation also considerable. 
60 Thornley, Cotton spinning, pp. 265-7; Murphy, The Textile industries, pp. 
80-1. 
61 Nasmith, Students' cotton spinning, pp. 517-9. 
62 Todmorden Advertiser, 22nd November 1889. 
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Despite transport costs, the main function of Lumbutts Mill was to supply 
weft to Waterside weaving shed. The installation of ring spindles was a major 
innovation at this site. In the mid 1890s, ring frames for the production of weft were 
in early developmental stages and the weft changing mechanisms of the automatic 
loom not yet available. It is doubtful that local management at Robinwood would 
have welcomed the transfer of the old mules, since the ring was more productive for 
lower count warps. The output of Robinwood prior to 1900 was coarse twist yarn 
(20s average) and it may not have been able to use old mules particularly efficiently 
for this function. However, the transfer was a short term measure. Where new 
purchases were made at Robinwood, rings were always ordered. 63 Willingness to 
experiment with new technology, however, does not in itself constitute successful 
entrepreneurship. The key question remained the success of implementation, and 
when tested by reference to the levels of profit recorded by Fielden, relative to the 
performances of Tootals and Horrockses accounts, the results were quite dismal. ' 
In circumstances where the usual institutional constraints of vertical specialisation did 
not apply, their importance can also be assessed by reference to the Fielden records. 
If such constraints were serious obstacles, an unconstrained firm such as Fielden 
would be expected to perform better than the rest of the industry. If it failed to do so, 
it may have been due to other constraints or the failure of the management in its 
entrepreneurial function. 
Automatic loom investments before 1914 
In discussing the diffusion of the automatic loom, some mention of the policies of 
63 WYRO/353/1, Directors' minute book; Robinwood was respindled with new 
ring frames in the period 1908-1910, pp. 325 and 348. 
64 WYRO 353/475, Detailed Accounts; Robinwood Mill Accounts. 
. 
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individual companies was made in chapter three. As already noted there, automatic 
looms were not introduced into Britain until the early 1900s, and were an 
insignificant chapter in the diffusion story relative to the ring spindle before 1914. In 
the next section, all companies that were known to have installed automatics will be 
examined. Each will be considered in as much detail as possible, evidence permitting, 
to determine how profitable the investments made actually were. Of the companies 
considered above, Tootals adopted a determined and systematic attitude towards the 
automation of weaving, Horrockses may have experimented, but nothing more, and 
Fielden began, but failed to carry through, a programme of asset replacement. A 
fourth company, Ashtons, was alone in Lancashire in showing a decisive commitment 
to the new loom, and was therefore included in our analysis. The only other 
documented, pre 1914, introduction of automatics was by the Gregs at Styal, and 
their policies have been documented elsewhere, ' although they are referred to again 
here for comparison. In considering each company in more detail below, we present 
the first comprehensive survey, as far as data sources allow, of the profitability of 
automatic loom investment in pre First World War Lancashire. 
Ashtons were the dominant force in automatic weaving and are therefore dealt 
with first. Given the ostensible advantages of the new method, the company might 
have been expected to perform well in comparison to the rest of the industry. In 
1911,34% of all automatics in Lancashire were installed at Ashton" As it was 
also a publicly quoted company from 1899 onwards, contemporaries would have thus 
monitored its progress with great interest. Returns to capital for Ashtons were 
compared with an average for the other vertically integrated firms in the industry 
(figure 6.6). 
' Rose, The Gregs of Quarry Bank Mill, pp. 96-8. 
' Calculated from Fowler, `Trade unions and technical change', p. 43. 
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Figure 6.6: Rates of return, Ashton Brothers Ltd, 
1899-1913 
Return on capital employed 
.Q 
U 
O 
4- 
C 
I- 
4- 
C) 
0 
Date 
Ashton Bros 
--° Vert. Integrated 
Sources: Ashtons, calculated from LGL, Commercial Reports and SEOI; industry 
average, average rates of return for vertically integrated companies per table 1.2 (see 
also appendix 1). 
177 
IuUU 1 WUI+ 1toUt-I 
By installing automatic looms on such a scale, which it used in conjunction 
with ring spindles, 67 Ashtons went in the opposite direction to the rest of 
Lancashire, and precisely in the direction advocated by the critics of the industry. Yet 
even a cursory glance at figure 6.6 provides no indication of decisive competitive 
advantage. Ashtons under performed against its competitors in more years than it 
outperformed them, although its profits in 1901 and 1906 were very good. Fellow 
entrepreneurs considering the model of vertical integration combined with ring spindle 
and automatic loom adoption would have not felt an urgent need to emulate the 
company. 
If vertical integration was not a constraint for Ashtons, then perhaps labour 
relations were. Two strikes, one in 1904 and a longer one in 1908, were occasioned 
by the use of automatic looms. However, the profitability trend of the company 
(figure 6.6) would appear not to have been influenced by either dispute. In the former 
case, the buoyancy of trade helped guarantee the union easy concessions within a 
week, whereas in the more depressed times of 1908 the strike was more protracted. 
Management used the 13 week 1908 strike to unload surplus stock, but also wanted 
to test, and if possible break, the strength of the union 68 In doing so, they had 
significantly departed from their hitherto paternalist management style. 
Although doing no damage to profit, the strikes thus caused other problems 
for managements. Henry Philips Greg, in common with Henry Lee of Tootals, and 
others in the family connected group responsible for the diffusion of Northrops in 
Lancashire, was instinctively paternalist in management style. Traditions of the earlier 
Gregs and his own management of Neville mill at Reddish exemplified this 
67 Worrall, The cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 1913; Ashtons 
had 98,594 ring spindles and 67,284 mule spindles; looms totalled 4,445. 
68 Fowler, 'Trade unions and technical change', p. 53. 
. 
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approach. " Yet wherever attempts were made to introduce automation to Lancashire 
weaving, such a management style must have appeared difficult to sustain. The strike 
problems experienced at Ashtons were paralleled by a dispute at Styal over speed ups 
six loom working, and attempts to introduce American methods. 7° Although 
automatics were not introduced there until 1909, industrial relations remained 
problematic as typified by the subsequent disputes in 1907 and 1908. " Once 
introduced in 1909, the operation of the automatics was trouble free. As with Fielden, 
low profitability of a marginal concern and the need be more efficient to survive 
provided the motivation for experiment. 
Another motivation was the determination of a particular entrepreneurial 
group. Henry Philips Greg was a business associate of the Tootals board through their 
joint promotion of the British Northrop Loom Company, n and would therefore have 
drawn on the experience of the Daubhill strike of 1906. Of all the cases of weaving 
automation developments, Tootal's Sunnyside mill, ý part of the Rumworth Mills 
complex at Daubhill, Bolton, witnessed the longest and most bitter strike. Harold 
Lee, son of Henry and responsible for the management of Sunnyside did not consider 
Northrop looms to be suitable for the mills' high quality patterned output. Instead it 
was proposed to introduce ` drop wires', or automatic warp stop motions, and this 
became the specific cause of the strike 73 The length of the strike, failure to recruit 
69 Rose, ` Henry Philips Greg', DBB, vol 2., pp. 647-8. 
70 O' Mahoney, Quarry Bank Mill memoranda, p. 66. 
71 Rose, The Gregs of Quarry Bank Mill, p. 98; 0' Mahoney, Quarry Bank Mill 
memoranda, pp. 71 and 75. 
72 Simmons, ` Denis Machell Hollins', DBB, p. 308. 
73 Liddington, Mumby, and Seddon, `There's no room on Daubhill for me', pp. 
1-2 (the attitude of Harold Lee led to an escalation into a bitter dispute); for 
a description of the warp stop motion, see Sandberg, Lancashire in Decline, 
p. 81-2. 
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`knobsticks', 74 and favourable trading conditions placed the Tootal board under 
considerable pressure. The directors report to shareholders acknowledged: 
... 
profits would have been higher but for a weavers strike at Rumworth 
Mill.. 
. 
This created considerable difficulty in meeting demands at a time of 
prosperity. " 
To put an optimistic gloss on the outcome of the strike the same report stated, 'new 
workers have been gradually introduced to replace those who have left the company's 
service'. 76 It was true that Lee had attempted to do this, but it was his failure that 
led to acceptance of union list terms two weeks later. A side effect of the strike was 
that Lee was persuade by the arbitrators to join the masters' federation. The strike 
thus formally ended the paternalistic management style, of which the Sunnyside 
Institute was the hallmark, and the Victorian individualism initiated by earlier 
generations of management. 77 The lessons of the strikes at Bolton and Hyde were 
twofold; traditional management styles had to be severely compromised, and 
automation at a time of industry prosperity meant generous concessions to the labour 
force. Only the second effect had a direct impact on profit, but as the industry 
recovered in the 1900s, restored profitability elsewhere would ironically have created 
a disincentive to potential investors in automatic looms. 
Horrockses management may well have found such arguments convincing. 
In the discussions of Tootals and Horrockses above, many similarities were noted; 
the timing of the establishment of the new companies and the marketing strategies 
74 Replacement non-union labour. 
MCRL, M461, Board Minutes, Minute book No. 3, Directors report to 
shareholders, 4th September, 1906. 
MCRL, M461, Board Minutes, Minute book no. 3, Directors report to 
shareholders, 4th September, 1906. 
Liddington, Mumby, and Seddon, 'There's no room on Daubhill for me', p. 
31. 
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they pursued provided interesting parallels. Their managements also shared a common 
interest in subsequent reorganisations, such as the Calico Printers Association. '$ 
However, Horrockses management did not follow the example of the Greg, Lee, 
Broadhurst, and DM Hollins entrepreneurial axis down the road to automation of 
weaving with anything like the same vigour. 
The attitude of Horrockses management to the automatic loom was not clear 
from the evidence, but was probably ambivalent. The marginal cost of loom 
replacement decisions at different locations within the company calculated are shown 
in table 6.5. They were calculated on the same basis as table 6.4. 
11 Howe, `Sir Frank Hollins', DBB, p. 315. 
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Table 6.5: Horrockses, loom replacement marginal 
cost calculations 
Date Site No of Unit cost 
looms £ 
1889 Yard 18 3.17 
1893 New Preston 344 7.46 
1893 Yard 72 5.63 
1894 New Preston 54 8.15 
1894 Yard 375 4.47 
1895 Field 32 31.50 
1896 Yard 15 12.87 
1896 Moses Gate 32 16.06 
1896 Field 34 29.98 
1899 New Preston 53 2.90 
1899 Field 136 2.80 
1900 Yard 18 30.67 
1903 Moses Gate 8 46.38 
Source: Calculated from CVR machine book. 
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Marginal costs for replacement looms showed a wide variation. A possible 
explanation of such variation is suggested by the availability of automatic and plain 
looms at substantially different purchase prices from the late 1890s onwards? 9 
Prices varied according to width, and the acquisition of wider looms, for example for 
sheetings, would provide one interpretation. Alternatively, it is possible that the series 
of small purchases of looms in 1895,1896,1900 and 1903, consisted of experimental 
consignments of relatively expensive automatic looms, particularly those in later 
years. The British Northrop Loom company was not fully established until 1904, and 
these purchases would therefore be American imports. 80 
Other evidence tended to support this conclusion. The business connections 
of between managements with other firms using and promoting automatic looms were 
strong. " From 1902 onwards Horrockses itself became a major investor in the 
British Northrop Loom Company. 82 Given that the records show no new net 
79 Feller, `The Draper Loom in New England Textiles', p. 340. American 
prices were $138 and $50 for Draper automatic looms and plain looms 
respectively prior to World War 1. Sandberg, Lancashire in Decline, p. 79, 
pointed out that plain looms were 24% cheaper in Britain. Using an exchange 
rate of £1 = $4.86, the approximate price of the two types of loom would 
be: 
Automatic looms £28.50 
Plain looms £7.82 
80 Sandberg, Lancashire in Decline, p. 81n noted that this version would be 
about 33 % more expensive than the later British version. 
81 Simmons, 'Denis Machell Hollins', DBB, p. 309; the connection between 
Hollins and Horrockses for purposes of brands and marketing has already 
been noted. 
82 CVR, Balance sheets and detailed accounts; the balance sheet showed the 
shares being fully paid up via instalments in 1902-4. See also, Howe, 'Sir 
Frank Hollins', DBB, p. 316, and Saul, ` The Engineering Industry'. These 
three sources suggested, although 3/4 of the shares were owned by the US 
Draper company and other American interests, the British Northrop Loom 
company the balance of participative shares were owned as a consortium by 
interested entrepreneurs; principally Henry P. Greg, William Tootal 
Broadhurst, William Livesey, Frank Hollins and Denis Machel Hollins. 
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investment in looms between 1903 and 1912, and that the company would be unlikely 
to invest in the shares of another dealing in unfamiliar and therefore risky technology, 
it does appear possible that the earlier purchases were indeed automatic looms. There 
was little evidence from individual companies for the use of this type of loom before 
World War One. That a large, innovative company such as Horrockses should be one 
of the few to do so is not a surprising conclusion. Nonetheless the extent of its 
adoption, as with the rest of the industry, was clearly limited. 
Industry structure, however, appeared to give no clue as to this pattern. The 
adoption of new looms did not parallel the adoption of ring spinning, as might be 
expected in a vertically integrated company. There were several further possible 
explanations as to why Horrockses may have experimented with the new looms but 
failed to adopt them on a large scale. Automatics were unsuitable for short specialised 
production runs and for the production of the heavily sized products typically 
produced for the far Eastern export market. " The product range, and the conflict 
between the marketing and production arms of the company referred to above, and 
its commitment to a quality image may have caused its management to resist the 
economies of scale opportunities presented by the faster throughput new looms. 
Another problem associated with the introduction of this technology was union 
opposition. " Unlike Ashtons, Tootals and Gregs, the company enjoyed excellent 
labour relations from the 1860s onwards and throughout the period. Based on the 
conciliatory management style of Hollins, & the risk of upsetting this employment 
I Taussig, Some Aspects of the Tariff Question, p. 283. 
84 Taussig, Some Aspects of the Tariff Question, p. 284; Sandberg, Lancashire 
in Decline, pp. 84-92. Authorities agree that the introduction of automatic 
looms implied at least a quadrupling of worker/machine ratios if the full 
potential for efficiency gain were to be approached. 
I Howe, `Sir Frank Hollins', DBB, p. 316. 
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strategy may have been considered too great. 
The final problem with the adoption of the new looms was cost. As noted 
above the cost of new automatics was about three times the cost of a traditional loom. 
The low rate of loom replacement suggests the company was generally reluctant to 
scrap well functioning plain loom capacity. It may also suggest hat, given the faster 
rate of spindle replacement, although vertically integrated, there was an increasing 
willingness to sell yarn based products to independent weavers. Overall, full scale 
conversion to automatic looms would have been an inconsistent strategy, being 
unsuitable for the product range, unacceptable to the workforce, and unprofitable per 
se, as an investment opportunity. The commitment to a wide product range also 
underpinned a commitment to both types of spinning technology. As regards overall 
marginal cost the advantage of ring spindles was relatively minor. 
Fielden Brothers, by contrast, as a more peripheral smaller company, 
produced a much narrower range of goods. As we have already seen, its management 
was innovative but nothing like as professional as Horrockses, Tootals and Ashtons. 
Like Gregs on the other hand, the company was unprofitable and its management 
were willing to try new methods to attempt to increase efficiency. Also these 
businesses were located away from the main centres of spinning and weaving 
specialisation and forced to concentrate on coarse products against the backdrop of 
an increasingly competitive world market. 86 Gregs had abandoned spinning in 
1894,8' a strategy also open to Fielden given its proximity to the great weaving 
centres of the Burnley area. The alternative actually adopted was a significant 
investment in ring frames, including a combined purchase of spindles for weft and 
automatic looms, thereby confirming the apparent technical compatibility of these 
Rose, The Gregs of Quarry Bank Mill, pp. 88-90. 
ý' Rose, The Gregs of Quarry Bank Mill, p. 90. 
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types of machine. " However, despite the apparent advantages, there are no other 
documented examples of companies making simultaneous introductions prior to 1914. 
The investment decision is therefore analysed in detail below. 
Unlike all the companies considered so far, Fieldens enjoyed good labour 
relations in that the introduction of automatic looms and their associated methods 
uniquely did not cause a strike. Partly this was because Todmorden was a company 
town and the Fielden family commanded the respect and deference of their 
workforce. S9 Also the scale of introduction was very small, and would have been 
seen as simply an experiment rather than a threat to working conditions. 
Another unique feature of Fieldens was that their experiment dealt 
simultaneously with spinning and weaving technology. The crux of the institutional 
constraints hypothesis is that vertical integration prevented the ' diffusion of ring 
spinning because independent weavers did not demand ring spun yarn, and that 
independent managements were incapable of co-ordinating high throughput 
production. ' At Fielden Brothers these problems were entirely absent. 
However, there were other important and serious difficulties that thwarted 
successful experimentation. The first was that the elements of alternative spinning and 
weaving technology were imperfect and not therefore perhaps cost effective. In the 
1890s and early 1900s, as shown in chapter five, both ring and mule technology were 
subject to improvements during this period, and in the former case there were special 
problems of `bad spinning' when rings were used to spin weft yarn. 91 Given that 
88 Lazonick, `The cotton industry', pp. 23-4; Bennett, An introduction to 
automatic weaving, p. 29. 
89 E. B. Fielden diaries, passim. 
Lazonick, `The cotton industry', pp. 24 and 20. 
Thornley, Cotton Spinning, p. 247; Nasmith, Students' Cotton Spinning, p. 
532. 
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interrelatedness constraints such as winding, and to some extent, transport were not 
present at Fielden Bros. Ltd., the relatively poor performance of the company may 
have been due to technical imperfections with the machinery. Also the scale of the 
investment in automatics was very small, especially given the availability of surplus 
capital, as represented by the build up of railway shares and other investments in their 
accounts. ' It was also very small in the context of the almost total conversion of the 
main mills to ring spinning 93 There was thus a startling mismatch of technology if 
the claims about the mutual compatibility of the ring spindle and the automatic loom 
were true in conditions prevailing prior to 1914. Alternatively, if Fielden Bros. Ltd. 
are not to stand accused of wasting an excellent innovative investment opportunity by 
not following through their faith in the ring spindle with an equal investment in 
automatic looms, there must have been compelling reasons for not doing so. 
Fielden's first contract for automatics was dated 31 October, 1906 when two 
looms were ordered at £61/16s each. The cost was two and a half times that of plain 
looms with the same reed space purchased from Butterworth and Dickinson in 
Burnley at around the same time. " This may have been too expensive. Only 14 
automatic looms were installed prior to 1914, suggesting that although willing to 
experiment, management did not yet consider automatic weaving to be a major step 
forward. Indeed, there was considerable resistance to its introduction in Lancashire 
well into the 1930s and 1940s. 'ß At Fielden Bros. Ltd. the usual disadvantages, 
associated with lack of ring spun weft, yarn rewinding, and to a certain extent high 
transport costs, were not present prior to 1914. Unless Fielden management acted 
WYRO, C3531475, Detailed accounts. 
93 See above, p. 150. 
WYRO, C353/1, Directors' minutes, pp. 318 and 352. 
9s Bennett, An introduction to automatic weaving. 
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irrationally, it may therefore be inferred that there were reasons other than the 
constraints imposed by industry structure for the slow adoption of the automatic 
loom. 
The decision can be analysed by reference to the costs incurred by the 
company. In the one major outlay, Fielden Bros. spent £1,300 on 396 weft ring 
spindles and 12 automatic looms, the former being purchased specifically to produce 
output for the latter. " Table 6.6 shows the saving in cash terms such an investment 
might have achieved. The source used was part of a treatise suggesting how savings 
might be made from investment in automatic looms under British conditions. 
96 WYRO, C353/1, Directors' Minutes, p. 334. 
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Table 6.6: Automatic looms, return on investment 
Plain Automatic 
loom loom 
Output per loom per week 263yds 209.5yds 
Equivalent no. of looms 10 12 
No. of weavers 2.5 1 
Labour cost 6s/loom per week 60s 
Labour cost, plain loom weaver 
plus 25 % 30s 
Sundrylabour 6s 
Extra tackling and stores 5s/lOd 
Extra wraps 6s/8d 
Weekly saving 1ls/6d 
Sources: Based on the Fielden automatic loom and ring frame' purchase, as detailed 
in WYRO 353/1 Directors' minutes, p. 334; assumptions as used by Young, T. M. 
The American Cotton Industry, p. 139-40. 
0 
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The weekly saving shown in table 6.6 arises as a result of replacing plain looms with 
automatics. The annual saving would have amounted to about £29 on the total 
investment. This is insignificant in relation to the total size of the business. However, 
the installation of automatic looms was an experiment and may have been replicated 
if satisfactory results had been obtained. It is therefore necessary to estimate the rate 
of return from the investment. A difficulty arises from the inclusion of the ring 
spindles in the single figure for total capital invested. However given the 
interrelatedness of the two technologies, the decision to invest in these spindles arose 
directly from the loom investment. Thus it is appropriate, in the first instance, to 
consider the purchases as a single decision. To the annual saving of £29 on the 
looms, any further savings on the rings' must be added. However, from the board 
minutes it is clear that the company already possessed ring frames for weft. 97 It did 
not possess automatic looms. Therefore the overall effect of the purchase would be 
to displace only plain looms, with no opportunity cost saving from the 'new rings. 
Furthermore, as noted already, the efficiency of the ring spindle before 1914 in 
British conditions has been overstated. Moreover, the opportunity cost of the ring 
spindles would have been the market price of ring spun weft or its internally 
produced cost on existing ring spinning capacity. The saving on the new looms 
should therefore be compared with their net cost. From the average prices quoted in 
the board minutes, a high estimate of the installed cost of the ring frames would be 
£220.98 The cost of the installed looms would be the remaining £1080, or £90 per 
loom. This may appear expensive compared to the cost of the earlier automatics noted 
above at £61 each. Whichever is taken, a saving of just over £2 per machine per year 
did not appear to justify further investment. 
WYRO, C353/1, Directors' minutes, 1st July 1896, p. 208. 
98 WYRO, C353/1, Directors' minutes, pp. 318-412. 
190 
Yet if management did take a decision on such a basis, they were not giving 
the automatic looms a fair chance. The main advantage of the loom, according to its 
manufacturers was that one weaver could mind up to 24 machines. Fielden Bros. Ltd. 
purchased a total of 14 machines, and were therefore only able to benefit from just 
over half of the potential productivity gain, since one weaver would still have been 
required to mind the 12 new machines, or possibly the 14 total number. To take a 
best case scenario, assume the latter and dispense with the sundry labour cost in table 
6.6. This brings the annual saving to £59, or just over £4 per loom. If £61 is taken 
as the marginal cost and a generous 20 years as the useful life of the loom, the rate 
of return was only 3.2%. With the risk associated with new technology, investments 
in railway companies were an attractive alternative by this standard. 
Fielden Bros. Ltd. could be criticised for choosing an investment which did 
not allow the full commercial benefits of their investment to be realised. Young's data 
suggested that if this had been done an annual saving of £119 could have resulted 
from an investment of £472, the equivalent of a return of 16.6%. " Using data from 
another contemporary source, Sandberg produced an estimate of 10%. 100 In this 
respect, however, the Fielden evidence is important since Sandberg assumed a much 
lower cost per loom, 
, 
typically £30. The actual cost in the case of Fielden was 
between two and three times that amount. Company policy since 1895 had been to 
widen the looms and therefore the equivalent cost of the replaced plain loom was 
proportionately higher as well. Loom widening would have increased labour 
productivity, but in a replacement decision the labour cost would have been saved in 
a similar ratio regardless of loom width. For companies using wider looms therefore, 
Young, The American Cotton Industry, p. 139-40. Young assumes a 
depreciation rate of 15 %. 
100 Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, p. 79. 
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the capital cost would be higher in proportion to the labour cost saving. The expense 
of automatic looms was also a function of the monopoly position of the British 
Northrop Loom company. "' For these reasons, it is possible to appreciate why the 
majority of British companies did not introduce the new looms prior to 1914. 
Within the context of a vertically integrated structure, Fielden Bros. Ltd. 
management did at least take up the opportunity to use ring spindles and automatic 
looms in conjunction with one another. However, the important inventions noted in 
chapter 5 which allowed full integration and automation of manufacture were not 
commercially available until the 1920s. Prior to these developments, integrated firms 
such as Fielden Bros. Ltd were happy to deploy ring spindles and experiment with 
automatic looms. Only when full automation was possible did vertical specialisation 
begin to lose its rationale as efficient throughput became achievable in single factory 
units. The distance between the Fielden sites may have therefore become a constraint 
in later years. The company did become more reluctant to invest in new 
techniques. 102 It was not until the end of the 1930s that the company installed high 
speed drafting. 103 Although pioneers in adopting rings for weft spinning, Fielden 
Brothers only had some of the necessary technical improvements available to it prior 
to 1914. It would thus be unfair to blame Fielden management for failing to introduce 
high throughput automated manufacture before the means to do so actually became 
available, and, in the case of automatic looms, before they became profitable. 
Technology and industry organisation: some interim conclusions 
Survival of archival evidence was inevitably patchy, and the comparisons in the above 
"I Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, p. 77. 
102 Note from a conversation with Mr. J. Hirst. 
103 RMA, 1939. 
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case studies were thus far from systematic. Nonetheless,, each has sought to illustrate 
a particular facet, which when combined with the analysis in earlier chapters, should 
support valid conclusions on the relationship between industry structure, technology 
diffusion and profitability. 
Little support has been found for the existence of constraints, in the form of 
labour relations and labour cost (chapter five), or in the form of vertically specialised 
industry organisation (chapter four and above). In the above discussion, we have seen 
that although integrated concerns performed better in the slump of the 1890s, they 
lagged all specialised, companies, whatever their technology, in the boom periods. 
Yet if industry organisation was a constraint, it would be expected that unconstrained 
integrated firms would perform better in all cases. As we have seen in chapter five, 
the real constraint was technical, and integrated firms did not have the means to 
introduce automated throughput manufacture. This would have to wait for the high 
draft ring spindle, automatic winding, and the more general availability of the 
automatic loom; these were the real technical constraints. 
1 
Lazonick, whose `constraints' hypothesis has occasioned much debate on 
Lancashire cotton, has taken care to outline his precise argument. Vertical 
specialisation promoted competitive advantage before 1914 or at least imposed 
constraints that were non-problematic in that sense. 104 However, specialisation was 
acknowledged to be a constraint in that it prevented the diffusion of ring 
spinning. 10S Lazonick argued that these were separate issues, but the use of the 
main empirical ingredient of this and earlier chapters, realised profitability, has 
presupposed that such a distinction was artificial. Return to capital both measures 
competitive advantage and sends signals to investors, thereby influencing diffusion; 
101 Mass and Lazonick, ` The British cotton industry', p. 57. 
pos Lazonick, `Rings and mules', p. 396. 
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such are the dynamics of a market economy. It is not consistent to argue that 
structure and labour relations were simultaneously a constraint and non problematic. 
The correct conclusion was that they were neither. 
On the basis of all the evidence considered so far, the major hypotheses of 
failure to invest in the `correct' technology and institutional constraints advanced 
elsewhere to explain the performance of Lancashire textiles are rejected. However, 
different routes to profitability existed which were not predicated on technology and 
organisation, although both might be important where other influences were also 
present. Such influences have, nevertheless, been alluded to so far only in passing; 
the next step will be to deal with them in turn, first, in the next section, 
entrepreneurship, finance and investment, and then in the final section, 
-industry 
efficiency and the world market. 
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Part 3 
Ownership, Control, and Divestment 
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Chapter 7: Growth and divestment 
- 
constraints on 
the entrepreneur? 
The previous section examined the performance of the Lancashire textile industry 
strictly by reference to the variables of technology and industry structure. Given the 
interim conclusion of no definitive relationship between these attributes, it is 
necessary at this stage to turn to alternative hypotheses to explain the development 
of the industry. As much recent discussion has concentrated on the technology and 
structure aspects, such hypotheses are not easily derivable from extant literature. 
Thus, unlike Part 2, it is unnecessary to preface the next stage of the argument with 
an extensive literature review. 
In searching for alternative models of business and economic development, 
it is thus appropriate to turn, at least initially, to the nature of capitalism itself, and 
specifically the social nature of capitalist institutions. A primary justification for such 
a perspective is that recent histories dealing with the British economy have 
emphasised it, ' but have not necessarily fully incorporated the history of the cotton 
industry. One aspect is so-called `personal capitalism', which has been identified as 
an important feature of British business. By this, it is understood that entrepreneurs 
viewed businesses in personal rather than organisational terms; as estates to be 
nurtured and passed onto heirs? In such an economic system, the distribution of 
profits, corporate saving, and capital accumulation are vital issues. Yet very little 
research has been conducted in this area, and there is need for more. 3 In judging the 
Chandler, Scale and scope; Elbaum and Lazonick, The decline of the British 
economy. 
2 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 286. 
3 Chandler, Scale and scope, p. 390. 
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pattern of entrepreneurial behaviour and the institutional constraints upon it, 
divestment is as important as investment. Indeed the former might well influence the 
latter. Evidence on how the profits from Lancashire textiles were actually spent 
suggests some interesting conclusions on strategy and structure within the industry, 
and is examined below in the first chapter of Part 3. 
Another important institutional element was the finance of economic activity, 
and in the case of a significant section of the cotton industry, the role of capital 
markets. Its study is important since it inevitably provides clues as to the importance 
of capital ownership, entrepreneurial groupings, and the features of managerial 
hierarchies. The second chapter of this Part analyses these relationships from financial 
and social perspectives. 
The current chapter addresses two issues; the growth of individual companies, 
and the distribution of trading surpluses. These two issues are related since a low rate 
of capital accumulation would be the obverse of high dividend distributions; a 
phenomenon which may have influenced the development of the industry and the 
economy as a whole if divested cash was used unproductively. Having examined 
growth rates, in analysing the pattern of divestment reference is then made to the 
relationship between the ownership and management groups as measured by 
propensities and pressures for profits to be paid out as dividends. The general 
approach suggested here is based on agency theory, which has gained wide 
recognition in contemporary financial and economics literature, 4 but has not been 
widely used in business history, even though well established historical analysis has 
presupposed a split between ownership and contjýol. s The difference in the current 
approach is the proposal of a financial agency variable hitherto unused in such a 
° For example, Jensen and Meckling, `Theory of the firm', pp. 305-360. 
For example, Chandler, The visible hand. 
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context, dividend policy, to explain the historical and institutional evolution of the 
relationship. 
The sample 
The evidence upon which much of the discussion in the following two chapters is 
based was drawn from the surviving business and published records of cotton firms 
in Lancashire. Using the same sample as described in chapter one, the constituent 
companies were first segmented on the basis of ownership. That is joint stock 
companies were compared with private companies. The former, having wider share 
ownerships than the latter, were arguably subject to different institutional pressures 
regarding their policies of capital maintenance and distribution. Three of the 
companies in the main sample, Ashton Brothers, Barlow and Jones, and Rylands had 
widely distributed ownership, their equity shares being quoted in London and 
Manchester. Of greater local significance were the large number of spinning 
companies quoted at Oldham. ' As pointed out previously, Oldham firms had a 
unique propensity to report their results to the general public. In addition to the 
companies in the main sample, therefore, it was possible to use aggregate data 
published in local and national newspapers and journals to examine the overall 
behaviour of Oldham spinning companies.? The remainder of the main sample 
6 Throughout this chapter `Oldham' firms are those firms which were quoted 
on the Oldham stock exchange or located in the `Oldham district', comprising 
Oldham, Rochdale, and the satellite towns to the immediate north east of 
Manchester. 
The sources of published accounting data used were; Oldham Chronicle, 
financial reports (Saturday issues), 1885-1914. Listings by company of profit 
and dividend per quarter; `Commercial history and review, VII-Textiles', 
Economist, 1895-1914. Both sources contained the same listing of profit per 
company, aggregate dividend and aggregate reserve balances carried forward. 
Here and elsewhere, the companies included in these aggregates are referred 
to as the Economist sample. 
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comprised private companies which were more secretive about their financial results. 
To investigate the dividend policies of their managements, archival business records 
were used, where possible, to isolate the necessary data variables. 
For all companies, whether private or not, the important data observations 
collated were the distributable profit, the dividend, and the undivided profit 
accumulated as reserves. From series such as these it was possible to test the extent 
to which managements were able to use the corporate form as a means of 
accumulating capital and thus to secure growth and reinvestment, or, conversely, the 
extent to which they came under pressure form their shareholders to pay profits over 
as they accrued. 
Growth and profit patterns: evidence 
Patterns of growth are illustrated by reference to capital accumulation in figure 7.1 
and table 7.1. As expected there was some divergence between private and public 
companies. Most surprisingly, however, whereas the former accumulated capital 
steadily, companies quoted in Oldham divested large amounts of cash. Figure 7.1 
shows an index of the average capital employed in those companies publishing 
balance sheets and hence appearing in the Economist sample and contrasts it with a 
similar index for private companies, and for those companies which had their shares 
quoted in London rather than Oldham. Trends for the latter in figure 7.1 should be 
treated with caution, as the sample consisted of only three companies, and for earlier 
years only one, Rylands, was included. Depending upon which companies reports 
could be got hold of, the Economist and Oldham Chronicle aggregates varied their 
component companies from year to year, although the same companies tended to 
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feature in the long run! This might have caused some minor distortions for 
particular years but the general trend was unmistakeable; a sharp decline to 1900 and 
a plateau in the ensuing years. 
For example, an Oldham Chronicle correspondent complained that Rochdale 
companies had become much more secretive in the 1890s; 26th June, 1899. 
Although information was difficult to obtain in some years, certain 
companies, such as those at Milnrow, published their results throughout the 
period and were thus included every year. 
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Figure 7.1: Average capital employed per company, 
1884-1913 
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Sources: Compiled from the series published annually in the Oldham Chronicle and 
the Economist and from the sources listed in table 1.2. 
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Table 7.1: Fixed asset and capital growth 
(1) Growth in spindleage (Compounded growth rates, 1.884-1911) 
Growth 
per annum 
Spinning firms, Oldham area 2.29 
Cotton spinning industry (excluding Oldham) 1.03 
(2) Growth in capital: (Compounded growth rates) 
Period Growth 
per annum 
Oldham quoted 
Dowry 1885-1912 
-4.24 
Haugh 1884-1913 
-0.92 
New Ladyhouse 1884-1913 
-0.78 
New Hey 1887-1913 
-1.52 
Moorfield 1884-1912 
-2.00 
Sun Mill 1884-1912 
-1.56 
Werneth 1889-1912 0.30 
Private 
Fielden 1891-1913 1.42 
Horrockses 1887-1913 2.93 
Osborne 1890-1913 
-3.50 
Tootals 1888-1913 1.78 
T. R Eccles Ltd 1897-1913 1.46 
Whiteley 1898-1913 2.82 
London quoted 
Ashton Brothers 1899-1913 3.43 
Barlow and Jones 1900-1912 0.90 
Rylands and Sons 1884-1913 1.63 
(3) Economy as a whole (rate of growth of manufacturing and commercial capital) 
Growth 
per annum 
1882-1914 2.38 
Sources: (1) Calculated from Chapman and Ashton `Sizes of Businesses' pp. 469-555. 
(2). as per table 1.2. (3) Calculated as a compound growth rate from Feinstein, 
National income, p. 194. 
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The statistics in figure 7.1 and table 7.1 suggest that the pattern of capital 
accumulation in public company dominated Oldham was significantly different than 
elsewhere in Lancashire and in the wider economy. In spindleage terms, Oldham 
grew rapidly, and, if such a crude measure of fixed assets can be equated with 
monetary capitalisation, at a rate close to the average for the economy as a whole 
(compare table 7.1; parts (1) and (3)). Such growth was undoubtedly associated with 
the increased geographical specialisation of cotton spinning within Lancashire in the 
Oldham area. ' It has been argued that growth was facilitated by the joint stock 
system and associated ready access to finance. 10 The 1904-7 boom witnessed a 
massive construction of new mills and expansion of capacity. The number of spindles 
installed in Lancashire increased from 46m in 1905 to 55.3m in 1908,11 and in the 
Oldham area 40 mills were floated in 1905,23 in 1906, and 39 in 190712 However, 
shrinking balance sheet capitalisation of established Oldham mills was the dominant 
feature of table 7.1, and the purpose of much of this chapter is to explain that 
apparently odd trend. 
The decline was a function of an absence of accumulated profits. For the 
industry as a whole in the period 1902-1911, credit balances on shareholders' 
reserves averaged 11 % of total capital invested; the trend following the trade cycle 
with no secular increase. " In 1912, total accumulated reserves for the whole British 
9 Farnie, English Cotton, pp. 271-2. 
10 Kenny, `Sub regional specialization', p. 54. 
" Robson, The cotton industry, p. 340. 
12 Thomas, The Provincial Stock Exchanges, p. 154. 
13 Calculated from, `Annual review of the cotton trade', 1903-1912, the 
Economist, by taking accumulated reserve balances as a proportion of the 
total of loan capital, share capital and accumulated reserve balances. 
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textile industry were only £8m. '1 Assuming capital was divided equally between 
spinning and the rest of the industry, accumulated reserves were is 3d per spindle. 
This compares with a ratio of 14s 6d of total capital employed per spindle as 
calculated based on figures per the Economist and Mitchell and Jones. 's Accumulated 
reserves thus represented only 8.6% of total capital employed. 16 
Few individual companies were exempt from this trend. The index of Oldham 
quoted companies in figure 7.1 represents the average of just under one hundred 
companies regularly included in the Economist sample. Specific examples reinforce 
the impression of the general trend. Slow growth rates in spindleage terms for the 
Milnrow companies was noted in chapter four; these were matched by actual declines 
in terms of monetary capital employed. The Dowry and the Moorfield, being more 
typical Oldham companies established in earlier flotation booms, provided even better 
exemplification of the drain of capital from the older companies. Like many others, 
the Dowry had repaid its loan account by 1906. " Companies featured in the 
Economist sample repaid £1.38m outstanding loan capital in the period 1893-1907.18 
The policy of managements appeared to be to use cash to reduce dependence on third 
party financial stakeholders rather than to acquire new fixed assets. 
The pattern was essentially one of capital circulation rather than capital 
accumulation. Between 1884 and 1907, the hundred or so companies featured in the 
14 Cairncross, Home and foreign investment, p. 98. 
is `Commercial history and review, VII-Textiles', Economist, 1901-1913; 
Mitchell and Jones, Second abstract, p. 186 
16 Where is 3d (15d) is taken as a percentage of 14s 6d (174d). 
" CAD, DOW. 1, nominal ledgers. 
18 Toms, `Financial constraints', p. 375. 
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Economist sample paid out an estimated £3.98m. 19 In the same period there was a 
net repayment of loan capital totalling an estimated £2.58m for the same 
companies. 20 However, it is tempting to believe that this total divestment of around 
six and half million pounds, from a sub section the coarse spinning industry, was not 
entirely lost to the trade. The 100 or so new mills erected in the Oldham district 
between 1905 and 1907, if we assume 100,000 spindles for each mill at £1 a spindle, 
would have required new capital of say, £10m. Given that much of this capital was 
raised locally, it is highly probable that some of it came from the capital divested 
from established companies. An apparent trend, `which will be investigated below in 
more detail, was thus the confinement of significant investment to new concerns, 
contrasted with the withering of capital in established companies. 
There were exceptions. The Werneth was the only company in table 7.1 to 
show any growth in capital during the period, primarily as a result of its construction 
of a new mill. 21 The Shiloh was another company which grew rapidly, constructing 
four new mills in this period? 2 However, such companies were unrepresentative. 
The Sun Mill Company, despite undertaking extensive re-equipment in the period 
1899-1907,21 still showed a net decline in capital employed. In the case of the 
Dowry, the downward trend was more dramatic, as there were very few years when 
19 Calculated by reference to the Economist, `Commercial history and review 
(1895-1913), VII-Textiles', cumulative table of dividends per company and 
number of companies, taking the average dividend per company and 
multiplying by the number of companies submitting returns. 
20 Calculated by reference to the Economist 'Commercial history and review (1895-1913), VII-Textiles' and Smith, `An Oldham limited liability 
company', pp. 52-3. For a note on the consistency of companies included in 
the sample between these dates, see above, pp. 34-5. 
21 OLSL, Misc. 42/17, quarterly reports to members, 1892. 
22 See table 4.5. 
1 Tyson, `Sun Mill' pp. 286-90. 
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the company managed to spend even its depreciation charges on new plant and 
equipment24 In 1913, the company had exactly the same number of spindles as it 
had in 1889. For whatever reason, the managements of these companies lacked either 
the power or the will to expand their businesses. That such a phenomenon should 
emerge in the cotton, the engine of growth in the first industrial revolution, was 
indicative of important institutional changes, perhaps with implications for the wider 
economy. 
Apparent reluctance to reinvest was, however, confined only to the publicly 
quoted companies which raise their finances predominantly within the Lancashire 
area. Those Lancashire companies which extended their capital raising endeavours as 
far as the London markets, were able to sustain higher growth rates than those 
companies whose shares were traded mainly in the hotel rooms of Oldham. Rylands 
and Sons, already the largest Lancashire firm, increased its capital dramatically 
between 1884 and 1895, although by a much slower rate thereafter. 2' The company 
expanded its capital base in 1886 through the issue of debentures, although the money 
came from immediate family. Expansion of the export business, combined with 
selected withdrawal from certain markets, took up some of the extra funding. 
Reinvested profits from these activities boosted reserves and contributed to further 
capital accumulation. " Surprisingly for a public company, Rylands thus raised most 
of its capital privately or internally. In contrast, Ashton Brothers grew rapidly, and 
following its reconstruction in 1899, was able to mobilise a large capital base via the 
London and Manchester stock markets. In the early 1900s the accumulation of profits 
24 CAD, DOW. 1, nominal ledgers, 1886-1914. 
I LGL, Commercial reports, 1884-1895. 
26 Farnie, `John Rylands', pp. 66-9. 
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added to that capita1,27 and assisted the investment in automatic equipment reviewed 
in chapter 6. 
Contrasts with privately owned companies were also dramatic. The extensive 
re-equipment of companies such as Horrockses, Tootals, and Fielden have been 
described in detail in chapter six. Frequent investment in plant, and other activities, 
meant that all three grew in terms of book value. 
Horrockses exhibited the strongest growth trend in this category of company. 
Unlike the Oldham joint stock companies, Horrockses grew by means of takeover and 
phased organic expansion. The decisive developments, initiated and orchestrated by 
Sir Frank' Hollins, were the intensive merger period of 1885-7 leading to the 
formation of the company, the developments of the Centenary Mill and the 
Manchester warehouse, and the acquisition of Swainson Birley. 28 The Centenary mill 
was so called as the project marked the centenary of the founding of the firm by John 
Horrocks in 1791,29 although the mill was not brought into full production until five 
years later. 30 The development thus occurred at the height of the trade depression, 
but also when Horrockses, almost alone in the industry, was turning in record profit 
performances 
. 
31 On completion of the Centenary mill project, the company almost 
immediately commenced the construction of another important building; the 
27 LGL, Commercial reports, 1899-1913. 
11 Howe, `Sir Frank Hollins', DBB, pp. 313 and 315. 
29 Pedrick, The Story of Horrockses, p. 27. 
30 CVR, Detailed accounts. The first profit and loss account for the mill 
appeared in the accounts in November 1895; the first balance sheet in 
November 1896. The first entry in the machine book was also for 1896, 
showing the full complement of 78,572 mule spindles. 
31 See above, chapters 4 and 6. 
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Manchester warehouse. 32 This development was part of a conscious policy to reduce 
dependence on the London wholesale and retail markets and whose staff, inherited 
from the pre 1887 merger, Hollins considered to be unreliable. " In addition to direct 
investment of this kind, some of the growth of the firm during this period came from 
the acquisition of Swainson Birley in 1900,34 and additional capacity was added 
through the acquisition of Fishwick mills. 's 
Like Horrockses, Tootals also expanded through a series of carefully staged 
developments. Its growth rate was slower (table 7.1), and this was due to 
repositioning in some markets. Withdrawal from the sewing cotton trade in the mid 
1890s allowed the divestment of Lee Spinning Company to the English Sewing 
Cotton'Company Ltd. 36 Sales of other parts of the business such as Dan Lane mills, 
Atherton and the Bradford branch, also formed part of a reconcentration strategy in 
the 1890s. 37 Such asset sales helped finance important aspects of this new strategy. 
Like Horrockses, the strategic centrepiece was the construction of a new Manchester 
warehouse; as for Horrockses, the building would have been a source of considerable 
prestige. Located in Oxford Street, the Tootals warehouse was commenced at about 
32 CVR, Detailed accounts. The construction costs on work in progress first 
appeared in the balance sheet in May 1897. The building must have been 
substantially completed by November 1900, when the cost was shown at 
£67,560. However additional improvements pushed the cost up further to a 
peak balance sheet value of £70,031 in October 1902. 
33 Howe, `Sir Frank Hollins', DBB, p. 315. 
34 Chapman, Merchant enterprise, p. 318; Howe, `Sir Frank Hollins', DBB, p. 
315. '' 
31 CVR, Detailed accounts. The acquisition appeared in the accounts of 
November 1900 as an asset of £38,649. These mills were presumably part of 
the assets acquired through the Swainson Birley takeover. 
36 MCRL, M. 461, Board Minutes, Minute book no. 2, December 28th, 1897. 
37 MCRL, M. 461, Board minutes, Minute book no. 2,12th September, 1899 
and Minute book no. 3,9th September 1902. 
208 
the same time, but completed much quicker than that of its rival. " 
On a smaller scale, Fielden adopted a similar policy; the partnership divested 
older mills on or before incorporation in 1889,39 and financed re-equipment from 
depreciation and accumulated profits 
.° 
Comparison of Horrockses, Tootal and Fielden, and contrasts with Oldham 
joint stock companies, has suggested that private, not public, capital was the more 
important engine of growth. All the developments referred to above for Horrockses 
and Tootals were financed from accumulated profits. 4' The typical Oldham company, 
on the other hand, was content to work its existing plant and machinery within the 
usually unaltered confines of the four walls of its mill. Such an arrangement was 
somewhat paradoxical. Normally, especially under modem conditions, it is the public 
company, with ready access to finance from the stock market, which is capable of the 
fastest growth. 
In the 1890s, that normal situation was reversed, temporarily at least. Putting 
aside important institutional constraints, which will be examined in detail later, the 
reversal might be attributed to the trading conditions that prevailed in the 1890s. As 
seen in chapter 4, vast fortunes were lost in the Oldham district in the early 1890s 
and it was hardly surprising that capital contracted through divestment. The Osborne 
Spinning Company, although privately financed, was affected in the same way as the 
Oldham publicly quoted companies, and adopted the same policies of high dividends 
38 The warehouse was reported to be ready in October 1898; MCRL, M. 461, 
Board minutes, Minute book no. 2,27th September 1898. 
39 Figure 6.3; also assets such as the Pernambuco Gas works, municipal 
responsibilities taken over by Todmorden Borough Council and the sale of 
office premises, EB Fielden diaries, passim. 
40 WYRO, C3531475, Detailed accounts, 1890-1914. 
41 CVR, Detailed accounts and MCRL, M. 461, Board minutes, passim. 
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and minimal plant replacement. 42 By contrast, Horrockses and Tootals had ready 
sources of cash, the former from the profits of its operations, the latter from strategic 
divestments. 
In the more prosperous 1900s the whole industry became cash rich, and in 
that period there were interesting parallels as well as contrasts. A common feature of 
both private and public companies was the accumulation of financial assets. Notable 
was Rylands, which by 1906 had financial assets equal to half its paid up capital! ' 
Typical investments were in railways and consols; a policy shared by Horrockses and 
Fielden in the 1900s. Investment in railway shares was a traditional Fielden strategy 
and was resorted to again after 1895; in the earlier days of the company the banks 
had regarded such investments as good collateral. ' Fielden had strong managerial 
connections with the railway companies and Edward Fielden, as a director of the 
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railways from 1898, directed spare cash from 
manufacturing operations into the railway associate. 45 After 1890, dependence on 
banking institutions almost completely disappeared as a consequence of the 
unwillingness of management o expand the business. Other railway and British 
industrial companies also benefited from the policy. The growth in capital of the 
company, from £130,000 in 1890 to £186,000 in 1913, was explained solely by the 
42 LCRO, DDX/869/3/1 Trade, capital and profit and loss accounts. Between 
30 June 1890 and 30 June 1911, the company charged depreciation of 
£33,365 at a very uniform rate; in the same period net additions to fixed 
assets amounted to £9,920. 
43 Farnie, `John Rylands', p. 67. 
44 Chapman, Merchant enterprise, p. 68. 
as EB Fielden diary, 22nd December 1897; WYRO, C3531475, Detailed 
accounts. 
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growth of this investment portfolio beyond cotton manufacture. '16 An accusation of 
refusal to invest and to expand the company could thus be levelled at the 
management. However, it would only be valid if to do so if alternatives appeared to 
give a reasonable prospect of return. 
The investment decisions that were taken do appear irrational if the actual 
rates of return are compared. Figure 7.2 shows the return on financial and estate 
investment compared with the return on manufacturing assets. Return is calculated 
by taking investment income, rent and profit as proportions of capital employed in 
each particular activity. 
46 WYRO 353/475, Detailed Accounts. By 1903, the largest single investment 
was in the. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, with a combination of 
ordinary, preference shares, and debentures totalling £19,823. A further 
16,906 was invested in the Great Central and Midland Railways. Other 
smaller amounts were invested in the shares of inter alia, Bolckow Vaughan, 
Cammell Laird, and the Bleachers' Association. 
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Figure 7.2: Fielden, returns on investment 
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As figure 7.2 shows, the best returns were from renting property, not from 
manufacturing cotton. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that ' E. B. 
Fielden considered selling the manufacturing side of the business in December 
1894.41 After consulting J. A. Fielden, °8 he chose to dismiss Wrigley°9 instead, and 
perhaps hoped for a turnaround under new management. Investment in railway stocks 
and some industrial companies meant risk was therefore lower than cotton, and the 
returns may have appeared satisfactory in the form of steady dividends. 
Horrockses was another company that invested in railways, in this case the 
Central African Railway Company S° For the most part, however, Horrockses 
pursued a policy of investing in other cotton companies and cotton based 
organisations such as the Manchester Ship Canal and the British Cotton Growing 
Association. Again, these reflected the business connections of the directors, and 
included the British Northrop Loom Company and the Cliff Spinning Company. " 
Likewise, Tootals held investments in the English Sewing Cotton company. 12 Despite 
some differences, the investments of all these companies were either part of larger 
portfolios or represented small proportions of the total capital invested. 
Oldham companies made similar investments, but on a rather more incestuous 
EBF diaries, 6th December, 1894. 
John Ashton Fielden (1859-1942), son of Samuel Fielden, played a generally 
inactive role in the management of the business, offering only occasional 
advice to E. B. Fielden. 
49 Wrigley, machinery inventor (see above pp. 173-4) and mill manager, 
epitomised the problems encountered when family owners needed trustworthy 
agents to carry out functions of this sort. 
so LCRO, DDHs/53, Balance sheet April 1914, the investment accounted for 
almost half the total of £49,000. 
s' LCRO, DDHs/53, Balance sheets, 1908. 
52 MCRL, M. 461, Board minutes, Minute book no. 3. 
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u 
basis. Sun Mill used its spare cash to build up a large, but relatively undiversified 
portfolio of investments. In 1909, over half the investments of £34,000 were invested 
in Swan Lane Spinning Company. Thomas Coates, a director of the latter, was also 
a director of the Sun Mills' The remaining investments were prominently in other 
Oldham district spinning mills. In common with other Oldham companies, and those 
in the rest of Lancashire, Sun Mill was cash rich by the mid 1900s. 
A mutual interdependence, with cross investments and directorships thus 
increasingly characterised the industry. Yet few firms used this cash to expand their 
productive capacity. Even Horrockses, which grew by leaps and bounds in the 1890s, 
made no new investments, other than in financial assets, after 1905. -Ashton Brothers, 
as noted above, was the only genuine exception to the trend. One might be tempted 
to conclude that Lancashire entrepreneurs, although good at making money, had 
either little idea on how, or few opportunities, to reinvest it productively. 
Yet investment was the most important feature of emergent companies on the 
international stage in the 1890s and 1900s. The companies of the second industrial 
revolution achieved competitive advantage through scale economies by investment in 
production, administrative and distribution functions. s° Integration of functions in the 
large corporate enterprise facilitated the reduction of unit cost. 55 But such functional 
investments presuppose an accumulation of capital under the corporate umbrella, or 
a class of entrepreneurs with the ability to quickly mobilise such capital. In cotton, 
whereas certain companies were growing as might be expected, and in line with 
overseas competitors, and were therefore able to develop large corporate organisation 
structures, a significant proportion of the industry, the joint stock Oldham section, 
33 Tyson, `Sun Mill', p. 301. 
sa Chandler, Scale and scope, p. 286. 
55 Lazonick, Business organization, p. 25. 
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was somehow constrained from pursuing a similar strategy. If a constraint could be 
suggested at this stage, share 'ownership by the local cotton investing public would 
appear the obvious explanation. Certainly share ownership was a very important 
determinant of entrepreneurial behaviour, and the issues are explored more fully in 
chapter eight. However, other influences were also at work and these are considered 
next in the ensuing empirical analysis of dividend policy. 
Dividend policy: (1) Individual companies 
Table 7.2 shows the average percentage of available profits paid out as dividend by 
specific companies together with those firms in the sample regularly included in the 
Economist. A ratio greater than one indicates that the company on average over 
distributed profits by depleting previously accumulated reserves. 
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Table 7.2: Dividend pay out policies 
(1) Individual companies 
Average ratio of dividend to distributable profit (pay out ratio) 
(1) (2) (3) 
1884-1913 1884-1899 1900-1913 
Oldham quoted 
Dowry 1.03 0.87 1.26 
Haugh 0.87 0.95 0.81 
New Ladyhouse 0.81 0.87 0.76, 
New Hey 0.85 0.81 0.89 
Moorfield 0.97 0.95 1.03 
Sun Mill 0.67 6.95 0.52 
Werneth 0.76 2.13 0.61 
Private 
Fielden 0.75 2.03 0.67 
Horrockses 0.57 0.87 0.51 
Osborne 0.95 0.91 0.98 
Tootals 0.49 0.56 0.51 
T. R Eccles 0.38 n/a* n/a* 
Whiteley 0.53 n/a* n/a* 
London quoted 
Ashton Brothers 0.72 n/a* n/a* 
Barlow and Jones 0.73 n/a* n/a* 
Rylands and Sons 0.87 0.79 0.98 
(2) Average, Economist sample 0.94 1.13 0.96 
* in these cases, data was available only from the late 1890s, further analysis by 
period was therefore not possible. 
Sources: (1) As for table 1.2. (2) Compiled from `Annual review of the cotton trade', 
per Economist, and the Oldham Chronicle. Ratios calculated by taking the dividend 
paid for each year by the amount of profit available to ordinary shareholders. The 
average was then calculated for each period by reference to the individual ratio for 
each year. 
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As a matter of general policy for the companies considered, profits were paid 
as dividends to shareholders rather than reinvested for growth. Such behaviour was 
more typical of Oldham district companies than elsewhere, more typical of public 
companies than for private companies, and more typical in earlier years rather than 
later. However, these trends are scarcely discernable without further reference to the 
particular circumstances of each company. 
In Oldham, the dividend propensities of limited companies reached the status 
of folklore. There was a local perception that the companies existed primarily for the 
purpose of paying dividends and nothing more, earning Oldham the nickname of 
`Diviborough'S6 Blatant examples of this were well publicised and attracted critical 
comment from contemporary observers. A correspondent to the Oldham Chronicle 
wrote: 
I thought all limited companies had at last got a lesson for life. I was wrong. 
Evidently they will not learn. Leesbrook declares thirty per cent. dividend. 
To do so now seems to me insanity. If they show thirty per cent. When their 
mill is brand new, and weft exceptionally good, why not pay 10 per cent. and 
depreciate the rest? By declaring 30 per cent they deceive the. public and, I 
think, themselves, for at their start they are going into the old error of not 
depreciating enough and paying away every available farthing in dividend. 
Every shareholder should surely know by now that depreciating more, and 
dividing less, makes any concern richer. n 
In table 7.2, such behaviour was best typified by the Dowry and Moorfield spinning 
companies. The former paid on average 103% of its available profits as dividends 
each year. 58 In practice, this meant it was capable of accumulating only small 
56 Farnie, English Cotton, p. 263. 
17 Oldham Chronicle, 4th April, 1887 
58 See table 7.2, column (1). 
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amounts of capital. " In one sense the similar behaviour of the these two companies 
was not to be expected as there were some differences in their share ownership 
structures. Eighty five percent of Moorfield shareholders in 1874, a total of 629 
predominantly middle class and small businessmen, held less than 80 shares each. At 
the Dowry, ten years later, the equivalent percentage of shareholders owning less 
than 80 shares was twenty two 60 Nonetheless both were relatively widely controlled 
and both conformed to Oldham norms. The Rochdale ring spinners of Milnrow were 
only slightly less generous than their Oldham competitors. All of these companies 
persisted with the policy of paying out as much as possible in dividends. 
For others in the Oldham district, a change of policy occurred. The Sun Mill 
and Werneth companies were as generous to their shareholders as any other company 
in the earlier years. Indeed, prior to 1900, both frequently paid dividends from non- 
existent profits, as the high ratios in table 7.2, column (2) testify. " When profits 
returned to the industry after that date, however, there was an apparent reticence to 
distribute too much largesse to the shareholders. A possible reason was that there 
were fewer of them, and that ownership concentrated around management and 
promotional groups. For example at the Sun Mill company, many small shareholders 
sold out under pressure from calls during the depressed years of the 1890s, thereby 
paving the way for the creation of a managerial oligarchy by 1905.62 Like the Sun 
59 CAD, Dow. 1, nominal ledger; reserves as at 30th June 1887 stood at £580, 
and by 30th June 1912 had accumulated to only £7,256. During the period 
between those dates the total profit available for dividend was £39,950. 
60 Smith, `A history of the Lancashire cotton industry', pp. 188 and 194. 
Further analysis of the Borough share register suggested there was no 
tendency for share ownership to concentrate in this period, p. 188. 
61 In some cases, the effect of paying a dividend greater than the available profit 
was to produce an average pay out ratio of greater than one. 
62 Tyson, 'Sun Mill', p. 294. 
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Mill, the Werneth had effectively transformed itself into a private company by 1913. 
Reductions of capital facilitated the exercise of management control as shareholders 
were effectively bought out. 63 Ownership was thus important and ownership changes 
were reflected in changes in policies towards the accumulation and distribution of 
profits. 
Above, it has been demonstrated that the privately owned limited liability 
section of the industry was the most important engine of capital accumulation, as 
confirmed again here by the statistics in table 7.2. Despite some exceptions, the ratios 
were generally lower than for the quoted companies. Horrockses and Tootals were 
content to retain about half the available profits, thus providing funds for expansion 
of their activities. Two other companies in the sample, G. Whiteley and Co. Ltd. 
(Whiteley) and T and R Eccles (Eccles), were owned by William Birtwistle (1855- 
1936) of Blackburn. " Birtwistle was above all a salesman, and like all good 
salesmen collected a handsome income in the form of a one and a half percent 
commission on the sales of Eccles. " Despite a personal majority share ownership, 66 
dividends from the company were a less important source of remuneration. He also 
collected a director's commission from Whiteley, which, again was much larger than 
his dividend entitlement from a significant shareholding. 67 Both companies 
accumulated capital and, unlike Ashtons, Horrockses, and Tootals, the cash was used 
63 OLSL, Misc/42/18, Quarterly reports to members; capital was reduced in 
1908 from £84,000 to £48,000 and again in 1913, to £36,000 (extraordinary 
general meeting, 9th December 1913) the latter being the occasion of the 
transformation to private company status. 
64 Birtwistle's companies should be distinguished from those belonging to the 
other important Blackburn firm of Birtwistle and Fielden Ltd. 
65 LCRO, DDX/868/7/1, profit and loss accounts and balance sheets. 
66 LCRO, DDX/868/20/1, Directors minutes, p. 3. 
67 LCRO, DDX/21/5, ledger and register of members. 
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to fund expansion in working capital rather than new plant and premises. In 
particular, as the companies expanded their customer base and product ranges, large 
investments were made in stocks and work in progress. In another respect, Birtwistle 
reinvested his drawings by buying the capital of other companies 
. 
68 Between 1895 
and 1910, he had assembled personal control of seven companies in the Blackburn 
area. 69 High rates of capital withdrawal from established businesses did not preclude 
the expansion of capital under such personal control. 
By contrast, in closely controlled companies such as Osborne the profit 
retention rate was also very low, suggesting that conflict between managerial groups 
and shareholders was not the only factor at work. Generosity may have simply 
reflected conformance to the norms of business practice in the Oldham area. Again, 
as with other Oldham companies, management took very little in the form of directors 
remuneration and still preferred an to hold wealth as individuals rather than allow 
capital to accumulate within the corporation. The directors of 'Osborne received ýa 
total of £17,200 in dividends between 1889 and 1903.70 This represented 107.5 % 
of the original equity capital invested, thus allowing the promoter/directors to more 
than recoup the initial investment. " It is probable that they used some of this money 
for reinvestment in other concerns. Their flotation of Gresham Mill Spinning Co. 
Ltd. to take over an existing concern in 1903 at a capital of £30,000 may have 
68 William had a fondness for moving house; he lived in 35 different ones 
during his lifetime, the limes, 15th June 1936, p. 17d, but did not 
accumulate much in personal wealth, leaving an estate of only £13,171 (The 
Times, 1st August, 1936, p. 15c). 
69 Birtwistle Group, The William Birtwistle group, np. 
7° LCRO, DDX/869/3/1, Trade, capital and profit and loss accounts. 
71 LCRO, DDX/869/3/1, Trade, capital and profit and loss accounts; total 
called up share capital when flotation was complete in June 1890 amounted 
to £16,000. 
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absorbed past profits from Osborne and helped to cement cross directorships. 
Although a separate company, the directors were essentially the'same. 72 The power 
of such elites, as groups of individuals, tended to cut across the development of a 
concentrated corporate identity. Although there was no pressure to pay large 
dividends, limited companies were not seen as engines of accumulation, implying that 
the continued growth of the industry was dependent on the reinvestment of profits by 
individuals, such as William Birtwistle or the Osborne directors. 
One company which differed markedly from the rest of the sample was 
Tootals. Whereas the general trend was to move from public to private, especially 
after 1900, Tootals sought additional capital by extending its share ownership. This 
may have had some influence on the pattern of dividend payment, as illustrated in 
table 7.3. Only eight shareholders were present at the first annual general meeting in 
1888, with the Broadhursts and Lees between them in a majority's Later meetings 
became much larger. At the general meeting of 7th September 1909, thirty nine 
shareholders and two press reporters attended. " None of this seems to have 
compromised the control of the dominant families; H Brooks Broadhurst was elected 
as a director at the same meeting. Edward Tootal Broadhurst benefited financially 
from the increased liquidity of more widely owned shares, making large disposals of 
shares through a large number of small transactions. " Newer shareholders may have 
been attracted by the dividend record of the company, including the bonus issue of 
LCRO, DDX/869/1/4, Memorandum and articles, 1906; DDX/869/10/2, 
Memorandum and amendments, 1903. 
73 MCRL, M461/1, minute book no. 1, p. 146. 
74 MCRL, M461/1, minute book no. 4,7th September, 1909. 
's MCRL, M461/1, minute book no. 4,8th October, 1908 and 22nd November 
1910. These two meetings registered the sale of 1,708 shares in 47 individual 
transactions. Tootal Broadhurst's proceeds from these sales would have been 
in excess of £10,000. 
190776 and the prospect of the record dividends the company was able to pay in the 
period 1910-3, despite only average profits (table 7.3). For example, following the 
creation of new shareholders, the company dramatically increased its dividend in 
1910 despite poor trading results. Tootal Broadhurst was widening his interests at this 
time, taking a seat on the board of the London and North Western Railway in 1905, 
and becoming more involved the promotion of Free Trade political organisation. " 
Similarly, Sir Frank Hollins of Horrockses began to divert his attention to such 
affairs via involvement and support of the Preston and Old Blackpool Liberal 
Associations. " In the case of Tootal Broadhurst, perhaps to finance these activities 
intended to benefit Lancashire in general, he diluted his control in the company 
through the sale of shares. At about the same time, Horrockses dramatically slowed 
down its previously rapid investment in buildings and fixed plant. 79 
76 MCRL, M461/1, minute book no. 4, directors' report 3rd September, 1907. 
A bonus was of £60,452 was paid by way of a call of £1 per share, raising 
the amount paid from £5 to £6. 
" MCRL, M461/1, minute book no. 3, board meeting, 21st November 1905; 
Clarke, Lancashire and the new liberalism, p. 288-9. 
78 The Times, 28th January 1924, p. 15d. 
79 CVR, Machine Book; Horrockses made no new investment in spinning or 
weaving plant after 1905. See also tables 6.3 and 6.5 above. 
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Table 7.3: Profits and dividends, Tootals 1888-1913 
Pay out 
Profit Dividend ratio 
1888 5926 0 0 
1889 21435 0 0 
1890 14185 7367 0.51 
1891 1505 7367 4.89 
1892 
-4865 7367 
-1.51 1893 47380 14703 0.31 
1894 
-19651 0 0 
1895 
-806 0 0 
1896 
-89 0 0 
1897 12503 0 0 
1898 
-12454 0 0 
1899 
-36 0 0 
1900 36401 14357 0.39 
1901 
-5739 14232 
-2.47 1902 14480 14168 0.97 
1903 44493 17304 0.38 
1904 
-960 14420 
-15.02 1905 9121 14357 1.57 
1906 48616 17228 0.35 
1907 140802 17228 0.12 
1908 20128 15257 0.75 
1909 23130 9452 0.40 
1910 
-20971 28356 
-1.35 1911 90229 28356 0.31 
1912 66819 28356 0.42 
1913 68301 28356 0.41 
Average 23072 11470 0.49 
Sources: Profits distributable to shareholders calculated from, MCRL, M461/1 
general meetings, minute books 1,2,3, and 4. 
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Table 7.4: Profits and dividends, Horrockses 1887- 
1913 
Pay out 
Profit Dividend ratio 
1887 28315 35007 1.23 
1888 60498 56011 0.92 
1889 43156 61262 1.41 
1890 70055 49009 0.69 
1891 72190 70014 0.96 
1892 92510 70014 0.75 
1893 76356 78766 1.03 
1894 50113 78766 1.57 
1895 148620 70014 0.47 
1896 69193 87517 1.26 
1897 44019 70014 1.59 
1898 135746 70014 0.51 
1899 145180 105021 0.72 
1900 64455 105021 1.62 
1901 44308 78765 1.77 
1902 98321 70014 0.71 
1903 42214 78766 1.86 
1904 19163 52510 2.74 
1905 249328 35006 0.14 
1906 144527 71414 0.49 
1907 211663 71414 0.33 
1908 131165 62487 0.47 
1909 255326 62487 0.24 
1910 251074 71414 0.28 
1911 119251 71414 0.59 
1912 263780 71414 0.27 
1913 379423 71414 0.18 
Average 122590 69443 0.56 
Sources: Profits distributable to shareholders and dividends taken from CVR, detailed 
accounts, LCRO, DDHs/53, balance sheets. 
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Table 7.5 shows the directors remuneration for a selection of companies in 
different years. In cases where companies were controlled by directors, an alternative 
to dividend payment was for management to simply award themselves directors' 
remuneration instead. Such companies might be expected to substitute directors' 
remuneration and dividends for one another. Thus there was an apparently inverse 
relationship between dividend payments and directors remuneration at Horrockses. 
The dividend pay out ratio (tables 7.2 and 7.4) demonstrated a small but steady 
decline throughout the period. ' In particular, there was a noticeable drop after 
1905, when increased profits were not matched by higher pay outs, less than half the 
available profit being distributed in most years (table 7.4). Meanwhile, the 
remuneration of the directors, and of the managing director especially, regularly 
increased. Although always generous, in some years Sir Frank Hollins allowed the 
company to pay him very well indeed. " The contrast between, the basic figure in 
1912 and the much larger 1913 payment (table 7.5) was typical of this sort of 
occasional large bonus. 
Another private company where profit appropriation took the form of 
directors' remuneration was Fielden. Between 1906 and 1914 in particular, the 
Fielden family managed to withdraw around £91,000 in the form of dividends and 
directors emoluments. ' Although the accounts do. not allow dividends and directors 
salaries to be distinguished, to do so is not important as both methods performed the 
80 See also, Toms, ` The profitability of the first Lancashire merger', table 1, p. 
130. 
81 Sir Frank spent much of his wealth outside the cotton industry; like Edward 
Fielden, he spent much of his time in Shropshire and had a second family 
home at Oldbury Grove, Bridgnorth; three of his four sons were educated at 
Eton, the Times, 28th January, 1924, p. 15d. On his death in 1924, his estate 
was valued at £315,357, ` Cotton Manufacturer's large fortune', the Times, 
21st March, 1924, p. 15d. 
I WYRO, C353/475, Detailed accounts. 
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same function; to provide an income to support the burgeoning Fielden landed estate 
and family dependents. ' Like Tootal Broadhurst, Edward Fielden viewed the 
business as a means of providing income for wider activities. In the Fielden case, as 
with Tootal Broadhurst's disposal of shares, capital receipts were used to supplement 
income. The figures in tables 7.2, column (2) and 7.5 were distorted by a one off 
dividend payment out of a capital receipt, following the sale of the Gas works to the 
Todmorden municipality84 As noted above, Fielden Bros. Ltd. did accumulate in the 
form of an investment portfolio, but the broad purpose was to provide a steady profit 
stream as a source of family income. 
For private companies, directors' remuneration was thus an important feature 
of the circulation and accumulation of capital. Dividends were an adjunct of this 
process and thereby less important. Conversely, for Oldham style public companies, 
dividends were much more significant and contrasted with the relative pittance paid 
to directors. ' At the Werneth Spinning company directors were poorly rewarded 
compared to the rest of the industry. For Oldham, it must be assumed that they were 
paid competitive rates. 86 Low remuneration was perhaps in part due to the low 
esteem in which directors were held. On the other hand, generous dividend policies 
reflected shareholder power and confirmed a lack of trust in the directors (tables 7.2 
and 7.6). If all available profits were paid out as dividends, it would be much more 
83 EB Fielden diaries, passim. 
84 WYRO, C3531475, Detailed accounts, 1893 and 1894. The profit recorded 
on the sale of the gas works was £10,795, of which £5,200 was paid as a 
dividend in the year ended 31st December 1893. 
81 Potter, The Co-operative movement in Great Britain, pp. 126,132. 
86 Other Oldham companies resisted large payments to directors, for example, 
Tyson, `Sun Mill', p. 294; Osborne, directors paid themselves the Oldham 
style salary of £120 per annum in the 1890s, LCRO, DDX/869/3/1, Trade,, 
capital, and profit and loss accounts. 
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difficult for directors to use corporate capital for any purpose other than that ratified 
by the shareholders. 
. 
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Table 7.5: The remuneration of " cotton company 
directors 
Company Year Sales Directors' % 
remuneration 
££ 
Fielden 1912 130,000* 9,294 7.15 
Horrockses 1890 993,895 8,339 0.84 
1912 1,585,672 19,231 1.22 
1913 1,634,108 45,807 2.80 
Osborne 1890 42,862 120 0.28 
T&R Eccles 1912 105,207 2078 1.98 
Werneth 1890 62,648 70 0.11 
1912 85,800 290 0.34 
Whiteley 1912 81,867 1,478 1.80 
* estimate based on sales in earlier years and the ratio of sales to balance sheet net 
assets. 
Sources: as for table 1.2. for each company that made any disclosure of directors' 
remuneration and sales. 
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Table 7.6: Profits and dividends, Oldham companies 
1884-1913 
Earnings Dividend Pay out 
per co. per co. ratio 
1884 2083 2519 1.21 
1885 
-31 862 -27.47 
1886 
-686 1152 -1.68 
1887 986 1824 1.85 
1888 2952 1989 0.67 
1889 2565 1981 0.77 
1890 4267 2778 0.65 
1891 417 2615 6.27 
1892 
-1054 466 -0.44 
1893 
-650 400 -0.62 
1894 47 610 12.97 
1895 589 570 0.97 
1896 533 767 1.44 
1897 1680 1175 0.70 
1898 3156 1879 0.60 
1899 4288 2501 0.58 
1900 4191 2954 0.70 
1901 3531 2984 0.85 
1902 
-17 1888 -111.77 
1903 
-504 1182 -2.35 
1904 p353 944 2.68 
1905 7701 2811 0.37 
1906 6556 3709 0.57 
1907 13212 5910 0.45 
1908 5865 4301 0.73 
1909 
-2721 2698 -0.99 
1910 
-3860 2037 -0.53 
1911 298 1771 5.94 
1912 5585 2683 0.48 
1913 5366 2683 0.50 
Average 2223 2088 0.94 
Sources: (1) As for table 1.2. (2) Compiled from `Annual review of the cotton trade', 
per Economist, and the Oldham Chronicle. 
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Shareholder pressure in Oldham produced dividend pay outs somewhat above 
those experienced by shareholders elsewhere in the industry (tables 7.2 and 7.6). For 
example those companies with Manchester and London quotations, and hence perhaps 
with more distant and less active shareholders. Table 7.2 shows the pay out ratios of 
these companies to be rather lower than for Oldham companies. Too much inference 
would be dangerous here, given that we have used data for only three companies. 
Nonetheless the pay out ratios of Ashtons and Barlow and Jones were a steady three 
quarters of available profits; both profits and dividends being less erratic than for the 
Oldham companies (tables 7.6 and 7.7). Rylands, it would appear, belied the trend, 
and became much more generous. with its dividends in later years (table 7.8). 
Ownership of the company widened during this period, and, as we have seen, spare 
cash was used for investment in financial rather than productive assets. This may 
have increased the certainty of cash flow together with the predictability of dividends 
(see table 7.8). Such assets would have been indicative of surplus cash, and 
management may have thus felt pressured to pay higher dividends instead of 
accumulating within the company. However, in considering the time trend for the 
whole sample in table 7.2, Rylands was something of an exception. 
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Table 7.7: Profits and dividends, Ashtons and Barlow 
and Jones, 1899 
- 
1913 
(1) Ashton Brothers 
Pay out 
Profit Dividend Ratio 
1899 8640 8640 1.00 
1900 9508 7560 0.79 
1901 26441 12960 0.49 
1902 17965 17280 0.96 
1903 15056 10800 0.71 
1904 3942 10800 2.73 
1905 28929 21600 0.74 
1906 62651 21600 0.34 
1907 40644 21600 0.53 
1908 47496 21600 0.45 
1909 19793 21600 1.09 
1910 7163 10800 1.50 
1911 13559 21600 1.59 
1912 29298 32400 1.10 
1913 47884 32400 0.67 
Average 25264 18216 0.72 
(2) Barlow and Jones 
1900 47508 37508 0.78 
1901 24822 25280 1.01 
1902 32479 31600 0.97 
1903 40112 31600 0.78 
1904 3742 10533 2.81 
1905 12048 10533 0.87 
1906 30779 21067 0.68 
1907 37463 21067 0.56 
1908 21197 14746 0.69 
1909 49272 16853 0.34 
1910 19272 16853 0.87 
1911 28173 16853 0.59 
Average 28906 21208 0.73 
Sources: LGL, Commercial reports, 1899-1913. 
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Table 7.8: Profits and dividends, Rylands and Sons, 
1884-1913 
Pay out 
Profit Dividend Ratio 
1884 102720 75000 0.73 
1885 91869 75000 0.81 
1886 124595 75000 0.60 
1887 102086 75000 0.73 
1888 117218 90000 0.76 
1889 139033 90000 0.64 
1890 148957 95625 0.64 
1891 158351 108750 0.68 
1892 170911 127500 0.74 
1893 167660 150000 0.89 
1894 173116 150000 0.86 
1895 230790 187500 0.81 
1896 220964 187500 0.84 
1897 186219 187500 1.00 
1898 218787 187500 0.85 
1899- 263770 198750 0.75 
1900 237551 187500 0.78 
1901 179926 187500 1.04 
1902 235548 187500 0.79 
1903 188792 187500 0.99 
1904 146447 187500 1.28 
1905 218030 187500 0.85 
1906 192039 187500 0.97 
1907 197995 187500 0.94 
1908 101661 168750 1.65 
1909 164589 150000 0.91 
1910 147943 150000 1.01 
1911 152044 150000 0.98 
1912 186837 150000 0.80 
1913 163931 150000- 0.91 
Average 171012 149312 0.87 
Sources: LGL, Commercial reports, 1884-1913. 
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Dividend policy: (2) the industry 
Thus far we have concentrated on contrasts between the behaviour of different types 
of company and have examined tables of individual company data in order to do so. 
However, the sample of individual companies used was too small to support more 
formal methods of statistical comparison. In the next section, such a method is 
introduced to examine the causes of changes in dividend behaviour for the industry 
as a whole through time. The main data used here are the aggregates of individual 
company results represented by the Economist sample, together with aggregated data 
for private companies and non Oldham companies taken from the main sample. 
Returning to the unusual patterns of capital accumulation identified at the beginning 
of this chapter in figure 7.1, we now examine the extent to which differences in rates 
of capital accumulation can be attributed to the patterns of divestment associated with 
different ownership structures. The models tested below explore the extent to which 
dividends were a function of the industry sector and ownership. First, the overall 
effect of changing tax structures, especially the impact of the reforms of the 1906- 
1914 Liberal government, are examined. Within the industry, it is expected that the 
publicly controlled companies of the Oldham district with their weak directorates and 
active, knowledgeable, shareholders, would pay out more in dividend than those 
companies which were privately controlled and this is the next area considered. 
Furthermore, given the greater vulnerability of specialised companies to the trade 
cycle, it might be expected that the dividends of Oldham companies might be more 
closely associated with profit levels than with the precedent established by the prior 
year dividend. 
For the industry as a whole, the possibility that alterations in national taxation 
rates may have caused dividend levels to change over time is explored. Overall, in 
the 1900s the industry was more profitable but also less generous to its shareholders 
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than in previous decades. A possible explanation might have been changes in the 
system of taxation. The election of the Liberal government ushered in dramatic 
changes in the period 1906-9. In particular, the principle of gradation was introduced 
in the form of a super tax and a distinction made between earned and unearned 
income. ' There was also a culmination of a steadily rising trend of income tax rates 
used to finance social expenditure and the arms race with Germany. In the absence 
of any capital tax other than death duties, the combined effect of these circumstances 
would be to discourage the payment of dividends. A rich shareholder would find 
unearned dividend income taxed at high rates, whereas if profit was retained within 
the company, there would be improved possibilities for selling holdings in the future, 
thereby realising an untaxed capital gain. Much of the evidence in support of such a 
contention is anecdotal. The companies in the sample marginally rather than 
dramatically reduced their pay out ratios. The super tax was in force for only five 
years before 1914 and it was thus difficult to draw any conclusions from statistical 
inference. Nonetheless the distinction between earned and unearned income may have 
encouraged private companies, where possible, to reclassify dividends as directors' 
remuneration. 
To examine all of these relationships formally, a series of statistical tests were 
carried out. Tables 7.9 and 7.10 show, respectively for Oldham and non Oldham 
companies, results from time series regression models which seek to explain a 
dependent variable, current year dividend, in terms of current year profit and prior 
year dividend. The regressions are summarised by reference to four models in which 
explanatory variables were selected for presentation in permutations which give the 
best summary of the impact of each major factor are then listed in terms of co- 
efficient and statistical significance. Additional variables were added for income tax, 
87 Seligman, The income tax, pp. 196-213. 
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and super tax using a dummy variable for the years in force. As these factors might 
be expected to co- vary through time; a time trend variable was also added. The table 
presents results from unlogged data; the use of logarithms did not significantly change 
any of the main outcomes. It should be noted, however, that the co-efficients as a 
result are much larger for the non Oldham companies, reflecting their larger size. 
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Table 7.9: Determinants of dividend distributions for 
Oldham companies 
Model (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) 
Constant 470.25 364.21 460.66 465.31 
Current year profit 0.2304 0.2246 0.2272 0.2482 
(8.917) (8.522) (8.887) (7.959) 
Prior year dividend 0.5270 0.4951 0.4823 0.4789 
(7.197) (6.257) (6.064) (5.955) 
Time trend 12.334 
-25.99 (1.054) (0.853) 
Tax 39.908 68.899 
(1.335) (1.005) 
Supertax 419.66 
(1.193) 
RZ 0.8695 0.875 0.8781 0.886 
F 86.58 58.34 60.05 35.61 
DW-H 0.3843 0.4370 0.5542 0.7017 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
Sources: Current year profit and prior year dividend, compiled from the Economist 
and Oldham Chronicle; tax, rate in the pound per Mallett, British budgets, table VII, 
p. 484. 
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Table 
. 
7.10: Determinants of dividend distributions for 
non 
- 
Oldham companies 
Model (7.5) (7.6) (7.7) (7.8) 
Constant 30838.31 16029.13 37782.1 24355.9 
Current year profit 0.0891 0.1449 0.387 0.138 (2.457) (3.010) (2.872) (2.681) 
Prior year dividend 0.7789 0.8964 0.8654 0.862 (11.518) (9.398) (9.665) (5.844) 
Time trend 
-2178.25 -1062.56 (1.690) (0.455) 
Tax 
-3593.7 -1280.37 (1.436) (0.372) 
Super tax 
-8807.36 (0.397) 
RZ 0.920 0.923 0.926 0.929 
F 150.37 108.36 105.02 60.79 
DW- H 0.6234 0.7049 0.1805 0.5499 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
Sources: Current year profit and prior year dividend, from the accounting records of 
all non- Oldham companies as listed in table 1.2; tax, rate in the pound per Mallett, 
British budgets, table VII, p. 484. 
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For non-Oldham companies, prior year dividend was a much stronger 
explanator of current year dividend policy. This variable was strongly significant in 
models 7.5,7.6,7.7, and 7.8 (per table 7.10), and much more so than for the 
corresponding variables in the Oldham company models (table 7.9). Non - Oldham 
companies tended to be larger and vertically integrated and had less vulnerability to 
the trade cycle, 88 and as predicted, were able to maintain steadier dividends. 
In the Oldham district, the trade cycle meant the risk of a missed or reduced 
dividend was much higher. Dividend precedents were therefore important in keeping 
and promoting the company as one which could be relied upon to pay steady 
dividends. It was the dividend payment record which was used to judge the 
performance of Oldham companies in a series of retrospective press articles in 
1907.89 In chapter four, it was shown how the exemplary dividend record of the 
Milnrow companies might have helped create their low risk reputation among the 
investment community. However, for Oldham district companies, the most important 
consideration of all, was the variability of profit caused by the trade cycle. Unlike the 
private and vertically integrated companies, the strongest explanator of current year 
dividend was the reported profit of the company in that year. Ability to pay, 
independently of accumulated reserves, was in all cases more important than the 
precedent of the previous years dividend. The crash in share values in the period 
1892-5 (chapter 4) and the extraordinary boom of 1907,90 were examples of the 
fundamental importance of the trade cycle to the fortunes of Lancashire and her 
investors. Relative to the rest of the cotton sector, Oldham companies were perceived 
88 See chapter 6 above, especially figure 6.1. 
89 Oldham Standard, see for example comments on the dividend record of the 
Empire and Fern Cotton Spinning Companies, 14th (p. 14v) and 21st (p.. 
14iii) September, 1907. 
90 Jones, `The cotton spinning industry', pp. 10-11. 
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as high risk. " 
For all types of company, profits and prior year dividend were the only 
important determinants of dividend policy. Where other variables were added, for 
time trend or for tax effects, marginal improvements in R2 were cancelled out by 
declines in the significance of the total regression (f statistic), and were typified by 
insignificant t ratios. It is perhaps not surprising that taxation did not have a 
significant influence on the distribution of profits given the small number of 
observations and the dramatic changes that occurred in the 1906-11 period. In every 
model tested, co-efficients for income tax and super tax were insignificant. The 
previous section offered anecdotal evidence of how dividend behaviour changed for 
some companies such as Horrockses, but is impossible to attribute this to changes in 
the taxation system for any type of company. 
To what extent however, were their genuine institutional differences between 
Oldham stock exchange quoted companies and those operating elsewhere in 
Lancashire under different ownership structures? Where net profits, and their cyclical 
movement, are thought to be a significant determinant of company dividend policies, 
the model proposed by Lintner may be useful for testing the apparent relationship 
. 
92 
The proposed model rests on a behavioural assumption of a minimum dividend 
(constant a) plus a gradual adjustment (at a certain rate, c) to a pre-set target (r) 
dividend payment as a proportion of available profits. 93 
91 Smith, History of the Lancashire cotton industry, p. 238; evidence of S Andrew to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce Enquiry, 1886; 5% was 
considered too low a return on Oldham capital, and 8 to 10% more 
reasonable, given the risk. 
91 Lintner, `Distribution of income', pp. 97-113. 
93 The current dividend is explained in terms of r, a target proportion of current 
year profits, and c, the fraction of the gap between the prior year dividend 
and the target dividend based on current earnings that the company would 
aim to make up in one year. Consider a company which aims to pay out 50 % 
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Du 
- 
Di(,, ) =a+c [(r R) -D1( 1)] (7.1) 
Equation (7.1) above can be tested by transformation into a statistical regression 
model (7.2). 
+U Du= a+ bPu+ dDi(,, ) (7.2) 
The equation resembles the model tested above in tables 7.9 and 7.10 (models (7.1) 
and (7.5)). Current year dividend D;,, is explained in terms of current year profits, 
Pit, and the previous year's dividend, D1(1_I). The subscript 1 denotes the application to 
an individual firm in the original model, but denotes the Oldham section of the 
industry, or the aggregate of non Oldham companies, for current purposes. This 
creates the possibility of aggregation errors, although given the tendency of Oldham 
company profits to converge around trade cycle determined norms which has already 
been established, " it is unlikely to cause any serious inaccuracies. " For non 
Oldham companies, there was greater divergence in the individual firm and therefore 
the model was tested for each in addition to the sample aggregate. The model is 
stochastic, i. e. the identified variables will not fully explain dividend behaviour and 
there will also be unidentified, random variables. Thus there is an error term, u,, to 
of its available profits as dividends with an adjustment rate of 40%. If the 
profit in the first year of operation is £100, the dividend is £50. If in the 
following year profit increases to £180, the new target dividend would 
become £90, a gap of £40 between the existing dividend and the target. At 
an adjustment rate of 40%, the dividend increase would be £40 x 40% _ 
£16, and the dividend actually paid, £66, and so on each year until the target 
of £90 is actually reached. 
94 Chapter 4; compare the trends in figures 4.5 and 4.6. 
9S See also McGouldrick, New England textiles, p. 128, which followed the 
same method. 
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reflect this. The required values for r and c can be derived by reference to the 
coefficients for each of the two independent variables: 
b= cr; and (7.3) 
d= (1 
- 
c). (7.4) 
Where used in time series analysis, potential problems with the Lintner model 
are autocorrelation and the endogeneity of the lagged variable. In this case some 
comfort may be drawn from the low significance attributable to the time co-efficient. 
However, the presence of serial correlation suggested by the DW-H statistics in all 
models tested above (tables 7.9 and 7.10), means that not all possible variables have 
been identified. A further behavioural assumption implicit in the Lintner model is that 
managers seek to pay a constant dividend each year plus a target proportion of the 
remaining profit. 96 Nonetheless these problems would apply to all types of company, 
and our main purpose here is to contrast the two different groups identified above. 
The results are presented in table 7.11. 
96 Statistically the inclusion of a constant term is important as a correction for bias and it is not possible to test the ideal target pay out ratio unambiguously, Fisher, `Survey of some problems', pp. 90-1. 
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Table 7.11: Dividend behaviour in Lancashire 
companies 
Summary statistics 
Oldham Other 
district 
Target pay out ratio 49% 37% 
Speed of adjustment 47% 22% 
Sources: as for table 7.9 and 7.10. 
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Interpretation of the statistics in table 7.11 suggests that Oldham managers 
sought to pay 'out a higher proportion (49%) of available profits as dividends, than 
for managers elsewhere (37 %). If the figures appear low in contrast to actual pay out 
ratios (table 7.2), the likely reason is in the ex ante statistical problems with the 
model identified above. The figures are also low when contrasted with the very 
limited number of examples where this model has been tested elsewhere. 97 However, 
the contrast between our two sample groups is not invalidated, and, as expected, the 
Oldham directors felt it incumbent upon themselves to aim to pay higher dividends 
than elsewhere in the industry. As the model tested provides a measure of the 
behavioural objectives of managers in terms of a percentage of profits, the differences 
in that target percentage cannot be attributed to the greater variability of profit 
resulting from specialisation. More likely, the difference was attributable to 
institutional and ownership differences. In the Oldham district, there was entrenched 
shareholder activism, elsewhere, share ownership was more dispersed or companies 
were privately controlled. To investigate this result further, it is necessary to examine 
the social and economic aspects of share ownership in Oldham in more detail. This 
will be the subject of chapter eight. 
As profit levels fluctuated more dramatically in Oldham, managers were also 
intent on adjusting dividend levels much faster. The speed of adjustment ratio for 
Oldham was 47% compared to 22% elsewhere (table 7.11). In a year of low profits 
or losses, Oldham managers would be more likely to pay no dividend at all. In the 
severe depression of the 1890s, many Oldham firms, best exemplified by the Werneth 
and the Sun Mill companies, accumulated large debit balances on reserve and did not 
9' These are the Consett Iron company, which, during a similar period achieved 
a target pay out of 90%, and the New England textile industry, which in the 
period 1866-1886 had a target pay out of 95 %. See Church et al, - 
'Accounting for profitability', p. 711, and McGouldrick, New England 
textiles, p. 131. 
243 
resume dividend payment until well into the 1900s when, with `true grit' and 
`perseverence, economy and rigid discipline"' these balances had been paid off after 
several years of profitable trading. 99 Under circumstances where shareholders 
expected certain levels of dividends, where accumulated losses prevented them from 
being paid, and where it was important to the prestige of the company that they were 
resumed, it was unsurprising that the trend for Oldham companies in figure 7.1 
exhibited its downward characteristic. In years of profit they would be more likely 
to adjust quickly to higher levels of profit distribution, thereby precluding the creation 
of reserves. Vertically integrated companies outside Oldham enjoyed more stable 
levels of profits and reflected this in less hasty adjustments to the level of dividend, 
and as seen in figure 7.1, were more successful as engines of capital accumulation. 
Hitherto our analysis has concentrated exclusively on dividend policy, but 
their are further related aspects which explain the. apparent inconsistency of that 
downward trend with the growth of spinning in the Oldham area. A particular trend, 
alluded to in chapter 4, which tended to accentuate further the haemorrhaging of 
capital from established quoted Oldham companies, was the series of, capital 
reductions, repayments and reconstructions affecting the industry in the early 1900s. 
So much money was made in the boom of 1907 by the existing mills that 
shareholders benefited from a bonanza of divested funds. Record dividends were to 
be expected during a record boom and the boom was far more pronounced in textiles 
than the rest of the economy. '°° Paradoxically record profits also signalled a wave of 
11 Oldham Standard, 13th July, 1907. 
99 Werneth, OLSL, Misc/42/17 and 18, quarterly reports to members, in 1900 
the company re-established a credit balance on reserve and paid its first 
dividend since 1891; Sun mill, Tyson, `Sun Mill', p. 294, back in the black, 
the company paid its first dividend for fourteen and a half years. 
100 Jones, `The cotton spinning industry', pp. 10-11. 
244 
capital reductions throughout the limited liability sector. Capital was repaid in large 
bonus dividends, and a series of conversions to private companies were made. Thus 
Windsor Mill Spinning Company Ltd. and Oldham Twist Co. Ltd. were granted 
permission by the court to reduce capital in 1907, and Moorfield made a repayment 
to its shareholders of £1 per, £5 share. 1°' Werneth made a series of capital 
reductions. The first, in 1899, allowed the large debit balance on reserve arising from 
fraud and poor trading to be written off against share capital. Further reductions in 
1909 and 1913 were responses to large profits and constituted straight cash 
repayments to shareholders, making up for the low dividends of the previous 
decade, 1°2 but also, as noted above, facilitating the transformation to private company 
status in 1913. For established companies, there was thus a clear pattern of 
divestment. 
High dividend pay out ratios prevented directors from amassing free cash 
flow to fund discretionary expenditure. In the cotton industry there is no evidence that 
dividends were associated with creative accounting. Depreciation was over provided 
when the actual rates used, for example seven and a half per cent on plant and 
machinery, are contrasted with the average thirty year life of those assets. 103 In 
practice excess depreciation was not used to fund directors' discretionary expenditure 
or the purchase of new fixed assets, and was applied instead to the repayment of 
loans, so that on average the both assets and liabilities declined over time. 104 Much 
of the capital divested from existing concerns was reinvested in new flotations. High 
101 Oldham Standard, for each company respectively; 31st August, 1907,15(iii); 
27 November, 1907,15(ii); 26 October, 1907,14(v). 
102 OLSL, Misc/42/18, quarterly reports to members. 
103 Ryan, `Machinery Replacement in the Cotton Trade', p. 569. 
104 Toms, `Financial constraints', p. 372. 
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dividends provided confidence for lenders and shareholders, thereby facilitating the 
raising of new capital, and ensuring its circulation via a rising class of wealthy 
individuals. " As the market was narrow and not fully efficient in the modern sense, 
shareholders ought to protect themselves by minimising agency costs and the hazard 
of directors acting against their interests. 106 High dividends, as described above, and 
full accounting disclosure, as discussed in more detail in the next chapter, provided 
the means of achieving this. 
The trend in figure 7.1 of declining capital for some firms in an industry still 
experiencing overall growth was also explained by the willingness of local promoters 
to launch new concerns. When capacity was expanded, typically existing companies 
were not enlarged through the plough back of profits. Instead, new companies were 
floated, usually with a heavy dependence on fixed interest loan finance. As these 
companies traded profitably, surplus cash flow was used to repay loans rather than 
invest in new equipment. Established companies could therefore be expected to show 
a decline in capital employed as equipment depreciated and loans were repaid. New 
share issues were rare for companies not being newly promoted. Takeovers and 
mergers using holding company and subsidiary relationships were equally scarce. 
Limitations were placed upon the emergence of the large, diversified organisation, 
since the diversification function was left to the individual accumulator of distributed 
profits. These individuals had emerged as a result of promotional, rather than 
functional management, expertise. Their ranks notably included John'Bunting T. E. 
Gartside and J. B. Tattersall. 107 By 1900, they commanded a power over the 
115 Thomas, The Provincial Stock Exchanges, p. 155-6 
106 As predicted in the model provided in Rozeff, 'Growth, beta, and agency 
costs', p. 252. 
107 Farnie, `John Bunting' DBB, pp. 506-9; Jeremy, 'T. E. Gartside', DBB, pp- 
495-8; 
- 
Mclvor, U. B. Tattersall', DBB, p. 444. 
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accumulation and distribution of capital which had been much less evident in the days 
of shareholder dominance of the 1890s. They may have looked to the impressive rates 
of capital accumulation achievable by concerns such as Horrockses, the empire 
building strategy of William Birtwistle, or even the daring expansion through 
investment in new technology embarked upon at Ashton Brothers. Their emergence 
in Oldham as a new entrepreneurial class did not occur until the 1900s; prior to that, 
as we have seen, the publicly quoted company had essentially failed as an engine of 
capital accumulation. 
The data published in the Economist, upon which the index of capital in 
figure 7.1 depends, was derived from only those companies publishing balance sheets 
and those companies tended to be established rather than newly floated. Significantly, 
many of the new companies floated in the 1904-7 boom tended to be private, showing 
a reluctance to disclose financial data to the public, presumably including the 
Economist. Newer companies would have accounted for a significant proportion of 
the new capital invested in the industry, but were excluded from the Economist 
samples. The trends in figure 7.1 do not therefore give a fully representative view of 
the industry as a whole. The emergence of these newer companies, whilst accounting 
for some of the differences in rates of industry growth and capital accumulation in 
existing firms, also raises wider issues of industry structure which will be explored 
in further detail in the next chapter. 
Overall, table 7.1 tended to confirm that growth in capital accumulation was 
below potential growth suggested by the rate of profitability of the industry 
highlighted in other chapters. Capital therefore must have left the industry during this 
period in preference to reinvestment. The question thus remains as to why 
entrepreneurs in some established companies took the seemingly irrational decision 
to allow their capital bases to decline at a time of apparent optimism and expansion; 
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whilst others chose not to fully reinvest available surpluses back into profitable 
concerns. 
How important was the dividend issue for Lancashire capitalism? 
From the above analysis it is suggested that differences in dividend policy mirrored 
industry structure, or more specifically the degree of specialisation and the impact of 
the trade cycle on profits. Such an association of structure and divestment has not 
been recognised in previous debates which have concentrated only on the first 
variable. A further and possibly more important cause of differences in dividend 
policy was ownership. This matter requires further investigation and will be dealt 
with in later chapters. For now, it is possible to draw some interim conclusions on 
the nature of capital accumulation and circulation, and its implications for business 
history. 
The modern argument of `dividend irrelevance' as founded on the 
assumptions of diversified investment portfolios in efficient capital markets1" was not 
applicable in nineteenth century Lancashire. In the Lancashire quoted section, 
shareholders preferred high and frequent dividends, possibly as compensation for 
their undiversified risk and out of a reluctance to incur the agency costs of giving the 
directors too much of a free hand. To investigate this point further, the social 
composition of Lancashire shareholders will be considered' in the next chapter. If 
true, the cost of new capital to existing firms might have been raised and perhaps 
thereby encouraged the divestment behaviour we have noted. Once the firm was 
established, the onus was on capital reduction rather than capital accumulation, and 
there were few instances of companies to raising new finance through second or 
pos Miller and Modigliani, `Dividend policy, growth and the valuation of shares', 
pp. 411-33. 
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subsequent share and rights issues. The high levels of divestment noted above thus 
appears to have been motivated by the demands of powerful shareholder groups. Even 
in the privately controlled companies, divestment levels were still high, even if in the 
form of directors' salaries rather than dividends. If this tended to delay the emergence 
of managerial elites, and left financial power concentrated in the hands of the 
wealthier shareholders, or if the industry simply remained short of cash for 
reinvestment, it is perhaps unsurprising that the custodians of the industry have been 
left open to accusations of failure to make innovative investments, or to utilise and 
develop productive resources. " 
These seeds of ultimate failure to do this were detectable by reference to 
patterns of profit distribution. The tendency of Lancashire firms to over distribute 
profits was also marked in the interwar period, but attributed to poor profitability 
rather than over generosity. "' However, the above survey has shown that in periods 
of record profit there was a marked tendency to distribute rather than accumulate 
profit. 
Much of the divested wealth was reinvested locally; there was no apparent 
integration with London capital markets; "' the three companies studied in the sample 
above which had London quotations were a distinct minority. Structurally, the 
framework of ownership and control of manufacturing assets tended to encourage 
individual rather than corporate capital accumulation. The powerful individual, 
contrasted with weak corporate organisation, provides interesting evidence for some 
of the hypotheses advanced recently to explain the pattern of Britain's industrial 
109 Mass and Lazonick, `The British Cotton industry', p. 9. 
110 Hart, Studies in profit, p. 122. 
111 Lavington, The English capital market, p. 208. 
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dominance and decline. Lazonick 12 has pointed out an important gulf between 
generalist and specialist managerial groups. The prevalence of small organisation 
structures in cotton textiles would indeed have prevented the emergence of specialist 
managers in personnel, marketing and finance, with the preparation of product cost 
and management accounting information for decision makers limited accordingly. 
Financial accounting, with its concern for the monitoring of capital circulation 
between corporate and individual sectors of the economy, remained dominant. 113 
As the fate of the industry depended upon individuals and not management 
hierarchies, it is not surprising that cotton has been selected as an example for those 
seeking to blame British economic decline on the failings of its entrepreneurs and 
fragmented industry structure. The cotton industry was indeed characterised by an 
individual capitalism, as identified by Chandler, "' with family enterprises dominating 
older dynastic firms such as Fieldens, but also significantly, personal enterprises, that 
is organisations operating without managerial hierarchies, dominating the emergent 
specialised companies in the Oldham area. 
All of this contrasted with emerging corporate concentration in overseas 
economies. In the British textile industry such concentration that did occur was 
clearly under the control of the private company. Although these companies did 
accumulate capital, they also divested significant amounts. In the spinning section 
divestment was even more prevalent and had an important influence in the evolution 
of the industry. For the private companies, business strategy was based on the 
investment and divestment priorities of individuals; in the quoted sector, management 
112 Lazonick, Business Organization, pp. 44-5. 
113 The accounting implications of these issues are discussed in Johnson and 
Kaplan, Relevance lost. 
114 Chandler, Scale and scope, p. 240. 
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lacked the cash flow to plan differentiation or new investment, and active shareholder 
monitoring dictated short term least cost solutions. 
Divested profits, accumulating to private individuals, meant reinvestment 
depended upon the correct market signals. Increasing dependency of the industry on 
rich individuals for future investment returns the debate to the entrepreneurial failure 
hypothesis, albeit from a different perspective. Sensible investment decisions were 
taken on the basis of the profit signals that would have been received. However, 
Lazonick has argued that there was a failure to remove constraints such as vertical 
specialisation, "s and earlier chapters have revealed the extent to which such 
constraints were genuine. If, under whatever circumstances, vertical integration was 
desirable, the large capital under managerial control that might have provided the 
impetus to such an expansion, had simply not been allowed to accumulate in a large 
number of Lancashire companies. The instrument for such a strategy, the centralised 
corporation, could not be created due to the way in which the profits were spent. The 
lack of institutional capital accumulation in the industry was at least in part a function 
of the institutional development of the British economy as a whole. It became an 
important constraint on the development of the industry, and as such is worthy of 
greater recognition in the debates that have taken place hitherto. For now, it will be 
explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
Increasingly able to mobilise capital as individuals, and using the private 
company as their vehicle, a new class of financial capitalist emerged in the Oldham 
district. These new entrepreneurs had much more in common with Edward Tootal 
Broadhurst, William Birtwistle, Henry Philips Greg, and Sir Frank Hollins, than the 
typical middle and working class shareholder of Oldham in the 1880s and 1890s. 
Before concluding on the highly individual character of Lancashire capitalism, the 
"s Lazonick, `Industrial organization' pp. 204-5. 
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story of how the respective power of these important social groups and individual 
entrepreneurs was transformed will be told in the following two chapters. 
252 
Chapter 8: Ownership, shareholder democracy and 
personal capitalism. 
As the preceding chapter has shown, certain aspects of the development of managerial 
capitalism and the emergence of modem capital markets which characterised other 
industries, especially overseas competitors, is open to question as far as the British 
cotton industry was concerned. As we have seen, managerial hierarchies were slow 
to emerge; the agency variable of dividend policy prevented the accumulation of 
capital, thereby influencing the social pattern of industry growth. The preceding 
discussion has suggested that the character of Lancashire capitalism was determined 
by the rise of the private company and by the unusual characteristics, in terms of the 
pattern of capital accumulation, of the Oldham district where the public joint stock 
company had dominated since the 1860s. The next chapter will examine the 
entrepreneurship characteristics of private companies. Our current concern is with the 
character of the Lancashire stock market and how it influenced the development of 
the corporate form in the six decades before World War One. 
Introducing a second agency variable, financial accountability, to complement 
the dividend behaviour issue already discussed, this chapter will examine the rise and 
fall of the market for Lancashire cotton shares. In the following discussion, the 
stewardship relation of managers and shareholders is examined, and the hypothesis 
addressed that, ceteris paribus, the degree of accounting disclosure is positively 
related to the social and economic power of the shareholder group. The historical 
importance of this variable is underscored by the sudden emergence of voluntary 
financial disclosure in a climate of no regulation, a unique event, yet hitherto 
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neglected by financial and other historians. In the context of the wider economy, 
there follows an assessment of its individualistic attributes and its continued 
domination by `personal capitalism'; the latter is understood, as in chapter 7, to be 
the management of a corporation without the use of a management hierarchy. 
Whilst the purpose of this chapter is to continue the analysis of the agency 
variables isolated in the last, there are some important differences in approach. 
Dividend policy, as a quantitative variable, has been analysed as such and reviewed 
empirically via the use of standard models and ratios. With financial reporting, the 
linkage with theory is more problematic. The observed variables tend to be 
qualitative and behavioural. At the same time, the theoretical tools of investigation 
have been developed from the analysis of modem financial markets, not those of a 
hundred years ago. It is therefore important to be clear on how the analysis of 
financial reporting differs between modem and historical situations, and a section 
prefacing the historical analysis addresses the issues accordingly below. 
Financial reporting and the extent of its regulation is an important question 
in all capitalist economies, of whatever period. The cotton industry of the late 
Victorian period, as a successful export industry, based on small firms, competitive 
markets, and free trade, idealised by some and condemned by others, represents a 
model of one particular type of economy relevant to many modern debates. Extended 
to financial reporting, such debates are mirrored by arguments about state regulation 
versus self regulation. In the absence of regulation, other than the permissive 
Companies Act of 1862, the financial reporting practices of Lancashire cotton mills 
displayed many interesting attributes. With the legal recognition of limited liability 
from 1856 and the continuing development of the cotton export trade, preparers of 
accounting reports, cotton mill managers, as well as paying out large dividends, also 
provided large amounts of voluntary disclosures, thereby indulging in what might be 
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described as an `overproduction' of information. 
The first section of the chapter discusses, in general terms, those factors 
which, in the absence of regulation, are likely to create pressure for accounting 
disclosure, thereby providing justification for the method adopted. In the second 
section, specific causes of the unusual pattern of financial reporting are then identified 
based on historical analysis of the cotton industry. Three institutional variables, all 
of which are relevant to the growth and finance of the cotton industry, are then 
introduced to explain the changes in accounting practice. These are first, the role of 
capital markets, efficient or otherwise; second, the related issue of changing patterns 
of share ownership; and third, the structure of industrial relations. The third section 
examines the changes in accounting practice and considers the impact of regulation 
in the form of the Companies Acts of 1900 and 1907, which is then reviewed in 
conjunction with the first three non-regulatory variables. Finally, accounting 
disclosure and dividend policies are reassessed in their context as agency variables 
governing relationships between important social groups. 
Historical analysis of financial accountability; assumptions and method. 
Because of the significance and uniqueness of the development of capitalism in 
Lancashire, its analysis contains valuable lessons not just for the historian, but also 
potential policy guidance for the present day legislator. In pursuing the historical 
analysis of financial reporting it is important to treat with caution the dominant 
assumptions of much modern theory and practice. One such is that the purpose of 
financial reporting is to aid shareholder decision making. ' The research problems 
associated with investigating financial reporting on the basis of this presumption are 
threefold. First, empirical research into the private decisions of shareholders lacks a 
' Edwards and Bell, Theory and measurement of business income. 
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theoretical structure against which to evaluate its findings? Second, shareholders are 
not a'homogeneous group; their decision making characteristics change over time and 
from economy to economy. Third, there is the problem of bias in favour of one 
particular social class. Given these problems, historical analysis, which can provide 
concrete examples of the determinants of shareholder decisions, which can document 
their evolution over time, and which can position them in the wider social context, 
is particularly' well justified. As will be shown, evidence from the accounts of 
Lancashire cotton companies amply satisfies these criteria, and allows the pre 
determinants of financial reporting *practices under specific antecedent conditions to 
be identified. 
Analysis of the growth and development of capitalism introduces the agency 
relationship between owners and managers as a historical variable. An important 
determinant of accounting disclosure, or lack of it, which has been identified by many 
present day commentators, is management monopoly of information. 3 According to 
some,, managerial choice was an important determinant of the financial reporting 
mechanism in the period under review. " More broadly, the origins of modern 
financial reporting, namely the use of accruals based audited accounts, have been 
explained in terms of the emergence of a professional managerial class. s The 
socialisation of capital, or the emergence of the diversified passive investor, has been 
cited as another important determinant of financial reporting practice. 6 Similarly the 
z Cooper, and Sherer, ` The value of corporate accounting reports', pp. 207 
232. 
3 Leftwich, `Market failure fallacies', pp. 193-211. 
° Edwards, A History of financial accounting. 
Yamey, `Some topics in the history of financial accounting', p. 39; 
Chatfield, A history of accounting thought. 
6 Bryer, `The late nineteenth century revolution', p. 649. 
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demand for audit arose from the growing separation of ownership and control and the 
absolute growth in the size of the British capital market? All of these views are 
consistent with, and to some extent derived from, the assumed rise of professional 
managerial classes. Although not directly challenged to date by accounting historians, 
such an interpretation sits uncomfortably with the views of those economists who 
believe that Britain remained wedded to an individual capitalism with strong craft 
control' and was slow to adopt managerial capitalism on the American model, with 
its professional managerial class. ' By contrast, individualism and resistance to the 
joint stock company itself as a manifestation of collectivism were well articulated by 
influential contemporaries such as Dicey. 1° The apparent association of modern 
financial reporting and managerial capitalism is tested in the historical analysis below 
by reference to the emergence of managerial groups and the accounting practices 
adopted. 
That relationship currently underpins the generally accepted interpretation of 
the formative years of modem financial reporting in Britain. However, the evidence 
upon which it is based has been taken from only a selective number of industries. 
Heavily represented during this period are railways, coal, combined coal and iron 
companies and regulated utilities. " Cotton company accounts by contrast have 
Watts, and Zimmerman, `Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the 
firm' p. 630. 
8 Elbaum, and Lazonick, The decline of the British economy. 
9 Lazonick, Competitive advantage on the shop floor; Chandler, Scale and 
scope, p. 239. 
10 Dicey, Lectures on the relation between law and public opinion, p. 245. 
Respectively, Pollins, ` Aspects of railway accounting before 1868', pp. 332- 
55, and Edwards, `Depreciation and fixed asset valuation in railway company 
accounts', pp. 251-63; Wale, `How reliable were reported profits', pp. 253- 68; Baldwin, Berry, and Church, `The accounts of the Consett Iron Company', pp. 99-110, and. Baldwin, `Management aspiration and audit 
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received very little attention. The omission is significant, since, as will be shown 
below, the reporting practices of cotton companies differed markedly from those 
industries which have hitherto influenced our understanding of the development of 
financial reporting. 
In addition to the above debates, it is useful to use historical evidence to 
examine the effects of increased regulation on industry structure and growth. With 
the abolition of compulsory accounting and audit provision in the 1856 Joint Stock 
Companies Act, the period up to 1900 was marked by a complete absence of statutory 
regulation under general company law. " Absence of regulation allows market based 
13 explanations of accounting disclosure to be more closely examined. Some have argued 
that market failure explanations of the need for regulation; the public good, the 
signalling, and the speculation problems, provide insufficient justification for the 
regulation of corporate disclosure. Their interpretation of British developments in the 
1844-1900 period reinforces this view in seeking market forces explanations of 
changes in accounting and audit practice. 14 Historical evidence reviewed below is 
particularly useful in examining the first two of these issues. The free public 
disclosure of accounting information in the United States prior to the regulatory 
intervention of 193315 is cited as evidence of the absence of a public good problem 
and thus lack of market failure. If anything, the disclosures of cotton companies in 
opinion', pp. 3-12; Edwards, `Companies, corporations and accounting 
change', pp. 59-73. 
12 Taylor and Turley, The regulation of accounting, p. 34. 
13 Watts, and Zimmerman, Positive accounting theory, p. 178. 
14 Watts, and Zimmerman, ` Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the 
firm' pp. 630-4. 
's Benston, ` The value of the SEC's accounting disclosure requirements', pp. 
515-32. 
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the unregulated period were more generous than those companies surveyed by 
Benston. The problem of the `free rider', costlessly consuming accounting 
information as a public good, is traced economically and socially through historical 
analysis in the discussion below. For the signalling problem, it is useful to 
investigate the origins of information asymmetry historically, rather than presuppose 
it. 
Problems with the efficient market paradigm 
The assumption of an efficient market has formed the basis of much modern 
accounting research, " but the necessity of making such an assumption is'arguably a 
weakness of this method. Moreover, where a priori deductive assumptions 
concerning managerial behaviour form hypotheses which are then tested against 
accounting reports whose content was determined by those assumptions, the positivist 
approach becomes tautological. " An obvious advantage of the political economy 
method, especially where historically rooted, is that the starting point is necessarily 
an inefficient market, and the behavioural dispositions of management groups likewise 
exogenously determinable. As the economy develops and efficiency perhaps therefore 
increases, the impact on financial reporting practices can be observed and quantified. 
The task is an important one, as contradictory assertions have been made. Market 
efficiency in the late nineteenth century - has been argued by some as a historical 
fact. '8 On the other hand, Kennedy" concluded that the market was inefficient and 
16 Watts, and Zimmerman, Positive accounting theory. 
17 Williams, `The logic of positive accounting research', pp. 464-6. 
18 Bryer, `The late nineteenth century revolution', pp. 649-90. 
19 Kennedy, Industrial structure, capital markets and the origin of British 
economic decline, p. 126. 
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that inadequate financial reporting was an important cause. Inefficiency was due to 
lack of rules re disclosure and lack of rules was a function of the excess power of 
directors. Such hypotheses can be tested by reference to the history of emerging 
financial markets. Either way, instead of presupposing an efficient market, it is 
surely more constructive to analyse accounting disclosures in terms of responses to 
the evolution of markets in their social and political contexts. 
The assumption of an efficient market causes other problems. For example, 
it is often made with no reference to social processes, such as habit and emulation, 20 
and historical antecedents, 21 which can influence the evolution of that market. 
Whereas market processes themselves might be described as ahistorical, market 
institutions possess social and historical specificity. Even market processes may 
require context, for example where characterised by processes of disequilibrium over 
time. u The current analysis therefore pays careful attention to the social and 
economic origins of the capital market investigated. 
Institutionally, financial markets are set up by specific individuals in response 
to economic need. It is also possible that certain individuals or groups within a 
market exercise a disproportionate influence. As noted earlier, the assumption of 
shareholder homogeneity, with, it might be added, assumed exogenously determined 
informational needs, is a restrictive one in accounting research. It can be argued that 
different ex ante resource endowments can lead to differing positions being taken by 
groups on accounting disclosure. ' Such propositions are ideally tested in a historical 
20 Polanyi, The great transformation; White, `Where do markets come from? ' 
p. 518. 
21 Mitchell, Business cycles, p. 86. 
22 Putterman, The economic nature of the firm, p. 16. 
23 Hakansson, `On the politics of accounting disclosure and measurement', pp. 1- 
42. 
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context, since the power of vested. interest groups can be examined without reference 
to political pressures, as may be the case with research based on the present day 
economy. 24 The recognition of unequally distributed resources, especially capital, 
and that there might be a resultant influence on accounting disclosure, is the opposite 
of starting by presupposing an efficient market. 
The above discussion has sought to justify the adopted approach by reference 
to wider debates on financial reporting and economic structure and by showing how 
the historical perspective can avoid the restrictive assumptions of other methods. 
Before examining the historical evidence, the general hypotheses that might be 
advanced are that changing patterns of disclosure were a function of economic and 
social changes, with reference to the positions of shareholders and managers, and the 
pattern of capital accumulation and therefore the financing requirements of the 
reporting organisations. The alternative hypothesis is that changes were a response 
to the transition from an unregulated to a regulated framework of financial reporting. 
Joint stock organisation and financial reporting in cotton textiles 
Before these hypotheses are explored in detail, it is important to examine the evidence 
by which they are tested. Much of the following discussion is based on evidence 
drawn from the surviving business and published records of spinning firms of south 
east Lancashire. Analysis of this evidence is important for three broad reasons; the 
general importance of the industry, contrasts with London based financial institutions, 
and the unusual character of financial reporting. 
The cotton industry had played a leading role in the early stages of the 
industrial revolution, and for the period of this study, 1856-1914, remained a leading 
24 Solomons, `The political implications of accounting and accounting standard 
setting', pp. 114-5. 
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export sector, constituting almost one quarter of total British exports as late as 
1913.25 Despite being a very significant industry, Lancashire cotton had little to do 
with London and its financial institutions. ' However, the industry was heterogenous. 
The weaving and fine spinning sectors remained dominated, as in previous history, 
by the small, secretive, private unlimited liability company. Such companies are 
excluded from the analysis below. By contrast, in south east Lancashire, where 
coarse spinning tended to predominate, the larger public company was the main 
vehicle of business activity. Geographically, as we have seen in previous chapters, 
the public limited company was therefore confined to the ` Oldham District', or south 
east Lancashire, consisting of Oldham itself, Rochdale, and Ashton under Lyne. The 
district was significant in its own right, accounting for a significant proportion of the 
British cotton spinning industry (26%) and of the world (12%) in 1890.21 
Nonetheless, its methods of business practice were unique in relation to the known 
history of the rest of the economy. 
The characteristics of the London financial markets add to the importance of 
south east Lancashire as a case study. Specifically, the evolution of the London stock 
market was governed by the propensity for accumulated capital to be invested abroad 
from 1870 onwards. 28 There was thus a dominance of quotations for overseas and 
non-industrial securities. As Pollard puts it, 'the London capital market was simply 
not interested in industry in Britain', adding that in 1914 only a very small proportion 
of total transactions on the London stock market were accounted for by the shares of 
25 Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, p. 6. 
26 Share prices in London and Lancashire were governed by different and 
opposite influences, see chapter 11 below. 
r Farnie, `The emergence of Victorian Oldham', p. 42. 
28 Edelstein, `Foreign investment and empire', pp. 70-98. 
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home industrial companies. 29 The market accounted for only a tiny fraction of the 
total number of joint stock companies, and new issues were rare, with issues to the 
general public rarer still. "- Prior to 1870, very little use was made of limited 
liability generally except for the railway companies, whose accounting practices in 
the 1840s and 1850s are well documented. 31 Elsewhere capital needs were 
sufficiently small to be funded through private savings 32 These trends might have 
been reflected in the evolution of financial reporting during the period for London 
based companies, and thereby influenced general conclusions on the evolution of 
accounting and reporting practice. " For example, in discussing depreciation 
accounting, it was noted that apart from the public utilities, there were very few 
`corporations' which were widely held, professionally managed, listed companies. 33 
By contrast, from around 1860 onwards these were precisely the sort of 
companies predominating in south east Lancashire. The Lancashire stock market, 
centred around the Oldham district, had 71 quoted companies in 1886, rising to over 
100 quoted companies prior to 1900,34 and was therefore the third largest provincial 
exchange in the country after Glasgow and Liverpool in terms of number of quoted 
companies. 35 Unlike the Glasgow, Liverpool, and London markets, all the quoted 
companies were manufacturers, representing a substantial proportion of the local 
29 Pollard, Britain's prime and Britain's decline, p. 93 
30 Cottrell, Industrial finance 1830-1914, p. 184. 
31 For example, Pollins, `Aspects of railway accounting before 1868', pp 332- 
355. 
32 Shannon, `The limited companies of 1866-1883', pp. 290-316. 
33 Bryer, `The late nineteenth century revolution', p. 657. 
34 After the weekly listing in the Oldham Chronicle. 
35 When compared with the collation in Edelstein 'Rigidity and bias', pp. 90-1. 
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economy, as dominated by cotton spinning companies. 
Besides its general economic and financial significance, the crucial 
characteristic of this particular sector of the industry was that for over thirty years, 
between approximately 1860 and the late 1890s a very significant proportion of its 
companies engaged in a policy of full and public disclosure of accounting data. 
Although the issue of compulsory balance sheet publication frequently exercised the 
minds of London based legislators, few appreciated the extent of voluntary disclosure 
in the north. When a parliamentary commissioner asked an Oldham witness if he 
thought balance sheet publication would be a good idea, he hastily pointed out that 
it was already common practice: 
They are published every quarter. They are published almost broadcast, and 
I dare say that if you, as an outsider, wanted shares in almost any limited 
liability company in Oldham that they might be got. I do not think there is 
any secrecy as regards the accounts of companies at all... 
. 
11 
The witness added: `There is not much fault to be found with the limited liability 
companies in the way of withholding information from their shareholders'. " 
Widespread balance sheet publication was supplemented by extensive press analysis. 
Local newspapers devoted perhaps a quarter of their space to analysing balance 
sheets, reporting shareholders meetings and criticising managements. 31 The 
publication of balance sheets and widespread quotation of manufacturing stocks on 
local share listings in South East Lancashire thus preceded the adoption of such 
practices in London by several decades. The reasons for this pattern of development 
are now examined. 
36 BPP, Royal commission on the depression of trade and industry, minute 
4336. 
3' BPP, Royal commission on the depression of trade and industry, minute 
4586. 
38 CWS Annual, 1884, quoted in Ellison, The cotton trade, p. 138. 
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'Popular' capitalism; causes and consequences 
If a `share owning democracy' ever existed, it did so in south east Lancashire in the 
1860s and 1870s. The popularity of share ownership was rooted in the co-operative 
principle upon which many Lancashire business organisations had been founded since 
the 1840s, and the subsequent development of `working class limiteds'39 Rochdale, 
the town which had seen pioneering developments in distributive co-operatives, was 
also the location of the first such venture in the field of production. The Rochdale 
Co-operative Manufacturing Society, which became known as the Mitchell Hey mill 
was formed on orthodox co-operative principles in 1854. All the promoters were 
members of the Society. 40 In Oldham, a similar development six years later was the 
Sun Mill Company. Founded by the members of the Oldham Industrial Co-operative 
Society, it was given a democratic structure by its founders, although an important 
difference was that it was established from the start on limited liability principles. 41 
William Marcroft as one of the original promoters, in particular, was idealistically 
committed to the ideal of producer co-operation and employee control. 42 Management 
of the company was by means of elected committees, for example along the lines of 
responsibility for'different parts of the balance sheet, namely the `Fixed Stock' and 
`Saleable Stock' committees. 4' At the Mitchell Hey, all employees were shareholders 
39 Ellison, The cotton trade, p. 134; Potter (Webb), The Co-operative movement 
in Great Britain, pp. 126-133. 
40 'Rise and progress of the Rochdale limiteds', Rochdale Observer, 10th May, 
1890. 
41 Tyson, `William Marcroft', DBB, p. 121. 
42 Tyson, 'William Marcroft', DBB, p. 121. 
43 Tyson, `Sun Mill', p. 230. 
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and surpluses were paid as a bonus to labour. ` Formation of co-operative 
enterprises in Lancashire had tended to precede the evolution of joint stock 
legislation, and although the Sun Mill Company followed the Act of 1856, the limited 
liability principle was seen only as an adjunct of co-operation °S and the Act was 
regarded as a means of reinforcing such working class investment. 46 
The expansion of the 1873-5 mill building boom, when sixty new mills were 
floated, 47 tended to reinforce these social trends. In 1873 75 % of shares in these 
mills were owned by working class investors °S A couple of years later total 
investors in Oldham numbered 10,000, or one in five of the population! ' Although 
by this time few workers owned shares in their own companies, cotton operatives 
were significant contributors to the share lists of other companies floated under the 
limited liability acts. S° Characteristically, there was wide public participation at 
company meetings, in new issues, and in the buying and selling, of existing shares. 
Active participation at meetings was an important feature of the co-operative 
movement, " which the early working class limiteds emulated. Democratic structure 
was another inheritance from the co-operative tradition. Quarterly meetings were on 
a `one member one vote' basis, and directors' salaries kept to about one tenth of 
'Rise and progress of the Rochdale limiteds', Rochdale Observer, 10th May, 
1890. 
as Farnie, English cotton, p. 249. 
46 Tyson, `William Marcroft', DBB, p. 121. 
Ellison, The cotton trade, p. 135. 
41 Farnie, English cotton, p. 250. 
49 Tyson, `Sun Mill', pp. 221-2. 
51 Chapman, The Lancashire cotton industry, p. 231. 
11 Foster, Class struggle and the Industrial Revolution, p. 222. 
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those earned in other industries in companies owned by `upper class' shareholders., ' 
Democratic norms were enforced by mechanisms such as limits on maximum 
shareholdings, proxy holdings, and institutional anonymous or nominee investors. 53 
Meetings were on a `one member one vote' basis. The expertise and scrutiny of 
shareholders over their businesses was thought by some to contribute towards 
improved efficiency34 and contrasted with the poor management of other companies 
which were run as `investment unions' and owned by those who `know nothing of the 
business carried on'. ss Adult education was another important prop of the co- 
operative movement" and in the 1880s Lancashire had a dominant lead in the 
provision of City and Guilds technical education. ' Such factors undoubtedly 
discouraged the emergence of passive, or `naive', investor groups. Shareholder 
activism, and attendance at quarterly meetings, tends to reinforce the view that few 
shareholders held fully diversified investment portfolios, " and this would have 
increased their concern with the management of specific companies. Also, the 
practice of calling up only a proportion of the nominal value of share capital removed 
some of the protection of limited liability and created the risk of additional calls, 
thereby adding to shareholder vigilance. Where directors posed the threat of calls, the 
52 Potter, The Co-operative movement in Great Britain, pp. 126,132. 
s3 Smith, 'An Oldham limited liability company, 1875-1896', p. 41. Shareholder 
participation and democracy were evidenced by the strong resistance to proxy 
voting, for example there was a heated debate on this issue at a quarterly 
meeting of Leesbrook Spinning Co. Ltd, Oldham Chronicle, 19th January, 
1889. 
sa Ellison, The cotton trade, p. 138. 
ss BPP, Royal commission on the depression of trade and industry, q. 5275. 
56 Foster, Class struggle and the Industrial Revolution, p. 223. 
-1' Argles, South Kensington to Robbins. 
58 As discussed in chapter four. 
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shareholder response was often hostile. " 
By more recent standards, and by contrast with other industries, the lot of the 
typical director was thus an unhappy one. Remuneration was low, shareholder 
criticism intense, and accountability high. Despite adverse employment conditions, 
replacement managers were readily available from at least two identifiable sources; 
existing directors from other firms who had perhaps fallen foul of their 
shareholders60 and from the growing pool of technically educated skilled 
operatives. " Technical education and the rise of skilled labour groups explain the 
pool of potential replacement directors and the weak bargaining power of the 
fledgling managerial class, the former reflecting the co-operative tradition, the latter 
changes in factory organisation. Directorships were therefore often hotly contested. 62 
However, as predicted by Putterman, 63 where management itself is less of a scarce 
resource, the success of participatory organisations tends to be promoted. 
Although Lancashire limiteds conventionally used accruals accounting and 
modern auditing methods, the co-operative tradition, and its associated democratic 
membership and share ownership, had interesting implications. The usual split 
between ownership and control of company assets, common to most ' public 
corporations, emerged only partially. Shareholder influence manifested itself at the 
Werneth Spinning company, for 'example, through votes on significant purchases of 
11 For example, Oldham Chronicle, 28 December 1895, p. 8, iv-v. 
60 Tyson, `Sun Mill', pp. 219-21. 
61 Chapman, and Marquis, 'The recruiting of the employing class from the 
ranks of the wage earners', p. 306. 
62 A contest at a meeting at the Higginshaw Spinning Company was likened to 
`a miniature Waterloo' (Oldham Chronicle, 30 December, 1893, p. 8(vii)) 
63 Putterman, `Some behavioural perspectives on the dominance of hierarchical 
over democratic forms of enterprise' p. 157. 
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fixed assets, and the setting up of a shareholders' committee of investigation into a 
fraud. 64 Anywhere else, the former fixed asset decision would have been taken by 
directors and the fraud investigation conducted by auditors. Shareholders were very 
active in policing the directors and were generally intolerant of creative accounting 
mechanisms such as the manipulation of depreciation. To use one of many examples 
as a detailed illustration, at the Albany Spinning Company, the directors suspended 
the usual £700 depreciation charge for two quarters during a period of bad results. 
If the intention was to disguise the poor trading position from the shareholders, they 
were unsuccessful. A motion was put to the meeting suggesting that the £1400 
missing depreciation be written off reserves and that depreciation be allowed in future 
at the old rate. The proposer of the motion described under-depreciation as bad 
business policy. The meeting then agreed to resume depreciation but without the 
proposed write off from the reserve. The stock valuation was also disputed and the 
directors accused of hiding losses. Attended by over one hundred and twenty 
shareholders, the meeting was punctuated by periods of uproar as these issues were 
debated, and the chairman then removed from office by a simple majority vote. &5 
Shareholder activism was thus vitiated by an acute sense of moral hazard; with the 
recognition that directors had to be allowed to conduct day to day management came 
intense scrutiny from the members. Accounting information thus played an important 
role in the close monitoring of the managerial group. 
Along with generous disclosure, there emerged a uniformity of accounting 
practice. Accounting expertise was rapidly transferred and emulated from mill to 
mill. 66 As the above example has shown, departure from an accepted accounting 
64 Toms, `Financial constraints' pp. 368-9. 
61 Oldham Chronicle, December 28,1895,8, iv-v. 
66 Smith, `An Oldham limited liability company', p. 37. 
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base attracted criticism. Depreciation of seven and a half percent reducing balance 
on plant and machinery was standard to most companies. 67 That consistency was 
imposed without regulation is testimony to the power of shareholders to prevent the 
opportunistic behaviour by directors. 
In the above discussion, the significance of the co-operative tradition has been 
stressed. From the 1870s, co-operation was subsumed by the limited liability 
principle. Although earlier influences were of continuing importance, the growth of 
the industry brought new pressures which tended to change financial reporting 
practices. The most important were, the changing pattern of share ownership, the 
functioning of the capital market, and the structure of industrial relations. These are 
now examined in turn. 
Transitional influences (1): The changing pattern of share ownership 
From the 1870s onwards, and especially after 1900, the earlier principle of co- 
operation declined. The super-imposition of limited liability status on co-operatives 
created an illusion of democratic structure which changes in share ownership 
subsequently undermined. In the process, much confusion of principles arose. The 
following statement, as addressed to a parliamentary committee member, by a witness 
illustrates the point: 
(The mills are worked)... on what you call the co-operative principle, except 
that you have some special meaning in the words co-operative principle. They 
are all on the limited liability principle, but of course all the co-operators are 
party to it, so that is co-operation 68 
Shareholders' meetings at Sun Mill also debated the issue of whether or not the 
limited companies could actually be considered co-operative. One co-operative 
67 Moss, Cotton spinning companies' accounts, p. 34. 
68 BPP, Royal commission on the depression of trade and industry, q. 4400. 
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principle definitely sacrificed was that of the worker/shareholder. Gladstone visited 
the company in 1867 to be told that only 4 out of 1,000 -shareholders were also 
employees. He pointed out `... this company is not really a co-operative one, but an 
association of small capitalists'. " At Mitchell Hey, the co-operative principle also 
lost its dominance in the 1860s; ironically as a result of success. In 1860, new capital 
was required for a new mill and this brought about a new class of shareholders who 
objected to the payment of dividends to labour. As workers at other mills, they 
contended that they had no similar right to these bonuses, and in 1862, after two 
previous unsuccessful votes, succeeded in abolishing the labour bonus principle. 70 
Thus these associations became a passing legacy of the co-operative movement to the 
Lancashire limiteds. 
In subsequent decades the main issue for shareholder groups was the power 
and increasing lack of accountability of certain directors. Changes at Sun Mill 
provide useful examples of this point. Prior to shareholders being aware of the 
potential threat, Sun Mill had altered its articles so that a director with a seat on the 
board of another company could assume office. In the early 1890s the directors 
engaged in a £30,000 speculation in futures using borrowed money, first without the 
knowledge, and then to the dismay of, the shareholders. Meanwhile the increased 
alienation of the operatives led to a strike in 1889. The resulting conflict spread to 
other mills and was enthusiastically pursued by the directors through recruitment of 
new workers from the ranks of the unemployed. 71 When the directors staged their 
final coup against shareholder interference in 1906, they did so on the basis of an 
69 Tyson, `William Marcroft', DBB, p. 121. 
70 `Rise and progress of the Rochdale limiteds', Rochdale Observer, 10th May, 
1890. 
71 Tyson, `Sun Mill', pp. 256,267-70,275. 
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increased concentration of share ownership. Many working class investors, unable to 
meet the threat of calls in the depressed 1890s, had sold their shares as values fell !2 
The directors used a new set of articles to vote through the necessary political 
realignment in board room control. Their provisions included minimum share 
ownership qualifications, increases in share transfer fees, reduction in quorum for 
general meetings, which now became half yearly instead of quarterly, provisions for 
proxy voting and increased director's borrowing powers. To celebrate their success, 
they also secured a vote of a £500 directors' bonus. " Such changes were typical 
of the developing trend in the Oldham district, particularly in the final decade before 
1914. 
Co-operative capitalism was replaced by individual rather than corporate 
capitalism. The co-operative tradition had always emphasised dividends. As noted 
above, capital thus circulated and accumulated with individuals, via dividend 
payments, rather than corporations, as accumulated reserves. The new class of 
individuals created financial empires through the flotation of new mills rather than the 
profitable exploitation of existing ones and began to use accounting information in 
new, but more familiar ways. At an early stage of their activities, these individuals 
were blamed by many for the depressed condition of the industry in the 1880s and 
for using laudatory prospectuses to guarantee high initial share prices and then selling 
their own holdings soon after flotation, which tended to defraud the longer term 
investor, making large profits for themselves in the process. 74 Activities of this sort 
meant that accounting information performed a signalling function but in reinforcing 
72 See chapter four and figure 11.2. 
13 Tyson, `Sun Mill', pp. 294-5. 
74 BPP, Royal commission on the depression of trade and industry, qq. 5041, 5117. 
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incorrect perceptions of value, enabled unscrupulous promoters to exploit the tradition 
of open disclosure, as combined with an inefficient market, and amass new fortunes. 
Increasingly, as their own wealth accumulated and the need to attract long term 
outside finance declined, their methods became associated with the private company 
and the selective disclosure of accounting information. Accumulated individual 
capital formed the basis for these new, more narrowly controlled concerns. " A 
good example was John Bunting and his loose federation of companies referred to as 
the `Bunting group'. 76 He was outstanding in the range of his promotional 
activities, but his method of business empire building was replicated by other 
successful managers who were able to accumulate private capital. " The growing 
influence of such individuals manifested itself in the concentration of shareholder 
wealth and the emergence of multiple directorships. 
The structure and ownership of capital was an important constraint and has 
not been fully considered in the debate on Lancashire textiles to date. As the industry 
evolved, the earlier principles of co-operation and working class participation's 
began to disappear and the accumulation of individual wealth became more important. 
Financial restructurings of the early twentieth century and the large bequests of 
corporate wealth in favour of individuals underlined this trend. Wealthy individuals 
became vital middlemen between the earned profits of existing firms and investment 
in new concerns. Unlike the former, the latter were closely controlled and 
's Jones, Accountancy and the British economy, pp. 56-7. 
76 Farnie, `John Bunting', DBB, pp. 506-9. 
" See chapter 7 above. Other examples in Oldham included Thomas Henthorn 
(1850-1913), Harry Dixon (1880-1947), William Hopwood (1862-1936), 
Ralph Morton (1875-1942), T. E. Gartside (1857-1941), John S. Hammersley 
(1863-1933), and Sam Firth Mellor (1873-1938), see Gurr and Hunt, The 
cotton mills of Oldham, pp. 9-10. 
78 Farnie, English cotton, pp. 255-6 
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independent of equity markets and other financial institutions. Promoters operated 
freelance and took their own chances on new issues, with no assistance from the 
banks. 79 Bunting epitomised this new class of individual. He became the leading 
share broker in the area and ploughed the dividends and profits of his activities back 
into the promotion of new mills. Of the fourteen or so promotions Bunting is known 
to have been involved with, ' three were notable and innovative for different 
reasons. He assisted the Palm, promoted in 1884, then the largest ring mill in 
Lancashire. " Iris, built in 1907 at the height of the boom, typified the apparently 
extravagant financial arrangements of many flotations with a very high degree of 
dependence on loan finance. " Such borrowings were out of all proportion to the 
asset base of the new company and it seems highly probable that it was the financial 
standing of Bunting himself responsible for attracting the loan finance. The final 
flotation of note came in 1907 with Times No. 2. This attracted an enormous amount 
of publicity at the time, at 160,000 spindles being half as large again as its nearest 
competitors. The capital requirement was large at £1 per spindle but Bunting was 
83 again able to attract loan finance on the strength of his wider empire. 
The activities of individuals such as Bunting were facilitated by the structure 
of local capital markets, which gave ready access to cheap capital. Transaction costs 
associated with the issue of new capital were low. Share dealing was on the basis of 
cash only deals and an absence of contract notes and official regulation. Loan finance, 
raised directly from the via press advertisements, independently of the banks, was 
79 Thomas, The provincial stock exchanges, pp. 154-5. 
80 Farnie, `John Bunting', DBB, p. 508. 
8 See chapter three, p. 56. 
81 Thomas, The provincial stock exchanges, p. 155 
83 Jones, `The cotton spinning industry', pp. 87-8. 
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generated similarly on the basis of low transaction cost' High dividends provided 
confidence for lenders and shareholders, thereby facilitating the raising of new 
capital, ' and ensuring its circulation via a rising class of wealthy individuals. 
Bunting was outstanding as a beneficiary of the system and performed a 
crucial function in the circulation of divested and reinvested capital. His method of 
business empire building was replicated by other successful managers. ' The growth 
of the influence of such individuals manifested itself simultaneously in the 
concentration of shareholder wealth and the emergence of multiple directorships. The 
earlier predominance of active but diverse shareholder groups was in terminal decline 
by 1900. A Shareholders" Protection Association was formed in 18891' to 
orchestrate opposition against the rising power of multiple directors, but the practice 
gradually became more prevalent from then on. Other methods of reducing 
shareholder power were explored in the newer companies set up in the 1890s and 
1900s. These tended to issue less marketable higher denomination shareholdings, had 
limited shareholding, and did not publish their balance sheets. The Werneth Spinning 
Company ceased to publish its balance sheets from 1912.88 Bunting adopted a policy 
of minimum disclosure with his companies at about this time, 89 Such retreats from 
shareholder scrutiny helped reduce dependency on external financial stakeholders, and 
may have removed constraints on decision making for powerful individual directors 
and promoters. Diversification of risk may have been a motive, but from the point 
84 Farnie, English cotton, pp. 253-5. 
Thomas, The provincial stock exchanges, pp. 155-6. 
See above, p. 273. 
87 Oldham Chronicle, 9th Feb, 1889, p. 8 
$$ OLSL, Misc/42/18, quarterly reports to members. 
89 Farnie, `John Bunting', DBB, p. 507. 
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of view of managerial elites rather than investors. Thus these individuals failed to 
utilise the corporate form to concentrate financial resources but left their individual 
wealth scattered across otherwise independent companies. 
By 1900 their power contrasted with the days of working and middle class 
shareholder dominance of the 1870,1880s and 1890s and was a far cry from the days 
of `democratic investment'. Reduced shareholder power was evidenced by apparently 
sub optimal financial policies from the point of view of the investor. For example, 
the Oldham Chronicle commented: 
It looks foolish for a spinning company to owe £15,542 to a bank and yet 
have £14,299 on loan to other spinning companies. In the old days 
shareholders would have kicked against this method of finance. 90 
However, shareholder power was not supplanted by a new managerial elite in the 
conventional sense. Rather it represented a series of examples of an early form of 
management `buy in'. 9' Bunting et al used their concentration of voting power to 
appoint and control the managements of the firms in their group. Important features 
of this form of organisation were the monitoring of management by active investors, 
usually the original promoters, and commitments to service external funding, in the 
form of high levels of debt for newly floated companies. In this sense, local directors 
were still dominated by the needs of shareholders. These were no longer the working 
class people with traditions of co-operation, but an emergent millionaire class 91 At 
90 Oldham Chronicle, 15th July, 1911, p. 12, (iv). 
91 A `buy in' is here defined as the purchase of the share capital of a company 
by an external management group with a view to changing its management 
structure. A feature might be that some outside managers are imported by the 
investor (Thompson, et al, `Management equity ownership', p. 417), in this 
case individuals rather than banks. Bunting was a promoter first and 
foremost and used a holding company structure to control his individual 
management teams. 
92 Bunting actually left an estate of £742,940, but by the time he died in 1923 
the First World War and its detrimental impact on the cotton industry had 
reduced his fortune (Farnie, `John Bunting', DBB, p. 508). 
276 
a the level of the smaller company, the tendency to use the private company as the 
unit of business organisation was equally pronounced. Other forms of 'buy ins', 
were instances of private companies buying up the share capital of hitherto publicly 
quoted companies. Examples included Industry Spinning Company, taken over in 
1888, the Higginshaw Spinning Company (1898), the Bankside Spinning Company 
(1900), Cambridge Spinning Company (1907). 93 In the latter case, through poor 
trading results the share price of the company had declined to virtually zero. `Buy 
ins' were paralleled by `buy outs' where the term is used to imply transfers to private 
company status. 94 As noted in chapter seven, inter alia, the Werneth, the Windsor, 
and the Sun Mill Spinning Companies used profits made in the 1907 boom to reduce 
capital, and a few years later withdrew their quotations and ceased balance sheet 
publication. In all these, and many other cases, the stock market quotation was 
withdrawn and the practice of balance sheet publication abandoned. One event 
clearly exemplifies the impact of changed ownership on financial reporting practice. 
The Hathershaw Spinning Company, a quoted, balance sheet publishing company, 
was destroyed by fire in 1907. Its site was bought by Bunting and the company 
replaced by the newly floated Iris Spinning Company. Very little share capital was 
issued by this company and the majority of the assets were financed by loans, 
creating an astonishing level of gearing 95 Otherwise the company remained closely 
controlled, unquoted, and did not publish its balance sheets. 
It is this crucial change in ownership structure that explained the changing 
character of financial reporting. Bunting adopted a policy of minimum disclosure for 
93 The examples discussed in this section were identified from the Oldham 
Chronicle lists and Gurr and Hunt `The cotton mills of Oldham'. 
94 For an explanation of this type of buy out, see Samuels et al, The 
management of company finance, p. 918. 
11 Thomas, The provincial stock exchanges, p. 155. 
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his companies. 96 Likewise, many of the new companies floated in the 1904-7 boom 
tended to be private, issuing less marketable higher denomination shareholdings, and 
reluctant to disclose financial data to the public. Despite a substantial growth in the 
industry, a much smaller proportion of companies saw fit to publish balance sheets 
even though a significant majority maintained share list quotations (table 8.1). Such 
retreats from shareholder scrutiny constituted part of a strategy of reduced 
dependence on external financial stakeholders, and may have helped remove 
constraints on decision making for powerful individual proprietors and promoters. 
16 Farnie, `John Bunting', DBB, p. 507. 
278 
Table 8.1 The Changing Pattern of Disclosure 
a Year A B TOTAL A as % 
of total 
1885 69 27 96 72 
1902 72 29 101 71 
1907 71 54 125 57 
1913 65 94 159 41 
A= Companies quoted and publishing balance sheets 
B= Companies quoted but not publishing balance sheets 
Source: Compiled from the Oldham Chronicle (various issues). 
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Changes in ownership structure noted above help to explain why the practice of 
balance sheet publication began to decline. Of 68 mills floated independently between 
1890-1913,72% sought share listings. ' Yet none adopted the practice of publishing 
balance sheets. Unlike the co-operative venturers of the 1860s, the newer promoters 
geared their activity more towards placing equity capital, rather than attempting to 
attract a wide public participation. 
Part of the reason was that the industry was awash with surplus cash, 
especially following the boom of 1907.95 As published balance sheets had been used 
hitherto to attract loan capital and retain investor confidence, they now became 
superfluous. The emergent class of promoters had no need to offer accounting 
information in return for new capital. Share issues to expand existing companies were 
rare. Takeovers and mergers, apart from the restructurings referred to above, were 
also scarce. Therefore promoters with wealthy contacts for placing new issues had no 
need to remain dependent upon the groups that had once contributed substantially to 
venture capital, such as the skilled working class, once the new concern was 
launched. Quotations ensured liquidity and convenient exit routes for the big 
promotional shareholders. With these changes, accounting data tended to be 
increasingly regarded as a private rather than public good by those responsible for its 
preparation. Balance sheets could be circulated privately to the now more 
concentrated private groupings of shareholders without the expense of publication or 
the need to trouble the press. Thus the signalling function of accounting information 
was also in decline. The wealth and standing of the promoter, rather than the balance 
Calculated from the collation in Jones, ` The cotton spinning industry', pp. 
221-3, in conjunction with the quotation and balance sheet company lists in 
the Oldham Chronicle. Where existing companies built additional mills, these 
were excluded. 
98 Toms, `Financial constraints', p. 375, and chapter seven above, p. 211. 
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sheet, became the chief mechanism of ensuring the confidence of financial 
stakeholders. 
Transitional influences (2): capital markets and financial reporting 
It has been recognised that modern equity markets in the UK and the USA are 
characterised by passive and dispersed share ownership, which creates an incentive 
for individual shareholders to `free ride' rather than participate in decision making'9 
In turn this has been imputed to a lowering of costs associated with the disposal of 
shares and a discouragement of active participation at meetings. 1°° These tendencies 
are reinforced by increasing market breadth and liquidity. 101 In its early years, the 
Oldham stock market was characterised by opposite tendencies. Company 
membership had much in common with co-operative traditions, creating a reluctance 
to dispose of holdings, whilst simultaneously encouraging participation at meetings. 
Investors were overwhelmingly local, although this became less true as the century 
progressed. 102 Each subsequent flotation boom encouraged promotional cliques 
which tended to use proprietary information at the expense of smaller shareholders. 
Nonetheless the influence of the latter remained important into the 1890s, until the 
crash in share values and the inability of small investors to meet calls, fundamentally 
altered the character of the market. As noted above, in the new circumstances of the 
1900s, the position of promotional and management groups became much stronger. 
In the Oldham case, there was no apparent relationship between these changes 
and changes in stock market efficiency. The market was narrow and investments were 
9' Berle and Means, The modern corporation. 
100 Hirchman, Exit, voice and loyalty. 
101 Bhide, `The hidden costs of stock market liquidity', pp. 31-5 1. 
102 Smith, `An Oldham limited liability company', p. 41. 
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not based on diversified portfolios, 103 and neither attribute was altered over time as 
small shareholders were replaced by promotional and managerial interests. In the 
former case, the narrowness of the market was reinforced by the activism of the 
shareholders, and in the latter, by the establishment of block shareholdings. 
Chapter four showed that the market was efficient throughout in the weak 
form informational sense, that is share prices reflected promptly all publicly available 
information. Opportunities to profit from financial information, once published, are 
rare in a modern efficient market1' and given the access to, and understanding of, 
published accounting information on a reasonably equal basis across a large number 
of active shareholders, it might be supposed that this was also the case in Oldham. 
It would also explain the resentment felt towards the rising class of promoters who 
might have used their position to profit from private information. '13 
In the early years especially, accounting reports were used as a policing 
mechanism through which shareholders were able to voice their concerns. Full 
accounting disclosure arose from the risk associated with lack of diversification which 
in turn was a function of the activism of the co-operative tradition. It is thus unlikely 
that accounting disclosures contributed to the allocative efficiency of the market, as 
they were just as likely to result in the removal of inefficient managements as to lead 
shareholders to exit their investment in favour of a more efficient concern. For 
promotional interests, the function of the market for promoters was liquidity to exit 
their investment. This would have led to the transfer of wealth from one shareholder 
group, but again, without necessarily ensuring the efficient allocation of capital. For 
103 See above, p. 79. 
104 Ball, and Brown, `An empirical evaluation of accounting information 
numbers', p. 174. 
pos BPP, Royal commission on the depression of trade and industry, pp. 404-7, 
415,427. 
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this group, quotation was important for exit liquidity, but published accounting 
reports were of no real consequence. Overall, therefore, changes in accounting 
disclosure were unrelated to the degree of market efficiency, since in the 
informational and allocative sense, these remained reasonably constant, whilst 
accounting disclosure declined. That decline is more convincingly explained by 
changes in the social and economic structure of share ownership documented above. 
Transitional influences (3): The Structure of Industrial Relations 
Concentration of ownership was reinforced by the steady withdrawal of the wider 
population from investment in the cotton companies. Industrial disputes in previously 
democratically'managed companies were symptomatic of this retreat of the cotton 
spinning working class from share ownership and the associated rise of trade 
unionism. In 1886 several witnesses to the parliamentary Royal Commission on the 
Depression of Trade and Industry pointed out that there were very few operatives 
who owned shares, particularly in their own companies. ` The' effects of the 
American Civil War and the depression of the late 1870s had increased the perceived 
riskiness of the trade. Trade union membership increased, and worker-shareholders 
were treated with suspicion on the shop floor. 107 
Growth in trade union organisation was an important reason for the increased 
secrecy with which company managements began to treat accounting disclosure. The 
1870s and 1880s saw a rapid growth in union membership. 108 Increasingly 
tempestuous industrial relations culminated in the `Brooklands Lockout' and the 
106 For example, BPP, Royal commission on the depression of trade and 
industry, q. 5131. 
107 BPP, Royal commission on labour, Group C, Textiles', qq. 190-3. 
101 White, `Lancashire cotton textiles', p. 216. 
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subsequent agreement of 1893. The settlement had an important impact on accounting 
disclosure. Across the industry, employers were allowed to move for up to a five 
percent reduction in wages; conversely up to a five percent increase could be 
requested by employees. Such demands tended to follow the economic cycle. 109 
Accounting information therefore became a potentially vital weapon in the bargaining 
process. For example, an abortive negotiation to link wages to profits in 1899 broke 
down over the issue of accounting disclosure. James Mawdsley, the union leader, 
proposed a conciliation board which could adjust wages automatically in line with 
changes in the standard rate of profit. The employers' representatives rejected the 
suggestion on the ground that it would require inspection of the books by persons 
other than the mill owners and their representatives. "' The union side then refused 
the compromise option of verification of the figures by audit, arguing that they could 
not trust the figures prepared by managements of the limited companies, nor those 
of `ignorant accountants'. "' Under these circumstances, the management response 
of increasing resistance to public disclosure of balance sheet information appeared 
reasonable. Open publication of results in the local press, and especially the detailed 
analysis of accounts, died out during the 1890s. From then on, - the press confined 
itself to profits, dividend percentages and tables of summary comparatives for those 
data items. 
Industrial relations, together with changes in share ownership and the nature 
of the capital market, help to explain the reasons for the shift from open and 
voluntary financial reporting to more restricted disclosure practices. The above 
discussion has attempted to establish why balance sheet publication occurred in the 
109 Burgess, The origins of British industrial relations, p. 233. 
10 Burgess, The origins of British industrial relations, p. 289. 
"' Porter, `Industrial peace in the cotton trade, 1875-1913', p. 54. 
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absence of the compulsion of regulation. It is clear that circumstances were already 
changing prior to the first legislative intervention in 1900 and that government policy 
cannot therefore fully explain changes in business organisation. However, it is 
important to attempt to quantify its impact before reaching overall conclusions. 
Regulation and accounting practice 
In general, the effect of the Acts of 1844,1856, and 1862 was that, although there 
was no legal requirement to prepare accounts for the shareholders or the public, the 
articles of association invariably imposed an obligation to the former. 112 As we 
have noted, public provision of accounting data by cotton companies was thus a 
voluntary extension of shareholder power. The 1900 Companies Act made auditing 
compulsory for all companies. "' A balance sheet had to be produced, but there was 
no requirement for an accompanying profit and loss account. Directors were 
debarred from being auditors of the company. 114 Yet all of this and more had been 
standard practice for cotton spinning mills for many decades. It is not surprising that 
the Act had little effect on the public disclosure of balance sheets. The proportion 
of quoted companies also issuing balance sheets to the public was about the same in 
1902 as in 1885 (table 8.1). 
In the wider economy, the provisions of the 1900 Companies Act were 
perceived as onerous, especially for the small closely controlled company. Thus the 
Companies Act 1907 gave auditing and financial reporting exemptions to private 
lie Edwards, and Webb, ` The influence of company law on corporate reporting', 
p. 260. 
Jones, Accountancy and the British economy, p. 100. 
114 Stacey, English accountancy, 1800-1954, p. 79. 
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companies. "' The 1907 Act was particularly significant for business organisation 
in Britain. By 1914 about 15,000 of the total 48,492 registered under the Act had 
transferred from public to private status under the provisions of the Act. "' In 
south east Lancashire the institutional force of forty years' practice meant the 
traditional quoted, balance sheet publishing, company did remain important. Indeed 
the number of companies maintaining stock market listings rose between 1907 and 
1913 (table 8.1) and more companies were quoted in 1913 than ever before. 
However, as noted above, many companies with `a long history of quotation and 
balance sheet publication began to cease the practice and convert to private concerns 
through capital reductions. 
The local press implicitly acknowledged the rising importance of the private 
company. Such companies did not publish full accounts, but in many cases disclosed 
the dividend payment. From 1907 onwards the Oldham Chronicle began to publish 
a list of companies (list `C') which were neither quoted nor issued published balance 
sheets, but which were listed by reference to their dividends. Between December 
1907 and December 1913 the number of companies covered by this list increased 
from 72 to 107. The vast majority of these were newly promoted companies. 117 
Private companies, as contrasted with the popular flotations of the 1870s, undoubtedly 
became an increasingly useful vehicle for Lancashire entrepreneurs. However, the 
legislation followed rather than initiated changes in accounting practice. In the 
example of the cotton mills, social change and capital ownership patterns were more 
"s Cornish, and Clark, Law and society in England, 1750-1950, p. 262. 
16 Jones and Pool, A hundred years of economic development in Great Britain, 
p. 168. 
For a list of all the newly floated companies, see Jones, 'The cotton spinning 
industry' pp. 221-3; for a list of those which were included in list C 'non 
balance sheet companies, see 'The cotton trade in 1907', Oldham Chronicle, 
28th December 1907, and subsequent annual reviews of the trade. 
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important than, and their impact thus pre-dated, the effects of regulatory initiatives 
on accounting disclosure. 
Shareholder power and social change 
The evidence considered has suggested that the principle of co-operation, where 
assimilated into joint stock organisational forms and coupled with a large number of 
relatively equal and 'active members, tended to produce a self regulating and 
widespread pattern of financial disclosure. Accumulation of capital and business 
power by dominant groups of individuals, and reduced dependency on the capital 
markets, subsequently eroded the public supply of financial information. At the same 
time, the working classes ceased to be active shareholders, and instead looked to the 
growing protection and influence afforded by their trade union organisations. 
These social and economic transitions were well under way before the 1907 
Companies Act provided a convenient vehicle of financial secrecy to promotional and 
ownership groups in the form of the private company. Nonetheless shareholder 
power, as represented first by the skilled working class, then by the middle classes, 
and finally by groups of individual venture capitalists, was the driving force in the 
development of the joint stock section of the cotton industry. 
The implications, for the history of the economy as a whole and the 
perspectives that' have been used to interpret it hitherto, are several. First there is 
some need to reinterpret the accounting history of the period, second, to readdress 
the ` personal capitalism' issue, and finally, on the basis of the evidence presented in 
this and the previous chapter, to draw further conclusions on the finance on growth 
of the cotton industry. 
Accounting practice and disclosure was not determined simply by a rising 
class of professional managers. Contrasts with other parts of the economy, where a 
more managerial style capitalism did emerge, underline the importance of the lessons 
from Lancashire. Modern financial reporting gained an early and firm foothold there, 
but tended to move in the opposite direction to the managerialist tendencies identified 
elsewhere. However, to argue that managerial capitalism was a precondition for 
modern financial reporting would be incorrect on the basis of the evidence of the 
cotton mills. Accruals, accounting and audit emerged before managerial capitalism 
developed elsewhere and they continued to be practised, regardless of the changes in 
industry structure that occurred. However, 'the more individualistic capitalism that 
emerged placed a strong break on accounting disclosure. The evidence therefore 
suggests that shareholder power in itself is not a sufficient guarantee of full disclosure 
in the absence of regulation. In the case considered above, the co-operative principle 
and the encouragement of working class participation in share flotations mitigated the 
perception of the `free rider' failing to contribute towards the cost of published 
accounting information. Hence shareholders must be powerful as a collective force, 
but without domination of individuals or sectional interests. 
Shareholder activism was an important driver of financial disclosure, and this 
issue may be of some relevance to modern problems of regulation and corporate 
control. In the cotton industry case, close involvement of shareholders in management 
decisions was made effective by their degree of financial and technical knowledge. 
In the modern context, as the technical division of labour between industries and 
firms proceeds, shareholder knowledge of the specific issues facing a particular 
company becomes far more difficult to guarantee. Nonetheless the more 
knowledgeable the shareholder class in general, the lower the premium associated 
with management skills and the more accountable to their shareholders the managers 
of a company will be. The relationships identified are of wider significance, even 
though the actual barriers to shareholder activism and technical education may vary 
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through time and from economy to economy. The precondition identified in the case 
study of the need for shareholders to have a risk seeking attitude in order to 
concentrate on the issues facing a single company, and to avoid the passive luxury 
of portfolio based returns, may also be seen as impractical. However, the diversified 
investor relying on an efficient market to secure owner and manager goal congruence, 
is only one possible model of actual practice as reflected by current international 
comparisons. "' 
The conventional model of interpretation, of the development of modern 
financial reporting being linked to the emergence of corporate, or managerial 
capitalism, is not supported by the evidence above. Accounting practice had little to 
do with rising power of a new managerial class, and it is therefore difficult to support 
the generalised hypothesis of the dependence of modern financial reporting upon it. 
Rather, if Lazonick's19 view of the cotton industry representing the classic example 
of British adherence to craft production and resistance to managerial professionalism 
is accepted, it should come as no surprise to find that financial reporting practices 
also reflected these attitudes. To the extent that Lancashire cotton was stereotypical 
of the individualistic ownership of the British economy, some reappraisal of the 
emergence of financial reporting practices is also called for. 
Throughout the period 1860 to 1914, Lancashire could be described as 
stereotypical of the `personal capitalism'. However, during that time, the character 
of capitalism altered decisively, implying, as Chandler does, that there might be more 
than one category of this form of business organisation. 12° The categories noted 
"$ Hutton, The state we're in, ch. 10. 
19 Lazonick, Competitive advantage on the shop floor. 
120 Chandler, Scale and scope, p. 240; the types of non managerial company are, 
the personal enterprise where companies are administered without a 
managerial hierarchy, the family enterprise, where the founders establish a 
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above were threefold. First, co-operative capitalism; in its purest form, as in the early 
days of Sun Mill and Mitchell Hey, characterised by active and equal involvement of 
the members, and in pure form, akin to the utopian socialist experiments of New 
Lanark. Second, popular capitalism; in which share ownership is diverse, but 
managerial behaviour constrained by the activism of the equity group. Third, venture 
capitalism; where individuals with large personal financial resources are able to 
construct financial empires to the negation of the institutional influences of banks and 
equity markets. All three, for one reason or another, prevented the emergence of 
professional managerial hierarchies,, and were therefore forms of Chandlerian 
personal capitalism. In the case of the cotton industry, each form preceded the other 
historically, and, the industry thereby provides a useful exemplification of how 
business history can be examined from an institutional evolutionary perspective. 
In terms of the competitive position of the British economy, the institutional 
dynamics of this emergent ownership structure meant that, at a time of growing 
overseas industrial concentration, the basic unit of British enterprise in a leading 
export sector became the smaller private company, capable of raising capital only 
from restricted sources,, instead of the public company with much greater potential 
for growth. It has been argued elsewhere that pre war commitments to traditional 
technologies were the principal cause of the post war collapse of the industry. ", 
Part Two has shown that hypothesis to be a difficult one to sustain, but the above 
analysis has suggested that constraints on growth, development, and investment, were 
financial rather than the technical. Furthermore, it could be said that the financial 
dimension represents a framework for the analysis of the technical. Entrepreneurs 
were unsurprisingly happy to invest in traditional technology as long as it was 
hierarchy but retain a major equity stake. 
121 For an explanation of these arguments, see chapter two. 
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profitable for them to do so. As we have seen, investing in mule spindles was at least 
as profitable as investing in vertically integrated companies before 1914 (figure 6.1). 
By 1926 investment was more problematic as entrepreneurs were without the 
concentrated corporate financial power necessary to restructure the industry, 
regardless of market signals hinting at its profitability. Without the guarantee of 
profits and dividends in a stable expanding market, share issues and new loan finance 
were ruled out. The only potential source of funding left to entrepreneurs wishing to 
reposition the industry through investment in new, cost reducing technology, would 
be to draw on accumulated reserves from previously profitable trading or as 
individuals, to draw on private savings. As the former were minimal, the fate of the 
industry depended on the willingness of individuals to reinvest previously accrued 
profits at a time when there was insufficient certainty to guarantee such investment. 
However, to make such a conclusion at this stage is to presuppose much 
about the impact of forces in the economic environment beyond the control of the 
entrepreneur. The next chapter investigates further the characteristics of Lancashire 
entrepreneurship. Part Four then goes on to consider the performance of the industry 
as a whole in the context of that environment. Only after that will it be possible to 
finally conclude on the role of classes and individuals and to evaluate the 
considerations that encouraged and constrained their actions. 
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Chapter 9: The characteristics of Lancashire 
entrepreneurship 
In the previous two chapters we have seen how dependence on external financial 
stakeholders militated against the accumulation of capital by Lancashire cotton 
corporations. Such an inverse relationship was the opposite to that hitherto suggested 
by those criticising `individual' or `family' capitalism. Above, evidence on 
entrepreneurship has been dealt with only in passing, for example as a variable 
affecting issues such as technology and financial policy. Companies such as 
Horrockses and Tootals provided valuable case studies of these issues, and useful 
contrasts with the role of the entrepreneurs responsible for marshalling the economic 
power of the Oldham Limiteds. In this chapter, specific cases of individual capitalism 
associated with family business connections are given particular prominence; the 
Birtwistle group of Blackburn, the Fieldens of Todmorden, together with examples 
of small firms, the Osborne Spinning Company of Oldham and the Healey Wood Mill 
of Burnley. These are contrasted with other companies in the main sample where 
appropriate. Performances and financial structures of individually controlled 
businesses are then contrasted with those dependent on stock markets. Finally, 
integrating all the comparative analysis to date, conclusions are drawn on the causes 
and consequences of differences in performance for individual companies. Throughout 
the chapter a simple average index of return on capital employed for ' all the 
companies listed in table 1.2 was used as a comparative yardstick. 
Individual and family capitalism 
In considering Lancashire entrepreneurship, there were a number of possible working 
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definitions that could have been used. The one chosen was that offered by Casson, 
as the process of taking a position `against the prevailing view'. Because such an 
individual must either share secret information in order to gain financial backing, or 
have capital already to hand, access to financial resources is effectively an entry 
barrier to entrepreneurship. ' Since a primary objective of the current enquiry is to 
examine the process of capital accumulation, such a definition was thought to be 
particularly suitable. 
As noted elsewhere it has been suggested that for Britain as a whole, failure 
to invest in production, distribution, and management, and resulting poor 
performance from the 1890s onwards, was caused by the family priorities of 
entrepreneurs, or the dictates of so-called `personal capitalism' 2 For the purposes of 
the following discussion, we identify two types of personal capitalism; individual 
capitalism and family capitalism. 
The former has been dealt with already. As we have seen in chapters seven 
and eight, the typical Lancashire entrepreneur became a financial capitalist, defined 
here as one who organised loose coalitions of companies via individual control of 
assets or through a dominant role in the flotation of new companies, and as typified 
by John Bunting. In the context of chapter six, it should be reiterated that it was this 
type of entrepreneur that possessed the financial resources to develop integrated 
businesses, had they chosen to do so. Furthermore, there arose a reluctance to depend 
upon external shareholders to finance expansion, and the experience of some of the 
Oldham companies in chapters seven and eight suggested why this might have been 
the case. At the same time, there was a reluctance to delegate responsibilities to 
managerial hierarchies within the firm, and this in turn created a predominance of 
I Casson, The entrepreneur- an economic theory, p. 14. 
2 Chandler, Scale and scope. 
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specialised companies. Although increasingly controlled by cross directorships and 
share holdings, each mill was structured by the necessary activities to fulfil the 
specialised productive task; hierarchy within the work force, exemplified by the 
minder- piecer system helped guarantee a narrow span of control? At the strategic 
apex, the financial capitalist had little need for management hierarchy per se. For 
these reasons, a special type of individual capitalism had emerged in parts of 
Lancashire by the early 1900s. 
Yet the family controlled company remained an important feature of the 
business landscape. Those firms that sought to retain family control and avoid 
dependence on outside creditors and shareholders have been blamed for the pursuit 
of non expansionary strategies. ' Family control might also therefore have been 
expected to reinforce the predominance of the small firm. The alleged relationship 
between the gentrified social objectives of entrepreneurs and industrial decline has 
been the subject of wider discussion. 5 Under certain conditions, it has been argued 
that firms dominated by family groups or individuals with good business connections 
can function extremely well. Based on trust, involvement in local communities, and 
infrastructural networks, such connections can significantly contribute to sustained 
competitive advantage. ' In contrast to the classical view of the development of the 
large corporation, which equates expansion in demand, labour specialisation and mass 
production, and as most recently exemplified by Chandler, the efficient survival of 
non-mass production types of industrial organisation has been argued to be especially 
I See chapter five, p. 128. 
° Lazonick, Business organization, pp. 45-9. 
Rubinstein, Capitalism, culture and decline; Wiener, English culture and the 
decline of the industrial spirit. 
6 Jones and Rose, ` Family Capitalism', Business History, pp. 1-15. 
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likely where flexibility in response to sudden changes in demand is an important 
feature. 7 As we have seen in previous chapters, flexibility was an important feature 
of Lancashire textiles, especially in the case of specialised firms. In particular, it has 
been suggested that flexibility tends to support three variants of non 
- 
mass production 
capitalism; the municipality; paternal capitalism, and the federated family firm. 8 
Examples of these types of capitalism are considered below. 
So far (chapter eight), the discussion has concentrated on the publicly 
controlled companies of the Oldham district. Chapter seven showed that these 
publicly quoted companies in the Oldham section of the industry were also the 
slowest to expand. In this chapter we concentrate on the various models of personal 
capitalism which existed beyond that sector, and the constraints imposed upon these 
companies are contrasted with those which existed for firms elsewhere in the 
industry. Chapter eight outlined some reasons for the emergence of a special class of 
entrepreneur in the Oldham area; the discussion below uses a case study approach to 
provide some contrast with entrepreneurs elsewhere in the industry. 
A financial capitalist: William Birtwistle 
William Birtwistle (1855-1936) and his emergent group of companies (hereafter the 
Birtwistle group) provided a good example of the type of empire building associated 
with entrepreneurs prepared to take over existing businesses as going concerns, 
thereby pulling together a loose federation of companies. Assembled in the late 
1890s, these companies shared the proprietorship of William Birtwistle, a Blackburn 
based entrepreneur, but little else, remaining a loose association of relatively small 
and independent operating companies (table 9.1). Although the managements of these 
Sabel and Zeitlin, `Historical alternatives to mass production', pp. 134-147. 
I Sabel and Zeitlin, `Historical alternatives to mass production', p. 147. 
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companies often overlapped, and were under the day to day control of Birtwistle 
himself, there were no apparent transfers of goods or cash from one business to the 
other and no other signs of mutual interdependence? Any integration was within the 
business units, for example at Whiteley, rather than for the enterprise as a whole. At 
neither business unit level, nor for the group as a whole, were the spindleages 
consistent with the number of looms, Birtwistle group being a predominantly a 
weaving based organisation, and individual companies would have needed to buy in 
a substantial proportion of their yarn requirements. 
Eccles, LCRO, DDX/868/7/1, Profit and loss accounts and balance sheets; Whiteley, DDX/868/21/5, Balance sheets. 
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Table 9.1: Birtwistle Group Mills 
Company Location Date Mule Ring Looms 
acquired sp. sp. 
John Hawkins Woodfold Mill, 1895 945 
& Sons Ltd Darwen 
Greenbank Mills 1898 52,688 27,868 1,755 
& Hartford Mill, 1910 
Preston 
Abbey Mill, 1898 4,500 13,000 700 
Withnell 
T and R Eccles Lower Darwen 1897 1,070 
Mill, Blackburn 
George Whiteley Albion Works, 1899 21,400 13,720 600 
Blackburn 
John Fish Ltd Waterfall Mills, 1906 29,000 42,000 880 
Blackburn 
Primrose Mill, 1906 770 
Blackburn 
Totals 107,588 96,588 6,720 
Sources: Compiled from, The William Birtwistle group of mills, and Worrall, The 
cotton spinners and manufacturers directory, 1913. 
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The remarkable feature öf the Birtwistle `empire' was the rapidity with which 
it was constructed. Treated collectively, the business in 1913 was on a par with the 
largest Lancashire enterprises, " and Birtwistle was recognised by his contemporaries 
as a significant entrepreneur: 
William was a notability on the Manchester Royal Exchange, where his 
constantly growing group of spinning and weaving mills made him, by the 
beginning of World War One, one of the most powerful men in the trade. " 
Although a self congratulatory statement from a far from independent source, the 
group deserves a more widespread recognition. " Lack of attention from historians has 
perhaps reflected that, individually, the businesses were typical of the median 
organisation in this part of Lancashire. 
Although Birtwistle provided some parallel with Bunting, the latter was more 
dependent on the promotional and share broking aspects of the trade. 13 Birtwistle, by 
contrast, drew his expertise from merchanting and familiarity with the markets of 
Liverpool and Manchester. Directors of the companies in the group were drawn by 
and large from cotton broking interests. 14 Geo. Whiteley Ltd (hereafter Whiteley) 
and T and R. Eccles Ltd (hereafter Eccles) were both conversions from partnerships 
10 The company was approximately the same size as Horrockses, having slightly 
less spinning capacity, but slightly more weaving, c/f table 9.1 and Worrall, 
The cotton spinners and manufacturers directory, 1913. 
11 The William Birtwistle Group of Mills, np. 
12 Elsewhere, William was recognised as a significant figure. He continued his 
acquisitive strategy into the 1920s, for example with the acquisition of Ewood 
mills in 1928 (the Times, 17th December, 1928 p. 11g), and by the time of 
his death in 1936, controlled 16 mills, `forming one of the largest 
combinations under the same management in Lancashire', the Times, 15th 
June, 1936, p. 17d. 
13 Farnie, `John Bunting', DBB, pp. 506-9; Oldham entrepreneurs were 
examined in more detail in chapters 7 and 8. 
" Whiteley, LCRO, DDX/868/21/1, and Eccles, DDX/868/20/1, ledgers and 
registers of members. 
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in the late 1890s, and Liverpool cotton brokers, such as Henry Eccles, continued to 
be significant shareholders. " The establishment of the Birtwistle group constituted, 
through business connections as represented by shareholdings, a commitment to 
forward integration by the Liverpool firm of Eccles and Eccles. Like Horrockses, 
Birtwistle entrepreneurs played to their strengths on the merchanting side of the 
business. 
The two Birtwistle companies, Whiteley and Eccles, feature in table 9.5, and 
a summary of the performances of these two companies vis a vis the rest of the 
industry is shown in figure 9.1. The former, a vertically integrated company, 
performed indifferently, and like Horrockses, Tootal, Ashtons, Barlow and Jones, and 
Rylands, missed out on the very high returns of the 1907 boom uniformly enjoyed 
by the Oldham companies, including those of the Bunting group. The other, Eccles, 
was the best performing company in the whole sample (table 9.5). That the 
companies performance was markedly different, given they had the same 
management, was perhaps the result of wider factors other than entrepreneurship. 
What is clear, however, was that the dynamism of Birtwistle as an individual 
was the most important driving force behind the rapid emergence of the group. By 
the standards discussed in chapter seven, the growth of the entity if considered 
collectively was quite remarkable, with spinning growing at a rate of 250% and 
weaving at over 700% in the years 1895-1913.16 Yet the businesses, once acquired, 
as typified by Whiteley and Eccles, did not expand their productive capacity. " As in 
's Whiteley, LCRO, DDX/868/21/1, minute book; Eccles, DDX/868/20/1, 
directors' minutes. 
16 Calculated from The William Birtwistle group of mills, and Worrall, The 
cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 1913. 
17 Eccles, LCRO, DDX/86817/1, Eccles, Profit and loss accounts and balance 
sheets; Whiteley, DDX/868/21/5, balance sheets. 
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Oldham, the domain of the publicly quoted company, real capital growth and 
accumulation accrued to the individual, not to the jointly controlled hierarchical 
organisation. Such holding company structures, as typified by Birtwistle's companies, 
were quite sufficient as guarantors of profit. 
300 
Figure 9.1: Rates of return, British cotton and 
William Birtwistle companies 
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Certain special factors help account for the profitability of Eccles, a 
specialised manufacturing company. Very little was spent on replacement of fixed 
assets and depreciation charges slightly exceeded plant replacement, which, as we 
have seen, was also a feature of Oldham companies. `$ As a result the fixed capital of 
the company declined slowly during the period. Working capital by contrast increased 
substantially, suggesting that a greatly increased throughput was possible on a 
relatively small fixed capital base. For example, in the 1912 balance sheet stocks 
stood at 110% of fixed assets, compared to only 37% in 1897.19 With its own 
buildings at Lower Darwen Mill, more was invested in fixed assets than the typical 
`room and power' weaving company. Lower capital bases meant that small firms with 
low fixed costs would not experience steeply rising unit costs noted elsewhere in 
periods of short time working. 20 Other companies with small capitals showed 
exceptional returns; the Haugh and New Hey Spinning Companies and Healey Wood 
Mill all achieved over 35%. in 1907,21 and are examples of where relatively low 
interest and depreciation charges might tend to exaggerate apparent success. 
However, any problems in this respect cannot distort the strength of 
significant trends. The decisive factor for Eccles was that in the period 1897-1914 the 
company trebled its sales turnover, mainly for the Indian market, in the form of 
shirtings and 'dhooties', without needing to increase its capital. Other than in the 
1908/9 recession, margins remained relatively constant, but throughput increased 
dramatically, and it was the latter factor which accounted for the rise in return on 
capital (table 9.2). The contradiction between production efficiency and marketing 
'$ See table 7.1 above. 
t9 Eccles, LCRO, DDX/868/7/1, profit and loss accounts and balance sheets. 
20 Winterbottom, Cotton spinning calculations, p. 255-7. 
21 See appendix 1. 
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was noted earlier for companies uch as Horrockses. 1 By contrast, Horrockses had 
chosen an opposite strategy, using branding, increased product range, and market 
power to widen its margins at the expense of productive efficiency? Only in the 
recession of 1908-9 was there a decline in return on capital associated with low 
margins 
-a phenomenon experienced by the rest of the industry as well. 24 Unlike 
Horrockses, Birtwistle made no attempt to integrate the operations of his mills, and 
Eccles was able to reap the benefit of efficient production runs associated with 
undifferentiated commodity output. Given its price, cost and capital base structure, 
it was unlikely that Eccles would have been tempted to switch to the British Northrop 
Loom company as a capital equipment supplier after 1903. For this company at least, 
the recovery of the Indian market after 1896, together with the connections of 
William Birtwistle on the Manchester exchange, which had the effect of increasing 
the volume of business, were the decisive success criteria. 
21 Chapter 6, p. 132. 
21 See above, table, 6.2. 
24 Robson, The cotton industry, p. 336. 
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Table 9.2: T and R Eccles; profitability, margins, and 
efficiency 
Year Asset Profit Return 
turnover margin to capital 
1898 2.71 5.32 14.47 
1899 3.33 5.52 18.40 
1900 3.64 6.13 22.34 
1901 3.75 3.80 14.27 
1902 3.29 5.11 16.85 
1903 3.43 1.53 5.28 
1904 3.78 3.22 12.20 
1905 3.77 8.41 31.78 
1906 3.95 5.52 21.82 
1907 4.21 4.96 20.93 
1908 4.02 1.52 6.13 
1909 3.45 0.32 1.11 
1910 4.33 1.86 8.09 
1911 4.80 3.47 16.72 
1912 4.18 6.21 26.00 
1913 5.32 5.63 30.00 
1914 5.14 2.92 15.01 
Sources: Calculated from LCRO, DDX/868/7/1, profit and loss accounts and balance 
sheets. For definitions of ratios used, see table 6.2, p. 155 above. 
A 
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Like Bunting of Oldham, Birtwistle used the profits of his mills to finance 
further acquisitions. In contrast, however, he did not use his entrepreneurial skills to 
amass a personal fortune. The small estate he left on his death (£13,171) was only 
a fraction of that left by Bunting (£742,940), Hollins (£315,357), and the millions of 
the third generation Fieldens. 1 One reason was that he used the corporate form to 
pass on wealth to his sons. For example, when Abbey, Carr and Woodfold Mills 
were restructured as William Birtwistle Ltd. in 1925, the overwhelming majority of 
the shares were placed in the hands of his sons, Arthur and Frederick. ' However, 
William was not a `family' capitalist, as most of his earnings were reinvested in the 
industry and not in country houses and so on. Like Hollins and Tootal Broadhurst, 
he took a wider view of the needs of the industry and its employees. The involvement 
of his son Arthur as a Brigadier General in the First World War, may have motivated 
the great efforts of his father to secure War Loan finance for tank building. Like the 
earlier Fielden's, William's public spiritedness extended to concern for his 
employees, including the provision of special accommodation, ' and the donation of 
land for the unemployed? These concerns aside, during the focal period of this 
study, before 1914, growth rather than personal enrichment was the principal 
objective of the company, and this dynamism helped create a significant and enduring 
association of cotton enterprises. 
25 The Times, 1st August, 1936, p. 15c, Farnie, ` John Bunting', DBB, p. 508, 
The Times, 21st March, 1924, p. 15d, below, p. 308. 
26 UTR, credit ratings, Abbey, Carr and Woodfold Mills, 1st November 1927. 
n The Times, 15th June, 1936, p. 17d. 
28 The Times, 24th April, 1934, p. 11g. 
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A family capitalist: Edward Brocklehurst Fielden 
The Manchester based textile elite, " of which Birtwistle later became an important 
member, had always formed an important part of the activities of several generations 
of the Fielden brothers. In this respect, what works well for one company or 
generation might not work for another. For the Fieldens of the late nineteenth 
century, our next comparative case study concern, these connections appeared to 
detract from business profitability more than they contributed towards it. 
Like many Oldham companies, the overall performance of Fielden was dismal 
in the 1890s. Although there was a recovery in the 1900s, it was not as strongly felt 
when compared with specialised competitors. After 1908, however, the company 
managed appeared to have been turned around to an extent (figure 9.2). 
29 Pearson, `Collective diversification', pp. 379-414. 
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Figure 9.2: Rates of return, British cotton and 
Fielden Brothers Ltd 
Return on capital employed 
25 
20 
15 
10 
co 
"- rJ 
0 
-5 
-ic 
-Jr. 
ft 
i 
i 
ii' 
i\ 
' 
1. 
"' \ 1} t {f 
¬_ t 
t5}}¬ 
"i 
. 
"` s{ 
s 
1884 1889 1894 1899 1904 1909 
Date 
Fielden Industry 
Sources: Calculated from WYRO, C353/475, Detailed accounts. British cotton 
industry calculated as a simple average of all main sample companies for each year. 
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Fielden Brothers Ltd performed significantly worse than all the comparator companies 
whether smaller or larger (table 9.5). Yet all were less innovative than Fielden, given 
its experimentation in automatic looms and weft ring spinning. 30 There were many 
possible reasons why the company performed badly. 
Unlike other entrepreneurs, such as Birtwistle, the Lees and Edward Tootal 
Broadhurst, the Hollins's and the Gregs, there was a certain disinterestedness in the 
new generation of Fielden entrepreneurs. John Ashton Fielden, the son of Samuel 
Fielden, inherited the bulk of his father's estate of £1.16 million. " He showed little 
interest in the business that had earned his fortune, other than as a major 
shareholder. " As chairman, E. B. Fielden had responsibility for the management of 
the company. However, his main concern was to live as a country gentleman. As 
many others have done, he defined a gentlemanly lifestyle in terms of commitment 
to rural activities, particularly farming and hunting. His diary provided clear evidence 
of these priorities. As a businessman, E. B. Fielden recorded many of his concerns, 
but issues of land management and country sport were typically better documented 
and given far greater prominence. The division of time can also be ascertained from 
diary entries and although he paid frequent visits to Todmorden, he was present for 
only five days in a typical month. 33 In addition, he exercised control via periodic 
30 See chapter 6, pp. 185-92. 
31 Todmorden Advertiser, 14 February, 1890. 
32 WYRO 353/1 Directors' minutes. J. A. Fielden held 40 shares, E. B. Fielden, 
80 shares. 
33 EBF diaries, passim. Although Board meetings were monthly, EB Fielden 
normally made a second journey to Todmorden in the average month, or 
managed Fielden affairs from Norfolk Street Manchester. He normally visited 
at least one, and sometimes all three, of the manufacturing sites. Although he clearly took his business responsibilities very seriously, with some 
exceptions, country sport prowess, such as the number of animals killed, 
normally accounted for the most detailed diary content. 
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scrutiny of financial reports sent to him through the post, and monitored the position 
and cover of the company in the futures market very carefully. 34 It is significant in 
the context of recent discussions of the cotton industry, as examined above in chapters 
two and six that, the key to controlling a profitable business was seen as knowledge 
of the markets, rather than technical developments. 
The distance of the Fielden family from the business at this time is consistent 
with the view that the commitment to Todmorden and the employment of its people 
at the Fielden mills owed much to the events of the past and feelings of continued 
obligations of loyalty to the town. The Fielden family had historically regarded 
themselves as providers of work for the local populace, being deliberately labour 
intensive and refusing to lay workers off 'during recessions, but expecting deference 
in return. " E. B. Fielden continued this tradition, but was more distant than his 
family predecessors. When a hand was killed in an accident at Robinwood, he noted 
the concern of his uncle Samuel Fielden, who unlike Edward, wanted to put the 
question of new boilers and gearing on hold until he had got over the accident. 31 
Although perhaps lacking the paternalistic attitude of his forebears, Edward 
nonetheless was a serious taskmaster and continued the tradition of instilling fear and 
respect in his employees. 37 
31 According to Mr. J. Hirst, two returns per week were sent for yarn produced 
and cloth sold. On the basis of the extent of over or under cover, E. B. 
Fielden would then decide whether to go longer or shorter. The accounts and 
production cost data for the mills were also sent at less frequent intervals, (eg 
RMA, 1895-1914). 
35 Weaver, John Fielden, p. 25; Fielden, ` Autobiography of Samuel Fielden', 
p. 144. 
36 EBF diaries, Wednesday 10th and Thursday 11th April, 1889. EB Fielden 
wanted to discuss the question of the gearing and boilers, but on learning that Samuel Fielden was to preoccupied with the accident to be able to concentrate 
on the matter, he returned to Dobroyd Castle for dinner. 
37 Note from a conversation with Mr. J. Hirst. 
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Nonetheless, the commitment to, and interdependence of the Fielden family 
with the Todmorden community was not what it had been in earlier decades. In part 
this reflected legislation and changing local authority responsibilities as much as 
family management style. Thus E. B. Fielden presided over the sale of the gas works 
(1892) and the closure of the of the previously Fielden sponsored schools at 
Robinwood and Centre Vale in 1889.38 The increased secrecy which clouded the 
business activities of the company from 1890 onwards arose partly from a desire to 
conceal the extent to which the new management team were prepared to allow the 
company to decline. Figures appearing in Worrall's directory in the period 1889-1914 
showed 100,000 spindles and 1,600 looms. 39 Consistency with what was known 
publicly about the company in 1889 was thereby achieved. 40 Yet the evidence from 
the accounts suggests these figures were deliberately overstated. The output of 
Robinwood averaged around 2,500,000lbs of 20s twist per annum. 41 This represented 
the productive capacity of around 18,900 rings or 30,300 mules. 42 A return 
completed at Waterside counting house in 1886, prior to full conversion to rings, 
showed that Robinwood had 22,028 throstle and 452 ring spindles. The same return 
showed Lumbutts to have 5,344 ring spindles and 8,568 mule spindles at Jumb. 43 
Taking into account other mills still open at this time, total spinning capacity was 
around 60,000 mule equivalent. The publicly disclosed figures for looms appear 
38 EBF diaries, 1889 and 1892. 
39 Worrall, The cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 1891 and 1913. 
40 Todmorden Advertiser, 9 November, 1889. 
41 Accounts of Robinwood and Lumbutts mills, WYRO/353/421,480 and 481. 
Also RMA, 1895-1914. 
42 Calculated using the production per pound data in Taggart, Cotton mill 
management, p. 202. 
43 Machinery analysis by mill, Waterside Counting House, 1886. 
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more consistent, the board minutes showing 1501 in 1896« Although the company 
significantly modernised its operations through a programme of ring frame purchases 
and loom widening in the 1890s, this did not compensate for the decline in the total 
scale of the business in terms of mill closures prior to 1891 (figure 6.5). In the 
reorganised company, spinning capacity was therefore insufficient to keep the 
weaving shed going and the company would have needed to buy some of its yarn, 
especially weft, from other local spinning firms. ` 
As the Fielden family sought to reduce their commitment to Todmorden, the 
problem arose of finding local people with whom day to day management of the mills 
could be entrusted. The innovative drive of the first general manager, Thomas 
Wrigley, has already been noted in chapter six. However, his stewardship coincided 
with a period of poor financial performance. It is true that the efficient specialised 
spinners of Oldham also suffered until 1895, but even by their standards the Fielden 
losses were serious, particularly in 1894. To the Fielden family, which by this time 
was extended and with many of its members enjoying extravagant lifestyles, financial 
results came before innovation and Wrigley was dismissed in 1895. In a letter to E. B. 
Fielden, John Ashton wrote that Wrigley's ideas as to cotton spinning were `far too 
antiquated to be of any use at the present time' 43 It was inconceivable that anyone 
conversant with the cotton industry press and the technical issues facing the industry 
could hold such a view. There was some evidence that Edward Fielden did not share 
the opinion of his cousin and appreciated Wrigley's innovative talents, given that he 
44 WYRO C353/1, Board Minutes and WYRO C353/140 Details of new (Butterworth and Dickenson) looms, 1896-7. 
as John Ashton Fielden to E. B. Fielden, January 13th 1895. He went on to 
point out that results were unsatisfactory and he should be replaced with a 
`modern man'. 
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had taken steps in 1892 to support a patent law suit in which the latter was 
involved. " However, Edward became impatient, suspecting manipulation of 
accounts and noting the inability of Wrigley to control his juniors 47 The need for a 
scapegoat for the poor financial performance of the business thus took precedence. 
The dismissal of Wrigley placed a question mark over the willingness of top 
management to consider the long run position and to continue to support innovation. 
The problem of vertical integration from a technical viewpoint was examined 
in chapter six; from the perspective of the family firm there were further dilemmas. 
First, there was the problem of only a partly integration and there were external 
markets for the outputs of Robinwood and Lumbutts and Waterside also bought some 
of its yarn from local spinning companies. ' Under such circumstances, the 
management of the vertically integrated organisation becomes problematic, since 
management co-ordination replaces the market as the mechanism for transfer between 
different processes of production. For Fielden Bros. Ltd. management, the co- 
ordination problem would have also manifested itself at the interface of spinning and 
weaving technologies, both of which were in flux and both of which demanded 
different types of specialist knowledge. The difficulties faced in this respect were 
generally not shared by cotton entrepreneurs in the emergent specialist spinning and 
weaving centres. As with the Gregs the solution might have been to move into 
specialised weaving, or as with Birtwistle, to run the companies as independent units. 
Edward Fielden had a sympathy towards the local communities around Robinwood 
46 EBF diaries, 2nd December, 1892. 
" EBF diaries, 2nd and 3rd October 1894. The pretext for Wrigley's dismissal 
was his failure to prevent the theft of tools from the works by a junior 
manager. 
48 WYRO, C353/421,480 and 481 Lumbutts and Robinwood mill accounts, 1890-1914; RMA, 1895-1914. 
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and Lumbutts, but also had the pressing matters of his country estate to attend and 
thus far less time available to devote to management, could follow neither course. 
At local level, E. B. Fielden needed trust to guarantee efficiency and profit. 
As shown in chapter 6,49 he did nothing to encourage independent action from his 
managers, even though some of his earlier lieutenants were dynamic and innovative. 
Cost control, imposed out of the needs of family circumstance, secured finance for 
the estates, but did not translate into competitive advantage. 
Nonetheless at certain times, the Fieldens were willing to take risk in less 
innovative ways. A particular focus of Edward Fielden's entrepreneurial activity was 
dealing in futures markets. S° With the family background in mercantile activities, 
Fielden Bros. Ltd. might have been expected to benefit from the expertise of its 
management and connections in such markets. However, this was not the case. 
Although futures were used as hedges against price fluctuations for both cotton and 
yarn, the point can be illustrated by a review of the evidence as to the success of the 
buying policy of the company. A cotton spinner buying cotton for future delivery 
would require insurance against the risk that the price would rise between the date of 
the contract and the date of delivery. This was achieved by taking out a contract to 
sell futures on the delivery date. Cover could thus be comprehensive or partial, 
depending on the buyers' attitude to risk and ability to judge the market. A strategy 
of comprehensive cover would produce the same average cost of cotton as that 
available to the market. A speculative strategy would produce gains or losses relative 
to the market in terms of cheaper or more expensive cottons' There was some 
41 See above, pp. 165-170. 
so WYRO C353/1 Directors' Board Minutes, p. 280, all futures transactions had 
to be approved at Board level. 
51 Thornley, Modern cotton economics, p. 82. 
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evidence that Fielden management chose to speculate on some occasions, although 
E. B. Fielden sometimes reprimanded his managers for taking an uncovered 
position. 52 The overall outcome appeared to accentuate the loss making position of 
the company in the 1890s. The average cost per lb of cotton at Robinwood, based on 
invoice price, for the period 1895-1914 was 5.855d. For the same period the cost in 
the market as a whole was 5.5625d. 53 This is quite a serious gap, since the first 
figure is based on the production of 20s yarns from American cotton and the second 
on 32s. Furthermore, the calculation ignores a series of net losses on futures recorded 
in the accounts. ' A loss on a futures contract would have been directly 
counterbalanced by a gain in the main trading account via cheaper raw cotton costs 
in the spot market. Even without the additional losses, however, Fielden was still 
paying more for its spot cotton than the market average. As already noted, E. B. 
Fielden regarded ability to judge the markets as the most important aspect of cotton 
mill management and was aware of the difficulties involved. He considered delegating 
the function to brokers, but was dissuaded from doing so by one of his trusted 
advisers. ss 
Despite the losses on futures, it is difficult to attribute the competitive 
sz EBF diaries, passim. 
53 Calculated from Robson, The cotton industry, p. 336. 
sa The total net losses on futures for the years 1891-1894 inclusive were 
£18,965. Assuming a covered position and falling cloth and/or yarn prices 
this would have improved trading profit in roughly the same proportion. 
However, as losses on the trading account were also high, and much worse 
than elsewhere in the industry (figure 9.2) it is likely that some of the loss 
arose from an uncovered speculative position. The net profits/losses from 
futures in other periods were as follows: 
1895-1899 £5,123 (profit) 
1900-1904 £13,436 (loss) 
1905-1914 £4,352 (loss) 
Calculated from WYRO C353/475, `Detailed Accounts' 
55 Coates to Fielden, July 28th 1910. 
314 
disadvantage in cotton input costs purely to E. B. Fielden the entrepreneur. The 
explanation may simply lie with difficult communications and expensive transport 
costs. Geographical location, and the remoteness of Todmorden from Manchester and 
Liverpool, undoubtedly increased the costs of delivered raw cotton at Robinwood and 
Lumbutts and would account for the differences noted above. The decline of mills 
away from the main centres of Burnley and Oldham would have been accentuated by 
such costs. Enjoying transport cost advantages, the latter may have been the first to 
benefit from any up turn in trade. In at least one year during the 1890s, the company 
suffered as a result of its location. As a correspondent noted: 
At Waterside, there are a large number of looms at a standstill 
... 
and others 
in the district 
... 
Burnley is working at `full swing' s6 
This formed one example of how commitment to an increasingly peripheral local 
community imposed a constraint, made worse, as noted in chapter three, by the need 
to persevere with out of date buildings. Perhaps the Fielden's could have used their 
connections in the Lancashire and Yorkshire railway to overcome the problem, but 
as figure 6.3 illustrates, the Robinwood, Lumbutts and Waterside sites were not 
ideally located in relation to one another. 
Less charitably, in terms of the ability of Fielden management, the trends 
may reflect a policy of needless exposure and losses on uncovered purchases. 
Alternatively, the company was dependent on the markets of India and China, and 
may have suffered disproportionately during the period of silver devaluation and the 
temporary rise of the Indian cotton industry. 57 Finally, relationships with suppliers 
and agents may have been poor. Whichever of these, the earlier Fieldens would have 
overcome the problems, given their ability as merchants. The consequence of poor 
56 Textile Mercury, 5 August, 1893, p. 110. 
-5' Chapman, Report of the tariff commission, pp. 420-7; see also chapter 11 below. 
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buying was the loss of some of the competitive advantage which the company had 
enjoyed via its merchanting activities prior to 1889. 
Edward Fielden and his representatives remained active participants in the 
Manchester markets. The company office at Norfolk Street was used as a base for 
frequent company meetings, negotiations with agents and important customers such 
as Rylands 58 However, the scale of the business was far less than it had been in 
former years. In 1865, the capital invested in the Manchester arm of the Fielden 
operation had amounted to £706,000. Significant divestments were made since then 
and reflected in the estates of the third generation partners. "' The Manchester 
operation henceforth was a shadow of its former self. In 1895, the Manchester office 
maintained only 40 customer accounts with a total value of £8,700.60 The causes of 
the restructuring were connected with the deaths of the previous generation Fieldens 
and the distribution of their estates. The consequence for the Todmorden successor 
company was increased manufacturing specialisation through the loss of its 
distribution network and this was consistent with the increasing rarity of the 
merchant-manufacturer. " Another consequence may have been lower profits through 
more difficult access to markets, albeit with the compensation of a lower risk profile 
for the company. 
Overall the Fieldens of the 1890s and 1900s lacked the entrepreneurial drive 
of their predecessors. The mills became a function of their private priorities and 
S$ EBF diaries, much business was transacted in Manchester by EB Fielden, 
usually in conjunction with his adviser, Thomas Lodge. 
59 The combined estates of John Fielden and Samuel Fielden were £1.64m, 
Textile Mercury, 5 August 1893, p. 110; Todmorden Advertiser, 14. February, 
1890. This was over twelve times the capitalised value of the successor 
company at £130,000. 
60 WYRO C353/257, Manchester Accounts. 
61 Chapman, Merchant enterprise, p. 303. 
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family commitments. J. A. Fielden tended to ignore the business, whilst E. B. Fielden 
attempted to simultaneously live the life of a country gentleman and with some 
success, turned around an old manufacturing business badly in need of modernisation. 
In the early 1890s at least, innovation tended to occur in spite of and not because of 
the attitude of senior management. There was some loyalty to the people of 
Todmorden and the traditions of the past, but these had provided capital to dispose 
of and they were determined to spend rather than invest, even if that meant reducing 
the scale of the manufacturing business. 
Personal capitalism: Small firm examples 
Many companies in Lancashire combined the key attributes of Birtwistle and Fielden. 
Their owners and managers were often dominated by business connections with other 
companies or markets and family relationships. For both the expanding Birtwistle 
empire and the contracting Fielden concern, the fundamental unit of business 
organisation remained the small firm. Lack of concentration was an important feature 
of the industry and appeared to become more so as specialisation intensified. 
One such small firm was the Osborne Spinning Company. Based in Oldham, 
it was floated in 1889 to take over the running of a mill originally established in 
1853,62 but was completely refitted with 45,000 Platt Bros. mule spindles. 63 The 
company was thus about half average size for mills of this time. It remained under 
the control of the small group of promoters and directors, and unlike the typical 
Oldham company considered in chapter eight, did not issue its shares to the local 
public. These individuals were perhaps wealthier than the average Oldham 
shareholder, requiring a down payment of £5 for each £100 share in contrast to 70s 
62 Gurr and Hunt, The cotton mills of Oldham, p. 43. 
63 LCRO, DDX/869/9/1, plans and tenders. 
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for each £5 share on a typical quoted company. Its strategy was to spin a range of 
counts with a bias towards higher quality Egyptian cotton at 60s and 70s counts, 
again unusual for an Oldham company. TM It was a successful policy, and Osborne out 
performed both the industry and larger companies such as Dowry, Sun Mill and 
Werneth in terms of return to capital (figure 9.3). 
The policy of the Osborne management suggested that increasing returns to 
scale were not the only way to secure profits for Lancashire entrepreneurs. 
Specialisation in the higher quality market on the basis of a small capital commitment 
produced relatively high profits. Apart from one minor refit, the directors made no 
significant investment in new equipment. As a result the capital employed declined 
through the repayment of loan finance and the depreciation of fixed assets throughout 
the period. ' The variability of ROCE for Osborne compared to Werneth and the 
industry as a whole is partly explained by the very low capital denominator 
exaggerating the impact of fluctuations in absolute profit and loss. There is thus some 
evidence here of Lancashire entrepreneurs doing what they have often been accused 
of, continuing to run machinery long after it was written off for accounting purposes 
and resisting pressure to scrap and replace machinery in existing mills. ' Osborne 
made good profits which could have been used to finance new investment, for 
example in ring spindles. The evidence suggests its management deliberately chose 
not to, and not that they were constrained from doing so through lack of finance. 
Credence is thus given to the view of Saxonhouse and Wright that mules were a 
LCRO, DDX/869/9/1, plans and tenders. 
61 LCRO, DDX/869/3/1, trade, capital and profit and loss accounts; see also the decline in net book value of company assets in table 7.1. 
66 Ryan, `Machinery Replacement', p. 569. 
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positive choice in their own right, " albeit from a financial, rather than industry 
structural, point of view. 
Another highly successful small private company was Healey Wood Mill. 
Based on a very small capital, the company typified small business dominated north 
east Lancashire. Defined as vertically integrated for its simultaneous presence in 
spinning and weaving operations, the company actually controlled two separate 
factories, a shed of 170 looms producing towellings and a spinning mill of 6000 weft 
spindles, spinning waste. 68 As with many other examples already considered, no 
attempt was made by management to enlarge either of the premises or to increase 
productive capacity. The purpose of the company was to produce profit and hence 
dividend to its shareholders. A very small proportion of the very small capital of the 
company was kept undivided in reserve, and the company also remained independent 
of any external borrowings 69 The return to capital thus corresponded closely to the 
annual percentage declared dividend and this was used to estimate the former for the 
years 1885 to 1905. "' Throughout the period, the company was relatively profitable, 
for example achieving a return of 42% in the boom of 1907.71 Unlike the Blackburn 
companies of Birtwistle, Healey Wood's product range of waste, crapes, plains and 
towelsn was not overtly dependent on the Indian market. The independence of the 
spinning and weaving branches of the business would also have helped keep profits 
67 Saxonhouse and Wright, `Stubborn Mules', p. 90. 
68 Worrall, The cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 1913. 
69 For example at 31st January 1913, at the end of an average quarter, the balance on reserve was £1,362 out of a total capital of £12,372; RM, BB637, 
Private ledger. 
70 See appendix 1. 
71 See appendix 1. 
71 Worrall, The cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 1913. 
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more consistent as spinning and weaving tended to lead and lag respectively in the 
trade cycle. ' To a company such as this, the benefits of vertical integration, in terms 
of more efficient throughput, were not obvious. 
Nor was there any apparent need for the another avowed benefit of vertical 
integration, the development of a professional managerial hierarchy' The 
importance of dividends reflected the characteristics of share ownership. Of the 
eighteen individual shareholders, two were widows. A further block of shares was 
held by will executors. Between them these had effective control of the company. 75 
Like Fielden, the concern was thus run partly for the benefit of inheritors of earlier 
entrepreneurs, in this case John Cronkshaw of Blackburn, whose widow, Ellen, 
served as company chairman. For this type of shareholder, the important function of 
the business was to provide income for estates. 
Another significant stakeholder, with different priorities, was the 
entrepreneur, Thomas Burrows (1839-1906). Although the companies he floated were 
on a far smaller scale, Burrows was a Burnley equivalent of Oldham's John Bunting. 
Thomas Burrows and Company Ltd was the most important successor to the Haggate 
Joint Stock Commercial Company, which like Mitchell Hey at Rochdale and Sun Mill 
at Oldham had been an attempt at co-operative manufacturing in the 1850s. 76 
Between 1887 and 1905 the company acquired control of mills at Calder Vale, 
Gannow, Queensgate, and Westgate. None of these were significant in their own 
73 See chapter 11. 
74 Chandler, Scale and scope, 
's RM, BB 647, share registers. 
76 Frost, A Lancashire township, p. 65. 
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right, but their combined size added to Burrows's significance as an entrepreneur. " 
Burrows also became chairman of the Calder Vale Room and Power Company and 
of Healey Wood Mill. Like Edward Fielden, he also pursued a career in local politics 
and on the bench. 78 As a Liberal, he was immensely active in Burnley municipal 
politics, becoming Mayor in 1891 
. 
71 However, Burrows's activities resembled closest 
those of William Birtwistle. Again capital accumulation occurred at an individual 
rather than corporate level; none of the individual businesses such as Healey Wood 
Mill expanded whereas the holdings of Burrows did. Like Bunting, Birtwistle, and 
other such individuals, this type of entrepreneur needed to see profits distributed as 
dividends rather than accumulated. Previously distributed personal wealth could then 
be used to reinvest in new concerns. For Healey Wood Mill, all the shareholders, for 
different reasons, preferred to receive dividends and keep the company roughly at the 
same size. 
Absence of single family control might have explained the style of 
management adopted. Despite the small scale of Healey Wood Mill, its management 
deliberately shunned paternalism in favour of a hostile and distant attitude to its 
workers. In May 1912 when the workpeople requested a picnic be organised for the 
forthcoming fair week, management resolved instead simply to pay 2/6 per head. 80 
Sense of identity amongst the workforce could not have been high and many left the 
company voluntarily when management refused to raise wages at a time of labour 
Britannia and Belle Vue Mills at Westgate had 1527 looms; Worrall, The 
cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 1913. 
78 Frost, A Lancashire township, p. 66. 
79 Burnley Express, 27th June, 1906. 
80 RM, BB 648, Minute books, 27th May, 1912. 
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scarcity. " As at Milnrow and Oldham, conformance with the requests of employers' 
federations became the dominant principle of labour management. Healey Wood 
directors were always quick to follow the local associations on short time working 
and alterations of wage rates. 12 Increasingly, paternalism became peripheral and 
confined only to firms like Fielden where such attitudes were well entrenched over 
several generations. Elsewhere, federal structures, at the level of the financial 
capitalist style entrepreneur, and at the level of industry employer associations, were 
important reasons for the decline of paternalism in an industry still characterised by 
the small firm. 
Individual and collective capitalism: impacts on performance 
Case studies, whilst important in the analysis of individual decisions and their 
constraints, only support tentative conclusions on the performance of Lancashire 
capitalism and the role of the entrepreneur. In this section, examining a larger cross 
section of companies, the discussion is widened to show contrasts between public and 
privately controlled companies. 
Throughout the period, with the exception of the boom of 1907, publicly 
quoted companies were out-performed by those whose capital was in private hands. 
Earlier chapters have shown that diverse shareholder control and stock market 
quotation did not promote organic growth through reinvestment of profits, and in 
general it appeared not to support the generation of superior profitability either. 
Figure 9.2 and table 9.4 contrast the profitability of privately controlled businesses 
with those whose shares were traded by the public. The latter class included Ashtons, 
81 RM, BB 648, Minute books, 28th January 1907. 
82 RM, BB 648, Minute books; for example, 21st and 28th January, 17th June 
1907,1 June 1908,1 March 1909. 
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Barlow and Jones, and Rylands, which had their shares quoted in London and 
Manchester, together with companies quoted at Oldham. 
After 1905, the performances of both type of company were very similar, 
with a slight accentuation of the trade cycle effects for the publicly quoted companies 
(figure 9.2). Before that date, there was a clear advantage for the privately owned 
company. The discrepancy in the 1890s was due largely to the slump which affected 
the specialised spinning firms in the Oldham area. Rylands, being more diversified, 
enjoyed consistent if unspectacular levels of profit during the 1890s and 1900s. Only 
the Oldham companies experienced a roller coaster of return to capital fluctuations 
in these two decades. Ashtons and Barlow and Jones, both earned profits at a much 
steadier rate. The apparent contrast in performance suggested in figure 9.2 was 
therefore a function of specialisation, and hence of issues explored in previous 
chapters, as it was of ownership per se. Although the differences between average 
returns for the period as a whole were not statistically significant, the apparent 
divergence of profitability in the 1890s especially drew the age of the dominance of 
the Oldham Limiteds to a close and reinforced the emergence of the individual cotton 
financial capitalist. 
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Figure 9.3: Average Returns on Capital, quoted and 
private companies 
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Table 9.3: Average Returns on Capital, quoted and 
private companies 
Quoted Private 
Average: 
1884-1896 5.35 6.90 
1897-1913 8.32 9.56 
1884-1913 7.03 8.41 
Std Dev (whole period) 4.36 3.74 
Sources: As for figure 9.3. 
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Oldham, as in many cases considered already, was very much a special case. 
Prior to 1900, for the institutional reasons explored in chapter eight, the majority of 
larger companies were publicly quoted. Even those floated in the 1905-7 boom, 
although more closely controlled by individuals, continued to- have stock market 
quotations. Patterns of ROCE were replicated for individual companies within the 
industry. 
A problem which affected many companies in the early 1890s was a wave of 
speculative losses in the futures markets. The experience of Fielden in the futures 
markets has been noted above, and it would be unfair to conclude that the problem 
was confined to any one type of company. However, speculative losses were in all 
cases attributable to incomplete stakeholder scrutiny over management. In the Oldham 
companies the losses that were incurred at the Werneth and the Sun Mill were 
symptomatic of the increasing tendency of directors to engage in unauthorised 
transactions and to lose money at the shareholders' expense. Also, in the sample 
companies, losses on futures accentuated the poor performance of the publicly quoted 
companies in the 1890s. Even by the dismal standards of Oldham, the Werneth 
1 
performed very badly in the 1890s, and this was attributable specifically to the 
additional fiduciary dimension of the director shareholder relationship. The year 1893 
was particularly disastrous although the subsequent decade marked a gradual recovery 
(figure 9.3). In addition to losses on futures, along with most of the industry, 
Werneth suffered a nineteen week closure during the `Brooklands' dispute in the early 
part of 1893. " Problems were compounded later in the year following the 
perpetration of a major fraud against the company which added to losses from futures 
speculations. The profit and loss account for the quarter ended 31 October 1893 
11 OLSL, Misc/42/17, quarterly reports to members. 
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showed an amount of £14,557 written off. M Such frauds, associated with the lack 
of shareholder control which also allowed futures speculation, were a common 
problem at this time. Shareholders at Sun Mill, and at the Eagle Spinning Company 
in Rochdale, changed their indoor rules to prevent directors making unauthorised 
dealings in futures. 85 One person who would have felt these shareholder director 
conflicts of interest keenly was Samuel Ogden Ward. One of the early large 
shareholders at Sun Mill, he floated a succession of companies before becoming 
chairman at Werneth. 1 For the latter company, the fraud case attracted considerable 
local publicity, ' with the result that a manager, a Mr. G. Ashton, was prosecuted. 
Intervention of the shareholders, their concern with policing the activities of company 
officials, and the falsifying of the books of account by the latter, were noteworthy 
features of the incident. Despite the success of the prosecution there is no evidence 
that any of the loss was recovered. 88 Added to the impact of the general depression 
of the mid 1890s, these incidents ensured the financial results were below average. 
OLSL, Misc/42/17, quarterly reports to members. 
85 Tyson, `Sun Mill' p. 275; Rochdale Observer, 9th April, 1892. 
86. Tyson, 'Sun Mill', p. 219; OLSL, Misc/42/2, Werneth board minutes. 
87 Oldham Chronicle, 30th December, 1893 and passim. 
88 OLSL, Misc/42/2, board minutes, 28th November, 1893. 
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At Werneth the strong recovery from the weak position of the 1890s deserves 
further comment. Effects of the trade cycle were less pronounced for the company 
than for the industry as a whole in the later years. The likely reason was that the 
company had expanded capacity by building the second mill. Size, and expanded 
product range would have constituted a useful hedge against the effects of the trade 
cycle, fire hazards and breakdown. 89 The investment in the second mill proved 
particularly worthwhile 
-when No. 1 mill was destroyed by fire in 1899 and not 
reconstituted until 1901.90 As with the vertically integrated companies and those 
outside the specialised Oldham area, the fluctuations in return to capital became less 
dramatic for this company after 1900, and by comparison with its competitors missed 
out on the boom of 1907. However, as can be seen in figure 9.4, the dampening 
effect on profit in that year was negligible, No. 2 mill presumably providing some 
reserve capacity for orders. The performance of the company vis a vis Oldham 
competitors was interesting, given its increased specialisationin Egyptian yarns, and 
that virtually all other companies in the area specialised in American counts 91 
Financing strategies 
Public and private companies also provided interesting contrasts in their financial 
structures (table 9.4). Traditionally, the publicly quoted Oldham companies had 
drawn their capital from a wide range of sources. Typically all raised finance from 
loan accounts and these served the savings needs of the local population in much the 
same way as a modern building society. Anyone holding a loan account with an 
89 Jones, `The cotton spinning industry', p. 91. 
10 Gurr and Hunt, The cotton mills of Oldham, p. 54 
91 Worrall, The cotton spinners' and manufacturers' directory, 1913, showed 
only two other mills in Oldham, Gem and Cairo, to be spinning Eygptian 
cotton. 
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Oldham spinning company would earn a fixed rate of interest, usually 4% from the 
1890s onwards, although the rate would be raised for new mills in order to discount 
risk, and would be able to make deposits and withdrawals on demand at the company 
office. In addition to facilitating shareholder control, an important purpose of the 
published balance sheet, reflecting dependence on external financial stakeholders, was 
to maintain the confidence of the loan holders. In line with the concentration of share 
ownership noted in chapter eight, table 9.4 shows that dependence on loan finance 
also reduced for established companies such as Dowry, Moorfield, Sun Mill, and 
Werneth. New companies, when floated by individuals such as Bunting were often 
backed by disproportionate amounts of loan finance, 92 and in such cases it was the 
standing of the promoter that provided the required confidence to prospective lenders. 
11 For example, Iris Mill, chapter eight, p. 271. 
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Table 9.4 : Sources of long term finance 
Public companies 
Barlow and Jones 
Rylands 
Ratio of debt to total long term finance 
1890 1906 
% 
10.9 65.2 
21.6 18.9 
Dowry 54.1 nil 
Haugh 45.0 35.8 
Moorfield 26.3 nil 
New Hey 48.2 nil 
New Ladyhouse 48.4 37.7 
Sun Mill 38.4 24.6 
Werneth 37.4 28.7 
Average (Oldham district) 42.5 18.1 
Average (public companies) 36.7 23.4 
Private companies 
Fielden nil nil 
Horrockses 46.1 55.7 
Osborne 60.2 5.9 
Tootals 62.6 60.0 
Average 42.2 30.4 
Sources: Calculated for each company from the sources listed in table 1.2 (1890 data 
for Barlow and Jones taken from `Commercial reports', LGL, for that year); loan, debenture and preference share capital taken as a percentage of total long term 
finance. 
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What was very surprising about the use of finance was the absence of class 
differences, preference shares and debentures among the Oldham section of quoted 
companies. By contrast, companies with London quotations made substantial use of 
these fixed interest instruments. " Extensive use of debentures was made by Ashtons, 
Barlow and Jones, and Rylands, and the former two also used preference shares to 
widen their capital base. Such were the importance of these new financial instruments 
to those companies using national capital markets. In Oldham the culture of raising 
finance, as described above, was entirely different. 
Another surprising feature was that private companies, particularly 
Horrockses and Tootal, also made use of formal instruments of debt finance. Tootals 
used quoted debentures and also issued preference shares; Horrockses used both types 
of financial instrument, and as with Oldham companies, a depositors loan account. ' 
As with the established Oldham companies, the latter account had declined in relative 
significance by the early 1900s. As noted in chapter seven, much of the expansion 
at Horrockses and Tootals was financed from reserves, but additions to equity were 
occasionally matched by new issues of debentures and preference shares. Use of the 
capital base to enhance growth might be more usually expected of a public company 
which would be indifferent to dependence on additional external stakeholders. In 
contrast to the norm, Lancashire manifested its rising dependence on the personal 
capitalism through the growth of privately controlled companies and the associated 
use of secured debt finance. 
The financing of cotton and the character of capital accumulation were 
important had important implications for the banking sector of the economy. The 
local capital market was an important source of finance through new share issues 
9' Cottrell, Industrial finance, p. 167. 
94 CVR, Balance sheets and detailed accounts, 1887-1905. 
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almost always for newly floated companies; the banks played no role in the process. 
None of the companies in the sample, regardless of ownership used the banks for 
anything other than the temporary overdraft -financing of working capital. In this 
respect, cotton conformed with the wider economy where the stock market was 
preoccupied with overseas, transport and utility sectors and the commercial banks 
with the provision of working capital, leaving the majority of industrial fixed capital 
finance coming from private sources and profit retentions. " British banking 
responded to this in its own evolution. For example it concentrated rapidly, providing 
a uniform service and lacked the adaptation to the needs of specific industries typified 
by French and German banks % Ironically, cotton entrepreneurs only resorted to the 
banks for long term finance when the industry plunged into its post war crisis. 9' 
Differential rates of profit: Causes and consequences 
Parts two and three of the current work have commented upon and analysed the 
important technical and financial decision variables which confronted cotton 
entrepreneurs before 1914. Before going on to consider the macro environment in 
which those decisions were taken, below, as a concluding and summary evaluation, 
a comparison of relative performances of all the companies in the sample is 
undertaken. Table 9.5 provides a summary of the returns to capital employed for all 
the sample companies. 
91 Cairncross, Home and foreign investment, 1870-1913. 
96 Lavington, The English capital market, p. 127. 
97 Bamberg, ` The rationalization of the British cotton industry', pp. 83-102. 
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Table 9.5: Average Returns on Capital, by company 
and by period. 
Average Return on Capital (%) 
Company Description 
1884-1914 1884-1896 1897-1914 
Ashton Bros VI; M, R, AL; Q; Ma 7.41 N/A 7.41 
Barlow&Jones VI; M, PL; Q; Bo 5.53 N/A 5.53 
Dowry VSS; M; Q; OI 4.81 3.89 5.44 
Fielden VI; R, PL, AL; P; To 3.06 
-1.28 4.51 
Haugh VSS; R; Q; Ro 8.36 6.06 10.03 
Healey Wood* VI; M, PL; P; Bu 12.78 14.58 11.57 
Horrockses VI; M, R, PL; P; Pr&Bo 12.33 14.41 11.23 
New Hey VSS; R; Q; Ro 9.37 6.52 11.05 
New Ladyhouse VSS; R; Q; Ro 13.79 12.94 14.95 
Osborne VSS; M; P; OI 7.19 4.84 8.16 
Rylands VI; M, PL; Q; Ma 4.28 3.96 4.49 
Sun Mill VSS; M; Q; O1 4.60 0.95 7.75 
Tootals VI; M, R PL; P; Ma, Bo 4.67 3.15 5.47 
TR Eccles VSW; PL; Bl 16.57 N/A 16.66 
Werneth VSS; M; Q; OI 4.60 2.10 6.63 
Whiteley VI; M, R, PL; P; Bl 6.27 N/A 6.27 
Averages: 
Sample companies 7.61 5.88 8.92 
Vertically integrated 6.26 5.15 7.10 
Quoted companies 7.03 5.35 8.32 
Private companies 8.51 6.80 9.82 
Economist sample (Oldham quoted) 5.20 3.09 6.69 
$ years 1884-1906 based on estimates only. 
N/A no data available for these years. 
Key 
Structure: VSS, 
"vertically specialised, spinning company; VSW, vertically 
specialised, weaving company; VI, vertically integrated company. 
Technology: M, mule spindles; R, ring spindles; PL, plain looms; AL, automatic looms. 
Ownership: Q, quoted; P, private. 
Location: 01, Oldham district; Ro, Rochdale district; B1, Blackburn district; Pr, 
Preston; Bo, Bolton; Ma, Manchester; To, Todmorden; Bu, Burnley. 
Sources: Calculated for each company from the sources listed in table 1.2. 
334 
Until 1896, vertically integrated companies tended to be more profitable than 
specialised companies. Integration might have been useful insurance against the risks 
posed by the endemic recessions of the 1880s and 1890s. As seen in chapter four, the 
dedicated spinning companies of Oldham suffered particularly in the depression years 
of 1892-5. Contemporaries found scapegoats in trade unions, the system of joint stock 
ownership prevalent in Oldham, and foreign competition's As pointed out in chapter 
four, the market capitalisations of specialised Oldham mule spinners collapsed, but 
few advocated a restructuring of the industry. In contrast, specialised ring spinners 
such as the Haugh, the New Hey, and especially the New Ladyhouse performed 
better, although their profits were only impressive when compared with Oldham mule 
spinners, and not necessarily when compared with other firms in the industry. 
Integrated concerns such as Horrockses and Tootals were less spectacular in terms of 
return to capital, but were the only corporate growth engines of the cotton economy. 
The former company was especially impressive in that it earned large rates of return 
and expanded operations significantly. 19 
Integration, ring spinning and automatic looms were not panacea for poorly 
performing firms. This was true even in the 1890s as the results of Fielden Brothers 
Limited and John Rylands suggested. Even those companies which nominally were 
integrated, such as Fielden, chose to allow individual businesses to run independently 
of one another, and often at large distances. As we have seen in chapter six, Fielden 
abandoned integrated production at their main site, prior to the scrapping of mule 
spindles and the introduction of rings and automatic looms. Significantly, Rylands, 
Horrockses and Healey Wood performed better in the 1890s than in the 1900s, 
despite the latter decade being a far more profitable period for the industry as a 
98 Textile Mercury, 16 November, 1895; pp. 385-6. 
99 Toms, `The Profitability of the First Lancashire Merger', pp. 134-6. 
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whole. Horrockses remained more profitable than Rylands, but both exhibited a much 
lower deviation of returns than the specialised spinners of Oldham. The rewards for 
the Oldham companies were the spectacular returns of the 1904-7 period. The Sun 
Mill, the Dowry, and Osborne Spinning companies, all earned returns of more than 
20 % in at least one of those years. Except Healey Wood, which was a small concern 
and only nominally integrated, the vertically integrated companies missed out on these 
rewards. These results no doubt further encouraged the expansion of specialised 
spinning capacity in the form of new mills in the Oldham district immediately prior 
to the First World War. 
The ostensible benefits of vertical integration were therefore not made apparent 
to decision makers by market signals in the period prior to 1914. The reduced risk 
associated with diverse operations was outweighed by the advantages of specialisation. 
Bankruptcies were very scarce in the first decade of the century, despite the tendency 
towards specialisation. 10° Diversification became an increasingly unpopular strategy. 
Oldham companies began to find niches in particular count specialisms, with most 
shifting to lower counts. 101 Dowry and Sun Mill reflected this trend by lowering their 
average counts in the period 1891-1913 and narrowing the range of counts produced. 
None did so as dramatically as their neighbour, the Shiloh Spinning Co., which was 
rewarded with massive profits and growth after 1897.102 The Werneth and Osborne 
Spinning companies went in the opposite direction by moving into finer counts and 
a broader product range. Neither company benefited in terms of higher returns, but 
nonetheless both established satisfactory niches. 
Although the profits earned by Oldham companies fluctuated dramatically, 
10° Hobsbawm, Industry and empire, p. 155. 
See figure 3.1 and table 3.1. 
102 Jeremy, ` T. E. Gartside', DBB, p. 497. 
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the results of individual companies correlated remarkably with the industry average. 
If the spinning economy was doing well, each concern tended to earn commensurately 
high profits. Conversely, in a downturn, there were few hiding places and all 
companies took losses. Narrowing of product range may have been a response to this. 
However, such vulnerability to the trade cycle was accepted as normal. In good 
years, cash was saved in order to avoid abandoning dividend payments in bad 
years. 101 
Entrepreneurship evolved in the period; diverse control of small shareholders 
in Oldham was replaced by the rising financial capitalist. Flexible, rather than mass 
production, on the basis of the mule and the power loom remained appropriate and, 
in terms of the Sabel and Zeitlin taxonomy, 114 it was the use of federal structures 
which facilitated the combination of factory organisation and artisan production 
methods; the municipal and welfare modes of capitalism were increasingly 
marginalised by these developments. Such organisers of loose federations of 
companies were prevalent elsewhere in the industry and the federal structure of the 
industry was reinforced by entrepreneurial collaborations with the dictats, of the 
masters' federations. For this reason, along with the increased marginalisation of 
family capitalism, the managerial paternalism associated with the company town of 
the middle years of the century was also in decline. 
Overall, commitment to specialisation and traditional technologies appeared 
to produce the requisite level of profits for most companies in pre 1914 Lancashire. 
Reinforcing these developments was the changing character of entrepreneurship. With 
the decline of the Oldham public company and family capitalism elsewhere, a new 
breed of financial capitalist emerged whose main skill was the appropriation and 
103 Toms, `Financial Constraints', p. 374. 
104 Sabel and Zeitlin, `Historical alternatives to mass production', p. 147. 
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reinvestment of profits around financially, but not technically, integrated holding 
company style structures. Independent operating units would not be interfered with 
provided they produced profits and the combined effects of plant depreciation and 
dividends reduced the capital bases of the units whilst enriching and enlarging the 
personal domain of the entrepreneur. 
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Part 4 
Profitability, efficiency, and the world 
market 
r- 
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Chapter 10: The economic analysis of return on 
capital employed 
The objective of the next two chapters is to examine the history of the Lancashire 
cotton textile industry between the years 1880 and 1914 by reference to its 
performance in first in financial, then in economic, terms and then to examine the 
impacts of wider macro economic forces. In doing so, a bridge will be established 
between the micro historical perspective considered thus far, which has concerned 
itself with investment and financial management issues associated with specific 
decision making groups, and the wider macro economic framework of those 
decisions. Chapter 10 below therefore analyses the financial and economic 
performance of 
-the industry collectively in terms of relative profitability and 
efficiency, whilst chapter 11 goes on to discuss the opportunities and constraints 
imposed by wider market conditions. 
The most comprehensive survey of productivity in the cotton industry to date 
ends in 1886.1 This is unfortunate, as interesting things apparently happened after 
that date. Many commentators on the growth performance of the British economy 
have contended that something went wrong around 1900. ' Coinciding with the rise of 
international competition and the development of new techniques, there was an 
apparent structural break in the, long run trend rate of growth since the industrial 
revolution. This so-called `climacteric' has occasioned much debate, mainly over 
whether it was a highly significant mid 2 or late Victorian phenomenon, ' or a 
Blaug, `The productivity of capital', pp. 358-81. 
2 Coppock, ` The climacteric of the 1890s', pp. 1-31. 
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relatively insignificant Edwardian one. " As a leading export industry, cotton has 
often figured prominently in these discussions, especially for those who have sought 
to attribute the structural break to slower export growths More generally, cotton has 
been one of those industries which have usually been included in surveys, ' and also 
being an industry thought to conform strongly to the climacteric hypothesis. For 
example, one survey of statistical evidence for the cotton industry showed no apparent 
efficiency gain between 1885-1910. ' By contrast the efficiency of the Massachusetts 
industry increased by 17%. in the same period. ' A more recent collation of the 
evidence on labour productivity tended to confirm this view? 
Some have suggested that the structural break was associated with a change 
in trend of real wages. The levelling of previously rising living standards was 
associated with the stagnation of British industry. " Recent statistical estimates have 
suggested that whereas real wage growth did not decline by as much as previously 
thought, there was nonetheless a significant slow down in the 1900s. " For cotton, 
Phelps Brown and Handfield-Jones, `The climacteric of the 1890s', pp. 266- 
307; Crafts, Leybourne, and Mills, `The climacteric of late Victorian 
Britain', p. 103. 
4 McCloskey, 'Did Victorian Britain fail? ', pp. 446-59. 
Coppock, `The climacteric of the 1890s', pp. 1-31; Lewis, Growth and 
fluctuations. 
6 Jones, Increasing return, Phelps Brown and Handfield-Jones, `The 
climacteric of the 1890s', pp. 266-307; Feinstein, `What really happened to 
real wages', pp. 329-355. 
Jones, Increasing Return, p. 51. 
8- Jones, Increasing Return, p. 55. 
9 Lazonick and Mass 'The performance of the British cotton industry' p. 21 (reproduced as table 10.7 below). 
10 Lewis, Economic survey, pp. 74-5. 
11 Feinstein, 'What really happened to real wages', pp. 351-2. 
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we have derived an index of return on capital employed (ROCE) in earlier chapters 
which below is used for further analysis in conjunction with trends in real wages. 
In attempting to further our understanding of the climacteric, many have used 
total factor productivity (TFP) type indices. " The question of what really happened 
to the cotton industry is as unclearly resolved as for the rest of the economy. An 
attempt to do this for cotton by means of a `real cost', or inverse TFP, index has 
been criticised for failing to deal adequately with varying, as opposed to `normal', 
levels of profit. " Elsewhere the absence of any aggregate profit measure has been 
cited as a reason for difficulties associated with productivity measurement for cotton 
other than for labour based indicators. " Below, equipped with such a measure we 
present an analysis of the behaviour of return to capital in its own right, then of 
productivity from the point of view of labour and capital, and then for the two 
combined. 
Another important argument concerning the economy during, alluded to and 
commented upon in previous chapters, was that a fundamental weakness of the British 
economy in the period 1890 to 1914 was its failure to divert capital from older 
industries such as cotton, into the newer industries of the second industrial revolution 
such as motor cars and consumer durables. 15 Part Three above showed that although 
capital was divested by established cotton companies, the resulting circulation passed 
through very specific and increasingly individualistic channels, typically reforming 
as venture capital and typically being reinvested locally in new cotton textile ventures. 
An institutional explanation of this pattern of circulation was offered. Putting aside 
12 McCloskey, `Did Victorian Britain fail? ', p. 459. 
13 Sandberg, Lancashire in decline, p. 104. 
14 Lazonick and Mass, `Performance of British cotton', p. 34. 
15 Chandler, Scale and scope, p. 250. 
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institutional constraints, a further dimension explaining entrepreneurial behaviour can 
now also be advanced, and this forms a hypothesis for the next section; that 
reinvestment in cotton was preferred to other industries because cotton offered the 
prospect of higher returns. 
Aims and methods 
As in previous chapters, we rely on data from the sources in table 1.2. In this case 
we use an index for the simple weighted average of all the companies in the sample. 
Although the number of observations is smaller than for the Economist sample, firms 
included in that index were heavily biased towards coarse spinners of American 
cotton, and excluded vertically integrated and weaving companies entirely. The index 
used, therefore was more representative of the industry as a whole. For comparative 
purposes and for economic analysis return on capital series calculated elsewhere are 
used together with the conveniently collated statistical sources, primarily by Jones and 
Robson. 16 " 
ROCE has been used hitherto broadly as a proxy for the relative success of 
the strategies pursued by individual businesses. " A collation of return to capital 
statistics also provides the opportunity for a reappraisal of the overall efficiency of 
the industry. Methodological and other issues associated with the use of accounting 
based rates of return have been discussed in previous chapters; in the context of the 
current examination, two further issues regarding the use and importance of ROCE 
need to be stressed. First, it provides a yardstick of success against which the 
performance of entrepreneurs and their organisations can be judged. Second, it allows 
16 Jones, Increasing return, appendix II; Robson, The cotton industry in Britain, 
pp. 331-9. 
17 ROCE is used here as defined previously; see chapter 1, pp. 18-19. 
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the allocative decisions of individuals and institutions to be assessed in the context of 
a market economy. Both justifications are particularly significant where, as in the 
case of Lancashire cotton companies, there is documentary evidence that the measure 
used by the historian was also used by the decision makers themselves. " As our 
purpose is to judge the decisions made by entrepreneurs and investors, actual signals 
sent to decision makers are therefore used, and the distortive effects of error and bias 
recognised as historical fact rather than amended. 
Whereas ROCE would have been a real signal transmitted in historical time, 
the Cobb Douglas production function, and its TFP variant, involve more meticulous 
and retrospective calculation. In particular it would allow the overall performance of 
the economy to be measured in terms of increasing or declining returns to scale and 
of measures of changing rates of output growth. Initially the technique was used to 
justify a revision of the earlier dismal interpretation of the performance of the late 
Victorian Economy as a whole. " More recently, criticisms of the TFP approach 
itself have placed new question marks on the performance of the economy its 
entrepreneurs 20 Problems are likely to be experienced especially with the Cobb 
Douglas technique since the indices used ignore market imperfections, are insensitive 
to inaccuracies of growth rates of inputs (capital, labour and output), and are based 
on possibly false assumptions regarding the definition of capital? ' Furthermore, 
18 As guidance for investors, the local press produced league tables of 
companies by rate of return on capital. For an example see Oldham 
Chronicle, 2nd October 1888. 
19 McCloskey, `Did Victorian Britain fail? ', pp. 446-59; McCloskey and 
Sandberg, `From damnation to redemption: judgements on the late Victorian 
entrepreneur', pp. 89-108. 
20 Nicholas, `British economic performance and total factor productivity 
Growth, pp. 576- 82. 
21 McClelland, Causal explanation and model building, pp. 194-201. 
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when attempting to measure entrepreneurial performance in terms of residuals, there 
are problems of definition and interpretation. ' Although these criticisms are 
accepted when attempting to measure entrepreneurship, that is not the main purpose 
of our analysis below, which is concerned more with production efficiency per Se. 
Elsewhere it has been argued that the importance of market imperfections has been 
overemphasised. ' In any case, cotton, with its low entry barriers, homogenous 
products, and large numbers of small firms, conformed more accurately than most 
industries to the assumptions of perfect competition. 
A final difficulty in applying the TFP technique to textiles has been the 
absence of data. For example insufficient data has so far been gathered to allow 
return to capital calculations to be made. Without this, the relative shares of factor 
inputs cannot be directly ascertained. Below this problem is addressed by the 
incorporation of the ROCE series into the analysis. 
To overcome specific objections associated with any one method, we use 
below several different ones to assess industry performance. Overall averages of 
industry financial performance by reference to ROCE are used to provide contrast 
with other sectors of the economy. Having analysed the time series trend of ROCE 
we then go on to examine economic measures of factor productivity. This is achieved 
first of all by reference to labour and capital inputs separately, then by the application 
of economic production functions, both in Cobb Douglas and TFP forms. Return on 
capital employed in conjunction with data on net output is of specific use for the 
latter. As noted above, previous studies have in general not used * return to capital 
data. In the analysis below, with the benefit of such a measure for cotton, their 
conclusions are revisited. This allows us to re-examine the issue raised in chapter two 
22 Geary, `Accounting for entrepreneurship', pp. 283-7. 
23 Thomas, ` Accounting for Growth, 1870-1914', pp. 568-74. 
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of whether or not the industry really did 'fail'24 in terms of profitability and 
productive efficiency, and thereby to rationalise the investment decisions taken. 
Comparative financial performance of the Lancashire cotton industry 
Below we examine the overall trend in ROCE for Lancashire textiles through time 
(table 10.1). We then go on to make comparisons with similar measures and 
benchmarks for other industries and for the economy as a whole. In commenting on 
the financial performance of Lancashire in its wider context it is of interest not 
merely to compare cotton textiles with the returns available in the wider economy, 
but also with other, newer, sectors of the economy which might have demanded 
capital resources at the expense of mature industries during this period. In both areas 
of potential comparison, however, there is little readily useable data. The main 
comparators used are an index for British industry as a whole, and motor vehicles as 
representing a newer industry. 
Table 10.1 shows the average return to capital and the standard deviation of 
the return in three periods. To control for trade cycle effects, the periods used were 
calculated from corresponding troughs. As can be seen from table 10.1, the history 
of profitability in the industry fell into distinct periods. The 1890s characteristically 
were years of low return and low risk. During this, period the rate of profit was 
scarcely above the average official London discount rate 
. 
21 In the period 
immediately preceding the First World War, by contrast, the risks to investors were 
greater, but the premium over the risk free rate was commensurately higher. 
24 Jones, Increasing Return. 
21 Williams, `The rate of discount', pp 380-400. 
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Table 10.1: The rising trend of return to capital, 
1886-1910 
Average Standard 
ROCE Deviation 
1886-1892 3.85 2.46 
1893-1903 3.92 2.89 
1904-1910 7.89 9.53 
Sources: As for table 1.2; average return to capital for all companies in the sample. 
See also appendix 1. 
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The hypothesis of increasing returns, and, with increasingly violent 
fluctuations in profits, increasing risk, is suggested by the figures. Risk was high 
from an investors' point of view, the industry being very vulnerable to the trade 
cycle. The impact of the 1904-7 boom was particularly pronounced, and the industry 
clearly outperformed the previous peaks of 1890 and 1900. Given the orientation of 
the average producer to the manufacture of undiversified goods, such vulnerability 
to the trade cycle was partly to be expected. 
To what extent were these improved fortunes experienced elsewhere in the 
economy? Our starting point for the analysis was a comparison between an industry 
average for cotton, as computed from the total average return for the main sample 
companies, and rates of return for British manufacturing industry (figure 10.1). 
Unfortunately, and perhaps surprisingly, there was no readily accessible data which 
allowed an annual ROCE series to be computed for British manufacturing industry. 
However, one survey, compiled for a large sample of companies from similar data 
sources to the cotton company sample, presented results based on five year 
averages. 26 In addition to figure 10.1, table 10.2 compares the cotton industry to 
British manufacturing on that basis. 
26 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire, p. 117. 
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Figure 10.1: Rates of return to capital, British cotton 
and manufacturing industry 
Return on capital employed 
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Sources: Cotton, as per table 10.1; manufacturing industry, Davis and Huttenback, 
Mammon and the pursuit of empire, p. 117. 
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Table 10.2: Rates of return to capital, British cotton 
and manufacturing industry 
% Five year average return to capital 
British Cotton 
industry 
1885-89 14.50 5.74 
1890-94 11.30 5.70 
1895-99 10.80 7.56 
1900-1904 7.10 6.13 
1905-9 7.20 11.72 
1910-13 7,90 8.63 
Whole period 9.87 7.61, 
Std dev 2.68 3.96 
Sources: As for figure 10.1. 
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As can be seen from figure 10.1 and table 10.2, British industry as a whole 
experienced a gradual decline during the observed period. Cotton, by contrast, 
performed badly in both absolute and relative terms, but only up until 1896. 
However, as the decline persisted for the rest of the manufacturing economy, cotton 
recovered very strongly in the 1900s. Precisely at the time of Chandler's `window of 
opportunity'27 to invest in new industries, cotton, a traditional staple industry 
suddenly began to offer dramatically attractive returns compared to continuing 
declines elsewhere. 
In previous discussions of the trade cycle, much has been made of the great 
depression of 1873 to 1896. However, perhaps not enough has been made of the 
boom of 1905-7. For cotton, unlike other sectors by and large, especially in its 
dramatic climax of 1907, returns were quite spectacular28 and must have had a 
profound influence on the cotton investor. Anyone with an awareness of the trade 
would have appreciated its cyclical nature and would surely have tolerated low returns 
during recessions if they felt that each recurrent boom would produce such splendid 
rewards. Psychological explanations are often neglected in economic analysis and are 
difficult to support with either quantitative or archival evidence, but it is tempting to 
. 
infer that the experience of 1907 must have had a lasting impact on investor 
expectations and reinforced the commitment of large amounts of capital to the cotton 
textile sector. 
In comparing the textile sector with an index for the economy as a whole, we 
have not fully addressed the issue of the specific attractiveness of newer industries. 
One such industry, motor vehicles, required a large capital base, and would only have 
27 Chandler, Scale and scope, p. 286. 
11 `All records broken: Unprecedented profits', was the headline of the review 
of 1907, Oldham Chronicle, 28th December 1907. 
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succeeded in obtaining that capital if potential investors could be convinced of the 
relative attractiveness of expected returns. Actual returns, which are not the same 
thing, but which would have represented the nearest available benchmark signal for 
a contemporary investor, were compared for cotton textiles and motor vehicles (table 
10.3). 
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Table 10.3: Rates of return to capital, British cotton 
and the motor vehicle industry 
Year 
% rate of return to capital 
Motor 
vehicles Cotton 
1906 10.00 13.09 
1907 7.20 22.03 
'1908 5.30 8.14 
1909 6.20 3.31 
1910 10.60 2.82 
1911 11.50 7.27 
1912 12.30 13.57 
1913 12.50 12.03 
Average 9.45 10.28 
Standard deviation 2.65 5.89 
Sources: Cotton, as for figure 10.1; motor vehicles, Lewchuk, `The British motor 
vehicle industry', table 5, p. 17. 
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As the data in table 10.3 suggest, the motor vehicle industry had more in 
common with the wider British economy than with cotton textiles. In that sense its 
performance was strange, in that cotton was an established industry whereas motor 
vehicles were not. The latter industry might therefore have been expected to have 
followed the rest of the economy less closely. Moreover, motor vehicles as a new 
industry might have been expected to be more risky to the potential investor. Yet 
cotton produced far more volatile returns. Even though motor vehicles was in the 
growth phase of the product life cycle, whereas Lancashire textiles might be said to 
be a mature industry, the returns to the latter were on average much better. All this, 
together with the data for manufacturing as a whole, leads to the conclusion that it 
was the trade cycle rather than the product life cycle that determined the development 
of the economy during the pre 1914 period. As a result, profits in cotton, an export 
industry, offered much more promise to investors than motor vehicles, an industry 
of the second industrial revolution which, in the earlier phases of growth at least, 
depended upon demand from the domestic market. 
But what of the actual causes of the shift in profitability after 1896? The 
turning point is significant as it appears to link the fate of Lancashire with other 
debates as to the nature of cyclical impacts British economic performance 29 As an 
export industry, cotton textiles was inevitably affected by factors which did not 
necessarily have the same impact on other British trades. These influences were the 
relative fall in the value of gold, an associated general rise in prices, and rising 
incomes in export markets. 3° Rising prices would have created gains as a result of 
29 Coppock, ` The causes of the great depression, 1873-1896', pp. 205-32; Saul, 
The Myth of the Great Depression. 
30 Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' Associations, Measures for the 
Revival, p. 10; see also chapter 11 below. 
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stock increasing in value during the period held, " and, depending on positions taken 
in futures markets, may have favoured some cotton companies and distorted ROCE 
upwards. However, the effects were marginal. Taking the example of one sample 
company, the Werneth Spinning Company, the stock holding gain in 1907, a year in 
which coarse yarn prices advanced more than 15 %, accounted for only 2.55 % of total 
profits. 32 Moreover, input prices rose more than output prices for spinning 
companies. 33 Much more important therefore was the sheer volume of business 
available and this was a result of the second factor, rising incomes in export markets. 
Another possible cause of upward divergence of ROCE in cotton might have 
been access to cheap sources of finance. Local interest rates tended to be above the 
London discount rate before 1896 when the yield on consols fell; after that date 
Lancashire entrepreneurs received another bonus in cheap finance, as London interest 
rates rose. In any case, at a typical rate of 4 to 5%, Lancashire loan deposits were 
lower than the average rate of profit on total capital invested. High dependence on 
loan finance characteristic of newly floated concerns34 meant the return to share 
capital increased to an even greater extent than the return on total capital during a 
boom. For example, whereas the ROCE for 1907 was 23.6% (per figure 10.1), the 
return on the share capital employed was 35.2%. 35 Conversely recessions 
31 Such effects are ignored in calculations of return to capital based on book 
values, thereby tending to overstate profitability. 
32 Calculated from OLSL, Misc/42/18, quarterly reports to members. Estimated 
by taking a holding period price increase in yarn based on the yarn price and 
the averages days' sales held in stock, applied to the average. value of stock 
held. 
33 See the price series for cotton and yarn in Robson, The Cotton Industry, p. 
336. 
34 See above, chapters eight and nine. 
35 Campion, 'Pre war fluctuations', p. 627. 
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accentuated losses, but the general effect was beneficial given the underlying positive 
trend in ROCE and must have encouraged further equity investment. 
Thus, according to this measure, Lancashire was performing well vis a vis 
the rest of the economy, and had entered a period of buoyancy and optimism. The 
picture of depression and decline, as painted elsewhere and perhaps as indicated by 
other measures, 36 is therefore not fully justified. Previous chapters have shown that 
returns on capital varied significantly from company to company (table 9.5), and 
above it has been shown that was a strong variation over time for the sample as a 
whole (figure 10.1). Particularly striking, as noted above, was the recovery in profit 
after 1896, and the scale of the boom of 1904-7. Moreover, the recovery in 
profitability occurred during a period when entrepreneurs allegedly made their most 
fateful mistakes, particularly in terms of their reluctance to adopt new methods, " 
and in association, their failure to restructure the industry? ' The tendency was 
toward a vertically specialised structure relying on the tried and tested production 
methods of mule spindle and plain loom. Such strategies were rewarded by high 
returns (figure 10.1), with the especially pronounced boom of 1904-7 tending to 
benefit specialised companies. It is difficult to blame entrepreneurs as individuals or 
as a class for following market signals, particularly when so pronounced. Nostalgia 
in later years had little to do with attachments to obsolete techniques and much more 
to do with the long anticipated return of these days of `easy money'. 39 However, 
returns to the investor do not of course tell the full story of industry performance. 
36 Jones, Increasing Return, p. 117; Lazonick and Mass, `The Performance of 
the British Cotton Industry', p. 24. 
37 Young, The American Cotton Industry, p. 137. 
38 Lazonick, `The Cotton Industry', p. 20. 
31 Bowker, Lancashire Under the Hammer, p. 23. 
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Economic performance and efficiency (1): labour and capital productivity 
Whereas cotton investors were rewarded by far better returns after 1896, the picture 
for employees was more ambivalent. As for the rest of the economy, the upward 
trend in real wages, defined in terms of the difference between money wages and the 
cost of living, which had begun with the industrial revolution, came to an apparent 
end after 1900 (table 10.4 and figure 10.2). Any check to real wages, if it existed 
would be important, as it has been associated also with a check to labour 
productivity. Using cotton as a case study, these trends will now be re-examined. 
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Table 10.4: Real wages, 1880-1913 
Percentage annual growth rate 
Cotton Manufacturing UK Economy 
1882-1899 1.48 1.67 1.71 
1900-1913 0.23 0.19 0.58 
Sources: Cotton and manufacturing, calculated from Feinstein, `New estimates of 
earnings' table 4, pp. 608-11 and `A new look at the cost of living', table 4 pp. 170- 
1; UK economy, Feinstein, `What really happened to real wages', table 4, p. 344. 
358 
Figure 10.2: Real wages, 1880-1913 
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The trend in figure 10.2 had important implications for the evolution of 
industrial relations. Especially in the spinning section, cotton trade unions have been 
considered a good example of a craft based labour aristocracy. 40 However, the 
evidence in table 10.4 and figure 10.2 suggested that cotton workers were poorly 
rewarded relative to the manufacturing sector as a whole and the economy in general. 
Manufacturing was affected as much by the spread of general unionism as it was by 
the retention of craft control, 41 whereas the general economy included a growing 
class of professional and salaried workers hitherto unrecognised in the construction 
of real wages indices. ' Although the breaks in trend occurred for both cotton and 
manufacturing around 1900, cotton had been lagging behind for about a decade. We 
have commented elsewhere that cotton suffered badly in the depression of the early 
1890s, and it is evident from figure 10.2 that contemporaries were incorrect to blame 
the trade unions for the plight of the industry and the crash in share values, 43 as 
relative wages were falling, albeit perhaps not as steeply as the employers would have 
liked. 
If the Brooklands agreement had stabilised industrial relations, 14 it did so at 
the expense the stability of wages themselves. By implicitly linking wage advances 
and reductions to the trade cycle, but at the same time limiting them to one per year 
and to a maximum of five per cent, 45 the agreement helped ensure that wages 
40 Fowler and Wyke, The barefoot aristocrats; Lazonick, Industrial relations, 
231-62. 
a' Clapham, An economic history, p. 322. 
42 Feinstein, ` What really happened to real wages? ', p. 339. 
43 Textile Mercury, 15th April and 2nd November, 1895. 
44 See chapter eight, pp. 277-8; Porter, `Industrial peace', pp. 49-61. 
45 BPP, Board of trade report on wages, q. 7567. 
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fluctuated, but with nothing like the variation in profits. Thus cotton wages raced 
ahead in the boom of 1904-7 relative to other groups, but then fell dramatically again 
in the slump of 1909-10. However, in relation to generally improving profits, the 
share of extra wealth accruing to labour was low, and adjusted only slowly so that 
the benefit of the 5% advance of June 1907 was shortlived and by July 1908 the 
employers were already pushing for a reduction. 46 For employers, some of the 
benefits of supporting trade federations were discussed earlier in relation to case study 
companies, and collective action on wages must have contributed towards higher 
profits for the rising class of cotton financial capitalists, and as concluded in chapter 
nine, probably outweighed the benefits of the paternalistic management style. In so 
far that this was a deliberate and forced response to an apparent increase in the 
bargaining power of the operatives, ' the Brooklands agreement would appear to 
have been an effective management response for the maintenance of profitability. The 
decline of the `company town' and paternalism suggested earlier to be a result of the 
attractiveness employer solidarity and its associated industry wide conditions appear 
to be re confirmed by the evidence on relative real wage trends. 
For cotton workers, craft unionism and its industry wide accommodation with 
employers' federations at Brooklands, appeared to offer little benefit. The Leninist 
argument of `embourgeisification', 48 the rising wealth of the working class creating 
a mood for the acceptance of reformist ideas, did not apply in the strict sense. 
Election of reformist trade union officials before 1890, according to one view, was 
46 `Cotton trade wages', Oldham Chronicle, 4th July 1908. 
47 Burgess, The origins of British industrial relations, p. 232. 
48 Lenin, Imperialism; as an example of `reformism', Mawdsley, the spinners' 
union leader was a Conservative party supporter. As a mouthpiece of the 
senior minders, the Cotton Factory Times represented the views of moderate 
trade unionism, Burgess, The origins of British industrial relations, p. 249. 
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the result of narrowing margins after 1873 and the need felt by employers for an 
industrial detente. 49 Mutual interest policies culminated in the compromise at 
Brooklands when Macara and Mawdsley, representing the two sides, struck up a 
lasting friendship, and an agreement which, `pointed the way... to that industrial 
harmony which arises from wise statesmanship and eschews the weapon of force' so 
However, the union leaders' policies of employer collaboration subsequently created 
conditions which led a relative fall in real wages for cotton operatives in the 1900s 
at a time of rising profits for the employers. Yet as the conditions which had led to 
the rise of collaboration went into reverse, there was no return to increased militancy. 
From 1893 the characteristic mood was of `industrial peace'; " even the boom of 
1907 failed to produce strikes associated with wage demands, and signs of growing 
disaffection were only apparent in the very last years before the warn 
Although generalisation about trends is difficult where the trade cycle played 
such an important role, the real wages trend is suggestive of a shift to profits at the 
expense of wages. The rising trend of ROCE and of cotton share prices (see figure 
4.2), in conjunction with figure 10.2 suggested that capital gained at labour's expense 
in the 1900s. Evidence from the accounting records of cotton companies provides 
only tentative support for this hypothesis (table 10.5). Using profit and loss account 
data, the proportions of net value added53 shared by capital (measured by profit, 
interest and depreciation) and labour (wages and salaries) were calculated and 
49 Burgess, The origins of British industrial relations, p. 248. 
5 Macara, Recollections, p. 27. 
s' Porter, `Industrial peace', pp. 49-61. 
sz White, Lancashire cotton textiles, pp. 222-5. 
s' Defined here as the difference between the sales value of output and all non 
capital and labour based costs. 
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compared for two dates, 1898 and 1912.54 Between these dates the real wage trend 
was relatively flat (figure 10.2). Averaging calculations for the six years before 1898 
and 1912 suggested that the figures were representative. The results of these 
calculations are shown in table 10.5. 
sa The companies for which such data was available for the years between these 
dates were Osborne, Eccles, Sun Mill, Werneth, and Whiteley; see table 1.2 for source documents. 
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Table 10.5: Capital, labour, and value added, 1898- 
1912. 
Spinning Weaving 
1898 1912 1898 1912 
(1) Percentage 
shares 
of value added 
Wages 55.7 54.4 79.7 75.4 
Capital 44.3 45.6 20.3 24.6 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(2) Percentages to 
sales 
Wages 15.1 10.8 23.2 15.4 
Capital 11.8 8.8 5.9 5.1 
Material 65.1 73.1 62.3 75.1 
Other expenses 8.0 7.3 8.6 4.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: Calculated from company accounts, sources per table 1.2. (1) For each 
company and for each year, material and non wage expenses (excluding profits, 
interest, and depreciation) were subtracted from sales to obtain value added. Wages 
calculated as percentage of value added with capital share treated as the residual. (2) 
Each profit and loss expense item calculated as a percentage of sales. Capital defined 
as the total of profits, interest and depreciation. 
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Data presented in table 10.5 confirm the hypothesis of a shift to capital. 
However, the shift was very slight, and since evidence was available for only five 
companies in total, it would be wrong to attempt to read too much into the figures. 
The safest interpretation might be that there was at least a stability in the respective 
shares of value added but more likely a shift to capital. At a national level the shift 
to capital hypothesis has been supported by considering the rising trend in interest 
rates along in conjunction with the flat trend in real wages 
. 
51 Use of new data has 
called this interpretation into question, and it has been argued that nominal GDP per 
worker was rising in the Edwardian period. " However, the likelihood of sectoral 
variation was also suggested, in particular cotton, which might have experienced a 
shift to profits on the basis of its export boom' In support of this hypothesis we 
add here the trends of strongly rising share prices in Lancashire and the performance 
of the ROCE index noted above. 
To what extent, however, were rising profits also associated with rising 
efficiency? Table 10.6 shows a compilation of labour efficiency data from the most 
recent examination of this issue. 
ss Layton, The relations of capital and labour, pp. 34-6. 
56 Feinstein, ` What really happened to real wages? ', p. 347. 
s' Feinstein, 'What really happened to real wages? ', p. 351; Feinstein's 
conclusion on cotton rested on the Smith and Home `An index number', 
which only included companies with London quotations. Lancashire 
companies with local quotations enjoyed more equally if not more spectacular 
return to profit during the 1900s (see chapter 9, table 9.5) 
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Table 10.6: Annual percentage changes in output per 
operative, 1870-1913. 
Whole 
Spinning Weaving Industry 
1870-1878 1.91 0.62 1.30 
1878-1890 3.02 1.14 1.99 
1890-1901 0.46 
-0.03 0.12 
1901-1913 
-0.13 0.61 0.30 
Source: Lazonick and Mass `Performance of British Cotton', p. 21. 
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The labour productivity figures in table 10.6 tend to suggest stagnating efficiency, 
which is the intention of the authors. However, the impression suggested by such 
statistics can easily be changed if the periodisations are altered. During upswings the 
industry apparently became much more efficient as full capacity was approached. This 
can be confirmed from the detailed figures for spinning presented by Lazonick and 
Mass, " which show a 10.2 %S9 increase during the upswing years of 1904-7 on the 
basis of their single year output data and 5.3 %60 when calculated on the basis of 
three year average output. Corresponding declines occurred in the troughs of 
recessions, but over a longer period the increase in productivity is still apparent. 
Again using the detailed data from the same source, 61 productivity still shows an 
increase of 4% between 1901 and 1912.62 On the output per operative basis steep 
increases in productivity occurred during the upswing of the trade cycle, as 
acknowledged by Sandberg. 63 For example in upswing years of 1904-7, based on 
the figures of Phelps Brown and Handheld-Jones there was a steep apparent annual 
S8 Lazonick and Mass, ` The Performance of British Cotton', appendix 1, table 
Al, p. 40. 
39 Output per operative, 1904,7316 lbs; 1907, '8061 lbs; percentage increase 
10.2%. 
60 Output per operative, 1904,7220 lbs; 1907,7604 lbs; percentage increase 
10.2%. 
61 Lazonick and Mass, 'The Performance of British Cotton', appendix 1, table 
Al, p. 40. 
62 Lazonick and Mass, ` The Performance of British Cotton', appendix 1, table 
Al, p. 40. Using the same data a decline of 1.51 % in output per operative for the period 1901-13 was calculated (table 8, p. 21). Conclusions depend 
thus heavily on the year selected for measurement. 
63 Sandberg, Lancashire in Decline, p. 97. 
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average increase of 5.8%. M The use of labour productivity evidence from this 
period to prove stagnation in the industry is thus questionable, particularly given that 
the denominator in output per operative calculations is based on intermittent census 
data. " Indeed, when used in conjunction with return to capital the opposite 
conclusion may be drawn; that in the last uninterrupted boom before the decisive 
discontinuity of 1914, there was the highest level of investment and the largest 
increase in productivity recorded since the 1870s. 
Output in relation to labour input, however measured, gives only one 
restricted view. The productivity of capital should also be considered. Again, there 
are measurement problems. Where output was measured purely on a per spindle basis 
there was no clear trend for capital output ratio (figure 10.3) and therefore no 
apparent improvement in productivity However, this is too simplistic, as it ignores 
both factory layout and economies of scale associated with putting more mules or 
looms into larger factories, as well as any effective slowing down of machines 
associated with increased quality. ' Where output was calculated in relation to the 
number of factories, the resulting capital output ratio declined steeply (figure 10.3). 
Furthermore, if output quality is taken into account, there was a further decline in the 
capital output ratio. Overall, the line which tends to slope downwards most 
prominently from left to right in figure 10.3 is that which shows the combined effects 
64 Phelps Brown and Handfield-Jones, `The Climacteric of the 1890s', appendix 
B, table II, column 17. Calculated by taking the compounded annual increase 
of ratio of index numbers for 1904 and 1907 (117 and 98) respectively. 
11 Lazonick and Mass, 'The Performance of British Cotton', p. 40. 
66 Lazonick and Mass, ` Performance of British cotton', table 1, p. 6. 
67 The number of firms was used as a surrogate for the number of factories; the 
multi plant firm was a rarity, and even where the owners were the same, new factories were usually floated separately, thereby acquiring the status of an independent firm (see above, especially chapters eight and nine). 
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of quality and larger factories. 
All three measures in figure 10.3 show downward slopes and cyclical effects 
of varying degrees. Factors such as machine speed ups, mule lengthening, factory 
layout, and quality shifts created the opportunities for marginal improvements in 
capital productivity. The next stage of our analysis is to consider these and labour 
productivity effects simultaneously via an examination of total factor productivity. 
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Figure 10.3: Capital/output ratios, 1880-1913 
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I. 
Economic performance and efficiency (2): Total factor productivity. 
So far several trends have been noted which we must now attempt to reconcile. After 
1900 there was a levelling off in the growth of real wages; meanwhile profits 
recovered and achieved high levels up to 1914, and there is some evidence that 
capital was being more efficiently employed. Total factor productivity (TFP) 
measures attempt to provide a holistic view of industry efficiency by comparing 
output changes with the combined effect of changes in factor inputs. 
In the context of recent debates on the cotton industry, these rising trends are 
significant and contrast with some of the pessimistic interpretations referred to earlier. 
One reason for the difference is methodological. The only previous survey which has 
attempted a total factor product type exercise assumed a constant `normal' rate of 
profit throughout the period considered. " This in spite of the dramatic fluctuations 
caused by the trade cycle. It has been demonstrated that efficiency gains measured by 
the real cost index and the profitability of the industry were inversely related and the 
method thereby flawed. 69 Rising returns to capital noted here may also therefore 
suggest rising returns to scale. 
To test the hypothesis further, we now examine the performance of the 
industry by reference to labour and capital as factor inputs in respect to output. First 
we apply a general Cobb Douglas model (table 10.7), followed by the TFP model 
variant (table 10.8). For the Cobb Douglas model, the output of the industry (Q) is 
explained in terms of the supply of inputs; capital and labour. The result is thus 
expressed in terms of the pattern of returns to scale. This can be achieved using a 
capital/ labour production function. In its stochastic form the Cobb Douglas 
68 Jones, Increasing return; for a fuller critique of this point see Sandberg, 
Lancashire in decline, p. 104. 
69 Sandberg, Lancashire in Decline, p. 104. 
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production function can be written as: 
Q =AKß`Ll"2e° (10.1) 
where A is a constant, K and L are measures of capital and labour input respectively 
and ßl and ß2 are measures of the parameters to be estimated, u is a stochastic 
disturbance term and e is the base of natural logarithm. To apply the model to 
empirical data it is necessary to conduct a log linear transformation: 
1nQ = ßo +ß, 1nK + ß21nL +u (10.2) 
The properties of the model are that i3 is the partial elasticity of output with respect 
to capital. In other words, it measures the percentage change in output for a I% 
change in capital input holding labour input constant. Similarly 02 measures the 
partial elasticity of labour. The sum of ßi and ß2 provide a measure of returns to 
scale. If the two add to one, there are constant returns to scale, increasing returns if 
greater than one, and decreasing returns if less than one. 
Bearing in mind the trend in figure 10.3, output was adjusted for quality. 
Yarn produced and consumed was used as the output measure, as inputs were based 
on aggregates for spinning and weaving. Numbers employed, adjusted for hours 
worked, was used for labour employment, and the number of factories as a measure 
for capital employed. The Cobb- Douglas model has been widely used in empirical 
analysis, " but not specifically applied to the Lancashire textile industry. 
Modifications of the Cobb- Douglas function allow the performance of individual 
71 Thomas, Introductory econometrics, p. 212. 
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industries to be tested. " Table 10.7 shows the results for three models; an ordinary 
production function (1) as in equation (10.2) above, a production function with an 
added variable for time trend (2): 
1nQ = ßo + ß11nK + ß21nL + ß3t +u (10.3) 
and a model which shows the time trend alone (3) 
InQ = X30 + ß3t +u 
In all cases, quality adjusted output is the dependent variable. 
71 Thomas, Introductory econometrics, pp. 221- 225. 
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(10.4) 
Table 10.7 Factor productivity and output growth, 
1884-1913 
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant 
-9.92 5.52 7.66 
K 2.18 
-0.64 (3.29) (0.87) 
L 0.33 1.57 
(0.31) (1.92) 
time trend 0.02 0.015 (5.05) (7.63) 
R Squared 0.44 0.72 0.68 
F 10.61 22.01 58.20 
DW 0.82 1.38 1.21 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
Sources: Output based on yarn produced and consumed, per Jones, Increasing return, 
table II p. 275, adjusted by the yarn quality index in Sandberg, `Movements in the 
quality, tables 2 and 4, pp. 10-11; capital input, spindles and looms per Robson, The 
British cotton industry, table 5, p. 340, using a weight of 60 spindles to one loom; 
labour, based on total hours worked, per Lazonick and Mass, `The performance of 
British cotton', table Al, p. 40. 
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The result in equation (1), by reference to the sum of the capital and labour co- 
efficients, implies dramatically increasing returns. However, in statistical terms, given 
the low labour t ratio, F statistic and r squared, the model has low explanatory 
power. Furthermore, the low Durbin Watson ratio suggests some autocorrelation in 
the error terms and that the model therefore has failed to identify one or more other 
significant explanatory variables. Addition of a time trend variable in (2) improved 
the overall performance of the model, but reduced the capital and labour co-efficients 
to insignificance. It is thereby suggested simply that output, capital and labour all 
varied with time. In other words, as confirmed by model (3), the time series 
regression adds very little to a simple comparison of trends through time. Even where 
the time trend variable was included, the DW ratio did not improve sufficiently to 
reject a hypothesis of uncorrelated error terms. In this sense, putting productive 
efficiency per se to one side for a moment, we provide some tentative confirmation 
that economies of scale were external rather than internal during this period, as 
manifested in the improvement of transportation, communication, marketing and 
banking. 72 
The trend growth of output during the period 1884 to 1913 was about 1.5 % 
per year. Unlike industries elsewhere, there was no apparent `climacteric'; growth 
for cotton between 1884 and 1899 was around 1.3 % compound, but accelerated to 
just over 2% in the period 1900-13. " Again, the export boom of 1905-7 accounted 
for most of this increase. Although the time trend is of interest, the results in table 
10.7 tell us little about production efficiency and the relationship of output to inputs, 
and because of the time trend effect, do not constitute the true parameters of a 
Farnie, English cotton, p. 319. 
73 For the economy as whole, the corresponding figures were c2.2% in the first 
period, falling to between 1.2 and 1.6 in the second; Feinstein, Matthews and 
Odling-Smee `The timing of the climacteric' (table 8.3). 
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production function. 
As a variant of the Cobb- Douglas production function, we therefore now 
turn to the TFP method. In applying this technique, similar data were used, but 
instead of attempting to derive factor shares in the production function from a 
regression result, we use predetermined weights for the share of labour (Si), and 
capital (Sk), in the production function represented by equation 10.2. 
ML' (10.2) 
This provides a useful link with the analysis in earlier chapters since accounting data 
can be used to determine what these weights should be. A summary of the results of 
the accounting exercise is provided in table 10.5 above. Analysis of profit and loss 
account data for specialised spinning and weaving companies suggested that although 
the share of value added shifted from capital to labour during slumps there was an 
opposite effect during booms. 74 On average the proportion of value added accounted 
for by labour and capital remained reasonably constant, and although there was a 
small aggregate shift from labour to capital, the percentage was too small to be 
material to the figures presented in table 10.8. Following table 10.5, weights of 55 % 
labour, 45 % capital were used for spinning, and correspondingly 75 % and 25 % for 
weaving. As previously, the output data were adjusted for quality, this time using 
specific series for yarn output and cotton cloth exports 75 For capital, due to the 
need to separate spinning and weaving, spindle and loom measures were used instead 
of the number of factories, hence the figures in table 10.8 ignore any economies of 
74 For example, OLSL, Misc. 42/17 and 18, Werneth Spinning Company, 
quarterly reports to members, during the slump years of 1892-5, wages 
represented a disproportionately large fraction of value added (86%). 
75 Sandberg, `Movements in the. quality', tables 2 and 4, pp. 10-11. 
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scale associated with larger plants. 
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Table 10.8: Cotton industry; total factor productivity, 
1884-1913. 
(1) TFP analysis 
- 
spinning 
Output Labour Capital Residual 
1884-1899 1.18 0.52 0.47 0.19 
1900-1913 1.56 0.52 0.46 0.58 
Overall 1.58 0.48 0.49 0.61 
(2) TFP analysis 
- 
weaving 
Output Labour C apital Residual 
1884-1899 1.34 0.62 0.30 0.42 
1900-1913 1.39 0.61 0.30 0.48 
Overall 1.67 0.57 0.28 0.62 
(3) Annual compounded growth rates (%) 
Spinning 
Output Labour Capital 
1884-1899 1.04 
-0.39 0.25 
1900-1913 3.23 1.07 2.27 
Overall 1.54 0.29 1.22 
Weaving 
Output Labour Capital 
1884-1899 1.85 
-1.16 1.15 
1900-1913 2.38 3.04 1.37 
Overall 1.74 0.77 1.29 
Sources: Output, spinning yarn production per Jones, Increasing return, table II, p. 
275, weaving, cotton piece goods exports per Robson, The cotton industry in Britain, 
table Al, p. 331. and as adjusted by the yarn and cloth quality indices respectively, 
per Sandberg, `Movements in the quality', tables 2 and 4, pp. 10-11; capital based 
on index of total capital employed sources as per figure 10.3; capital and labour 
weights in (1) per table 10.5; labour data as per table 10.7. 
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The statistics in table 10.8 differ from those previously published in two respects; the 
adjustment of output for quality, and the weighting of the input measure to 
simultaneously include capital and labour. The first aspect is relatively insubstantial 
as output and quality trends have long been well known, although the computation 
of the latter has been subject to some criticism, suggesting that the cloth index was 
too narrowly based on grey cloth, which was becoming a smaller proportion of more 
highly finished exports. 76 However, such criticisms could only be indirectly 
extended to yarn quality. Also, given their concentration on cloth content alone, they 
ignore any value added from developments in finishing. Notwithstanding these issues, 
the quality adjustment had only a minimal impact on the most important trends 
suggested by the data in table 10.8. On the quality adjusted basis, the growth rate for 
spinning between 1884 and 1913 was 1.69 % per annum. Without such an adjustment, 
the rate falls to 1.42%. In the period 1884-1899 the rate correspond, very closely, at 
1.3% respectively and 1.25%. Only in the period 1900 to 1913 was there an 
important difference with the rate of growth rising from 2% to 3.23 % when adjusted 
for quality. In weaving the differences were much smaller, with quality adjusted 
output growing more slowly than the standard series in the period after 1900, but 
somewhat faster before that date. " In short, weaving gained in productivity through 
quality shifts in the 1890s, whilst spinning gained in the 1900s. The 'fine counts' 
theory, which had been advocated in the 1890s, 79 had been associated with an 
76 Lazonick and Mass, ` Performance of British cotton', pp. 12-3. 
77 These calculations are based on compound growth rates calculated from, for 
spinning, yarn produced and consumed in 1913 to 1884 per Jones, Increasing 
return, table II, p. 275, and for weaving, cotton piece goods exports per 
Robson, The cotton industry in Britain, table Al, p. 331., and as adjusted by 
the yarn and cloth quality indices respectively, per Sandberg, `Movements in 
the quality', tables 2 and 4, pp. 10-11. 
78 `Finer counts in Oldham and what they are indicative of', Textile Mercury, 
16th August 1890, p. 104. 
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underlying rise in yarn quality up till 1894, but thereafter, as the Indian market was 
recovered, there was an overall decline through to 1907.79 In general, however, 
movements in quality did not have a particularly important influence on trends of 
production efficiency. 
Much more significant was the way in which capital and labour resources 
were added to the rising output. Table 10.8, by reference to the positive residuals, 
suggests that there were still increasing returns to scale, in approximately equal 
proportion, for both the spinning and the weaving branches of the industry. These 
were even for weaving throughout the period, but much more pronounced for 
spinning after 1900 (table 10.8 (1). Rising returns to scale would be consistent with 
the rate of technical development and the improvements associated with the spinning 
mule discussed in chapter five. They would also be consistent with increased external 
economies such as improved infrastructure and access to financial resources 80 
Finally they would be consistent with the trends noted above; evidence of apparent 
increases in efficiency suggested by the data in table 10.8 is complemented by the 
declining capital output ratio in figure 10.3. They would also be consistent with and 
added to by the evidence of rising financial returns to capital and the absence of any 
clear decline in either labour productivity or real wages. 
Although rising returns to scale should be recognised, they were perhaps not 
the most important trend noticeable from table 10.8. The possibility of a shift from 
labour to capital was suggested above in connection with the flat trend of real wages 
in conjunction with rising returns to capital. That shifts between factor inputs 
occurred is confirmed by the statistics in table 10.8. In spinning, capital was very 
rapidly attracted into the 1900s in response, no doubt to increasing levels of 
79 See chapter 11, figure 11.1. 
80 Fannie, English Cotton, pp. 213-15; 244-51. 
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profitability and output, but also perhaps to an industry with regulated wages and 
labour cost hence effectively removed from the competitive equation, and slow to rise 
in periods of rising prosperity. Labour input meanwhile grew only slowly for the 
period as a whole, and declined somewhat in the 1890s. In weaving there was also 
a loss of labour input during the years of depression. However, when the recovery 
came, it was this section of the industry, with its predominantly female labour 
force, " which saw a major expansion in numbers employed. In the unprecedented 
export booms of 1905-7 and 1911-13, there was an over commitment of capital in the 
case of spinning, and labour in the case of weaving. 
Perhaps to an extent such entrepreneurial behaviour is to be expected for 
industries whose output is cyclical around an upward secular trend, as cotton was in 
the 1900s. Confident expectation of a new and greater boom would no doubt have 
alleviated the worries of entrepreneurs whose new mills came on stream in 1908 just 
after the close of the greatest trade boom in history. With the benefit of hindsight, the 
commitment of extra capital in the Oldham district was more serious than the 
increases in the mainly female weavers of north east Lancashire. In the event the 
former created a damaging legacy of overcapacity which caused unforeseen problems 
later. Investments had been made for the best possible reasons, but cotton was 
unfortunately not living in the best of possible worlds. 
Did Lancashire become more efficient before 1914? 
Above we have considered financial and economic measures of performance in an 
attempt to reach a judgement as to whether the efficiency of Lancashire cotton 
stagnated before the first world war. The ROCE statistics have allowed a wider 
triangulation of the evidence on performance than presented in previous studies. In 
$' Chapman, The Lancashire cotton industry, p. 158. 
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view of the evidence above, it seems that the hypothesis of constant or decreasing 
industry efficiency can only be accepted, if, unlike elsewhere in the economy, there 
was a shift to capital at the expense of labour. Otherwise rising profits and constant 
real wages would be suggestive of rising industry productivity. Both of these views 
are consistent with the rising trend of industry profitability. The evidence presented 
above suggested that both trends were important and mutually compatible. 
If the shift to profits hypothesis is stressed, there would have been two 
significant consequences. First, union inability to defend real wages and seek major 
advances in buoyant trading conditions may have meant that trade unions were 
weaker than hitherto recognised, that the Brooklands agreement was generally 
favourable to the employers, and that unions would not have been able to mount any 
serious challenge to a determined employers' bid to replace mules and power looms 
with alternative technologies. For industrial relations, this was the opposite to what 
happened in the period 1867 to 1885, when there was a shift from capital to 
labour. 1 According to one view, this put pressure on employers and forced them 
into industry wide bargaining at Brooklands. s' If shifts in the balance of one factor 
of production to another are to be used as proxies for power and influence, then it 
would be difficult to blame unions for failure to make investments in alternative 
technology since their power to resist was low and, notwithstanding arguments 
presented elsewhere about the lack of urgency for the acquisition of ring spindles and 
automatic looms, responsibility should instead be laid at the door of employers. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the shift to profits would have contrasted 
with many other industries, which suffered large share price declines, such as iron 
82 Blaug, `The productivity of capital', appendix C, p. 379. 
83 Burgess, The origins of British industrial relations, p. 232. 
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and steel, engineering, food and drink, and electricity and gas. " To a rational 
investor, after a decade in the doldrums, cotton would suddenly have appeared an 
attractive prospect. The promoters of the new flotations in Oldham would not have 
needed to look far for risk capital, whilst in other industries which were perhaps 
becoming more important in the arena of international competition, investment that 
might have otherwise taken place did not. 
The shift to profits was probably a more important determinant of investment 
behaviour than rising returns to scale, although the latter continued to play a role, 
despite the smoke screen of the trade cycle. If we accept that investors were at least 
to some extent rational in response to market signals, either trend would provide an 
explanation of investor behaviour. The relative profitability of cotton before 1914 
provided a strong rationale for the attraction of new investment capital and accounts 
for its continued disproportionate importance as an export industry. It is to the 
dynamics of that export market that we must now finally turn. 
84 Feinstein, `What really happened to real wages?, p. 351. 
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Chapter 11: World markets, the gold standard, and 
the cotton investor, 1870-1914 
Earlier chapters have concentrated on firm specific and micro economic variables 
associated with entrepreneurial decisions. It is important, however, to set those 
decisions in a wider context. Fluctuations in investment levels were just as likely to 
have been caused by the general level of confidence in the industry as by specific 
opportunities presented by technical improvement. In Oldham especially, with its high 
proportion of joint stock public companies, share values were an important barometer 
for the industry as a whole. Threats to confidence might have arisen various sources, 
including the rise of foreign competition, and the purpose here is to quantify and 
assess these impacts. 
The world market for cotton has been dealt with extensively elsewhere in its 
own right; the purpose of the present work is to quantify the effects of the changing 
macro economic environment in order to assess the impact on industry profitability 
and decision making on issues such as technology and divestment, and the 
interrelationship between product and capital markets. The share price index (figures 
4.2, and figure 11.1 below) suggested that 1896 might be an important turning point 
for the cotton industry, as indeed some have argued it was for the wider economy., 
Returns to the cotton investor and to capital invested (figures 4.1 and 4.3) tended to 
support this view and also implied differential performances within the sector. 
The apparent turning point of 1896 was historically important. Before 1914, 
As noted in chapter, 10, there has been much debate on this subject; see inter 
alia, Coppock, `The causes of the great depression' pp. 205-32; and Saul, The Myth of the Great Depression. 
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cotton continued to represent a large proportion of British export activity; 2 the 
market forces which influenced returns to capital in the cotton industry are likely to 
be important for the wider economic history of the period, either because the cyclical 
effects of the cotton industry influenced other sectors, or because, if sufficiently high, 
as they apparently were after 1896, they may have prevented the redistribution of 
capital to the newer industries of the second industrial revolution. Given the 
significance of cotton during this period to the process of economic growth and 
development, as noted in chapter two, the industry has also therefore been the subject 
of important academic debates. Incorporating additional evidence by which the 
performance of the industry can be measured, this chapter will re-examine the key 
quantitative interrelationships upon which existing interpretations have depended. 
Economic determinants of industry profitability 
Through an examination of macroeconomic interrelationships, besides considerations 
such as technological choice and industry structure, additional variables, not 
considered in previous chapters and less subject to entrepreneurial influence, can be 
incorporated. These are primarily the influences of price and the international 
monetary system, product quality, and capital market integration. 
One survey sought to test North's hypothesis that prices are the principal 
cause of economic change, and examined the demand for and supply of Lancashire 
cotton goods for the period 1830-60.3 Both were found to be inelastic with respect 
to price; a series of adjustments to equilibrium at different but higher levels of output 
was offered as an alternative hypothesis. Having covered an earlier period no attempt 
2 Cotton manufactures represented 35.8 % of all exports in 1870 and 24.1 %, in 
1913; Robson, The cotton industry, p. 334. 
Wright, `An econometric study of cotton production and trade', pp. 111-120; North, The economic growth of the United States. 
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was made to extend these conclusions for price behaviour for subsequent decades. 
Using similar data sources (table 11.1), these relationships are reconsidered below for 
the period 1884-1914. 
Another important aspect of the price based argument, advanced primarily by 
contemporaries seeking to defend the industry and its entrepreneurs, was that the 
industry was critically governed by international monetary policy. ' The overseas 
value of the pound, as determined by the workings of the gold standard before 1914, 
was deemed to be of critical importance since the key export market, India, used 
silver currency. In practice, the gold standard was effectively a system of fixed 
exchange rates, which meant that rises and falls in the value of gold led directly to 
changes in domestic price levels. ' The rise in the value of gold against silver up to 
1896, and the reversal of that trend from 1896-1914, thereby first depressed the 
industry and then gave way to extraordinary boom conditions. Dependence on 
international exchange translated into political pressures, in the form of the bimetallic 
movement, and was reinforced by the attempts of the Indian government to introduce 
duties on cotton imports. 6 Its ultimate failure to introduce them helped the revival of 
Lancashire exports to the Indian market after 1896. 
In the pre-1914 period, a second effect of the supply, and hence value of 
gold, was on the incomes of customers in export markets. Such rises in incomes, it 
was argued, tended to be complementary to British exports in this period and 
outweigh the competitive impact of associated growth of overseas production 
.7 As 
° FMCSA, Measures for the revival, pp. 7-10. 
Whale, `The working of the pre war gold standard', pp. 18-19. 
6 Green, 'Rentiers versus producers', pp. 588-612, and `The bimetallic 
controversy' pp. 673-683; Howe, `Bimetallism', pp. 377-91; Harnetty, ` The 
Indian cotton duties controversy', pp. 684-702. 
FMCSA, Measures for the revival, p. 10 
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incomes rose after 1896, so did the export markets for Lancashire's goods. Using 
previously collated series of industry statistics (table 11.1), together with the series 
o for share prices and returns to capital presented above in chapter 4 and fully tabulated 
in appendices 1 and 2, the currency hypothesis is fully analysed below. 
If trends in world monetary conditions were important to Lancashire, then so 
too for the rest of the British economy. The trade cycle characterised the cotton 
industry, like the economy as a whole. Given the importance of the industry in terms 
of exports, and that there is evidence that exports were a significant determinant of 
the trade cycle, ' examination of the demand conditions for cotton goods is 
particularly important. On the other hand, those disputing the export-trade cycle 
relationship have tended to stress monetary conditions as an alternative hypothesis,, 
but as noted above, money was also a vital issue as far as Lancashire was concerned. 
Our analysis will therefore readdress the uncertainties in these areas. 
A second broad area of debate has stemmed from the argument that the 
decline of the industry in the 1920s and 1930s was explicable in terms of the 
decisions taken by managers on how to produce and sell cloth prior to 1914.10 These 
points have been dealt with extensively in earlier chapters, but it is important to add 
at this stage one particular aspect broadly relevant to a consideration of world market 
conditions. Trends in product quality have been held to be an important determining 
influence on the structure of the industry; ä symbiosis between world markets, 
product quality and technological choice has been advocated. " The main points of 
S' Ford, `The trade cycle in Britain', pp. 27-49. 
9 Eichengreen, 'The causes of British economic cycles', pp. 145-61. 
10 Lazonick and Mass, ` The performance of the British cotton industry ', p. 2. 
11 Lazonick, and Mass, ` The Performance of the British Cotton Industry, ' pp. 4-9. For the purposes of the analysis in this chapter, yarn and cloth quality 
are defined according to the measure used by Sandberg, `Movements in the 
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this argument were that there was an increase in demand for highly finished, but low 
quality goods in response to higher incomes in poorer countries such as India. There 
was thus higher demand for style rather than quality. Merchants responded to orders 
by securing the lowest quality cloth technically compatible with the requisite finishing 
process, which implied the use of low grade cotton in spinning and heavy sizing in 
weaving. Hence the marketing strategies of Lancashire firms provided a further 
justification for claimed `technological backwardness' and adherence to the `old' 
technologies of mule spinning and powerloom weaving. Strict limitations were 
thereby placed on labour productivity increases. Unit labour costs rose, but cheaper 
cotton inputs meant total cost could be cut. 12 There is no problem here with 
consistency vis a vis the above monetary explanation of the fall and rise of Lancashire 
fortunes prior to 1914. Earlier chapters have questioned the alleged `backwardness' 
of investment decisions. The extent to which Lancashire in fact competed on price 
and the role of product quality in its marketing strategy are reassessed below. 
Finally, it is useful to consider the degree of integration between product and 
capital markets, and between conditions faced by investors in the cotton industry and 
those in the economy generally. The argument noted above, that the trade cycle was 
driven by exports, if accepted presupposes a degree of integration between the 
national economy and its leading export industry. However, before 1870, and 
especially in the early days of the industrial revolution, although highly significant, 
the Lancashire cotton industry was characterised by its relative regional isolation. 
Transport and communications were initially poor, although they improved rapidly 
quality', pp. 4-5, the ratio of declared value of exports to physical quantity. The resulting index is then deflated by a composite price index to reflect 
quality changes. 
12 Lazonick and Mass, ` The performance of the British cotton industry', pp. 2- 5. 
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between the cities of Liverpool and Manchester and the main manufacturing towns. 
What is less certain is the extent to which the regional cotton economy began to 
integrate with the financial centre of the economy in London. The last decades of the 
nineteenth century saw large capital flows between London and the rest of the 
world. " Circulation of capital into and out of cotton investments might also have 
been important, since, as some have suggested, the relative returns may have been 
a disincentive to investments in the industries of the second industrial revolution. 14 
Whilst recognising that in the 1770s early Lancashire enterprises were dependent on 
local payment systems, it has been argued that by 1820 the combined effects of war 
finance, the industrial revolution in the North, and the financial revolution in the 
south, had created an integrated capital market. " Thus by the late Victorian period, 
differences in returns, investor confidence and wealth accumulation between 
Lancashire and the wider economy may simply have reflected that, as a significant 
sub-sector of the economy, cotton was subject to different cyclical circumstances in 
the macro economic environment. On the other hand, it has been suggested by some, 
that as in the days of the industrial revolution, Lancashire remained essentially a 
separate economy, much poorer, and implicitly relatively unintegrated with the wider 
financial and mercantile activities of London and the home counties. " Aspects of 
these alternative possibilities are investigated further below. 
13 Hall, The export of capital from Britain, 1870-1914. 
14 Chandler, Scale and scope, p. 284. 
ýs Buchinsky and Polak, `The emergence of a national capital market in England, 1710-1880', p. 18. 
16 Rubinstein, Capitalism, culture and decline, p. 30. 
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Data and method 
Collations of data from various sources were used in conjunction with the series 
presented in other chapters, principally chapter 4 (see table 11.1). With a view to 
minimising the impact of time trends, logged data was used for all series. Independent 
variables were assumed to be exogenous, and in the first instance, uncorrelated. 
Throughout the analysis, we concentrate exclusively on the export of manufactured 
cotton goods, which represented about 75 % to 85 % of the industry; " yarn exports 
and production for the domestic market, which accounted for the remainder, are 
assumed to have been relatively insignificant throughout the period under 
consideration. 
As a precursor to examining stock market interrelationships with macro- 
economic variables, the demand and supply conditions of the cotton market were 
examined by reference to various measures of price, income, and product quality. As 
part of a broader analysis of the determinants of investor confidence in Lancashire, 
demand and supply variables, such as prices, quantity, quality and incomes were then 
tested against the stock market index. Prices of cotton and yarn at Liverpool and 
Manchester attracted much comment from market reporters and appeared to have 
been linked to market sentiment. " It one accepts the argument that the industry was 
driven primarily by margin, and not by production efficiency, price, volume and 
investor returns would be closely related. Similarly supply might also be expected to 
vary proportionately with realisable prices for output, and capital investment in the 
industry might thereby reflect confidence as to anticipated future prices. In turn this 
would lead to an expected association between the level of capital investment and 
" In 1907,83.6 % of cotton production was exported; Kahn, Great Britain and 
the world economy, p. 189. 
18 Oldham Chronicle, passim. 
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investor confidence, as reflected in the stock market index. 
Also, 
- as with a modern stock market, it was expected that the performance 
of the share price index might be related to three main variables; inflation, interest 
rates and corporate profits. The apparent importance of inflation and monetary policy 
to Lancashire has been stressed in the foregoing discussion. Specific price levels, for 
raw cotton, yarn, and cloth, might also be expected to influence the index, 
particularly given the importance of margin noted above. Likewise a variable for 
world trade was added to represent export demand, and gross national product by 
expenditure to represent domestic demand. Interest rates are also a potentially useful 
variable as a measure of the risk free opportunity cost investment. Three possible 
measures were selected; the yield on consols, the prices of a portfolio of fixed interest 
securities, and the yield on railway debenture stocks. Investment in railway shares 
was a common outlet for surplus individual and corporate cash in Lancashire, as the 
investment policies of Fielden Brothers and Horrockses Crewdson testify. " It might 
be expected that where railway stocks were high in price and low in yield, the 
opposite might be true for cotton shares. In addition to these measures, an index of 
the shares of industrial and commercial, companies quoted in London was used to 
represent the extent to which cotton equity investor confidence was influenced by 
confidence in the performance of other similar British investments. A further use for 
the London index was to compare the relative importance of explanatory variables for 
companies quoted on Lancashire and London exchanges. Finally, share prices might 
be expected to encapsulate profitability, and the return to capital series for quoted 
companies, as discussed in chapter 9 (see also appendix 1) was used in conjunction 
with the other identified variables. 
19 Fielden, WYRO, C353/475 balance sheets; Horrockses, LCRO, DDHs/53 
and CVR, balance sheets. 
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Table 11.1: Data and Data Sources 
Observation Source 
Cotton piece goods exports Robson, The cotton industry in Britain, table 
Al, p. 331. 
Share price index As for figure 4.2,4th quarter observations. 
Retail price index Capie and Webber, Monetary History, table 
III (12) col. IV; December observations. 
Yield on consols ibid, table III (10) col. VIII. December 
observations. 
Yield on railway debentures Harley, `Goschen's conversion', p. 106 
Price of fixed interest securities Smith and Home, `An index number', table, 
III, p. 5. 
Index of London share quotations ibid, index numbers for 
_ 
industrial and 
commercial companies, pp. 13-19. 
Profit rate Overall average return on capital employed 
for quoted companies, appendix 1. 
Gross national product Feinstein, National Income, T8, col. 10. 
Prices of piece goods exports Mitchell and Jones, Second abstract, table 8, 
p. 195. 
Relative price cloth exports Mitchell and Jones series above adjusted by 
an equally weighted index and per the 
method used by Hatton, `The demand for 
British exports', p. 592; for France and 
Germany, Kindleberger, The terms of trade, 
pp. 22-3, and the USA, Lipsey, Price and 
quantity trends, p. 413 
Yarn margins Robson, The cotton industry, p. 336. 
No. of spindles/looms ibid, p. 340. 
World production and trade Lewis, `World production', table 1 Al and 
A6, average weighted at 1913 proportions. 
Cloth quality Sandberg, `Movements in the quality', table 
2, p. 10, column (3). 
Yarn produced and consumed Jones, Increasing return, table 2 pp. 275-7. 
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The demand for manufactured cotton goods 
Demand conditions have been considered in econometric analyses elsewhere, 20 and 
these are replicated and compared with models specific to the time period 1884-1914 
in table 11.2. In each, we seek to establish the relationship between quantity 
demanded and price, income and quality variables? ' These are labelled models 11.1, 
11.2,11.3 and 11.4, and were selected from the many tests conducted to provide the 
best overall summaries of relationships. In all cases the quantity of cloth demanded 
is the dependent variable. Although previous econometric models are included in table 
11.2, our main purpose is not direct comparison, as there are some differences in 
data and method, but to establish in broad terms, following the discussion in the 
preceding section, the relative importance of price, world incomes (proxied by an 
index of world production and trade) and product quality as determinants of demand. 
An important feature of all the equations was price inelasticity. Equation 
(11.2), which reapplied the same model used by Wright (equation 11.1) to justify the 
conclusion of price inelasticity in the 1830-1860 period, showed a similar result. As 
with Wright's model, the price co-efficient has the wrong sign and, although more 
significant statistically, is near zero. The probable reason was that prices and demand 
fell and then rose again simultaneously through time in line with the economic cycle, 
as confirmed by the significance of the time trend in models (11.1) and (11.2). Prices 
were therefore an unstable variable, and selection of start and end dates for the time 
20 Wright, `An econometric survey', pp. 111-120, and Hatton, `The demand for 
British exports', pp. 576-594. 
21 Two additional variables, overseas issues and lagged exports, were also 
considered. The former was used by Hatton, `The demand for British 
exports', p. 584, to simulate the impact of capital export, and the latter to 
assess the effect of the time lag between the determinants of demand and the 
shipping of goods (p. 584). No further analysis was done on the first 
variable, given the relatively low significance of the variable in the original 
model (table 11.2). 
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series analysis was therefore crucial. Thus whilst Hatton's price coefficient was 
statistically significant for the period 1871-1914 (equation 11.3), it becomes 
insignificant for the shorter period of 1884-1914 (equation 11.4). Low price 
coefficients were a feature of all models tested for this period, for both actual and 
relative price indices. 
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Table, 11.2: determinants of the demand for cloth, 
1871-1914. 
1830-1860 1884-1913 1871-1913 1884-1913 
(11.1) (11.2) (11.3) (11.4) 
Constant 7.39 9.55 1.56 3.85 
Grey cloth price 0.10 0.02 (0.59) (4.67) 
Cloth quality 
-0.52 -0.66 
-0.60 (1.58) (2.65) (3.55) 
Time trend 0.06 0.01 
(8.57) (7.30) 
World trade 0.35 0.34 
(3.89) (5.66) 
Relative export 
-0.38 -0.002 
price (1.73) (0.04) 
Overseas issues 
. 
0.03 
(1.50) 
Lagged exports 0.23 0.21 
(1.35) (1.28) 
R2 0.99 0.87 0.95 0.90 
Durbin Watson 1.90 1.66 n/a* 2.07 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
* statistic not available 
Sources: Equations (11.2) and (11.4) calculated from data per table 11.1; equation (11.1), Wright, `An econometric survey', p. 118; equation (11.3) Hatton, `The 
demand for British exports', p. 588. 
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Caution must be exercised in this type of analysis due to the risk of 
collinearity between price and income variables. For example if world incomes rose, 
the associated rise in demand could lead to rising prices, rather than the latter being 
independently determined. In the case of equation (11.4), the diagnostic statistics 
suggested strong multicollinearity between the variables. ' To address the issue of 
price and income interdependencies, pooled data was used based on the subtraction 
of the income from the demand variable. ' However, this failed to eliminate 
interdependencies among the remaining variables. ' Thus to confirm the relative 
importance of each variable, individual price and income variables were regressed 
against demand. This did not change the result compared with the overall model 
(11.4). 21 Nor did a further test based on first differences, where although the overall 
significance of the model declined, the income variable remained significant, and the 
price variable insignificant. ' 
Thus whilst price was relatively insignificant, high income elasticity was 
clearly the important feature of demand conditions. World production and trade was 
a robust variable in all models tested, regardless of time period. Indeed, the time 
trend variable was always insignificant when used with a model also incorporating 
world production and trade. The growth in overseas markets and foreign production 
was, as Sayers would have put it, ' `complementary' to Lancashire, rather than a 
21 The condition index (CI) ratio of the highest and lowest eigenvalues was 
561.102. 
21 After Tobin, `A statistical demand function for food', pp. 113-141. 
24 CI = 277.183. 
21 Price: R2 = 0.34, t statistic = 4.02; income: R2 = 0.81, t statistic = 10.98. 
26 R2 = 0.39; income co-efficient = 0.9 (2.87); price coefficient 0.008 (0.065) (t statistics in parentheses). 
27 Sayers, The vicissitudes of an export economy, p. 5. 
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`competitive' threat. Continued growth of exports occurred because the growth in 
total demand outstripped growth in alternative sources of supply, not because 
Lancashire entrepreneurs cut their prices. However, a situation of complementarity 
was unlikely to prevail in the long run. Dependency on world incomes linked the 
industry to a decisive hand of fate. In the 1930s, industry lobbyists were keen to 
blame a repetition of the adverse monetary conditions which had prevailed before 
1896 as being responsible for the fate of cotton. 28 Growth of income in external 
markets was an exogenous variable and if it worked in Lancashire's favour before 
1914, the likelihood was that the impact was conversely negative after 1920. 
Another aspect of demand conditions which may have helped Lancashire 
exporters in the pre 1914 period was the alleged decline in quality. Demand and 
quality were significantly but negatively related (equations 11.1,11.2 and 11.4). The 
quality coefficient was sensitive to the selection of the period analysed and tended to 
be more significant for later years. That conclusion was confirmed by equation 11.1, 
where the cloth quality coefficient was not statistically significant for the period 
before 1860. An index of the quality of cotton manufactures showed a small rise 
between 1898 and 1902, and, excluding a one off rise in 1907/8, followed by a slight 
but steady decline until 1914 (figure 11.1). Trends in quality have been attributed 
primarily to the proportion of goods exported to the Indian market, which tended to 
demand low quality cloth. " Hence changes in the quality of exports reflected falling 
sales to India prior to 1902 and rising sales thereafter. 
There is thus support for the argument, as put forward by Lazonick, that 
Lancashire relied on the use of low quality raw material input to increase its sales to 
28 FMCSA, Measures for the revival, p. 11 
29 Sandberg, `Movements in the quality of British cotton' pp. 15-19; Lazonick 
and Mass, `The performance of the British cotton industry', p. 4. 
low income markets in the period 1898-1914. Inverse correlation between the 
expansion of output and the quality of exports was strong for this period. However, 
this should not be exaggerated. The inverse relationship was less significant prior to 
the 1890s; the marketing of low quality cloth was a function of the recovery of the 
Indian market, very much a short run phenomenon of the decade before the First 
World War. 
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Figure 11.1: the quality of British cotton goods, 1884- 
1914 
Cloth quality, 1884-1914 
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Source: Sandberg, `Movements in the quality', table 2, column 1 and table 4, column 
2, pp 10-11. 
399 
ivuY IulzTv IUuv IWU"L 1808 
Supply conditions 
In this section we consider the determinants of supply. One conclusion from chapter 
10 was that there was an apparent tendency for entrepreneurs to respond to increased 
profitability in the spinning industry with significant capital investment in the 1900s 
and this relationship is re-examined below. Interest rates, representing the opportunity 
cost of investment were also considered, together with lagged output as a measure of 
production anticipated from the previous period. The determinants of the supply of 
cloth are shown in table 11.3, in models 11.5,11.6 11.7 and 11.8. In all cases the 
dependent variable is the quantity of cloth produced. 
There was a positive, if not very strong relationship between the supply of 
cloth to the export market and profit margins and the rate of profit. Prior to 1860, 
on the basis of equations (11.5) and (11.7), Wright concluded that British 
manufacturers were more responsive than their North American counterparts to 
changes in profitability, adjusting production levels accordingly. " By contrast, 
American companies tended to produce at full output all the time. In both periods, 
lagged output and interest rates had low explanatory power. Indeed, as will be seen 
below, financial decisions taken in Lancashire were to a large extent de-coupled from 
interest rates in the national economy. 
Generally as far as supply was concerned, the conclusions for the earlier 
period would appear to be equally valid for the later period, and the models above 
showed strong similarities regarding the influence of profit in all periods tested. For 
the later period, profit rate performed slightly better than profit margin. The time co- 
efficient became less influential than in the earlier period, perhaps reflecting a less 
clear trend in terms of export growth. A possible weakness of the model was that 
cotton piece exports were a potentially inaccurate proxy for cotton supplied. 
30 Wright, `An econometric survey', p. 118. 
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However, a calculation substituting yarn produced and consumed for cotton piece 
exports, showed very similar results. ' 
Relatively small responses to changes in profit suggest a generally inelastic 
supply curve; a view supported by practical instances of entrepreneurs attempting to 
shift the supply function. For example, although the mill building boom of 1905-8 
reflected a response in part to increased profit opportunities, construction lead times 
in many cases were quite slow. New capacity ordered at the height of the boom in 
1907 did not come on stream until the following year, by which time profits and 
profit margins had slumped. " 
31 Examples of mills commenced in 1907 and not completed until the following 
year, included, Orme (62,000 spindles), Marlborough No. 2 (110,000), and Trent (120,000); see Oldham Chronicle and Gurr and Hunt, The Cotton Mills 
of Oldham. passim. 
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Table 11.3: determinants of the supply of cloth, 1830- 
1914. 
1830-1860 1884-1914 1830-1860 1884-1914 
(11.5) (11.6) (11.7) 
. 
(11.8) 
Constant 4.13 8.31 4.03 7.68 
Profit margin 0.25 0.23 (3.13) (2.30) 
Profit rate 0.05 0.05 (3.59) (2.78) 
Time trend 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 
(23.33) (11.1) (7.00) (4.41) 
Interest rates 
-0.01 0.23 (0.16) (1.83) 
Lagged output 0.04 0.05 
(0.22) (0.24) 
R2 0.97 0.85 0.98 0.87 
Durbin Watson 1.90 1.07 1.90 1.36 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
Sources: equations (11.6) and (11.8) calculated from data per table 11.1; equation (11.5) and (11.7), Wright, `An econometric survey', p. 118. 
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Trends in the Lancashire stock market 
The main variables and hypotheses for the explanation of stock market trends were 
discussed earlier in the chapter. 32 Following that discussion we next examine the 
impact on two stock market indices, Lancashire and London, of financial, monetary 
and other economic variables. Our objective is to establish, and evaluate in terms of 
relative importance, the determinants of share prices, and in doing so, to examine the 
extent to which the export economy of Lancashire had become integrated with the 
national economy as a whole. 
Five models, equations 11.9,11.10,11.11,11.12 and 11.13, which provided 
the best summary of the relationships investigated, are presented in table 11.4. In all 
cases the dependent variable is the index of Lancashire share prices. The explanatory 
variables listed are intended as measures for the monetary conditions, especially the 
overseas value of the pound (Retail Price Index), corporate profitability, the level of 
national economic activity (Gross National Product) and various measures of the 
opportunity cost of investment (yield on consols, railway debenture yields and fixed 
interest security prices). To provide contrast, the tests were repeated with an index 
of London share prices as the dependent variable, and these differences are reported 
on in the narrative below. The behaviour of the London and Lancashire share indices 
are contrasted in figure 11.2. 
Analysis of the determinants of Lancashire share prices suggested interesting 
results. As expected, the interrelationship of share prices with inflation and company 
profits and was well supported. Retail price index (RPI) and profit rate, in that order, 
were consistently robust and significant variables. RPI performed better as a variable 
than prices for cloth manufactures and prices for cloth manufactures relative to world 
competitors, as well as raw material input prices, yarn prices, yarn margins, and total 
32 See pp. 382-3. 
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industry value added per unit. It is therefore shown in preference to these variables 
in the models presented in table 11.4. Given the vertical specialisation of the industry, 
and that the vast majority of share investment was in cotton spinning companies, it 
is perhaps surprising that cloth margins performed better than yarn margins as 
explanations of investor confidence. A linkage between industry performance and 
aggregate value added would have encouraged co-operation and feelings of 
interdependence along the supply chain. However, in contrast to RPI, neither of these 
variables were highly significant in their own right. Cotton investors, it is suggested, 
therefore took little notice of the Liverpool and Manchester markets and any 
indications of future profits that might have been contained in the futures indices. 
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Table 11.4: Share price determinants for Lancashire 
textile companies, 1884-1913. 
(11.9) (11.10) (11.11) (11.12) (11.13) 
Constant 
-11.87 -18.02 -12.01 -17.8 -18.34 
RPI 3.31 5.01 3.41 4.95 5.12 
(3.39) (11.75) (3.48) (10.05) (9.88) 
Yield on consols 1.11 1.10 
(2.08) (2.02) 
Profit rate 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 (2.12) (1.76) (2.13) (1.70) (1.75) 
Gross National 0.04 
Product (0.35) 
World Prodn 0.01 
and trade (0.14) 
Railway debenture 0.02 
yields (0.31) 
Fixed int. security 
-0.03 
prices (0.35) 
R2 0.882 0.862 " 0.881 0.871 0.870 
DW 1.169 1.324 1.175 1.301 1.355 
F 46.703 83.973 46.455 54.140 54.196 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
Sources: per table 11.1. 
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Figure 11.2: Share prices in London and Lancashire 
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Index of share prices, 1884-1914 
Lancs textiles and London industrials 
The real motives for investment may have been, first, a hedge against 
inflation after 1896, and second, to participate in the corporate profits which resulted 
from the reversal in international monetary trends. Conversely, deflation prior to 
1896 sapped confidence; the association of falling prices and falling share values can 
only have been the result of international monetary conditions so often bemoaned by 
the Lancashire supporters of bimetallism. 33 Share price falls were particularly steep 
for those mills which could not pay dividends, generally the mule mills, and as noted 
in chapter 8, the crash in values of the early 1890s brought about the demise of the 
working class investor. It also led to the creation of 'penny' share investment 
opportunities accompanied by spectacular gains for those able to hang on until the 
revival of 1896-9. 'a 
A curious feature of the Lancashire index, unlike London share prices, was 
that it did not respond in the normal way to changes in interest rates. The Lancashire 
share index was positively correlated to both measures of yield on risk free 
investment; the surrogates for national and local interest rates, yield on consols and 
yield on'railway debentures. It was inversely correlated to an index of fixed interest 
security prices (table 11.4). The normal theoretical relationship is that a cut in interest 
rates, causes share prices to rise. All the coefficients for all variables used had the 
wrong sign for the Lancashire share index, but were correctly related to the London 
index. 35 In equation 11.9, yield on consols was strongly co-linear36 with RPI and 
33 'Bimetallism' was advocacy of silver based currencies in addition to gold. The use of silver currency by India, and the dependence of Lancashire on India as an export market, had important political ramifications (see below, 
pp. 411-2). 
34 See chapter 4, p. 89. 
33 Without an index of profit rate for London quoted companies, it was not 
possible to apply exactly the same models to the London index. Without a 
profit variable, equation 11.9 produced the following coefficients for the London share index: RPI, 
-0.04 (0.07); yield on consols, 
-1.1 (2.79); gross 
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the rate of profit, and thus by dropping the former variable from the model (equation 
11.10), little explanatory power was lost. This odd relationship may have reflected 
local circumstances, for example the raising of fixed rate deposit style loan finance 
by cotton companies independently of regional and national banking infrastructure 
meant many investors had a steady opportunity return of 4% throughout the 1890s 
and 1900s, and may have meant changes in the discount rate had little effect in 
Lancashire. 
Other implications of the behaviour of share prices and interest rates are also 
important. Yield on consols had a significant negative relationship with the London 
index, a more expected result which reflected the dependence of London based 
companies on different economic influences. In contrast to Lancashire, the RPI co- 
efficient did not perform as a robust variable in all models for the London index. For 
example, as noted above, the RPI variable had an insignificant t ratio when used in 
conjunction with gross national product and yield on consols. This must reflect, 
unsurprisingly, the unique dependence of Lancashire on export markets, as for 
reasons noted earlier, RPI changes were a direct function of the operation of the gold 
standard. Such dependence partly explains the divergence of shareholder wealth 
suggested in figure 11.2. 
Further explanation is provided additional analysis of the movements of 
London share prices. For the London index, using RPI and yield on consols alone as 
explanatory variables, each was significant individually but jointly produced a low Rz, 
national product, 1.06 (11.46). R2 = 0.87 (t statistics in parentheses). 
36 Multicollinearity was tested for via CI indices and found to be a feature in 
most models. As with the demand analysis, its implications were examined 
by dropping variables, pooling data, regressing each variable individually and 
using first differenced data. In all cases, the relative importance of each 
variable was the same as presented in table 11.4. 
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due to the offsetting effect of the negative co-efficient for yield on consols? " An 
alternative model using real yield, that is nominal yield plus or minus the deflation 
or inflation rate, still offered only a partial explanation. Another variable, Gross 
National Product (GNP) was an insignificant influence for Lancashire (equation 11.9), 
again reflecting the export dependence of cotton, but was the most important 
determinant of share prices for industrial and commercial companies quoted in 
London. 38 The growth in the national economy did not benefit Lancashire, with, as 
we have seen, the possible exception of some of the combines such as Tootal, 
Broadhurst, and Lee, and Horrockses, Crewdson. In contrast, it provided a powerful 
impetus to London and another explanatory factor for the divergences between shares 
quoted on the London and Lancashire exchanges. Uniquely, exports were not thought 
to have played a leading role in the boom of the late 1890s, 39 and this may have 
been reflected by the apparent disaggregation of Lancashire from the rest of the 
economy. 
Most of the divergence occurred in the 1890s. It was an important decade for 
the cotton industry, during which it witnessed a decline in its fortunes, followed by 
a revival which lasted until 1914. Associated with the reversal were changes in world 
market conditions, investment, and share market confidence. So when was the turning 
point and what were the precise causes? Lancashire was characterised by economic 
depression for most of the 1890s. However, share prices and returns to mill investors 
rose sharply after 1896 (figures 4.1,4.2 and 11.2). But trade reports and annual 
37 R2 = 0.21; coefficients, RPI = 3.99 (2.693), yield on consols = 
-2.088 (2.237); t statistics shown in parentheses. 
38 vis the highly significant GNP t ratio noted above (11.46) and much better 
R2 (0.87) when used regressed in conjunction with RPI and consol yield 
variables. 
39 Sigsworth and Blaclanan, `The home boom of the 1890s', pp. 75-97. 
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surveys pointed to no obvious overall improvement. For cloth manufacturers, 1896 
opened with a `discouraging state of affairs' and a recovery in some of the finer 
sectors was undermined in August with a further rise in cotton and a decline in orders 
from merchants overseas. 40 1897 was a 'record year' for weaving losses 
. 
41 It was 
not until 1898 that the long deflation in cotton prices, which had persisted since 1873, 
finally reversed; 42 it is perhaps therefore appropriate to date the recovery here rather 
than two years earlier. 43 However, it is noteworthy that cotton share prices, being 
only available to investors in the spinning section, represented a proxy for a sustained 
recovery in that section of the industry alone from 1896. That year saw a genuine 
recovery in demand for direct yarn sales to the Indian market, whilst English 
investors, having been frightened off foreign stock after the Baring crisis and faced 
with lowered yields on consols, could pick up cotton securities at very low values. ' 
When, in 1897, the spinning employers called for a reduction in wages under the 
Brooklands agreement due to the poor state of trade, the Union resisted strongly, 
maintaining that they had ignored recent improvements and were basing their claims 
on out of date information. The trade improvement was genuine, and was the main 
reason for the collapse in unity of the Employers on 8 December 1897! s It was 
true that the weaving section did not feel the benefit until 1898, but spinning 
companies did so earlier, the recovery process having commenced in 1896. 
40 Economist, Feb 20th, 1897, p. 25. 
41 Economist, Feb 19,1898. 
42 Farnie, English Cotton, p. 171. 
43 Sigsworth and Blackman, 'The home boom', p. 89. 
44 Economist, 1897, p. 25; Sigsworth and Blackman, ` The home boom' pp. 92- 3. 
45 The Times, 9th December' 1897, p. 12(iii). 
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Nonetheless, as noted above, the permanent impact of the price trend reversal 
appeared to be an important underpinning factor for share values after 1898. The 
improvement of the 1900s was attributable externally to inflation and the decline of 
gold values. Strategically Lancashire responded by shifting to finer counts and sewing 
cottons, and from grey to dyed and fancy goods. By 1903, the combined effect was 
that important export markets had been recovered, especially India. 46 
Lancashire as a great manufacturing industry never really danced in step with 
the rest of the economy. Few other sectors of the economy quite shared the misery 
of Lancashire in the deflation of the early 1890s. Conversely, at the zenith of the 
cotton industry, the great boom of 1907, cotton investors' returns were far superior 
to those earned by investors elsewhere. ' Again, these returns were driven by the 
same influences in reverse which brought bad fortune in the 1890s. For Lancashire, 
there really was a great depression and it did end in 1896. For the rest of the 
economy, subject to different economic forces, it is more correct to indeed regard the 
great depression as a myth. 
The bimetallism debate 
Within forty miles of Manchester, as Macara put it, everyone depended on cotton in 
one way or another's It would be surprising therefore if the economic chasm that 
separated Lancashire and London in the 1890s were not reflected in a parallel 
political dichotomy. The assertion that the politics of that decade were characterised 
by a `rentiers versus producers' divide, " has attracted some controversy among 
46 Chapman, 'The report of the tariff commission', p. 426. 
41 See chapter 10, pp. 309-10. 
48 Quoted in Clarke, Lancashire and the new liberalism, p. 76. 
49 Green, ` Rentiers versus producers' p. 588. 
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historians, with some arguing this to be an oversimplification. " A new focus is 
given to this debate by figure 11.2 which clearly shows that whilst significant 
fortunes must have been lost by Lancashire investors in the early 1890s, no such 
difficulties were suffered by those with broader portfolios. In wealth terms at least, 
the `all too neat' distinction between Lancashire producers, and if not `rentiers', the 
wider economy is confirmed by the relative performances of the two indices in the 
1890s. The divergence between the London and Lancashire indices after 1885 
provided a test gauge of the strength of support for the bimetallic movement. 
However, this did not translate into straightforward political advantage for one side 
or the other. In the 1895 general election, the influential trade unions and their 
mouthpiece, the Cotton Factory Times, imposed a bimetallic test on all candidates, 
including Liberals. " Furthermore they combined the campaign against the gold 
standard with support for free trade in the face of threatened protectionist measures 
by the Indian government SZ Hence the difficulty for historians in terms of 
quantifying the apparent opposition of certain Lancashire industrialists to some of the 
fundamental tenets of the Manchester School. 53 Politically, bimetallism failed to 
produce a broad consistent body of support centred either in Lancashire or London, 
or unity in the support of either main party34 However, what clearly did unite 
Lancashire was the need to do something about the Indian market. Examples of 
support for monometallism amongst leading cotton entrepreneurs, such as Henry Lee, 
so Howe, 'Bimetallism' p. 390. 
51 Green, ` The bimetallic controversy', p. 676. 
52 Clarke, Lancashire and the new liberalism, p. 86. 
53 See the debate in Howe, `Bimetallism, ' pp. 377-91. and Green, 'The 
bimetallic controversy', pp. 673-83. 
54 Howe, 'Bimetallism, ' pp. 389-90. 
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have been cited as examples of lack of unity. " However, not all cotton producers 
were uniquely dependent on the Indian market, and Tootal Broadhurst and Lee were 
a good example of a company keen to exploit marketing opportunities through 
diversification in the 1890s, especially in the Americas, continental Europe, and the 
home market. " The ultimate failure of the bimetallic movement was not due to 
political fragmentation, as Howe asserted, but the economic panacea of rising prices 
and the recovery of cotton profits. It is beyond the scope of the present work to enter 
into a fuller discussion of this debate, but by providing an index of the wealth of 
Lancashire cotton producers, figure 11.2 provides support for the proposed consensus 
view that `bimetallic opinion in Lancashire rose and fell with the business 'cycle' -' 
Money: the decisive influence 
The overseas value of the pound has been identified above as the most important 
determinant of Lancashire's destiny in the period 1884-1914. Unlike other sections 
of the economy, monetary conditions contributed to the ebb of industry fortunes 
before 1896. In turn, they created the business cycle which, as we have seen, was so 
significant as a determinant of investment behaviour. Despite their implications for 
the cotton economy of Lancashire, cycles in the rest of the economy, although far 
from fully investigated above, at least had an opposite behaviour. That the national 
economy and its leading manufacturing export industry were subject to different 
macro economic influences was perhaps symptomatic of a wider and continuing 
conflict between the interests of manufacturing and finance capital. 
ss Howe, `Bimetallism', p. 380. 
56 MCRL M461, Finance Committee minutes, Minute book no. 1; analysis of 
customer ledgers, 30 November, 1890. 
-1' Green, ` The bimetallic controversy', p. 674. 
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There were few major changes in the structure of supply and demand 
conditions facing the industry 1830-1914, these remaining highly price inelastic 
throughout the period. On the other hand, high income elasticity of demand was 
consistently significant. In this respect, the growth in world trade was important to 
Lancashire. However, investor confidence was governed by a linked but different 
motive; the rate of inflation and the overseas value of the pound, and, to a lesser 
extent, the profitability of cotton enterprises. 
It has been noted already that the shares of ring spinning companies suffered 
relatively little loss in value during the early 1890s (chapter 4). The question might 
be asked, given that this was the case, that sales were being lost primarily to the low 
quality Indian market, and that Lancashire remained unintegrated with the wider 
economy in terms of the perceived availability of alternative investment opportunities, 
why did investors fail to support new ring spinning concerns during this period? The 
answer must be, in part, connected with lack of confidence in the future of the 
industry and the apparent riskiness of the alternative technology. Like mule spinners, 
ring spinners were selling into a commodity market and were thereby subjected to the 
same negative influences in the early 1890s. Vertical integration was only important 
in the sense that lack of confidence in export markets fed back down the value chain, 
stifling investment in all areas. Had large sections of the cotton industry vertical 
integrated in the 1890s it would not have solved the problem of overseas markets and 
might have lacked the volume necessary to achieve efficient throughput and 
economies of scale. In the 1900s world conditions would have guaranteed the 
throughput necessary, but enough profits were generated in any case to keep investors 
happy on the basis of vertical specialisation. 
Technology and industry structure, which can be modified where necessary, 
have never been significant as long run determinants of competitive advantage in the 
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textile industry. As seen in chapter 10, some improvements in efficiency did occur 
before 1914, but the economies of scale realised at that time must have been at least 
in part a result of the higher throughput possible where demand guaranteed high 
levels of output. The shift from labour to capital was as important as rising efficiency 
in creating the profit boom, and in any case this was only in part compensation for 
the high risk associated with earnings variability. Monetary and demand conditions 
therefore remain the dominant explanatory condition. Modern multinationals, in 
taking decisions on the location of production, consider exchange rates in much the 
same way as the constraints and opportunities previously imposed by the gold 
standard. 58 Monetary conditions as an explanation of firm behaviour hint at a long 
run constant in textile history; international exchange rates as a determinant of 
industry location. As Britain's initial competitive advantages, associated with location 
and climate, were undermined by technology, this became an increasingly important 
factor. As entry barriers have remained low and cost conditions have become more 
similar, exchange rates have been important from 1880 and have become more so 
since. 
s$ John Ashton, the former Finance Director of Coats Viyella, points out that 
echoes of dependence on international exchange rates are found in the modern 
cotton industry. Multi-national companies such as Coats Viyella and Courtaulds tend to move production back into the UK if the international 
value of the pound falls below a certain level. 
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Part 5 
Conclusions 
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Chapter 12: Conclusions 
Epilogue 
As boom in the 1900s had followed the slump in the 1890s, a similar story unfolded 
after 1918. This time, as with many other industries, the short boom of 1919-20 was 
small compensation for the long slump which lasted until the mid 1930s. Pre-war 
investments, motivated as we have seen by rising profits and a shift from labour to 
capital, especially in the large new Oldham mills, contributed to a major problem of 
overcapacity in the 1920s and 1930s. As a result, Lancashire went first `under the 
hammer' in the late 1920s, and by the 1950s was `on the scrapheap'. ' As 
demonstrated in earlier chapters, it was during the years of transition from the 
hammer to the scrapheap that the second wave of technical improvements began to 
supplant the methods adopted and entrenched since the first wave of change in the 
industrial revolution. 
In a world of growing protection and falling world demand, Lancashire cotton 
was bound to suffer more than most industries? But such conditions had been faced 
in the past, especially in the 1890s, when, as in the 1920s with the re-establishment 
of the gold standard, the pound was believed by many exporters to be overvalued. 
If cotton investors learned from history, no doubt many held back their capital in the 
1920s and 1930s until they could anticipate favourable changes in world trading 
conditions. 
The joint effects of these conditions accentuated the problems of the industry. 
Overcapacity created a surplus of fixed capital which when combined with technical 
Bowker, Lancashire under the hammer; Singleton, Lancashire on the 
scrapheap. 
2 Wolcott, `British myopia', pp. 367-84. 
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developments meant realisable values reached very low levels. Simultaneously, 
adverse profit signals created a scarcity of the equity finance capital on which 
Lancashire had traditionally depended, as provided by the company promoter and 
local investor. Intervention, in the form of the Bank of England therefore became 
necessary? In short, Lancashire could no longer survive as a self regulating local 
economy. 
The above comments represent a brief and perhaps over simplistic outline of 
the decline of the cotton industry. This is as it should be, since the main purpose of 
the research presented has been to examine conditions before 1914. However, each 
sentence points out a condition which, depending upon how it exerted its influence, 
was critical to an understanding of the profitability and growth of the industry. The 
sketch of the post 1918 period involves a reconsideration of these dynamic operators 
but with changed assumptions as to their direction. Nonetheless, further research is 
needed in this area before extrapolation can be taken any further. 
A brief resume 
Below conclusions are presented in the approximate order in which the issues which 
are commented upon were first introduced in the above chapter structure. Issues of 
technology and industry structure, which were presented in part two, have attracted 
a great deal of comment. These are re-addressed first. Having presented our 
conclusions, given the amount of interest these matters have attracted, we then pause 
to review the economic literature in the light of the research findings. Conclusions 
are then extended to cover further aspects of the industry which have previously been 
neglected, namely the social processes of capital accumulation with reference to those 
evolving relationships between managers and shareholders which, in the context of 
3 Bamberg, ` The rationalization of the British cotton industry', pp. 83-102. 
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broader economic change, helped forge the special characteristics of Lancashire 
capitalism. The broader issues of relative profitability, efficiency and the world 
market are then addressed. Finally the importance of all individual aspects are 
assessed and re- evaluated. 
The technological illusion 
Based on a review of previous studies of Lancashire cotton, it was first established 
that the historiography of the industry became dominated by certain assumptions. 
Chief among these were that entrepreneurs were indifferent or antipathetic to `new' 
technology. In Lancashire at the turn of the century it was said that: 
, the average small manufacturer regarded anyone who approached him to 
urge the adoption of a new kind of machine with pity. He looked at you as 
a person with a "bee in his bonnet"'4 
In fact, the diffusion of ring spinning was found to be associated with product and 
geographical specialisation, and it was thus embraced enthusiastically in some 
districts, notably Rochdale, but not in others, notably Oldham. Traditions of throstle 
spinning, and the role of capital equipment suppliers and their acquisition of patents, 
reinforced the tendency towards specialisation. 
Geographical diversity and product specialisation were not, however, 
sufficient to guarantee the simultaneous introduction of ring spindles and automatic 
looms, despite their apparent compatibility. Although compatibility was established 
by 1930s, before then the crucial feature was technical asymmetry. Competition 
between continuous and intermittent methods of spinning had been a feature of the 
industry since the origin of factory production. The adoption of the ring reflected the 
tradition, and supplantation, of throstle spinning in certain districts. By contrast, in 
weaving the automatic loom was a step improvement, and a potentially far more 
4 Young, The American cotton industry, p. 137. 
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efficient machine than its power loom predecessor. Unlike spinning, capital 
equipment manufacture of automatic looms was monopolised by the overseas 
controller of the patent rights and was hence less supportive of manufacturers. 
Furthermore, the automatic loom was not available in Britain for thirty years after 
innovations led to the first British commercial ring spinning experiments. An 
important consequence of technical asymmetry was that innovation did not create an 
impetus for change in industry structure. Instead, innovation was directed piecemeal 
and incrementally down existing channels of specialisation. 
Thus although ring spinning was carried out in a significant and increasing 
minority of establishments in the 1889-1914 period, in other districts as well as 
Rochdale, in virtually all cases it was in vertically specialised mills producing warp 
yarn. Vertically integrated firms, albeit unconstrained regarding the deployment of 
machinery in spinning and weaving branches, did not adopt the ring spindle and 
automatic loom simultaneously, mainly because there were few commercial or 
technical reasons for doing so. 
Many discussions have presupposed that ring spindles and automatic looms 
were more efficient than mules and power looms. Needless to say, many of these 
observers were writing with reference to hindsight and the subsequent self fulfilling 
prophecy of mule obsolescence. Before 1914, the ring spindle was actually the more 
labour intensive of the two methods, a feature not normally associated with current 
or impending technical superiority. There was little evidence that the ring spindle 
possessed any such superiority in the years before 1914 and was unlikely to have had 
any great appeal to employers seeking to cut labour costs or circumvent 
institutionalised labour relations. 
In 1914 the ring spindle would require further improvements and adaptation 
before its superiority became obvious in British conditions. Its ultimate triumph arose 
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from its compatibility with new efficiencies in before and after spinning processes, 
not from any inherent superiority in spinning itself. By the 1920s these advantages 
were becoming more apparent and were obvious by the 1930s. But by this time, 
conditions facing Lancashire entrepreneurs had changed dramatically. Before 1914, 
it was true that the ring was more efficient in terms of its faster speed but this only 
provided compensation for higher labour cost. The ring spinning companies surveyed 
in chapters 4 and 5 gained from savings on raw material inputs, an advantage that 
would have been shared by other ring spinning companies. Although not all 
succeeded in translating this into superior profitability, generally the ring spinners 
were the best performing companies in the whole of the Lancashire cotton industry. 
Despite their success, there were surprisingly few emulators. Lack of 
confidence in the future of the industry in the 1890s and the apparent riskiness of the 
alternative technology may well have acted as a deterrent. Like mule spinners, ring 
spinners were selling into a commodity market and were thereby subjected to the 
same negative influences in the early 1890s. Thus, although the profits were good, 
abnormal returns to ring investors were confined to a small group of companies and 
cannot be taken as proof that ring spinning had developed a decisive and permanent 
superiority over the mule. However, when compared with vertically integrated 
companies which also used ring spinning, the advantages of the specialised ring 
spinners was more pronounced. This suggests that ring spinning was introduced by 
the latter companies as an extension of the processes of specialisation already taking 
place in Lancashire; an explanation consistent with the traditions of Rochdale, which 
would also account for the general reluctance of other companies to introduce ring 
spindles for the warp side of their product ranges, where, in terms of rewinding 
costs, no constraints existed. There was every incentive for entrepreneurs to switch 
to rings for warp yarn since the profits of specialised ring spinners were better than 
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mule spinners despite the latter having the advantage of cheaper transport costs to the 
weaving shed. To a varying extent, rewinding and transport costs were avoidable by 
vertically integrated companies, yet savings in these areas could not be translated into 
superior profits. 
As has been widely acknowledged, industry organisation was not a constraint 
on the diffusion or the profitability of ring spinning in pre 1914 Lancashire. Vertical 
specialisation promoted competitive advantage before 1914. Without specialisation, 
it was still unlikely that ring spinning would have diffused more rapidly. Vertically 
integrated companies did adopt ring spindles, but this did nothing to enhance their 
financial performance vis a vis their specialised competitors; an unsurprising finding 
given the technical barriers which still existed for fully automated throughput 
production. This was particularly noteworthy as far as experiments with automatic 
weaving were concerned, which, whatever their technical advantages, failed to 
translate into superior profits for the vertically integrated companies responsible for 
their adoption. These companies were faced with additional problems, especially 
when markets were uncertain. For example, integrated companies such as Horrockses 
and Tootals tended to find that efficient marketing and efficient production worked 
in opposite directions. Taken with evidence on spinning, external economies and 
flexibility associated with vertical specialisation were thus confirmed as continuing 
to outweigh those of integrated throughput production. 
The principle message of part two was thus that industry organisation and 
technology were perhaps less important variables than previously asserted and 
provided few answers in the search for the ingredients of competitive advantage. 
Parts three and four therefore concerned themselves with attempting to identify 
alternative aspects of the industry that might have been important in this respect. 
Different routes to profitability existed which were not predicated on technology and 
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organisation, ' although both might be important where other influences were also 
present. 
A brief digression: Some general lessons for the historian and the economist 
Institutional constraints and entrepreneurial failure are two competing hypotheses 
which have been advanced to explain the development of Lancashire textiles. Realised 
profitability, the main empirical ingredient of earlier chapters provides the means to 
reconcile them. Return to capital both measures competitive advantage and sends 
signals to investors, thereby influencing diffusion, but also creating a positive 
feedback loop of signal, action and response. Such are the dynamics of a market 
economy. Entrepreneurs perform a duty to the economy in two ways; first, by 
responding correctly to signals sent by the market about the relative profitability of 
different investment decisions, or alternatively, by correctly ignoring the signals sent 
by the market in the above sense when the market misinterprets the truth about the 
profitability of competing investment decisions. The second case may arise because 
there is a short term/ long term dichotomy, or perhaps because a constraint exists 
which, due to its current non problematic nature, the market fails to recognise. To 
follow the second course is difficult and involves high risk, which is why it is 
perhaps more akin to entrepreneurship than plain management. 
Yet it is impossible to judge entrepreneurs in an industry which became the 
victim of long run decline by such a definition using historical method. To argue, as 
Lazonick does, that structure and labour relations were simultaneously a constraint 
and non problematic is a historical tautology. Necessary remedial action is definable 
by the hindsight blessed historian and not by the entrepreneur. If, at the time the 
entrepreneur is supposed to realise a constraint exists, the historian also defines the 
constraint as non- problematic, it is difficult to see how the entrepreneur can escape 
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the opprobrium that has been applied in the case of Lancashire cotton. 
There are two possible ways around the problem. The first is to subject the 
constraints to historical analysis and make them `disappear'. To an extent the above 
analysis has done that by showing that the constraint was technical, not 
organisational, and that technological transformation especially on the basis of vertical 
integration was not possible before 1930. The response to such an argument of the 
school of thought that seeks to explain economic development in terms of 
entrepreneurs and constraints might be to reinvoke the constraint of specialisation but 
to argue that before 1930 it was non problematic. To disprove such an assertion is 
difficult, by historical method or any other, since the constraint is only redefined as 
problematic when the decline it is seeking to explain actually occurs. 
An alternative response, if one seeks blame, is to blame the market for 
sending the wrong signals in the first place. If one was seeking evidence for the mis- 
allocation of resources through market inefficiency one might well look to examples 
from Lancashire cotton in the period 1900-13, when a large amount of new capital 
was attracted to the industry at a time when arguably it was required elsewhere. 
Armed with cheap fresh capital entrepreneurs had the means to overcome the 
constraints had they wanted to, but deliberately chose not to. This was because 
different routes to profitability existed which were not predicated entirely on 
technology and organisation. Nonetheless, the mis- allocation of capital is an 
important hypothesis and discussed further below. 
Did ownership matter? 
A transformation of the industry occurred in terms of the ownership of certain 
sections during this period. In the earlier years, especially in the Oldham district, 
ownership was diffuse and individualistic, and in some areas based on the 
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participative traditions of co-operation. Family capitalism and paternalism was also 
important, and dominated in certain 'company' towns. Gradually these traditions 
weakened and new ownership interests emerged based on promoters, cross 
directorships, and industry wide federations. Previously influential small shareholders 
were forced to abdicate control to this rising class of financial capitalists. The trend 
was accentuated by the slump in share values in the 1890s, the pattern of profit 
distribution, and the increased institutionalisation of labour relations. Shifting industry 
value added from labour to capital and rising profits after 1900 attracted capital into 
cotton and also reinforced the position of the newer owners of the industry. 
Their entrepreneurial behaviour had several interesting features. Perhaps the 
most significant was their creation of business empires through personal shareholdings 
and ability to personally manage relatively large numbers of similar firms. 
Conversely they were reluctant to establish professional management hierarchies, 
which, although increasingly common elsewhere, were compromised in Lancashire 
by preference for individual, and not corporate, accumulation. 
Individualism manifested itself in a marked tendency to distribute rather than 
accumulate profit. In the Oldham and Rochdale areas, shareholders preferred high 
and frequent dividends, reflecting the co-operative tradition, continuing individual 
dominance of share ownership structures and the consequent undiversified risk of 
close individual involvement. For established concerns, the onus was on capital 
reduction through depreciation and repayment of loan accounts, rather than capital 
accumulation. This function was in the hands of the individual, not the corporation. 
Instances of companies raising new finance through second or subsequent share and 
rights issues were very rare. In the privately controlled companies, divestment levels 
were also high, even if in some cases in the form of directors' salaries rather than 
dividends. Dominance of promotional groups prevented the emergence of a specialist 
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managerial class. Whilst individuals used cross shareholdings and directorships to 
achieve considerable power and wealth, few corporations achieved the scale required 
to justify significant investment in the personnel, marketing and finance specialisms, 
characteristic of the managerial classes. Preparation of management accounting 
information for decision makers, was strictly limited. Financial accounting, and the 
monitoring of capital circulation between corporate and individual sectors of the 
economy, remained a dominant concern. Lancashire became dependent on the 
circulation of capital via the individual between previously established companies and 
the newly floated. For these reasons, levels of reported profit, upon which this survey 
has relied, were of the utmost importance to the contemporary investor. 
They were also of importance for the historian, facilitating comment on two 
crucial areas of British business history. These are first, the question of when and 
why capital was allocated (mis- allocated) in Lancashire, and the consequences for 
the structure of the economy as a whole. The apparent over commitment to cotton in 
the decade before 1914 was arguably a weakness, regardless of the profitability and 
success of the industry. Second, the contrast of the powerful individual with weak 
corporate organisation, generalist owner/ managers with the professional specialist, 
and loose associations of companies with fully integrated concerns, provides 
interesting evidence in the context of arguments advanced recently to explain the 
pattern of Britain's industrial dominance and decline. As the fate of the industry 
depended upon individuals and not management hierarchies, it is not surprising that 
cotton has been selected as an example for those seeking to blame British economic 
decline on the failings of its entrepreneurs and fragmented industry structure. 
Lancashire textiles thus contrasted with emerging corporate concentration in 
many industries in overseas economies. Such concentration that did occur tended to 
be under the control of the private rather than public company, thereby reinforcing 
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the entrepreneurial role of individual capitalists. Nonetheless all companies, however 
controlled, made significant divestment of profits which accumulated to private 
individuals. Reinvestment depended upon market signals and the willingness of rich 
individuals to commit personally accumulated funds. From the perspective of the 
entrepreneurial failure hypothesis, it was the character of capital accumulation, rather 
than the failure of a class of individuals that was important. Investment decisions 
were apparently sensible on the basis of the profit signals received, but because of its 
individualistic ownership, the industry could not be expanded on the basis of 
integrated, professionally managed, organisation structures. Under whatever 
circumstances, if any, vertical integration was desirable, the large amounts of capital 
under the control of a professional managerial hierarchies, that might have provided 
the impetus to such investments, had not accumulated in Lancashire companies. The 
strategic instrument, the centralised corporation, could not be created due to the way 
in which the profits had been spent. The lack of institutional capital accumulation in 
the industry was at least in part a function of the separate development of Lancashire, 
as an export led manufacturing sector from the institutional and investment priorities 
of the British economy as a whole. Ownership of capital thereby became crucial to 
the development of the industry, with profitability an important determinant of its 
deployment. 
The wider context 
Relative profitability was determined by demand in product markets, the allocative 
signals of the capital market, and the investment decisions taken by entrepreneurs. 
Profit signals sent to investors by capital markets, as confirmed by accounting profits, 
played an important role in determining the future of Lancashire cotton. The trade 
cycle introduced a dynamic perspective to these relationships. Thus when demand was 
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weak, especially before 1896, the profits of companies were depressed and the 
industry attracted no new investment. During these periods there were otherwise good 
opportunities for ring spinning and the profit signals from ring companies were 
relatively positive. ' Confidence, underpinned by share values on the Oldham exchange 
and by the ability of companies to sustain dividends, was undermined during this vital 
window of opportunity. In the upswing which followed in the 1896-1914 period, 
pressure was placed on capacity and all sections of the industry were able to record 
strong profit performances. Demand for Lancashire products grew rapidly in response 
to rising incomes in export markets. The period tended to coincide with superior 
share price signals for mule spinning and more of a profit parity between the two 
different types of spinning company. Whatever the circumstances of the trade cycle, 
but for different reasons at different points in time, opportunities for investment in 
rings were limited. The role of historical accident must be thus acknowledged. 
Having said that, cyclical impacts, especially demand in overseas product markets, 
would have caused problems for entrepreneurs whichever technology they adopted. 
Some improvements in factor efficiency were realised in the thirty years 
before 1914. In part, this must have been attributable to the higher throughput 
possible in certain years where demand could sustain high levels of output. However, 
the shift from wages to profits was as important as rising efficiency in creating the 
1904-7 boom, and the high risk associated with earnings variability meant that only 
high profits would have attracted the investment in spinning on the scale that actually 
occurred. Cotton profits were higher than elsewhere, for example motor vehicles, and 
hence attracted more investment. Efficiency gains, although slower than in earlier 
periods, were still similar to the economy as a whole. 
Supply and demand conditions remained constant throughout the period in 
terms of price inelasticity. On the other hand, high income elasticity of demand was 
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consistently important. In this respect, the growth in world trade was critical to 
Lancashire. However, investor confidence was governed by linked but different 
motives; the rate of inflation and the overseas value of the pound, and, to a lesser 
extent, the profitability of cotton enterprises. 
In the context of the world market, the vertically specialised structure of the 
industry was only important in the sense that lack of confidence in export markets fed 
back down the value chain, stifling investment in all areas. Had large sections of the 
cotton industry vertically integrated in the 1890s it would not have solved the 
problem of overseas markets and they might have lacked the volume necessary to 
achieve efficient throughput and economies of scale. In the 1900s world conditions 
would have guaranteed the throughput necessary, but enough profits were generated 
in any case to keep investors happy on the basis of vertical specialisation. 
In addition to the volume of production, monetary and demand conditions 
explained the trade cycle and were therefore a dominant cause in the development of 
the industry. The long run constant in textile history, commented upon in chapter 11, 
is the importance of international exchange rates as a determinant of industry 
location. At the time of writing, one large textile company stands ready to re-open 
four long dormant Oldham mills if and when the UK exchange rate falls below a 
certain level. Britain's initial competitive advantages, associated with location and 
climate, were ultimately undermined by technology diffusion after 1920 and later by 
capital mobility. As entry barriers have remained low and cost conditions have 
become more similar, in the modern world this relationship has perhaps therefore 
become an increasingly important factor. Nonetheless, as we have seen, the 
nineteenth century parallels of the British commitment to free trade and the gold 
standard were capable of exercising a dominant influence on the destiny of the 
industry. 
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The overseas value of the pound uniquely contributed to the trough of 
industry fortunes in 1896, and differentiated cotton from other sections of the 
economy. In that sense, the primary cause of the business cycle for cotton was 
monetary; changes in international money values caused changes in export demand. 
Whether or not this contributed towards cycles in the rest of the economy has not 
been fully investigated, but on the basis of the opposite behaviour of the national 
economy and its leading export industry, the answer is probably that it did not. 
Overall conclusions 
The analysis presented above calls for a reappraisal of the history of the Lancashire 
cotton industry in the thirty years prior to 1914. An exemplification has been 
provided of the circumstances where an export industry based on relatively small, 
specialised business units can work successfully where the necessary conditions are 
met; most importantly rising incomes in export markets, but also technical parity and 
the avoidance of currency overvaluation. In 1914, the industry was intact as a world 
leader, based on the experience of a century and a half, and a technology that 
appeared 'perfectly satisfactory for the purposes of sustaining that position. The 
pattern of development in the pre 1914 period suggests earlier interpretations have 
perhaps exaggerated the length and the gradualness of Lancashire's decline, in the 
sense that there were few symptoms of future difficulty present before the First 
World War. 
The signals the market sent to entrepreneurs confirmed the adequacy of their 
strategies of shunning alternative technology and vertical integration, no doubt 
reinforcing both aspects. That alternative technologies ultimately became superior 
could not have been foreseen, but vertically specialised production was not in any 
case a barrier to its introduction. The problem for Lancashire ultimately lay in 
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markets, not in terms of the accurate signals they sent, but in their propensity to 
suddenly and decisively alter trading conditions. 
Whatever the technical merits, profitable industries are rarely restructured, 
and Lancashire cotton would have been a surprise exception had entrepreneurs done 
so at this stage. Certainly the commercial and technical signals could not have 
suggested that such action would be appropriate. If the industry could have been 
restructured before 1914, then so it could have been after the First World War when 
it arguably became more necessary. Pre 1914 technical constraints have been 
identified and it was also noted that it was in the inter-war period that the means to 
remove them were fully developed. Decision making priorities of historical actors 
were understandable under such circumstances. However, their ability to control 
events was limited, and the importance of demand and the trade cycle requires 
emphasis once again vis a vis more manageable factors such as machinery investment 
choices and industry structure. 
Characterised as they were by their easy access to financial resources, 
emergent groups of capitalists might well have made sweeping changes to industry 
structure had they chosen to do so. However, although ring spinning was found to 
be in general more profitable, the basis of that superiority was an extension of the 
process of increased specialisation. All specialised companies, whether ring spinners, 
mule spinners, or weavers, tended to do much better than their vertically integrated 
counterparts in the period after 1900. 
However, considering technical issues in conjunction with characteristics of 
capital ownership, it is concluded that as the industry failed to attract investment 
when profit signals turned negative, for example in the 1890s, and attracted a lot of 
capital in the booms of the early 1900s, and that if any constraint did exist to prevent 
restructuring it was financial rather than organisational. 
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In short, the established financial, technical, and organisational structure, 
when combined with buoyant overseas monetary and trading conditions, created the 
synthesis of a profitable industry; when external conditions changed, financial and 
social ownership, technical, and organisational aspects of the history of the industry 
became important but in that strict and steeply descending order. Lancashire was 
highly vulnerable to the world market; that vulnerability was accentuated by the way 
in which capital was created and divested. In the above analysis, an attempt has been 
made to link the development of an industry with the process of capital accumulation. 
Generally, the social nature of capital accumulation is crucial to our understanding 
of the progress of an industry which brought prosperity on the back of the First 
Industrial Revolution, but which ultimately failed to respond to the challenges of the 
Second. 
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ppendix 2: Lancashire share price index 
1884 100 1894 47.4 1904 65.7 
97.6 43.5 69.1 
88.1 37.8 70.8 
92.4 39.2 81.1 
1885 83.0 1895 39.5 1905 81.4 
77.5 42.7 84.5 
73.7 40.1 81.3 
73.5 38.3 80.3 
1886 68.5 1896 36.6 1906 80.5 
62.9 38.8 81.9 
62.2 39.0 87.3 
68.1 48.8 91.6 
1887 67.0 1897 53.4 1907 97.7 60.9 53.9 102.8 61.1 53.1 110.5 67.2 55.2 113.5 
1888 68.0 1898 60.0 1908 100.8 68.0 64.2 100.3 67.4 65.1 100.9 68.4 73.3 101.9 
1889 69.7 1899 73.5 1909 99 1 66.2 78.7 . 98 4 66.8 79.5 . 99 6 75.3 76.7 . 98.0 
1890 72.1 1900 79.0 1910 95 0 73.0 75.4 . 9 74.6 74.6 8.0 0 72.2 80.6 102.1 
.1 
1891 66.8 1901 78.5 1911 101 6 61.2 76.1 . 100 2 61.6 75.0 . 101 5 61.2 72.7 . 109.9 
1892 57.4 1902 69.4 1912 116 9 56.4 69.4 . 119 9 54.2 67.6 . 122 8 54.6 70.6 . 123.9 
1893 56.9 1903 71.3 1913 125 0 53.5 69.5 . 127 1 50.5 71.4 . 128 3 48.9 69.3 . 127.4 
1914 131.0 
129.2 
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